FAS Note: This report has been superseded by RDD-7, published in January 2001.
“DRAWING BACK THE CURTAIN OF SECRECY”
RESTRICTED DATA DECLASSIFICATION DECISIONS
1946 TO THE PRESENT
(RDD-5)
January 1, 1999
U.S. Department of Energy
Office of Declassification
NOTICE
This document provides a historical perspective on the sequence of declassification actions
performed by the Department of Energy and its predecessor agencies. It is meant to convey the
amount and types of information declassified over the years. Although the language of the
original declassification authorities is cited verbatim as much as possible to preserve the
historical intent of the declassification, THIS DOCUMENT IS NOT TO BE USED AS THE
BASIS FOR DECLASSIFYING DOCUMENTS AND MATERIALS without specific
authorization from the Office of Declassification. Classification guides designed for
that specific purpose must be used.
Approved for Public Release
This document supersedes Drawing Back the Curtain of Secrecy, Restricted Data Declassification Policy - 1946 To The Present (RDD-4), January 1, 1998. This is the fifth edition of the document first published in June 1994. The Office of Declassification anticipates periodic updates to this document. This edition includes editorial corrections to RDD-4, all declassification actions that have been made since the January 1, 1998, publication date of RDD-4 and additional declassification actions which were subsequently discovered or confirmed.
A New Approach:The breakup of the Soviet Union, the end of the Cold War, and other national and international events of recent history have enabled our national leadership to reconsider the constraints placed on both classified and unclassified Government information. The Department of Energy is committed to an openness program under Secretary Richardson. The openness program involves a comprehensive concerted effort to declassify and release information to the public consistent with the requirements of national security.
In furtherance of this openness program, a comprehensive review of the Department's classification policy toward information concerning defense applications of nuclear technology was under taken in March 1995. The Fundamental Classification Policy Review was tasked to determine which information required continued protection, with the objective of declassifying and releasing all information no longer warranting such protection. Technical experts from the weapon laboratories and representatives from the Department of Defense and other government agencies participated in the study. More than 70 recommendations for declassification of weapons-related information were made. Those declassification actions that have been formally approved by the date of this document, any other declassifications that have been made since publication of RDD-4, and recently found declassified information from earlier years are included in this document and are identified by a vertical line in the left margin. The older declassifications are inserted chronologically in the appropriate chapter.
For the initial edition of the RDD series (RDD-1), a search of the Department's files for all previous declassification actions was made. The result of this search was a document which provided a compilation of information regarding the topics which had been declassified over the years up to the date of publication. This update of that document continues to provide historical perspective on the sequence of declassification actions performed by the Department of Energy and its predecessor agencies. It is meant to convey the amount and types of information declassified over the years. Although the language of the original declassification authorities are cited verbatim as much as possible to preserve the historical intent of the declassifications, this document is not intended nor does it provide the reader sufficient basis or authority to decide whether other documents are classified or not. These decisions can only be made by specially trained individuals who are certified by the DOE as authorized derivative declassifiers. Nevertheless, it is hoped that this document will help enlighten the public on the technical policy decisions that underlie the Department's formidable classification responsibility. Public input is welcomed regarding how the Department may release information of legitimate interest to the public, while maintaining control of information important to national security.
Historical Background: The first atomic detonation, test shot Trinity, on July 16, 1945, near Alamagordo, New Mexico, was a device developed and produced under the Manhattan Project. This was followed at Hiroshima, Japan, on August 6, 1945, and Nagasaki, Japan, on August 9, 1945; these detonations heralded the end of World War II. Immediately following World War II, the academic and industrial sectors of the country placed considerable pressure to declassify and release information developed during the Manhattan Project. It is well to remember that at this point in time there was no Atomic Energy Act, no Atomic Energy Commission, and no Restricted Data category of information.
In November 1945, General L. R. Groves, head of the Manhattan Project, asked Dr. R. C. Tolman to develop a declassification policy for the classified information which had been developed to date. Dr. Tolman, who was the Dean of the Graduate School at the California Institute of Technology and had served as a science advisor to General Groves during the war, selected a distinguished group to help him in this task. The Tolman Committee developed declassification guidance that was accepted by General Groves and published in March 1946 as a Declassification Guide for Responsible Reviewers. The declassification guidance for the year 1946 is based on the work of the Tolman Committee. The outline of topics used in the 1946 declassification guidance provided the basic outline for the topics in this compendium. Modifications have been made to accommodate additional categories of information which have been declassified since that time.
The Atomic Energy Act, approved on August 1, 1946, established the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and provided the historical and legal basis for its successor agencies, the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) (January 20, 1975, through September 30, 1977) and the current Department of Energy. Among other things, it recognized the need for the close relationship between the AEC and the Department of Defense (DOD), and has facilitated the approval of joint AEC/DOD guides containing classification and declassification actions for almost a half century. The Act also recognized that classified atomic energy information is of a special and unique type, identified it as a new and distinct category, "Restricted Data," and defined this category as all data concerning the manufacture or utilization of atomic weapons, the production of fissionable material, or the use of fissionable material in the production of power other than that information that had been declassified by an appropriate authority.
The first International Declassification Conference was held in Washington, D.C., November 14, 15, and 16, 1947, among representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada to discuss revisions to the Declassification Guide for Responsible Reviewers. As a result of that meeting a revised guide was adopted and published as the Declassification Guide for General Application, dated March 15, 1948.
The Commission established the Weapon Effects Classification Board in August 1948, to determine the proper classification of nuclear weapon effects. Under the chairmanship of Dr. N. E. Bradbury, the Board met at Los Alamos on August 13, 1948 and recommended classification guidance for the weapon effects area. This guidance was used to declassify certain items of information recommended by the Board.
The 1946 Atomic Energy Act was amended and enacted as the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. Among other things, the new Act modified the definition of Restricted Data to include "design" of atomic weapons and changed the words "fissionable material" to "special nuclear material." It also provided for the declassification of Restricted Data following a determination that such information can be published without undue risk to the common defense and security. In addition, this 1954 Act provided for the transclassification of information related primarily to the military utilization of atomic weapons. Transclassification changes the information from Restricted Data to Formerly Restricted Data and causes it to be protected as National Security Information except when it is exchanged with a foreign country. These different categories of information are all classified but have different security requirements based on the sensitivity of information in each category.
Information Versus Documents. In the discussion of classified matters, it is important to note the distinction between "information" and "documents." Information is regarded as facts, data, or knowledge, whereas documents or material are the means through which information is conveyed. When an item of Restricted Data information is declassified, that bit of declassified information becomes eligible for public release regardless of the nature of the documents of which it may be a part. A classified document will always contain some classified information, will normally contain some unclassified information, and may contain declassified information. Such a document cannot be released until all of the classified information is deleted. The declassification of an item of information may result in the release of an entire undeleted document; then again, the declassification may have little effect due to the continued classified nature of the remaining document content. Likewise, sensitive unclassified information of many kinds contained in a document may preclude full release of the document.
Public Release. The philosophy of declassification and release of information changed with the passage of time. In view of national objectives in the 1940s, literally everything concerning atomic energy programs was classified. Immediately after World War II, an effort was made to remove many of the constraints on information concerning nuclear chemistry, metallurgy, physics, etc. This was followed by declassification of certain information regarding nuclear weapons tests, reactors, materials production, and even some weapon design and utilization data. However, declassification of information did not necessarily equate to its public release. As scientists ascertained that certain information had been declassified, they published reports, attended meetings, and, indeed, spread the word about their specific area of interest. But, for the greatest part, the fact that information was declassified went only to classification officers whose duties required it; seldom did such action reach the attention of the public in general.
Customers Use. The publication of this compendium is intended to provide information about which the public may have been generally unaware. It is felt that many people do not know that there have been declassification actions since the beginning of the atomic age, especially since most of these actions were considered to be of little interest to the public as a whole and, therefore, were not publicly announced. The document at hand provides a description of the declassification actions that are known to have been taken.
In addition to enhancing the knowledge of the general public, this document should be of interest and utility to historical researchers and individuals who are interested in information security. Perhaps it contains bits of information which may add to the larger picture or even solve certain problems encountered. Its value in this area can only be assessed at a point in the future.
Explanation of sources. This document is the result of a search reaching back for over half a century. During that time, the records were maintained under three Government agencies with differing goals and philosophies. The files were also affected by several internal reorganizations, relocations, amendments to document retention regulations, and complete personnel changes at all levels. However, with the able assistance of those responsible for records maintenance, the voluminous data contained in this document was recovered from the files.
The declassification actions were gleaned from many and varied source documents. They included staff papers, minutes of meetings, action memorandums, correspondence, classification and declassification guides, press releases, and classification bulletins. While the declassification actions themselves are not classified, most of their source documents remain classified due to the remainder of their content. Topics in this compilation are quotes from the original source documents to the extent possible. Where an exact quote is not possible, the editorial adjustments made for clarity have been kept to a minimum consistent with maintaining the intent of the declassification action. Some topics may appear terse, non-explanatory, incomplete or inconsistent, but they are copied as exactly as possible from their source document.
Each topic is followed by a reference number indicating the year of the declassification and its place in the chronological order of declassification actions for that year. For example, 49-2 is the second declassification action in 1949. Some declassification actions contain only a single topic, while most are actions with multiple topics. In addition, many topics list exceptions to the declassification action. The exceptions identify information which remained classified as of the date of the declassification action. These exceptions are printed in italics in this compendium. In many cases, the excepted topics were subsequently declassified in whole or in part. These subsequent declassifications are listed below the original topic where possible.
As time has passed, many declassified topics were superseded by more recent declassifications. Early day exceptions often no longer apply; they have been overtaken by other events. For example, in 1955 the only declassified information concerning the Controlled Thermonuclear Reactor was the fact of interest in such a program and the sites where work was underway. In 1959, all information regarding this program was declassified. There are many such examples, but, in the interest of completeness, this compendium incorporates all of the declassifications uncovered.
Users of this compilation should note that it is possible that the files hold other declassification actions which have not yet been discovered. This new edition provides a case in point. Recent discoveries of a previously overlooked series of classification bulletins issued during a nine-year period from 1957 to 1966 provide many new entries. While not generally very broad, these declassifications do fill in gaps in the declassification histories of several programs. As additional topics are declassified or previously undiscovered declassification actions are found, they will be included in the next edition of the compendium.
