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FAS Intro: The following plan was prepared "to prevent the inadvertent release of records containing Restricted Data or Formerly Restricted Data during the automatic declassification of records," including records that have already been declassified. The immediate impact of the plan will be to dramatically reduce or eliminate the automatic declassification of 25 year old historical records under executive order 12958.

The Secretary of Energy
Washington, DC 20585

April 13, 2000

The Honorable John Warner
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Section 3149 of the Fiscal Year 2000 National Defense Authorization Act requires that I provide you with a supplement to the plan developed under section 3161 of the Fiscal Year 1999 National Defense Authorization Act to protect against the inadvertent release of Restricted Data and Formerly Restricted Data that was submitted to you on January 28, 1999. The supplemental plan implements the provisions of section 3149 to include "...all records subject to Executive Order 12958 that were determined before the date of the enactment of that Act to be suitable for declassification."

The supplemental plan that I am submitting to you was developed with the Archivist of the United States, as required in section 3149, and has been coordinated with the National Security Council and the Department of Defense. If it becomes evident that additional steps are necessary to protect against the inadvertent release of Restricted Data and Formerly Restricted Data, I will not hesitate to modify this supplemental plan. If that should occur, I will provide you with a copy and an explanation of the actions taken.

If you have any questions or require additional information, please contact me or have a member of your staff contact General Eugene E. Habiger, USAF (Ret.), Director of Security and Emergency Operations, at (202) 586-3345.


cc w/enclosure:
The Honorable Carl Levin
Ranking Minority Member

Special Historical Records Review Plan (Supplement)
(Public Laws 105-261 and 106-65)

March 1, 2000

I. Introduction.

II. Categories of File Series. File series in a given category must meet all the criteria specified below under the category heading in order to be subject to the processing requirements in paragraph III of this Plan.


Category of File Series


Not Yet Reviewed

for Declassification



In Process



Already Processed




Have not been reviewed for declassification

Have been declassified by the agency of record, but have not yet been made available to the public

Have been declassified by the agency of record and are currently publicly available



Awaiting declassification review by the agency of record or NARA

Being administratively processed by the agency of record or NARA

Fully processed by the agency of record or NARA




May be at the agency of record, a National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) record center, or NARA

May be at the agency of record, a NARA record center, or NARA

May be at the agency of record, a NARA record center, or NARA

"Highly Unlikely" Status


Have not been validated as "highly unlikely" to contain RD/FRD

Review Status

Have not received a page-by-page review for RD/FRD by a
Historical Record RD Reviewer

III. File Series Processing Requirements.

IV. Training Required to Recognize RD/FRD.

V. Supervision and Evaluation of Historical Record RD Reviewers.

VI. Evaluation of Agency Compliance.

VII. Resolution of Disagreements. An agency may submit concerns over procedural requirements in the plan or its implementation, including the quality assurance/quality control reviews and evaluations, to the DOE Director of Nuclear and National Security Information and to the Director of ISOO in NARA. DOE and NARA shall confer and issue a joint decision on the concern within 60 days. If the response does not satisfy the agency or DOE and NARA are unable to reach a joint decision within 30 days, the agency may appeal the concern to the Secretary of Energy, who shall respond within 30 days. An agency making such an appeal shall simultaneously also notify the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

VIII. Notification of Inadvertent Releases.

IX. Use of Automated Declassification Technologies. The use of automated declassification technologies to protect RD and FRD from inadvertent release shall be considered by each agency as appropriate. Other software tools currently being developed shall be provided to the agencies as the tools are tested and proven effective.

X. Estimated Resource Requirements. (See Appendix 7)

XI. Timetable to Implement Plan. (See Appendix 8)

XII. Definitions.

Appendix 1
Criteria for Evaluating File Series Descriptions to Determine if
They are Highly Unlikely to Contain RD or FRD

To make a decision on the likely presence of RD/FRD in any given file series, each agency must use its own resources to determine during what period it or its predecessor(s) may have had interfaces with the nuclear weapons program. The evaluation guidelines described in 1-7 below may be used to aid this determination.

