FAS Note: This Energy Department report to Congress, released in redacted form in November 2002, is the seventh in a series. See the previous report here.

DOE/SO-70-0007 (Deleted Version)

Seventh Report on Inadvertent Releases of Restricted Data and
Formerly Restricted Data under Executive Order 12958
(Deleted Version)(U)

Report to:

The Committee on Armed Services of the Senate
The Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives
The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

U.S. Department of Energy
Office of Classified and Controlled Information Review
Germantown, Maryland 20874

May 2002


The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 (Public Law (P.L.) 105-261) requires that the Secretary of Energy notify the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate, the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives, and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs of inadvertent releases of Restricted Data (RD) or Formerly Restricted Data (FRD) associated with records processed under Executive Order (E.O.) 12958.

As a result of the Department of Energy's (DOE's) examination of approximately two million additional pages of publicly available records accessioned by the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), the Department discovered an additional 47 documents containing 94 pages of RD and FRD which were inadvertently released:

The identified documents are in collections belonging to the Department of State and the Department of Defense (Army, Navy, Air Force, Joint Staff, and Office of the Secretary of Defense). The documents were inadvertently declassified and made available to the public during the years from 1996 to 2000 by the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and NARA.

No classified documents of the DOE or its predecessor organizations were found.

The documents contained RD and FRD information, including:

A significant portion of the documents (40 of the 47) were improperly marked for classification level (e.g., Secret), classification category (e.g., RD), and/or automatic classification level downgrading. The improper markings occurred when the documents were originated, or at a later time during the lifetime of the documents. The improper marking of the documents for classification level, classification category and/or downgrading may have contributed to the inadvertent releases of the documents.

NARA, the Department of State, and the Department of Defense have been advised the specific documents contain RD and FRD. The 47 documents have been withdrawn from public access and protected in accordance with DOE requirements.

The inadvertently released nuclear weapons design information (RD) detailed in this report concerns the early generations of nuclear weapons that this country developed in the 1960s. Potential adversaries, emerging proliferant nations and terrorist groups aggressively target U.S. nuclear weapon information.

The inadvertently released nuclear weapons utilization information (FRD) detailed in this report could assist potential adversaries in assessing the strengths of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Additionally, inadvertently released information on deployments of nuclear weapons outside of the U.S. may violate international agreements and harm diplomatic ties with foreign host nations.

DOE will be conducting an assessment of the damage to national security resulting from the inadvertent release of RD and FRD addressed in this report.

In accordance with P.L. 105-261, DOE has trained 1,720 individuals from other agencies to recognize RD and FRD information. This includes 167 individuals from the Department of State, 73 from the Department of the Air Force, 26 from the Department of Defense Joint Staff and 78 from NARA. Additional training has been scheduled this year including refresher training.

DOE and NARA are working to better integrate their efforts to more quickly identify and safeguard documents potentially containing RD and FRD. All records that may contain RD and FRD are removed from public access.

Details of the specific inadvertent releases are contained in the attached classified appendix.