Although this compendium contains declassification actions for weapon test yields where declassification documentation could be located, it is clear that not all weapon test yields are included. For those that are included, the quoted yields may have been based on early estimates that were later refined as more information was obtained. For these reasons, a better source of weapon test information can be found in document DOE/NV-209 (Rev, 14) dated December 1994.
This document has been approved and issued by the Office of Declassification (NN-52). Comments, recommendations, and requests for copies should be sent to the following address:
U.S. Department of Energy
Office of Declassification
ATTN: NN-521
19901 Germantown Road
Germantown, MD 20874-1290
It has long been the policy of the Department of Energy and its predecessor agencies to conduct as much of its research and development work as possible on an unclassified basis. This policy is meant to promote the free interchange of ideas essential to scientific and industrial progress while assuring that classified information is not compromised. To this end, guides have been issued to assist in the identification of the fields of research and development that are unclassified or have been declassified. RDD-5 provides a historical perspective on the sequence of declassification actions performed by the Department of Energy and its predecessor agencies. It is meant to convey the amount and types of information declassified over the years. The language of the original declassification authorities is cited verbatim as much as possible to preserve the historical intent of the declassification. In recognition of RDD-5's utility as the sole source for documenting certain declassification actions, all Derivative Declassifiers are authorized to use RDD-5 as a basis for declassifying documents and material. Because RDD-5 does not contain the detailed context for declassification actions found in guides and bulletins, it is intended that this authority be used sparingly and in accordance with the following guidelines. Derivative Declassifiers should use RDD-5 as a basis for declassification only when:
- - no other classification guidance exists;
- - the information being reviewed falls in a classified subject area identified in the Derivative Declassifiers current description of authority or in an area that has no potential of containing classified or unclassified sensitive information (e.g., commercial reactors, biological effects of radiation, uranium mining and milling, etc.); and
- - the declassification action identified in RDD-5 clearly pertains to the information being reviewed.
If there is any doubt as to the relevance of an RDD-5 topic or the availability of other guidance, the local classification officer, classification representative, or the Office of Declassification should be consulted. When RDD-5 is used as a basis for declassifying documents or materials, it should be cited as such. RDD-5 is the source of last resort when making declassification decisions.
The following is a list of subject areas which are, for the most part, unclassified. It must be recognized that there may be facets of each which must remain classified because of the relationship with nuclear weapons, nuclear materials, or nuclear propulsion programs.
- Basic science: mathematics, chemistry, theoretical and experimental physics, engineering, science, materials science, biology, and medicine;
- Magnetic confinement fusion technology;
- Civilian power reactors, including nuclear fuel cycle information but excluding technologies for uranium enrichment;
- Source materials (defined as uranium and thorium and ores containing them);
- Fact of use of safety features (e.g., insensitive high explosives, fire resistant pits) to lower the risks and reduce the consequences of nuclear weapon accidents;
- Generic weapons effects;
- Physical and chemical properties of uranium and plutonium, most of their alloys and compounds, under standard temperature and pressure conditions;
- Nuclear fuel reprocessing technology and reactor products not revealing classified production rates or inventories;
- The fact, time, location, and yield range (e.g., less than 20 kiloton or 20-150 kiloton) of U.S. nuclear tests;
- General descriptions of nuclear material production processes and theory of operation;
- DOE special nuclear material aggregate inventories and production rates not revealing size or details concerning the nuclear weapons stockpile;
- Types of waste products resulting from all DOE weapon and material production operations;
- Operations solely relating to the public and worker health and safety or to environmental quality; and
- Heavy water production technology.
These unclassified subject areas relate only to information that was once within the Restricted Data definition. It is obvious that many cover basic scientific information that has always been unclassified and publicly available.
This document addresses information previously classified as Restricted Data, and includes no information classified under any other information control system.
- Information within the scope of publications, "Atomic Energy for Military Purposes," by Dr. H. D. Smyth, and other accredited releases concerned with project information. (46-1)
- Information already published in scientific or technical literature which was developed outside the Manhattan Project. (It must be fully understood that the mention of particular subject matter in the Smyth Report or in the scientific or technical literature does not make it proper to release information beyond that which is actually disclosed in the publication concerned. Furthermore, unaccredited publication of classified Project scientific or technical information does not constitute authority for declassification or for repeated publication of that information.) (46-1)
- Methods of applied mathematics and computation if illustrated on declassified subjects. (46-1) Examples:
- Shock hydrodynamics. (46-1)
- Integration of partial differential equations. (46-1)
- General diffusion theory. (46-1)
- Theoretical methods for determining equations of state. (46-1)
- Chemical kinetics including application to ordinary explosives. (46-1)
- Theoretical methods for calculating opacities. (46-1)
- General theory of blast. (46-1)
- Methods of applied mathematics if illustrated on declassified subjects. (47-1)
- Pure and applied mathematics including computational methods, provided it does not reveal information classified for other reasons. (48-1)
- All chemistry of non-classified substances not directly involved in production or utilization of active materials. (46-1)
- Methods of chemical analysis, with illustrations on non-classified substances. (46-1)
- General methods of chemical analysis developed for uranium metal and graphite. (46-2)
- Microchemical and microscopic techniques, if illustrated on non-classified substances. (46-1)
- Basic studies of chemical effects of radiation. (46-1)
- Details of fission product chemistry, omitting reference to separation processes. (46-1)
- Methods of isotopic analysis. (46-2)
- Mass spectrograph method (46-2)
| (1) | Analytical procedures. (46-2)
|
| (2) | Special instruments. (46-2) |
- Other methods
| (1) | Analytical procedures. (46-2)
|
| (2) | Special instruments. (46-2) |
- Mass spectrograph and other methods of isotopic analysis, including analytical procedures and special instruments provided the procedure does not permit an accuracy of analysis better than 0.1% of the isotopic abundance for heavy elements. (Care must be taken not to reveal classified purity specifications.) (48-1)
- Physical instrumentation and chemical and metallurgical techniques provided they do not reveal otherwise classified data. (47-1)
- All chemistry of non-classified substances not directly involved in production or utilization of fissionable materials and all methods of chemical analysis provided these do not reveal process details by inference. (47-1)
- The basic chemistry of all elements if not restricted by the following topics: (48-1)
- Reactions used, or alternates reasonably employable, in the classified technology of classified materials.
- Modifications through variations in reagents, reaction conditions, or equipment of general methods already employed in a classified process.
- New procedures reasonably employable as technological processes for the preparation of classified materials.
- Procedures used, or reasonably employable in a direct way, as analytical controls in classified processes.
- Effects of Radiation
- Physical and chemical effects of high energy levels of radiation on matter, except for special construction materials and chemicals used in production processes. The values of radiation levels in production piles should not be released. (46-1)
- Basic studies of the chemical and physical effects of radiation but restricted by the classified information described by the following topics: (48-1)
| (1) | The effect of intense radiation on structural properties of reactor materials and all important accessory reactor equipment (such as graphite or materials used in the instrumentation inside the reactor).
|
| (2) | The technologically important effects of intense radiation on chemical substances as employed or reasonably employable in the extraction and purification chemistry of elements 90 and above in production and pilot plants. |
- All theory on the effects of radiation on materials except for theoretical recipes specifically intended to fit substances of special significance to the Project. (Care should be taken that classified experimental information is not revealed either by inclusion or by implication.) (50-4)
- All effects of radiation on all substances, including basic studies of the chemical effects of radiation, except where limitations are stated in the examples below: (50-3), (50-4)
| (1) | Electrical thermal conductivities, except for materials of special interest for reactors, such as possible refractories. |
| (2) | Hall effect.
|
| (3) | All effects in semi-conductors.
|
| (4) | Mechanical properties, except for creep data directly applicable to the design of reactors obtained under condition of pile irradiation or thermal effects in reactor fuel elements.
|
| (5) | Transition effects and metastable phases in general.
|
| (6) | Irreversible (metastable) effect on the crystal lattice, i.e., lattice disordering and studies of stored energy associated therewith.
|
| (7) | All experimental information on the changes produced by ionizing radiations of energy above 1 Kev and by neutrons on
| (a) | The extra-nuclear properties of beryllium, beryllium oxide, beryllium carbide, graphite and zirconium.
| | (b) | The extra-nuclear properties of all elements of atomic number 90 and above as well as their alloys, mixtures and compounds.
| | (c) | The extra-nuclear characteristics in fuel-bearing solutions, slurries or suspensions and in reactor fuel elements and critical reactor components. |
|
| (8) | The effect of radiation on the properties of solvents and other chemicals used in the extraction and decontamination of fissionable materials, although it is not intended to prohibit declassification of properties which are of no vital importance to the process. (Water is excluded provided conditions in reactors are not revealed). |
| (9) | Effects of radiation on the corrosion characteristics and heat transfer properties of coolant systems, although it is not intended to prohibit declassification of properties of basic scientific value provided these are not vital to reactor development. |
- Pure and applied chemistry including analytical chemistry of all elements except: (50-3) (50-4)
- Analytical techniques for the detection of critical impurities in liquid metal coolants.
- The quantitative aspects of the use of organic solvents, or complexing agents on elements 93 and above.
- Technological application of ion-exchange studies for all elements of atomic number 90 and above.
- Procedures reasonably employable in the technology of source or fissionable material or weapons, or the alternates or modifications of such procedures.
- New procedures, reasonably employable in the preparation of source or fissionable material or weapon components, or important to the improvement of the process.
- Analytical procedures critically important to classified processes, especially:
| (1) | The analysis for B, Li, Cd, Au and Hg in source and fissionable materials as well as in important reactor materials.
|
| (2) | The analysis for Li, B, Be, Na, Mg, C, Al, O and F in fissionable materials. |
- Important new extraction processes for uranium or thorium from either low-grade or intermediate-grade raw materials.
- Important new methods and processes for separation of zirconium from zirconium-hafnium mixtures.
- Overall details, flow sheets, diagrams, production rates, operating procedure and policy, engineering and construction data, of production and pilot plants making special materials for the Project.
- Special precautions taken in plants producing fissionable materials with respect to critical mass.
- The production technology of the following substances: deuterium, tritium, special high-purity graphite, fission products, polonium, actinium, thorium metal, uranium metal, the compounds UF6 and UCl4, the isotopes U233 and U235, plutonium and its compounds, and alloys, compounds or mixtures containing fissionable materials intended for use as fuel elements. This includes description of actual manufacturing operations, or reasonable alternates, and laboratory work from which the nature of these operations could be clearly inferred. Amounts of these vital materials less than certain established minimal quantities need not be considered classified.
