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GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-1600

JAN 19 2001

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Review of Allegations Regarding Dr. John Deutch

(U) In February 2000 you directed a review of allegations of security breaches by Dr. John Deutch in his use of computers during his tenure as Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology) (USD(A&T)) and as Deputy Secretary of Defense (DEPSEC). Our review of these allegations consisted of three undertakings. First, the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) attempted to identity and locate all computers and computer memory devices possibly containing data entered by Dr. Deutch during his tenure as USD (A&T) fiom April 1993 to March 1994 and as DEPSEC from March 1994 to May 1995. All such computers and devices that were recovered were examined closely for the presence of classified information. Second, we conducted a thorough classification review of data retrieved from the recovered computers and computer memory devices, as well as of DoD-related data the CIA IG retrieved from computers and computer memory devices Dr. Deutch used at his residence and offices during his tenure from May 1995 through December 1996 as the Director of Central Intelligence. Finally, we attempted to determine whether there had been any compromise of classified material discovered on those computers or computer memory devices.

OIG Review (U)

(U) The OIG's comprehensive review of the computers and computer memory devices utilized by Dr. Deutch determined that Dr. Deutch used three DoD-procured Macintosh laptop and four DoD-procured Macintosh desktop computers between April 1993 and December 1996. The report of the Acting DOD IG detailing the recovery of these computers and computer memory devices and reflecting their dispositions is at Tab A. A matrix identifying the computers and computer memory devices, their dispositions, and the results of their examination is at Tab B [not included here].

Security Review (U)

(U) In February 2000, the CIA IG provided to the Department a copy of 26 journals (approximately 675 pages of text) that Dr Deutch had maintained during his tenure at DoD. The CIA had located these journals on three Personal Computer Memory Card International Association (PCMCIA) cards which Dr. Deutch had used to store and transfer data from the various computers at his disposal. These journals include Dr. Deutch's detailed descriptions of his daily activities; they focus on his official activities, although they also include many entries of a personal nature. Although the PCMCIA cards may have been authorized for the storage of classified information, the journal entries were entered and worked on from Dr. Deutch's home computers, which were not so authorized.

(U) A thorough security review of the journals has been conducted by security officials and subject matter experts in OASD(C3I) and OUSD(P). It should be noted initially that none of the journal entries bears specific classification markings. (By contrast, the CIA has located numerous documents that Dr. Deutch maintained on unclassified computers during his tenure as DCI, but which contained classification markings indicating that they were highly classified.) Our review team concluded, however, that the Journals contain many entries that include collaterally classified material and should, therefore, have been marked and treated as classified when written. At the request of the Department of Justice, security officials and subject matter experts analyzed specific entries of this sort, and prepared a list of examples at Tab C [not included here]. Additional examples from each of the journals are at Tab D [not included here]. In the opinion of those that reviewed the journals and prepared this list, these examples are illustrative of the kind and level of collaterally classified information contained in the journals.

(U) The Special Access Program Coordination Office (SAPCO) also reviewed the journals to assess whether they contained any Special Access Required (SAR) information. SAPCO identified 47 potentially classified references to DoD SAR information, of varying degrees of sensitivity, in the journals. After analyzing these 47 references, SAPCO concluded that 14 of these entries contain information that continues to be classified as SAR material. One entry refers to DoD SAR information that was classified at the time of its entry into the journal, but is no longer classified. The remaining 32 do not contain classified information but do refer to the existence of a DoD SAP in a general technology area, link an individual to a SAP, or mention a SAP by nickname. The SAPCO has retained copies of these entries and can provide a detailed report of this material, including verbatim excerpts, explanations, and an evaluation of the significance of each reference.

(U) In addition to the 26 journals that Dr. Deutch maintained during his DoD tenure, he also maintained 17 journals during his CIA tenure. These journals resided on the same three PCMCIA cards that contained journals 1 through 26. A review of these 17 journals identified 10 additional potentially classified entries that refer to DoD SAPs. Six of these entries contain information that continues to be classified as SAR. Two entries refer to DoD SAR information that was classified at the time of their entry into the journal, but are no longer classified. The remaining two do not contain classified information but do refer to the existence of a DoD SAP in a general technology area, link an individual to a SAP, or mention a SAP by nickname. The SAPCO has also retained copies of these entries and can provide a detailed report of this material, including verbatim excerpts, explanations, and an evaluation of the significance of each reference.

(U) We also analyzed a fourth PCMCIA card that Dr. Deutch used from June 1995 through December 1996. No classified material was discovered during this analysis. The CIA has retained custody of all four PCMCIA cards.

(U) In addition, the CIA provided to DoD 1,021 pages of clear text copy of e-mail entries sent or received by Dr. Deutch during his tenure at DoD. The CIA apparently discovered these e-mail messages on a backup drive on a CIA office local area network. We have reviewed these e-mail entries and have concluded that one e-mail message Dr. Deutch sent contains a reference to SAR material. The SAPCO has retained that e-mail message.

(U) We also examined 1,089 pages of Dr. Deutch's e-mail obtained from a backup DoD e-mail server into which he had dial-in access from May 1995 through December 1996. No classified information was discovered in this material.

(U) The Defense Computer Forensics Laboratory (DCFL) examined the two laptops that had been used by Dr. Deutch, which were subsequently disposed of as excess property; these laptops were retrieved from Florida A&M University. DCFL concluded that neither laptop's hard drive contained any classified information. A third laptop, disposed of through the Defense Reutilization and Marketing Office (DRMO), was evidently destroyed, and therefore could not be examined to determine whether it had been used to process or store classified information.

(S) [Three lines deleted]

(U) To summarize the results of the analysis of the computers and computer memory devices to which Dr. Deutch had access or possibly had access, DoD classified information (in the form of either SAR information or collaterally classified information) was present in two types of memory devices; the three PCMCIA. cards containing journals 1 through 43 that the CIA recovered and the l,021 e-mail messages the CIA discovered in its backup Local Area Network server. No classified information was discovered on any computer or computer memory device currently in DoD's inventory recovered by the Acting Inspector General's investigation.

Review of Possibility of Compromise (U)

(C/NF) [approximately 9 lines deleted] Thus, while the possibility of compromise cannot be foreclosed with certainty, our analysts have found no evidence of compromise to date. [approximately 3 lines deleted]


Source: Hardcopy
Original Classification: Secret (Redacted to Unclassified)
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