1. Definition of Restricted Data and Formerly Restricted Data. Restricted Data is defined in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, as "...all data concerning (1) design, manufacture, or utilization of atomic weapons; (2) the production of special nuclear material; or (3) the use of special nuclear material in the productionof energy..." Formerly Restricted Data is "...such data as the [DOE] and the Department of Defense jointly determine relates primarily to the military utilization of atomic weapons and which the [DOE] and Department of Defense jointly determine can be adequately safeguarded as defense information..."

2. Period Context of Records. All research on nuclear physics was unclassified prior to the formation of the National Defense Research Committee (NDRC) in June 1940. After the formation of the NDRC, publications on uranium research,which were at that time primarily concerned with isotope separation, were no longer made public. When the Manhattan Engineer District was formed on August 13, 1942, it took over all matters involving the production of Special Nuclear Materials and nuclear weapons research and shrouded all work in a veil of secrecy.

The likelihood of the occurrence of RD or FRD in an other-agency file series depends on what issues the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) or its predecessor or successor agency was involved in at the time and the involvement of the other agency in the same issues.

3. Examples. The following activities are provided as examples of past involvement with the nuclear weapons program by certain agencies and are not meant to be considered as all-inclusive:

4. Agency National Security Mission in Period when Records Were Generated.The national security mission of an agency or its predecessor organization during the period when the records were generated is another clue to the likelihood of the presence of RD or FRD in particular file series. Agencies involved in deliberations of the National Security Council or its predecessors or other policy-level councils are more likely to have received intelligence or facts about nuclear weapons capability.

5. Other Available Information About File Series. Other information known about the file series, such as the originating office or previous owner of the records and the activities engaged in at the time the records were created, may provide further clues to the likelihood of the presence of RD or FRD in particular file series. Finding aids for the file series, if they exist, would contribute to the historical context.

6. Type of Categorization Review or Survey Performed by Agency. An agency's certification should be based on the depth of the review of a file series that was done to support the certification. A certification that a file series is highly unlikely to contain RD/FRD is more reliable if the file series was extensively sampled or surveyed without discovering marked RD or FRD as opposed to relying on a review of file series title alone or the titles of the boxes containing the records.

7. Quality of Descriptive Information and Existence of Database. The existence of a database in which box- or folder-level data and review results are recorded provides a firm documentation trail and extensive information about the file series. It is not a guideline per se, but it would provide more confidence in the results from applying other guidelines.



Agency's Name:

Reporting Official: (Name and telephone number)

Point of Contact: (Name and telephone number)

1 . Record group to which file series belongs

2. File series title

3. File series volume (in linear feet)

4. File series location

5. Explain the basis for this determination and attach any survey notes or work products:

I validate that the file series identified above is determined as highly unlikely to contain RD/FRD.

(Signature of validating official)
(Name and title of validating official)


Restricted Data / Formerly Restricted Data
Recognition and Records Processing Seminar

Overview: The purpose of this seminar is to train all personnel reviewing records under section 3.4 of Executive Order 12958. Specifically, the seminar will include an overview of the Special Historical Records Review Plan, a review of the requirements for processing records affected by the Plan, and training on the recognition of RD and FRD in both marked and unmarked records. (NOTE: No access authorization (i.e., security clearance) is required for this seminar.)


Introduction and Overview of the Implementation Plan

In-depth review of the Plan and specific requirements outlined in the Plan's procedures for processing of the affected records. Specific examples of how to use the procedures for various record sets will be provided

RD/FRD Recognition Training

Review and Discussion of Questions



Overview: The purpose of this course is to train Historical Record RD Reviewers to recognize records potentially containing RD/FRD. Specifically, the course will enable such Reviewers to recognize nuclear information appearing in records not marked as containing RD/FRD which should be identified as potential RD/FRD and set aside. The course will use review aids, examples, and practical exercises extensively. Marking, handling, and coordination procedures for RD/FRD will also be covered. (NOTE: "Q," S CNWDI for DOD, or equivalent access authorization (i.e., security clearance) is required for this training.)