NOTE: This does not prohibit the release of information on the laboratory-scale separation of the fission products from one another. Care must be exercised not to reveal information regarding the large-scale production of specific radioactive products of fission. It is not intended to prevent the release of basic physical and chemical work concerned with irradiation of materials which could be used for the production of tritium, nor the methods of handling tritium gas on a small scale.
- The use of organic solvents and complexing agents on all elements. (The significance to project technology of these agents and solvents should not be stated or implied.) Also refer to I.C.11.a. above. (50-3) (50-4)
- Basic chemical studies involving ion exchange resins for all elements, excepting plutonium. Also refer to the NOTE following I.C.11k. above. (50-3) (50-4)
- The analysis of source and fissionable materials for other elements, excepting those prohibited by I.C.11.f.(1) and (2) above. (50-3) (50-4)
- The analysis of source and fissionable materials as minor constituents of samples, provided process or other critical information is not revealed. (50-3) (50-4)
- Improvements in existing unclassified extraction processes for uranium or thorium from intermediate-grade raw materials. Major improvements should be subject to review prior to their unclassified use. (50-3) (50-4)
- Methods for the analysis of gold and mercury in source, fissionable and reactor materials since such data are already fully covered in the open literature. (53-6)
- Basic data on anion exchange resins used in chemical extractions. (53-6)
- Redox separation process, to include costs information, but not all technical details. (55-1)
- Information relating to the chemical processing of reactor fuels and blanket materials irradiated in civilian power reactors. (56-6)
- Information concerning chemical processes used in chemical processing plants at Savannah River, Hanford or Arco, if it does not disclose:
- Production rate data
- Classified characteristics of material being processed
- Production plant operating conditions
- Classified programs (57-1)
- All chemistry and chemical processing except that revealing the quantities and specifications of the materials that are produced primarily for military purposes. (59-6)
- Nuclear Data
- All nuclear properties of non-classified substances. (46-1)
- All nuclear and extra-nuclear properties of all isotopes except those prohibited by the following topic and in Tables A and B. (48-1) (Tables A and B are located in Appendix A.)
| (1) | Spontaneous fission of all elements of atomic number 90 or above. Number of neutrons released per fission and thresholds and cross-sections for fission induced by neutrons below 25 Mev energy in all elements of atomic number 90 or above. |
- Quantitative information on all thermal (n, gamma) reactions and reactions on all isotopes where Z is 90 or greater, except where the following nuclei are targets: (50-1)
| (1) | U235 for which no information about these reactions may be released.
|
| (2) | U233, U234, U236, Pu239 and Pu240 for which only the existence of the reactions may be released. (50-1) |
- All nuclear and extra nuclear properties of all isotopes except as prohibited by the following topics. (50-3) (50-4)
| (1) | The nuclear properties of U233, U235, U236, U238, Pu239 and Pu240 except as permitted by topics II.H.7 through II.H.10, II.L.4. through II.L.7 below, and Appendix B.
|
| (2) | The neutron absorption cross section of Xe135 for all energies.
|
| (3) | The absorption cross section, for thermal neutrons, of carbon isotopes, of their natural mixture, and of high purity graphite specifically manufactured for use as a moderator, except as permitted by topic I.D.1.f. below. |
- Yield information must be expressed only in terms of numbers of particles per fission and not in terms of partial cross sections, in case the particular fission cross section is not declassifiable. (50-4)
- Any information on neutron cross sections concerning carbon or graphite which does not reveal a thermal cross section of less than 4.5 mb. (50-4)
- All nuclear data except: (59-3)
| (1) | the partial cross sections of lithium and its isotopes (for neutron energies between 1 Mev - 25 Mev).
|
| (2) | nuclear data obtained from weapon tests which would reveal significant information concerning the detonations. |
- Partial cross sections of lithium and its isotopes for neutrons of energies between 1 Mev and 25 Mev. (61-1)
- General Physics
- Elementary theory of neutron diffusion and general elementary pile theory omitting reference to classified installations. (46-1)
- Elementary theory of neutron diffusion and general pile theory. (47-1)
- It is the intent of these topics to release only that information which is of particular value for teaching the basic theoretical principles of reactors and for describing the use of these reactors as tools for scientific research. This excludes the release of information on the design of small reactors. (48-1)
| (1) | The theory and methods of measurement of criticality and fluctuations insofar as they do not release knowledge of such quantities as the number of neutrons per fission. (48-1)
|
| (2) | The theory of control rods for reactors. (48-1)
|
| (3) | All theoretical methods of treating neutron diffusion and slowing down problems for stationary media. Care should be exercised that examples cited do not involve semi-empirical methods leading to the calculation of the optimum lattice structures of chain reacting systems. Furthermore, great care must be exercised not to reveal empirical constants or give too narrow a range of values when citing examples. (Declassification of any work carried out directly or indirectly for Los Alamos must have written approval from the Director of the Los Alamos Laboratory.) (48-1)
|
| (4) | The theory and results obtained from the sigma pile but not those from exponential piles. The theory of exponential experiments and the results obtained from their use for determining the design and operating characteristics of reactors must remain classified. (48-1) |
- Experimental studies of the equation of state of all elements with atomic number less than 90 provided the methods used do not reveal information about applications or methods of use of items critical in the construction of weapons. (50-3) (50-4)
- Theoretical methods for calculating opacities. (50-3) (50-4)
- Theory of blast in air but without reference to theory and design of weapons. (50-3)
- Experimental methods of studying air blast but without reference to theory and design of weapons, application or methods of use of items critical in the construction of weapons, or destructive effects of specific bombs except those already used. (50-3)
- All theoretical methods of treating neutron diffusion and slowing down problems for stationary media. Care should be exercised that examples do not disclose constants whose release is prohibited. (50-4)
- Reactor theory applicable to those reactors listed below1 including the calculation of optimum lattice structures when illustrated by values permitted under topics I.D.1.e., II.H.7, II.H.9, and II.L.4. (50-4)
- Slowing down calculations involving neutrons produced from the thermal fission of U235 or neutrons from non-fission sources. (50-4)
- The equation of state studies for all elements under conditions other than those revealing classified information. (67-1)
- Information on equations of state and opacities of certain materials not of significance to weapon design. (72-11)
- The calculated equation of state (EOS) data from theoretical models for certain materials (for Z less than 72 all materials; but for Z=72 and higher, only materials at pressures whose EOS data is not useful for designing nuclear weapons). (83-6)
- Information concerning Equation-of-State (EOS).
| (1) | Static data for Z of 93 and 94 at pressures equal to or less than 20 kb. (89-1)
|
| (2) | Static data for Z greater than 94 at pressures equal to or less than 1 mb. (89-1) |
- Metallurgical techniques, if illustrated on non-classified substances. (46-1)
- Metallurgical techniques for elements below 90 excepting polonium. (If a treatment of an element substantially parallels a treatment of a classified element, this must not be stated or implied.) (48-1)
- Ceramics without reference to uranium or plutonium production. (46-1)
- Ceramic techniques except as prohibited by the following topics. (48-1)
| (1) | The use of particular ceramic materials in the production or utilization of fissionable materials.
|
| (2) | The development or manufacture of new ceramic materials specifically designed for the production or utilization of fissionable materials. |
- Physical instrumentation and chemical and metallurgical techniques provided they do not reveal otherwise classified data. (47-1)
- Physical and process metallurgy and fabricating techniques of elements 89 and below. (This permits the declassification of metallurgical techniques, even if the treatment substantially parallels the metallurgy of an element above 89, provided this parallel is not stated or implied.)2 (50-4)
- The physical metallurgy of elements 90 and above excepting uranium (but see I.E.6 below) and plutonium2. (50-4)
- The following items of physical metallurgy of uranium.2 (50-3) (50-4)
- Thermodynamic data and phase diagrams, unless of critical technological significance.
- Crystal structures of all metal and alloy phases except data on changes in the extra-nuclear characteristics produced by ionizing radiations of energy above 1 Kev and by neutrons on fuel bearing solutions, slurries or suspensions and on reactor fuel elements and critical reactor components.
- Physical and mechanical properties, such as density, thermal expansion, melting point, elasticity, electrical and thermal conductivities, magnetic properties, self diffusion, etc. (Care must be taken that anisotropic effects important in reactor technology are not revealed.)
- Deformation mechanisms of single crystals.
