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## CHAPTER 3

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# TRANSPORTATION SAFEGUARDS SYSTEMS

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### A. General Information

This chapter provides guidance for determining if historical records containing DOE/NNSA NSI, pertaining to the transportation safeguards system (TSS) are to be declassified or have their classification retained beyond 25 years in accordance with the provisions of E.O. 12958. ***Documents containing RD and FRD are not addressed by this document and retain present classification.***

Transportation safeguards system(s) refers to the equipment, personnel and procedures used to ship nuclear weapons, weapons components and special nuclear material between DOE/NNSA, Department of Defense (DoD), and contractor facilities. Guidance in this chapter applies to all such transport whether by the current Office of Secure Transportation (OST) or precursor methods, organizations, or contractors [e.g., U.S. Air Force Special Airlift Mission (SAM) flights, DOE/NNSA Albuquerque Shipment Security Section, Transportation Safeguards Division, etc.].

### B. Broad Guidance

The DOE recognizes the importance of declassifying as much information about its historic activities as possible. However, declassifying significant additional information about transportation safeguards systems could directly impact national security.

Nuclear materials are never more vulnerable to attempted acts of theft or sabotage than when they are being transported. Personnel and resources to protect shipments are inherently limited to those accompanying them. Therefore, information concerning routings, contents, protective equipment, and procedures, which would be useful to an adversary planning an

attempt to steal or otherwise disrupt a shipment requires strict control. Some of the equipment and procedural protection currently used by the OST is based on systems which have been in use for over 25 years. Therefore, historical records of transportation safeguards systems that are 25 years or older would have value to an adversary.

Information about shipment contents for nuclear weapon(s), device(s), weapon component(s), or military first destinations (MFD) is usually RD or FRD. Information on trip frequency, routes followed, and locations at any given time must remain classified as it relates to ongoing operations. Shipping documents are classified according to the information they reveal. For example, classification of shipping requests range from CNSI (for models, mock-ups, and SNM shipments not related to the weapon program) to SRD (for nuclear weapon shipments and shipments of SNM which would reveal classified production rates).

**NOTE:** The reporting identification symbol (RIS) used as identification does not provide protection of information.

Methods used to gather information about perceived threat(s) to particular shipment(s) or the transportation safeguards system in general; specific techniques used to collect information concerning threats to TSS trips; sources of information, not officially released, used to assess the credibility and level of threat(s) to TSS trips; and technical criteria, methodology and techniques used to assess threat(s) to TSS trips need to remain classified to protect ongoing operations.

Information is sensitive if it is uniquely related to transportation safeguards system operations as compared to those of

commercial carriers. Release of such information could reasonably be expected to assist individuals in disrupting or otherwise interfering with these operations. Information which would assist an adversary in planning or executing an attack, such as current design information and protective features of Safe Secure Trailer (SST), Safe Secure Railcar (SSR), and Safeguards Transporter (SGT) vehicles must remain classified to protect future operations.

Information revealing tactics and responses of the courier force to defend a shipment must also continue to be protected, as are threat scenarios and official evaluations of planned response effectiveness.

Most operational information concerning weapons shipments is classified as FRD because of its relationship to weapons production and stockpile information. Estimates of plutonium masses in nuclear weapons, or nuclear weapons components,

which can be derived from special loading rules for plutonium shipments, are RD.

Historical records, 25 years or older, containing DOE/NNSA transportation safeguards systems NSI not covered by the specific guidance below are unclassified. This does not include records containing information classified by statute such as RD and FRD (AEA of 1954, as amended). These records shall be handled, protected, classified, downgraded, and declassified in accordance with the provisions of the AEA and regulations issued under that Act. Reviewers who are not authorized by DOE/NNSA to classify or declassify such documents should not attempt final determinations. Refer to appendix A for information on identifying and handling documents containing potential RD/FRD. In all cases where there is a question concerning the sensitivity of the information, it should be referred to the DOE HQ classification office for a classification determination.

## C. Topics

### 3.0 TRANSPORTATION SAFEGUARDS SYSTEMS

- 3.1 All information concerning shipments using the TSS (current OST or predecessor organizations)

*NOTE:* Declassify when the information is no longer of benefit to an adversary.

**Retain  
Classification  
(potential for  
RD/FRD)  
[25X2, 8; EV]**

- 3.2 Standard operating procedures (SOP) for personnel involved in TSS operations

*NOTE:* Declassify when the information is no longer of benefit to an adversary.

**Retain  
Classification  
[25X2, 8; EV]**

- 3.3 Threat scenarios applicable to TSS shipments and used in training personnel for TSS mission(s)

*NOTE:* Declassify when the threat scenario is no longer plausible.

**Retain  
Classification  
[25X2, 8; EV]**

- 3.4 Design or performance information on equipment used in TSS operations

*NOTE:* Declassify when the equipment and performance specifications are no longer used by DOE.

**Retain  
Classification  
[25X2, 8; EV]**

- 3.5 Design or performance information on access denial equipment or operations used in TSS operations

*NOTE:* Declassify when the equipment and/or procedures are no longer used by DOE.

**Retain  
Classification  
[25X2, 8; EV]**

- 3.6 Plans and/or procedures used to provide security and safeguards to TSS shipments

*NOTE:* Declassify when the plans and/or procedures are no longer used by DOE and the information would not be of benefit to an adversary.

**Retain  
Classification  
[25X2, 8; EV]**

- 3.7 Vulnerabilities of any piece of equipment and/or operations as a whole concerning TSS shipments

*NOTE:* Declassify when the vulnerability no longer exists.

**Retain  
Classification  
[25X2, 8; EV]**

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