DAY 1		History of DOE and the RD/FRD Classification System	
		Overview of Nuclear-related Terms and Science
		Nuclear Explosives

DAY 2		Nuclear Explosives (Continued)
			Design/Manufacturing (Continued)
			Military Utilization	

DAY 3		Nuclear Explosives (Continued)
			Practical exercises  (Review of nuclear 
			explosive documents)

		Nuclear Materials Production
			Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Production Reactors
			Isotope Separation Technology	

DAY 4		Nuclear Materials Production (Continued)
			Practical exercises  (Review of nuclear 
			materials documents)

		Special Nuclear Materials (SNM) Used for 
		the Production of Energy
			Naval Reactor Program	
			Other Reactors	
			Practical exercises (Review of SNM in 
			the production of energy documents)

		Review of Major Areas of Declassified RD

		Procedures for Marking, Handling, and 
		Protecting Suspected RD

DAY 5		Comprehensive Review and Practical Exercise

		Certification Examination



DOE will periodically utilize Quality Assurance (QA)/ Quality Control (QC) methods to evaluate an agency's compliance with this plan.

QA focuses on the declassification review process itself (e.g., procedures, training, internal checks, etc.). QC focuses on the product that results from the process (i.e., the declassified records themselves).

QA/QC will be conducted by qualified DOE and DOE contractor personnel. Typically, DOE will examine records that have been declassified to ensure that no RD or FRD is being inadvertently released. Based on the results of this records examination, the agency's declassification review process will be analyzed and improvements may be recommended.

Quality Control Methods

Quality Assurance Methods



Agency's Name:

Reporting Official: (Name and telephone number)

Point of Contact: (Name and telephone number)

Date of Erroneous Release:

Date Erroneous Release Discovered:

1 Record group to which file series belongs

2. File series title

3. File series volume (in linear feet)

4. File series location

5. File series unclassified description, including

6. Identify the specific publication/document containing the inadvertent release and attach a copy of the released information

NOTE: When this form is completed, classify it at the level and category (RD or FRD) of the inadvertently released document

SEND TO: Director, Office of Nuclear and National Security Information (Attn: SO-223) (Classified mailing address)
U. S. Department of Energy
P. 0. Box A
Germantown, MD 20874-0963

AND 106-65, SECTION 3149

The following figures represent estimates of incremental costs to be incurred by DOE, Department of Defense (DOD), and NARA to implement Public Laws 105-261, Section 3161, and 106-65, Section 3149. The only costs estimated by other agencies are the costs of receiving training offered by DOE, which are not included here.

						FY 1999            FY 2000	Outyears
A.  DOE Estimated Costs
	1.  Cost for new Federal staff     	$  350,000	$  550,000	$  550,000 
	2.  Cost for new contractor staff 	$5,420,000	$7,100,000	$7,100,000
	3.  Cost for training DOE QA/QC
	       reviewers (including travel)	$  180,000	$  180,000	$  160,000
	Total DOE Estimated Costs 		$5,950,000	$7,830,000	$7,830,000

B.  DOD Estimated Costs
	1.  Cost for new Federal staff     	$  201,592	$  201,592      $  201,592
	2.  Cost for new contractor staff 	$1,359,458	$1,359,458	$1,359,458
	3.  Cost for travel associated with
	       training 			$  835,740	$  835,740	$  835,740
	Total DOD Estimated Costs 		$2,396,790	$2,396,790	$2,396,790

C.  NARA Estimated Costs
	1.  Cost for new Federal staff     	$   68,000	$   68,000	$   68,000
	2.  Cost for new contractor staff 	$        0	$        0	$        0
	3.  Other costs (including travel,
	     upgrading access authorizations,
	     and facility upgrades)		$  130,000	$  130,000	$  130,000
	Total NARA Estimated Costs 		$  198,000	$  198,000	$  198,000

TOTAL ESTIMATED COSTS				$8,544,790	$10,424,790	$10,404,790

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