- All information in the field of ceramics, whether of a fundamental or applied character except ceramic substances which are specifically developed for the production or technological use of fissionable materials. (This topic is not intended to restrict unclassified development of high temperature ceramics for power piles or other devices.) (50-3) (50-4)
- The use of MgO crucibles having a capacity of 50cc or less for metallurgical studies provided that this does not disclose the purity specifications required for uranium or plutonium technologies. (50-3) (50-4)
- Non-critical fabricating techniques of elements 90 and above, excluding plutonium. (53-6)
- Physical instrumentation which may be of use in the laboratory practices of the country. Care should be taken that the motivation for developing the instruments and the applications for which they were used should be disclosed only when the application itself is declassified. (46-1)
Examples:
| - | Counters. |
| - | Ionization chambers. |
| - | Energy-insensitive neutron detectors. |
| - | Mass spectrographs. |
| - | Electronic circuits. |
| - | Electric controls and circuits of all kinds. |
| - | Cyclotrons, Van de Graaff and other ion accelerators. |
| - | Special sources of neutrons and gamma rays omitting reference to their applications. |
- Physical instrumentation and chemical and metallurgical techniques provided they do not reveal otherwise classified data. (47-1)
- Physical instrumentation which may be of use in the laboratory or industrial practice of the country. (Care should be taken that the motivation for developing theinstruments and the applications for which they were used are disclosed only when the application itself is declassified.) (48-1)
Examples:
| - | Counters |
| - | Ionization Chambers |
| - | Neutron detectors including fission chambers used for this purpose. (Care must be exercised not to reveal classified properties of the fissionable materials.) |
| - | Mass Spectrographs (However, see I.F.4. below) |
| - | Electronic circuits |
| - | Electric controls and circuits of all kinds |
| - | Cyclotrons, Van de Graaffs, betatrons and other particle accelerators. |
| - | Sources of neutrons and gamma rays and sources of neutrons, omitting reference to their classified applications and excepting production technology and methods of handling high intensity gamma ray sources intended for classified applications. |
- Mass spectrograph and other methods of isotopic analysis, including analytical procedures and special instruments provided the procedure does not permit an accuracy of analysis better than 0.1% of the isotopic abundance for heavy elements. (Care must be taken not to reveal classified purity specifications). (48-1) (50-4)
- Vacuum equipment such as diffusion pumps, oils, gaskets, gauges, and leak detectors without reference to application in classified plants. (48-1)
- The related fact that complex and bulky cryogenic equipment was associated with the Mike test. (74-5)
- Simple association or simple presence of any material (i.e., element, compound, isotope, alloy, etc.) at a specified Department of Energy site. (98-1)
- Basic Chemistry. (46-1)
- Basic Physics. (46-1)
- Extra-nuclear Physics. (48-1)
- Nuclear Physics. (46-1)
- Production Processes
- The catalytic chemical exchange, water distillation, hydrogen distillation, and electrolytic processes for the large scale production of heavy water. (53-3)
- The composition of the catalyst and the design and actual production rates for the entire Trail plant. (53-3)
- The design production rates of the catalytic chemical exchange, water distillation, (except for Savannah and Dana), and hydrogen distillation process plants and the electrolytic process plants associated with them. (53-3)
- Sale price of D20. (55-1)
- A reasonable sale price ($28.00 per pound) for heavy water. (55-4)
- All information on the production technology of heavy water. (56-6)
- The fact of boosting, the fact that deuterium and tritium are used as boosting fuels in High Explosive Assembly weapons and that they are contained in components known as reservoirs or cartridges which are shipped between the Savannah River Plant and the AEC weapon facilities, the military and the United Kingdom. (72-11)
- Fact that gaseous deuterium (D) and tritium (T) are used as boosting fuel. (83-2)
- The fact that the thermonuclear fuel used in the Mike test (10/31/52) of the Ivy series was liquid deuterium. (74-5)
- The fact that the tritium - deuterium mixture of the George test (5/8/51), the first thermonuclear test explosion, burned well. (74-8)
- Basic Chemistry. (46-1)
- Basic Physics. (46-1)
- Extra-nuclear Physics. (48-1)
- Production of critical materials; tritium (H3): Quantities up to and including 40 liters total. (53-4)
- Research scale methods for the production of tritium and helium-3. (53-6)
- The fact that the U.S. has a large-scale tritium production program. (59-17)
- The fact that the Savannah River plant is the center of U.S. tritium production activities. (59-17)
- The USAEC has a tritium production program which is centered mainly at Savannah River, Georgia. Tritium is produced in the United States in amounts beyond that produced incidentally in reactors. The operation of tritium plants and the handling of tritium involves the loss of a fraction of the tritium, some of which escapes into the atmosphere. There is no reason to believe that other countries producing tritium are more successful in avoiding a similar loss. The tritium escaping into the atmosphere may compete with cosmic ray and bomb tritium in atmospheric tracer studies. (60-2)
- The fact that tritium in unspecified form is shipped in containers or reservoirs from Savannah River Operations. (67-1)
- Distribution of tritium on the surface in the vicinity of the [Greenland] crash (excluding that picked up on aircraft debris) (69-2)
Enclosed Area1
(square meters) | Tritium Deposition2 |
| (Curies) : | (% of total) |
1.97 x 103
1.10 x 104
2.49 x 104
3.90 x 104
|
365
657
986
1337
|
27.2
49.1
73.7
100 |
1Consecutively larger areas corresponding to the fall-out pattern.
2Total out to the specified boundary.
- The fact of boosting, the fact that deuterium and tritium are used as boosting fuels in HEA weapons and that they are contained in components known as reservoirs or cartridges which are shipped between the Savannah River Plant and the AEC weapon facilities, the military and the United Kingdom. (72-11)
- Fact that gaseous deuterium (D) and tritium (T) are used as boosting fuel. (83-2)
- The fact that compounds of Li6 containing tritium are used in the design of weapons as TN fuel. (72-11)
- The fact that the tritium - deuterium mixture of the George test (5/8/51), the first thermonuclear test explosion, burned well. (74-8)
- The fact that the Contingency Tritium Production Program (CTPP) contemplated the possible use of commercial Light Water Reactors in the production of tritium. (89-2)
- Fact that tritium is associated with some unspecified pits. (92-4)
- The fact that some unspecified pits include or contain tritium, no further elaboration. (94-14)
- As part of the 1958 United States - United Kingdom Mutual Defense Agreement, there have been three barter agreements. The United States received plutonium totaling 5,366 kilograms from the United Kingdom under the Barter A, B, and C Agreements during the period 1960 - 1979. The United States gave the United Kingdom 6.7 kilograms of tritium and 7,500 kilograms of highly enriched uranium for the plutonium. (94-15)
- The amount of tritium in a reservoir is typically less than 20 gm. (95-5)
- “Mint” was the material nickname for tritium. (96-2)
- For the palladium diffusion process - detailed sequence of operations, including times, temperatures, or pressures used for primary separation where the nominal conditions are: a temperature of 400 °C, atmospheric pressure, and a nominal throughput rate of less than 5 standard litres per minute, provided accurate production rate of tritium (T) is not revealed. (98-14)
- For the Thermal Cycling and Absorption Process (TCAP) - detailed (quantitative) sequence of operations (processing parameters), including, but not limited to, times, temperatures, or pressures, where: the nominal temperature range is from -50 to 150 °C, operating pressures range from atmospheric to 8 atmospheres, nominal throughput is 0.5 standard litres per minute, provided accurate production rate of T is not revealed. (98-14)
- For the thermal diffusion process - detailed (quantitative) sequence of operations, including temperature, pressure, or times of operation used for the thermal diffusion column, where: the nominal temperature range is 1000 °C, nominal pressure is atmospheric, and nominal throughput is 0.1 standard litres per minute, provided accurate production rate of T is not revealed. (98-14)
- For tritium transfer and storage by the metal hydride process - times, temperatures, or pressures used in metal hydride or other systems for general storing and pumping of tritium, if the nominal temperatures range from -50 to 500 °C, and nominal pressures are from 0 to 2.5 atmospheres providing inventories in storage beds can not be determined. (98-14)
- Basic Chemistry. (46-1)
- Basic Physics. (46-1)
- Extra-nuclear Physics. (48-1)
- Metallurgy. (46-1)
- Nuclear Physics. Classification will be retained, for the present, on all data pertaining to applications for beryllium in a production pile. (46-1)
- Nuclear Physics. (48-1)
- Mere fact that beryllium may be used in weapons. (57-10)
- Quantity of Be used outside the nuclear assembly systems. (67-1)
- The total quantity of Be used in the nuclear weapons program. (67-1)
- The mere fact that Be is used in the nuclear assembly system of designated weapons. (72-11)
- Basic Chemistry. (46-1)
- Basic Physics. (46-1)
- Extra-nuclear Physics. (48-1)
- Nuclear Physics. (46-1)
- The fact that a polonium-beryllium initiator is used in the 280 mm and 8" gun-type nuclear weapons. (64-5)
- Fact that Po-210 is used in weapon initiators. (67-1)
- Basic Chemistry. (46-1)
- Metallurgy. (46-1)
- Basic Physics. (46-1)
- Extra-nuclear Physics. (48-1)
- Nuclear Physics (See Appendix A, for declassified nuclear properties of thorium and its isotopes) (48-1)
- The sale price for thorium in billets -- $25.00 per Kg, and any proposed changes in the sale price of thorium. (55-4)
- The general process technology for reducing either uranium or thorium compounds to metal and for preparing uranium or thorium alloys. (56-6)
- All details of imports of uranium and thorium ores and concentrates. (60-5)
- Basic Chemistry. (46-1)
- Basic Physics. (46-1)
- Extra-nuclear Physics. (48-1)
- Nuclear Physics. (See Appendix A, for declassified nuclear properties of protactinium and its isotopes) (46-1) (48-1)
- Basic Chemistry. (46-1)
- General methods of chemical analysis developed for uranium metal and graphite. (46-2)
- Metallurgy. (46-1)
- Basic Physics. (46-1)
- Extra-nuclear Physics. (48-1)
- Nuclear Physics. (See Appendix A, for declassified nuclear properties of uranium and its isotopes) (48-1)
- The value of the thermal fission cross section of natural uranium and U235 released without any restriction as to accuracy of measurements. (50-1)
- All nuclear and extra nuclear properties of all isotopes except as prohibited by the following topics. (50-3) (50-4)
- The nuclear properties of U233, U235, U236, U238, Pu239, and Pu240 except as permitted by topics II.H.7 through II.H.10 and II.L.5. through II.L.7 below and Appendix B.
- The following properties concerning U233, U235, U236, U238, Pu239, and Pu240. (50-4)
- Existence, exact mass, spin, and moment.
- Method of formation of isotope insofar as this does not disclose classified nuclear constants otherwise prohibited.
- Charged particle and gamma ray reactions involving these isotopes at all energies.
- Details of neutron reactions (including fission and scattering) involving these isotopes above 25 Mev.
- Details of neutron induced trans-mutations involving these isotopes for all energies (including isotopic changes but not fission or capture).
- Spontaneous disintegration properties other than spontaneous fission.
- Spontaneous fission properties, except in the case of U236 and Pu240 for which only the existence of spontaneous fission may be admitted.
| (1) | The spontaneous fission properties of Pu240 and U236 with the exception of data on neutron emission in the spontaneous fission of U236 and Pu240. (53-5) |
- Fission Process. See topic II.H.10. below.
- The existence but not the magnitude of the (n,
) cross section in U233, U236, Pu239, and Pu240. (50-4)
- That information for natural uranium and the isotopes U235 and U238 specified in Appendix B as well as the following information. (50-4)
- The neutron fission cross section of natural uranium over the range 0.7 to 5 Mev.
- The energy spectrum of fission neutrons from thermal fission of U235.
- The following information may be declassified concerning the fission process of U233, U235, U236, U238, Pu239, and Pu240, however initiated: (50-4)
- Energies and momenta of related fission fragments (including ternary and quaternary fission).
- Energies, angular distributions and numbers per fission of protons, alpha particles and prompt gamma rays; and relative yields and energies of delayed neutrons.
- Frequency of occurrence of ternary and quaternary fission and angular distribution of fragments.
NOTE: Yield information must be expressed only in terms of numbers of particles per fission and not in terms of partial cross sections in case the particular fission cross section is not declassifiable.
- U308 costs. (55-1)
- Sale price of uranium containing up to 20% U235. (55-1)
- A reasonable sale price ($40.00 per Kg.) for normal uranium metal in billet form. (55-4)
- A price ($25.00 per gram of contained U-235) for uranium enriched to 20%U235. (55-4)
- Information concerning U.S. total ore production and approximate uranium production of the free world. (56-4)
- The charges for enriched uranium of various degrees of enrichment. (56-5)
- The fuel value of $16 per gram for U233 metal. (56-5)
- The general process technology for reducing either uranium or thorium compounds to metal and for preparing uranium or thorium alloys. (56-6)
- Information on over-all uranium ore reserves and uranium ore and ore concentrate production statistics. (56-6)
- The 40,000 kg of U235 allocated by the President to peaceful applications is unclassified. (57-1)
- Typical analysis of impurities found in normal uranium metal. This applies to metal used in the Civilian Application Program; it does not change the rules for the production reactor program. (57-8)
- Existence of uranium of approximately 0.22 ± 0.02 wt. % U235 and information that may be derived by analysis of this material by any means whatsoever. (58-1)
- That material of assay above 0.22 ± 0.02 wt. % U235 if specifically requested by a user. (58-1)
- The schedule of charges and buy-back prices of depleted uranium, or any modifications thereof which do not reveal AEC production costs. (58-3)
- Feed material technology: (60-5)
- High-alpha temperature range forming processes (600-1200 F) such as rolling and extrusion.
- Beta heat treating
- Technical efforts on development of new standard operating procedures for the above when carried on in specific equipment for production.
- All information concerning the conversion of ore concentrates to uranium metal at the Destrehan Street, St. Louis and the Weldon Spring, Mo. feed materials facilities. Maintain as classified technological details concerning the process used at Fernald. This declassification does not include production rates for years prior to 1955. (58-12)
- Past and current production rates or capacities concerning these same facilities for the production of uranium metal and intermediate compounds. (58-12)
- The fact that the Commission is stockpiling uranium ore concentrates. (59-13)
- Statistics on the production and procurement of U3O8. (59-14)
- Use in weapons of normal, depleted or fully enriched uranium and the identification of the fissionable materials used in a specific fission weapon. (59-16)
- All details of imports of uranium and thorium ores and concentrates (60-5)
- The existence of 97.5% highly enriched uranium (HEU); the fact that it is produced at the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant for use in weapons research and development; and the fact that it may be used in a device for NTS test. (62-1)
- Fact of use in specified or unspecified weapons of normal uranium or depleted uranium of any assay. (67-1)
- Uranium-zirconium hydride reactor technology (SNAP). (72-3)
- The quantity of depleted uranium on-site and processed at Rocky Flats, as represented by periodic inventory data and processing totals, as long as weapons design, production rate or quantities, or other classified information that is protected by classified inventory data is not revealed. (94-6)
- The historical (1952 - 1993) annual inventory difference for plutonium and highly enriched uranium at Rocky Flats. (94-7)
- The historical (1947 - 1993) annual inventory difference for highly enriched uranium at the Y-12 plant. (94-8)
- The fact that intermediate enrichments of uranium are used in U.S. nuclear weapons. (94-10)
- The amount of uranium element that was enriched by the Portsmouth and K-25 Gaseous Diffusion Plants to above 20 percent in U235. (94-10)
- The total Y-12 highly enriched uranium inventory as of December 31, 1993 in terms of the quantity of uranium element enriched to above 20 percent in U235. Also declassified is the maximum amount of enriched uranium stored at the Y-12 plant in the past. (94-10)
- The total current Portsmouth uranium inventory enriched to 20 percent U235 and above, expressed in terms of uranium element. (94-10)
- The Rocky Flats Plant current total uranium inventory enriched to over 20 percent, provided quantities in weapons components or other classified data is not revealed. (94-10)
Note: Declassified uranium inventory quantities in the specified assay ranges may be broken down into any unclassified forms or quantities (e.g., uranium, metal, fuel, spent fuel, UF6, etc.)
- As part of the 1958 United States - United Kingdom Mutual Defense Agreement, there have been three barter agreements. The United States received plutonium totaling 5,366 kilograms from the United Kingdom under the Barter A, B, and C Agreements during the period 1960 - 1979. The United States gave the United Kingdom 6.7 kilograms of tritium and 7,500 kilograms of highly enriched uranium for the plutonium. (94-15)
- The quantities of uranium, actual or planned, from the U.S. nuclear weapons program, that is enriched to greater than 20 percent in U235, that will be offered to the International Atomic Energy Agency for inspection or used for other unclassified purposes. (94-16)
- The specific assays of intermediate enriched uranium (enriched to between 20 percent and a nominal 90 percent) that were produced for weapons usage. (94-16)
- Quantities of uranium element enriched to over 20 percent produced in any time period by the K-25 and Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plants. (94-16)
- The total quantity of highly enriched uranium element and U235 isotope transferred from the United States to the United Kingdom under the Mutual Defense Agreement from 1944 to 1996. (98-4)
- Basic Chemistry. (46-1)
- Metallurgy. (46-1)
- Basic Physics. (46-1)
- Extra-nuclear Physics. (48-1)
- Nuclear Physics. (46-1)
- Nuclear Physics. (See Appendix A, for declassified nuclear properties of neptunium and its isotopes) (48-1)
- The mere fact that spent reactor fuels are "blended up" and recycled through Hanford in order to increase Neptunium237 production. (62-1)
-
“Palm” which was replaced by “Birch” which was replaced by “Brandy” which is the material nickname for Neptunium (Np237). The association of any of these nicknames with either of the others is also unclassified. (96-2)
- Basic Chemistry. (46-1)
- Basic Physics. (46-1)
- Extra-nuclear Physics. (48-1)
- Information concerning laser isotope separation research at LASL. (76-1)
- Fact of use of UF6.
- Fact of disassociation of UF6 to UF5 as a result of irradiation.
- Nuclear Physics. (46-1)
- Information that sufficient Boron 10 is available for making counters can be declassified. (46-1)
- The fact of use of B-10 for hardening in unspecified nuclear weapons. (67-1)
- The fact that B10 is used for reduction of neutron emission. (72-11)
- Basic Chemistry. (46-1)
- Extra-nuclear Physics (No physical or mechanical properties of solid or liquid states of plutonium metal may be declassified) (48-1)
- Nuclear Physics. (See Appendix A, for list of declassified nuclear properties of plutonium and its isotopes). (48-1)
- All nuclear and extra nuclear properties of all isotopes except as prohibited by the following topics. (50-3) (50-4)
- The nuclear properties of U233, U235, U236, U238, Pu239, and Pu240 except as permitted by topics II.H.7 through II.H.10 and II.L.5. through II.L.7 below and Appendix B.
- The following properties concerning U233, U235, U236, U238, Pu239, and Pu240: (50-4)
- Existence, exact mass, spin, and moment.
- Method of formation of isotope insofar as this does not disclose classified nuclear constants otherwise prohibited.
- Charged particle and gamma ray reactions involving these isotopes at all energies.
- Details of neutron reactions (including fission and scattering) involving these isotopes above 25 Mev.
- Details of neutron induced trans-mutations involving these isotopes for all energies (including isotopic changes but not fission or capture).
- Spontaneous disintegration properties other than spontaneous fission.
- Spontaneous fission properties, except in the case of U236 and Pu240 for which only the existence of spontaneous fission may be admitted.
| (1) | The spontaneous fission properties of Pu240 and U236 with the exception of data on neutron emission in the spontaneous fission of U236 and Pu240. (53-5) |
- Fission Process. See topic II.L.7. below.
- The existence but not the magnitude of the (n,ë) cross section in U233, U236, Pu239, and Pu240. (50-4)
- The following information may be declassified concerning the fission process of U233, U235, U236, U238, Pu239, and Pu240, however initiated: (50-4)
- Energies and momenta of related fission fragments (including ternary and quaternary fission).
- Energies, angular distributions and numbers per fission of protons, alpha particles and prompt gamma rays; and relative yields and energies of delayed neutrons.
- Frequency of occurrence of ternary and quaternary fission and angular distribution of fragments.
NOTE: Yield information must be expressed only in terms of numbers of particles per fission and not in terms of partial cross sections in case the particular fission cross section is not declassifiable.
- Physical properties of plutonium metal which have little military significance but are of basic scientific interest. (53-6)
- The fuel value of $12 per gram for plutonium metal. (56-5)
- Information concerning methods for the reduction of plutonium compounds to metal for civil uses and for the preparation of alloys of plutonium (plutonium content 50 atomic percent or less) for civil uses. (56-6)
- Information on the fabrication technology of plutonium alloys containing up to 50 atomic percent plutonium. (56-6)
- Information on:
- The physical metallurgy and the mechanical properties of plutonium alloy containing up to 50 atomic percent plutonium, subject, however, to the restriction that no release of information on plutonium alloys of special interest to the weapons program will be made, and (56-6)
- The thermal conductivity of plutonium and its alloys containing over 50 atomic percent plutonium. (56-6)
- The $12-45 "buy-back" schedule of prices and the $30 single value plutonium "buy-back" price schedule and future single value plutonium in "buy-back" prices, which are not usable to calculate classified production rates. (57-3)
- Information concerning the metallurgy of plutonium:
- Fabrication technology of plutonium alloys containing up to and including 90 atomic percent plutonium. (58-5)
- Fabrication methods for laboratory preparation (up to about 100 gms) of plutonium and its alloys except as prohibited by the following: (58-5)
| (1) | All information on plutonium or its alloys of special interest to the weapons program.
|
| (2) | Fabrication Technology for plutonium and its alloys containing more than 90 atomic percent plutonium except the description of method used in fabrication of materials under II.M.15.a. above beyond statement of basic method used, such as rolling, casting, etc. |
- The physical metallurgy and mechanical properties of plutonium alloys containing up to and including 90 atomic percent plutonium. (58-5)
- The following physical constants of plutonium and its alloys containing over 90 atomic percent plutonium (the pressure not exceeding 10,000 atmospheres) except for information on plutonium or its alloys of special interest to the weapons program. (58-5)
| (1) | Melting point
|
| (2) | Density
|
| (2) | Number of phases, transition temperature, and thermodynamic functions |
| (4) | Expansion coefficients
|
| (5) | Electrical properties
|
| (6) | Elastic constants and sound velocities
|
| (7) | Magnetic properties
|
| (8) | Crystal structures
|
| (9) | Thermal conductivity |
This is intended to permit the release of complete phase diagrams, including metallographic descriptions, which do not reveal additional data.
- Information concerning the preparation, properties and use of plutonium alloys except the phase stabilized alloys containing more than 90% of plutonium which are of specific significance to weapons. (59-6)
- The isotopic content of the plutonium fuel used in the Plutonium Recycle Test Reactor and in the Plutonium Recycle Test Reactor Critical Facility. (61-7)
- The mere fact that "barter" plutonium is to be or is being obtained from the UK. (62-12)
- The isotopic composition of "barter" Plutonium obtained from the U.K. (65-2)
- Information concerning the composition and properties of phase-stabilized alloys of plutonium containing more than 90 atomic percent plutonium. (63-7)
- The isotopic composition of plutonium as now produced in Hanford and Savannah River Plants. (64-4)
- The isotopic enrichment of Pu238 when classified use is not revealed. (65-6)
- Revealing the general fact of existence of nuclear weapons which contain only Pu239. (67-1)
- The mere fact that delta phase Pu has been or is used in weapons. (67-1)
- The isotopic enrichment of Pu238, when classified use is not revealed. (67-1)
- The fact that reactor grade plutonium can be used to make nuclear weapons. (67-9)
- The mere fact that high irradiation level reactor-grade plutonium can be used to make nuclear weapons. (67-10)
- The fact that approximately 6 kgs of plutonium were involved in the Thule, Greenland accident. (68-4)
- Best estimate of the amount of plutonium removed from the site. (68-4)
- The fact that ERDA has an interest in the separation of plutonium isotopes by laser methods. (75-1)
- The fact that a nuclear test was conducted using reactor grade plutonium and that it successfully produced a nuclear yield. (77-4)
Note: Information on date, event, name, yield, etc. remain classified.
DOE announced on June 27, 1994, that the event occurred in 1962.
- Historical plutonium production information and associated rare gas releases for the decommissioned production reactors at the Hanford site for the period 1944 through 1960. (89-4)
- Fact of use of alpha phase plutonium in unspecified weapons and test devices. (92-3)
- That plutonium-239 or weapon-grade plutonium is used:
- In unspecified implosion assembled weapons or pits of unspecified staged weapons. (93-2)
- As the sole fissile material in unspecified implosion assembled weapons, or in the pit of unspecified staged weapons. (93-2)
- Special nuclear materials masses: That about 6 kg plutonium is enough hypothetically to make one nuclear explosive device. (93-2)
- Hypothetically, a mass of 4 kilograms of plutonium or uranium-233 is sufficient for one nuclear explosive device. (94-1)
NOTE: The average masses of special nuclear materials in the U.S. nuclear weapons or special nuclear materials masses in any specific weapon type remain classified.
- The total quantities of plutonium produced or processed at Richland. (93-3)
- The total quantity of weapons grade plutonium including supergrade plutonium produced at the Savannah River Plant. (93-5)
- The Savannah River approximate total post-August 1988 plutonium inventory. (93-6)
- The United States total production of weapon-grade plutonium. (93-7)
- The current plutonium inventory at the Rocky Flats Plant. (93-8)
- The current total plutonium inventory at the Argonne National Laboratory-West.
(93-8)
- The current total plutonium inventory at the Los Alamos National Laboratory and the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. (93-8)
- The quantity of plutonium involved in the fire in Room 180 in Building 771 on September 11, 1957, and the quantity of plutonium involved in the fire in Buildings 776 and 777 on May 11, 1969, as represented by inventory data, the amount recovered, the amounts allocated to other disposition categories such as normal operating loss, and the amount considered inventory difference as long as weapon design, manufacturing, material composition or properties, or other classified information that is protected by classified inventory data is not revealed. (94-5)
- The historical (1952 - 1993) annual inventory difference for plutonium and highly enriched uranium at Rocky Flats. (94-7)
- The historical quantity of plutonium produced for any time period in the Savannah River reactors and information that only reveals Pu production. (94-9)
- The quantity of plutonium separated, or otherwise modified, to other forms (such as oxide or metal) at the Savannah River Plant during any time period. (94-9)
- Plutonium quantities at the Savannah River Plant for any time period, provided other classified information such as weapons design are not revealed. (94-9)
- The total quantity of plutonium involved in all nuclear weapons tests performed by the United States. (94-11)
- As part of the 1958 United States - United Kingdom Mutual Defense Agreement, there have been three barter agreements. The United States received plutonium totaling 5,366 kilograms from the United Kingdom under the Barter A, B, and C Agreements during the period 1960 - 1979. The United States gave the United Kingdom 6.7 kilograms of tritium and 7,500 kilograms of highly enriched uranium for the plutonium. (94-15)
| (*) | - During the period of 1960-1979, the following materials were exchanged: (97-3)
Barter A:
Barter B:
Barter C: | 480 kg UK plutonium for 6 kg of U.S. tritium
4,073 kg UK plutonium for 7.500 kg of U.S. HEU
813 kg UK plutonium for 0.7 kg of U.S. tritium |
|
- The fact that plutonium combined with any stated weight percent gallium exists: (1) stabilized as an alloy in the delta phase in nuclear weapons, providing neither weapon or alloy nickname (other than Headwind) is specified, and (2) as an oxide in the weapons program, providing the source of the plutonium is not specified by weapon or alloy nickname (other than Headwind). (95-1)
- The sum of the quantity of plutonium at the Pantex site and in the nuclear weapons stockpile was 66.1 metric tons on September 30, 1993. (95-6)
- “Palmolive” which was replaced by “Birchbark” which was replaced by “Brandywine” which is the material nickname for Plutonium (Pu238). The association of any of these nicknames with either of the others is also unclassified. (96-2)
- "Olive" which was replaced by "Bark" which was replaced by "Wine" which is the material nickname for Pu238. The association of any of these nicknames with either of the others. (98-13)
- Basic Chemistry. (48-1)
- Extra-nuclear Physics. (48-1)
- Basic Chemistry. (48-1)
- Extra-nuclear Physics. (48-1)
- Basic Chemistry. (48-1)
- Metallurgy. (48-1)
- Extra-nuclear Physics. (48-1)
- The kinetic energies and all nuclear properties of fission products may be declassified except: (48-1)
- Slow neutron capture cross sections above 100 barns for radioactive fission products.
- The absolute fission yield of delayed neutrons.
- The fission yield of any of the isotopes leading to delayed neutron fission.
- Technology - Information on the laboratory scale separation of the fission products from one another, but care must be exercised not to reveal information regarding the large scale production of specific radioactive products of fission. (48-1)
- Data on techniques for preparing and handling high intensity fission product sources so that they may be made available for industrial study as well as for studies in fundamental science and medical applications. (53-6)
- Production of Critical Materials; lithium and its compounds: Normal lithium hydride in excess of 100 lbs. when associated with thermonuclear weapons. (53-4)
- Production of Critical Materials; lithium 6: When not revealing nature or existence of large scale production process up to and including 25 gms total. (53-4)
- Lithium enriched in the isotope Li6; Material up to and including 1 Kilogram contained Li6 total. (54-2)
- Lithium enriched in the isotope Li7; Material up to 15 kilograms total contained Li7. (54-2)
- Other normal lithium compounds. (54-2)
- Mere fact that lithium is irradiated at the Savannah River or Hanford plants. (57-5)
- 50 kg of Li6 is now [January 1962] available for unclassified research (doubling the 25 kg previously available). Up to 1550 liters of He3 may be released for unclassified use, in addition to the 1500 liters already declassified and made available. (62-1)
- Partial cross sections of lithium and its isotopes for neutrons of energies between 1 Mev and 25 Mev. (61-2)
- Any quantity of Li6 or Li7 allocated for unclassified research. (62-7)
- The fact that lithium, deuterium (Li6D, LiD) are used in unspecified thermonuclear weapons. (62-10)
- The association of lithium hydride with the weapons laboratories. (62-10)
- The mere fact that normal lithium deuteride (LinD) is used in unspecified TN weapons. (67-1)
- The assay of top product of Li6 production plant or the fact that this top assay is used in weapons. (67-1)
- The fact that Li6H is used in unspecified weapons for hardening. (67-1)
- The fact that Li7H or LinH may be used as mockup materials in the weapons program. (67-1)
- The fact that compounds of Li6 containing tritium are used in the design of weapons as TN fuel. (72-11)
- General description of the processes used or investigated for the separation of lithium isotopes. (73-8) (74-6)
- The fact that the device fired in the Bravo test (2/28/54) of the Castle series used lithium deuteride as its thermonuclear fuel. (74-5)
- The quantity of depleted lithium hydroxide currently stored at the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant or other Department of Energy facilities. (94-3)
- The production rates and quantities of Li6 and Li7 (amalgam or hydroxide) produced by COLEX, or other processes, and information classified to protect production quantities. Such data would include, for COLEX, but not be limited to lithium tails inventories, plant capacity indicators such as number of columns, trays, pumps, etc. (94-4)
- Machining techniques in handling graphite. (46-2)
- For elements of atomic number 90 or above declassification of those aspects of their behavior under neutron bombardment, of their spontaneous fission, and of the number and energy of neutrons emitted in their fission which do not have any bearing on weapons or production information. (47-1)
- Information that AEC projects have up to 1 milligram of Am-241. (50-1)
- New isotopes in microgram quantities or less may be revealed provided that their half lives are shorter than 6 months. (50-1)
- Production of Critical Materials; Helium 3: Quantities up to and including 15 liters total. (53-4)
- Certain production methods for uranium, graphite and heavy water. (53-6)
- All information on the production technology of the separation of zirconium-hafnium mixtures. (56-6)
- Fact that the ORNL Fission Product Pilot Plant Facility (F3P) is separating large quantities of Ce144. (58-1)
- Declassifications concerning yttrium : (58-6)
- AEC interest in yttrium (Y) and its compounds
- Centralized procurement of yttrium
- Identification of yttrium suppliers
- Basic research on yttrium or its compounds
- Identification of yttrium metal as a special reactor material.
- The mere fact that Cerium144 is used in the ANP and SNAP programs. (58-6)
- The fact that up to 20,000 curies of Krypton is trapped at the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant and shipped to Oak Ridge for radioisotope sale. (58-7)
- The association of yttrium in quantities no greater than 1 kilogram with the Aircraft Nuclear Propulsion Program. (58-7)
- Information on the use of Tungsten (W) in weapons research and development:
- Mere interest of the weapons laboratories in tungsten;
- Procurement of high density tungsten by the weapons laboratories;
- The fact that tungsten is used in weapons;
- The quantities of tungsten processed in the weapons laboratories. (58-7)
- Two items on the program for production of research quantities of transplutonium elements:
- Total quantity of transplutonium element produced by HFIR-ORO.
- Mere fact that 12 kg. of Pu239 has been irradiated in the SROO reactors for this program. (60-5)
- In connection with the program on transplutonics, the mere fact that there is or has been a high Pu240 irradiation and recovery program at Savannah River for the Hanford PRTR. (60-6)
- The fact that plastic cases are used in weapons. (62-10)
- Fact of interest in hydriding of fissile materials. (88-4)
- Information about mercury inventories procured for use in Li6 enrichment at the Oak Ridge Y-12 plant (or their value). (93-1)
- Size (area) of the amalgamaker system and its operating temperature. Included is the number and size of the amalgamaker trays. (93-1)
- Mercury/thallium information:
- The fact of use of mercury and/or thallium (Hg-Tl) in electrical switches in specified or unspecified weapons. (93-2)
- The fact of use of Hg and/or Tl in weapons, use unspecified, quantity per weapon unspecified. (93-2)
- The quantity of mercury or thallium in an unclassified component. (93-2)
- The total quantity of mercury or thallium involved in normal operations at a specified Department of Energy facility (e.g., production or weapon dismantlement) provided other classified information is not revealed, eventhough it may reveal that there are classified uses of mercury and/or thallium in weapons or production processes. (93-2)
- The fact that certain specified transplutonic isotopes are potential weapon -useable materials. (94-14)
- The sweeping process used to remove impurities from quartz crystal material. (95-4)
- “Pork” is the material nickname for bismuth. (96-2)
- “Pork Chops” is the project nickname for the irradiation of bismuth. (96-2)
- The use of engineered materials of construction in gas centrifuges: (97-2)
- specified glass and/or carbon fibers (filaments in rotor construction);
- specified aluminum foil (and other base material) alloy thin rotor tube liners;
- specified aluminum alloys associated with rotor construction;
- unspecified aluminum alloys in end caps and baffles; and
- unspecified ball bearings.
- The presence of and a maximum amount of non-SNM hazardous materials used in nuclear weapons or weapon components in the event of an accident or other emergency situations. (98-5)
- Physics
- Experimental and theoretical work on general phenomena of discharges in magnetic fields. (46-1)
- Experimental and theoretical work on ion optics omitting references to classified installations. (46-1)
| (1) | Experimental and theoretical work on ion optics excepting novel features developed for plant operations and omitting references to classified installations. (50-3) |
- Experimental data on ionization cross section etc. (46-1)
- Experimental data on high voltage breakdown in vacuum, insulator characteristics in vacuum, etc. (46-1)
| (1) | Experimental data on high voltage breakdown in vacuum. (50-3) |
- Electrical controls and circuits of all kinds omitting reference to classified installations. (46-1)
- Experimental and theoretical physics of the electromagnetic separation plant provided they do not reveal production details or processes. (47-1)
- Electrical insulators of high-voltage, high-temperature type, without disclosure of design details actually used and without reference to classified installations. (50-3)
- Experimental and theoretical physics and chemistry, engineering designs and operating performance of single electromagnetic process units without identification as components of the Electromagnetic Production Plant. (52-3)
Note: The AEC staff paper explained that this permitted the declassification of the following:
| (1) | Experimental and theoretical work on general phenomena of discharges in magnetic fields, experimental and theoretical work in ion optics, data on high-voltage breakdown in vacuum, characteristics of electrical insulators of the high-voltage, high-temperature type, research on
filament and insulator failure, and theory and design of magnetic shims. (52-3)
|
| (2) | Full design data on basic components of a single calutron, ion source, filament, power supply and heater system, but without revealing the exact system for drain control. (52-3)
|
| (3) | Design data on single magnetic coils including shims. (52-3)
|
| (4) | Full operating data on a single calutron unit (Alpha or Beta) but without identification as a component of the Electromagnetic Production Plant. Data may include ion current, enrichment, collector efficiency, and performance of magnetic shims. (52-3)
|
| (5) | Feed material chemical composition and recycle chemistry processes. (52-3) |
| (6) | Feed material technology: (60-5) |
| | (a) High-alpha temperature range forming processes (600-1200 F) such as rolling and extrusion. |
| | (b) Beta heat treating |
| | (c) Technical efforts on development of new standard operating procedures for the above when carried on in specific equipment for production. |
- General theory and experimental work for other methods of isotopic separation for elements of atomic number below 90, but see Table A. (Care should be exercised that the information released for non-classified isotopes does not substantially aid work on classified isotopes.) (Table A is located in Appendix A) (48-1)
- General theory and experimental work for other methods of isotopic separation for elements of atomic number below 90, except deuterium, tritium, special purity graphite, polonium and actinium. (50-4)
- Information about the "isotron" isotope separator experiments and theory. The "isotron" is an electromagnetic separation device. (52-1)
- The calutron drain control system (at Y-12 Plant). (53-8)
- The design of large magnet arrays (at Y-12 Plant). (53-8)
- The theory, engineering design, capacity, and performance of electromagnetic plants including high intensity ion sources. (56-6)
- Physics
- Basic theoretical work on reflux separation processes, without reference to diffusion cascades. (46-1)
| (1) | Basic theoretical work on reflux separation processes without specific reference to diffusion cascades. (50-4) |
- General theory of thermal diffusion in gases without application to classified installations. (46-1)
| (1) | Information concerning the theory of the thermal diffusion method of isotope separation. (55-2) |
- Basic theoretical work on cascade design, kinetic chemistry, and thermal diffusion not revealing production methods in the diffusion plant. (47-1)
- General theory of thermal diffusion in gases without reference to UF6 or the application to classified installations. (50-3)
- Chemistry
- Theoretical work on chemical kinetics such as was developed in connection with corrosion problems, but without reference to the conditioning of barriers. (46-1)
| (1) | Theoretical work on chemical kinetics without reference to fluoride corrosion problems or conditioning of plant equipment. (50-3) |
- Fluorocarbon chemistry and manufacture, but without reference to application in plants for the production of classified substances. (46-1)
| (1) | Fluorocarbon chemistry and manufacture but without reference to UF6 or to application or requirements in plants for the production of fissionable material. (50-3) |
- Fluorine chemistry, including industrial preparation, (but without reference to application in plants for the production of classified substances), except for the methods of preventing barrier plugging and corrosion . (46-1) (50-4)
- Fluorine and fluorocarbon chemistry and technology. (47-1)
- Design and construction of a fluorine cell plant and a fluorine packaging, storage, and compression plant. (50-3)
- Analytical methods for materials used in the gaseous diffusion plant except insofar as they may reveal plant practice and production. (50-3)
- Some information in the fields of fluoride surface chemistry and gas bearings. (53-6)
- Industrial Aspects
- The technique of plating inside of pipes so as to protect against corrosion. (46-2)
- Vacuum pumps and compressors without reference to characteristics which may be unique to the diffusion plant. (46-2)
- Bellows-sealed reciprocating pumps. (46-2)
- Special high speed rotary pumps. (46-2)
- Special precautions in handling process gas. (46-2)
- The fact of cooling the enriched stream (A-line cooling) in diffusion plants. (76-2)
- The fact that diffusion process pressures may exceed atmospheric pressure. (76-2)
- The fact of use of fluorine and chlorine trifluoride in the cascade areas. (No elaboration.) (76-2)
- General theory of centrifuge. (46-1)
- Theory of centrifuge, except that experimental work on, and detailed mechanical design for, the centrifuge method of isotope separation for elements 90 and above must remain classified. (48-1)
- The total annual construction and operating dollars in the gas centrifuge program commencing with FY-1971. (71-4)
- The fact that the Equipment Test Facility and the Component Preparation Laboratories are associated with the U.S. gas centrifuge program. (71-4)
- The fact that the U.S. does not have and has not had a gas centrifuge pilot plant. (71-4)
- The fact that the Component Test Facility is a gas centrifuge pilot plant. (72-2)
- The financial breakdowns of construction projects in the gas centrifuge. (72-2)
- The AEC total annual funding for capital equipment not related to construction for the gas centrifuge program for uranium enrichment. (72-2)
- The total annual operating and capital equipment funding for each minor contractor (the University of Virginia, Yale, and Electro-Nucleonics, Inc.) active in gas centrifuge work on uranium enrichment. (72-2)
- The following information concerning the gas centrifuge program.
- Pilot plant construction and operating costs. (73-5)
- Full-scale production plant separative capacity, separative work costs, and costs for construction and operation. (73-5)
- Information concerning the gas centrifuge program. (74-2)
- Rotor diameter studied through the pilot plant stage.
- Fact that upper suspension contained a magnet.
- Fact of interest in bearings other than pivots.
- Fact of interest in composite materials for rotor construction.
- Fact of rotor and end cap balancing.
- Fact of use of aluminum alloy.
- Fact of supercritical operation.
- Procurement quantities which may imply the number of machines in a pilot plant.
- Total power level required for a centrifuge enrichment facility. (76-5)
- Information concerning the gas centrifuge program. (78-3)
- The number of centrifuge machines in a plant of specified capacity.
- The approximate length of a production-class centrifuge.
- The electrical power usage within a centrifuge plant.
- The cascade service module.
- Information concerning the gas centrifuge Component Test Facility (CTF).
- The design separative capacity (50,000 SWU) of the Component Test Facility at Oak Ridge. (77-2)
- The total number of machines in the CTF. (83-7)
- The total number of SWU's (Separative Work Units) produced in the facility during operation. (83-7)
- The unit cost of a Machine. (83-7)
- Cost/SWU. (83-7)
- The nominal separation capacity of a machine. (83-7)
- The length of the casings in CTF. (83-7)
- Information concerning the gas centrifuge program. (85-5)
- The chemical identities and on-hand quantities of epoxy resins and hardeners used in the centrifuge program.
- The machine floor mount.
- The electronic lower suspension concept, including rotor levitation controls, to the extent now developed for this gas centrifuge application.
- Centrifuge construction. (97-2)
- The use of engineered materials of construction in gas centrifuges:
- specified glass and/or carbon fibers (filaments in rotor construction);
- specified aluminum foil (and other base material) alloy thin rotor tube liners;
- specified aluminum alloys in end caps and baffles; and
- unspecified ball bearings.
- Techniques of particle size and surface area measurements without reference to barrier construction. This information should be of a scientific character and should not include data from which information could be inferred as to the size of the particles used in barrier construction. (46-1)
- Specifications, performance data, and useful design features of compressors, filters, pumps, blowers, motors, valves, diffusers, heat exchangers, piping, flow meters or other process equipment when their release can be made without reference to characteristicswhich may be unique to a diffusion plant and without disclosing the contribution of the equipment concerned to the productivity or capacity of a plant. (52-4)
- Arrangement of stages in series ("badger arrangement" and modifications thereto). (53-2)
- Arrangement of cells in series within each building. (53-2)
- Total number of stages and cells. (53-2)
- Information concerning gas bearings.
- Some information in the fields of fluoride surface chemistry and gas bearings. (53-6)
- Certain information concerning the theory of gas bearings for compressible gases for both journal and thrust bearings, as well as some experimental work on journal and thrust bearings. (55-2)
- The theory, design, manufacture and operation of all types of gas bearings, subject to the restriction, however, that no release will be made on: (56-6)
| (1) | Features of gas bearing technology specially relating to the diffusion plant, and
|
| (2) | Specifications and performance data of complete gas bearing compressor units for use in a gaseous diffusion plant. |
- A charge for separative work of $30 per kilogram of uranium. (62-5)
- That independent work3 (and all data resulting therefrom) on the development of porous materials not developed for but suitable for use as gaseous diffusion barrier may be published without undue risk to the common defense and security. (66-1)
- Production rates of uranium enriched in the isotope U235 subsequent to January 1, 1967. (66-4)
- Gaseous diffusion plant separative capacity subsequent to January 1, 1967, or any portion thereof. (66-4)
- Information on separative work production, capacity, and associated costs of the existing and projected future gaseous diffusion plants, or portions thereof, applicable toperiods subsequent to January 1, 1967, provided classified technology is not revealed; and information on gaseous diffusion plant material flows and assays. (67-2)
- The barrier tube length for gaseous diffusion plants. (69-3)
- The compressor cost figures as a percentage of total capital costs for a conceptual gaseous diffusion plant using U.S. technology: (72-5)
Estimated Capital Cost Breakdown of
Process Stage Components for an 8.75 Million SWU/Yr
New Gaseous Diffusion Plant Using 1970 Technology |
| Stage Size |
Small |
Medium |
Large |
Shaft Power, HP
Number of Stages
Separative Work Distribution (%)
Capital Cost Distribution (%) |
1250
340
9
20 |
2200
290
20
23 |
4050
550
71
57 |
| Stage Equipment Costs (%) |
Small |
Medium |
Large |
Gas Diffuser
Gas Compressor
Compressor Drive Motor
Electrical System
Heat Removal System
Process Building and Enclosures Process
Piping and Valves
Instrumentation
Miscellaneous Systems
Plant Start-Up and Support
Process Support Facilities
Engineering
Contingency
Interest During Construction
|
6.1
10.6
5.5
13.8
3.4
5.9
10.2
3.3
3.9
1.3
11.6
3.4
11.8
9.2
100.0 |
8.0
12.0
7.0
13.5
4.2
6.8
8.6
2.5
3.1
1.0
8.9
3.4
11.8
9.2
100.0 |
10.2
13.4
8.5
12.7
4.8
7.7
6.9
1.8
2.4
0.7
6.5
3.4
11.8
9.2
100.0 |
- The rates of production of uranium enriched in the isotope U235 and the separative capacity of gaseous diffusion plants prior to January 1, 1967. (73-8)
- Information concerning the gaseous diffusion program. (85-3)
- All cascade uranium hexafluoride pressures.
- All cascade barrier and uranium hexafluoride temperatures of 240 degrees Fahrenheit or higher and all those below 240 degrees Fahrenheit if the barrier forepressures are 10 psia or lower.
- Cascade and stage gas-phase inventory values.
- Cascade stage separation factors, interstage flows, and power levels.
- Cascade side and top purge rates, and vent rates, total.
- Compressor blade angles and tip clearances.
- Fact of use of vented cavity seals.
Note: All declassifications related to the cascades apply to information generated since October 1, 1980. Corresponding information before this date remain Confidential to protect certain enriched uranium stockpile quantities and other classified information.
- The fact that U.S. gaseous diffusion plant compressor shaft seals operate on the gas bearing principle. The detailed seal design will remain classified. (92-5)
- Gas compressor nozzle internal guide vanes and their specifications. (92-5)
- Highly enriched uranium (HEU) production information: (98-10)
- Historic HEU production by assay
- The amounts and assays of materials returned to the gaseous diffusion plants (refeed material) and of cascade feed rates at the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant for the period September 1, 1971, through September 30, 1977, for intermediate assay feed. Note: This action declassified all historic refeed activities at the gaseous diffusion plants.
- Cascade tails withdrawal rates at the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant for the period September 1, 1971, through September 30, 1997.
- Estimates of special nuclear material masses in weapons which are obtained by indirect methods involving production rates.
- Information concerning the LIS program: (74-1)
- The fact of AEC interest in the separation of uranium isotopes by laser methods is unclassified.
- General descriptions of excitation methods based on scientific data published in the literature as of July 1, 1973 are unclassified.
- Papers dealing with fundamental science, including spectroscopy of uranium and its compounds, where there is no recognizable association with or application to successful isotope separation, are unclassified.
- Laser schemes for uranium isotope separation, where the processes do not show a reasonable potential for the separation of practical quantities of special nuclear material, are unclassified.
- Total AEC dollars budgeted for research and development in uranium isotope separation using lasers, broken down by installations, and showing separate identification of operational, equipment or construction costs, is unclassified.
- The fact that ERDA has an interest in the separation of plutonium isotopes by laser methods. (75-1)
- Information concerning molecular laser isotope separation. (75-3)
- Fact of interest in UF6 as a candidate for laser isotope separation.
- Laser frequencies of interest to three significant figures.
- Use of any form of cooling for high-resolution spectroscopy.
- Information concerning laser isotope separation research at LASL. (76-1)
- Fact of use of UF6.
- Fact of adiabatic expansion cooling by means of a nozzle.
- Fact of two-step laser irradiation of the cooled gas in the ultraviolet and infrared regions.
- Fact of disassociation of UF6 to UF5 as a result of irradiation.
- Information concerning the AVLIS process: (90-2)
- The fact that iron or other specific commonly used element is alloyed with uranium to lower the melting point of the uranium and concentrations of the alloying element at the enrichment facility boundary, provided feed or product concentrations or other classified information is not revealed.
- Dye laser system characteristics for Atomic Vapor Laser Isotope Separation and Laser Demonstration Facility that do not provide significant information about process performance or separator design. Specifically:
| (1) | For the dye laser modulator:
(a) The fact that the dye laser beam is phase modulated,
(b) The position of the modulator in dye laser chain,
(c) The association of a specific commercially available design with AVLIS. |
| (2) | The AVLIS dye oscillator design. |
| (3) | The following dye laser performance parameters:
(a) Conversion (copper laser to dye laser) efficiency,
(b) Dye chain power output for AVLIS facilities,
(c) Amplifier power gain,
(d) Dye temperature and dye flow rates,
(e) Dye chain pulse repetition frequency (PRF). |
- Additional information concerning the AVLIS process: (96-2)
| (1) | Unaltered uranium AVLIS product from demonstration system separator pod and from a production plant module during activation or operations;
|
| (2) | Unaltered uranium AVLIS tails from a production plant module during activation or operation;
|
| (3) | The quantity (mass) of uranium and the U235 assay in a uranium-AVLIS separator melt;
|
| (4) | The current technique used to address the first metastable level (state) in the uranium-AVLIS process and the identity of the laser system used to do so;
|
| (5) | The identity of the dyes selected for the dye lasers chosen from a uranium-AVLIS plant; and
|
| (6) | The general shape of the waveform, the number of waves, and the frequency of each wave used to drive the electro-optic modulator for the dye laser chains. |
- The materials of construction used for AVLIS separator parts, not identifying the choice of material used for a specific part. (98-6)
- The process laser power or powers (power balance between process wavelengths) required for or delivered to a uranium separator module. (98-7)
- Information concerning an AVLIS Production Plant: (98-8)
| | (1) | Actual or demonstrated values of energy per SWU for a production stage or separator module, or for a production facility; |
| | (2) | Actual or demonstrated values of the cost of separative work for a production facility; and |
| | (3) | Actual or demonstrated values of the separative or SWU capacity of a plant separator or separator module. |
- Non-critical details for constructing production and pilot plants if they are similar to ordinary plant construction. (53-6)
- All information relating to the thermal diffusion method of separating uranium isotopes. (56-6)
- Research and development work on any method of isotope separation (other than gaseous diffusion and gas centrifuge) (unless declassified by the Commission) would be unclassified as long as the Commission is satisfied that the method does not have a reasonable potential for the separation of practical quantities of special nuclear materials. After a method has advanced to the point of having such potential, all additional work would be classified Secret Restricted Data until specifically declassified by the Commission. (67-3)
- Research on novel methods of isotope separation -- i.e., it is unclassified until it has a "reasonable potential for the separation of practical quantities of special nuclear-material." (See III.F.3. above) This policy does not apply to information and methods previously declassified by Commission action, e.g. electromagnetic and liquid thermal diffusion. (72-7)
- General description of the processes used or investigated for the separation of lithium isotopes. (73-8)
- Information concerning the Plutonium Special Isotope Separation (SIS).
- The possibility or fact that the plutonium AVLIS process will access one or more metastable levels in the excitation and ionization of plutonium atoms and that the wavelength range of interest for plutonium AVLIS is 560 to 800 nm. (88-1)
- The fact that the capability to use staging in the AVLIS process exists and is being implemented for the separation of plutonium. (88-1)
