Department of Defense
ANNUAL POLYGRAPH REPORT TO CONGRESS
Fiscal Year 2001 Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I DoD Use of Polygraph Examinations II Fiscal Year 2001 Counterintelligence-Scope Polygraph (CSP) Examinations CSP Refusals Specific CSP Examination Results Significant Information Developed III Utility of the Investigative Polygraph IV Training and Qualification Standards for Department of Defense Forensic Psychophysiologist (Polygraph Examiners) V Polygraph Research
EXECUTIVE SUMMARYThe Department of Defense (DoD) uses the polygraph in criminal investigations, counterintelligence cases, foreign intelligence and counterintelligence operations, and for requests for exculpation. This report contains numerous examples of polygraph utility in resolving counterintelligence and security issues as well as criminal investigations. The polygraph is clearly one of our most effective investigative tools.
The Department of Defense Polygraph Institute (DODPI) trains all federal polygraph examiners. The basic polygraph courses are taught at the Masters Degree level. The Institute also offers specialized courses in forensic psychophysiology through their continuing education program. In addition, DODPI conducts on-going evaluations of the validity of polygraph techniques used by federal examiners as well as research on new polygraph techniques, instrumentation, analytic methods, and polygraph countermeasures.
The Department published a handbook for all federal polygraph examiners which sets forth standardized techniques and procedures for conducting polygraph examinations. The handbook also outlines a Quality Assurance Program (QAP) wherein DODPI inspects federal polygraph programs to ensure compliance with both those techniques and procedures taught at DODPI and the continuing education requirements established by the polygraph community for polygraph examiners.
Approximately 73.6 percent of our polygraph tests are conducted as a condition for access to certain positions or information under the DoD Counterintelligence-Scope Polygraph (CSP) Program. The DoD CSP Program is authorized by Public Law 100-180. The purpose of the CSP Program is to deter and detect activity involving espionage, sabotage, and terrorism.
The DoD conducts CSP examinations on military personnel, DoD civilian employees, and DoD contractor personnel. Of the 8,784 individuals examined under the CSP Program in Fiscal Year 2001, 8,494 showed no significant response to the relevant questions (non-deceptive) and provided no substantive information. The remaining 290 individuals provided substantive information. Of these 290 individuals, 271 received a favorable adjudication, five are still pending adjudication, fourteen are pending investigation, and no one received adverse action denying or withholding access.
IThe Department of Defense has used the polygraph for almost half a century. It is used in criminal investigations, counterintelligence cases, foreign intelligence and counterintelligence operations, exculpation requests, and as a condition for access to certain positions or information. The polygraph is a tool that enhances the interview and interrogation process. Often it is the only investigative technique capable of providing essential information to resolve national security issues and criminal investigations. The use of the polygraph as a condition for access is limited by a statutory quota for CSP examinations.
DOD USE OF POLYGRAPH EXAMINATIONS
The following table reflects Department of Defense Polygraph Program statistics for Fiscal Year 2001.
Criminal 2,046 17.1% Exculpatory 436 3.7% CI Scope 8,784 73.6% All Others* 666 5.6% Total** 11,935 100%
* Includes examinations conducted in support of personnel security investigations, counterintelligence and intelligence operations, and polygraph assistance to non-DoD federal agencies.
** Does not include polygraph examinations conducted by the National Security Agency (NSA). A breakout of polygraph examinations conducted by NSA is contained in a classified table submitted with this report. Nor does it include polygraph examinations conducted by the National Reconnaissance Office, which are conducted under the authority of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI).
IISection 1121 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 (Public Law 100-180, December 4, 1987; 101 Stat. at 1147) authorizes the Department of Defense to conduct CSP examinations as a condition for access to certain information.
Fiscal Year 2001 Counterintelligence-Scope (CSP)
The purpose of the CSP Program is to deter and detect espionage, sabotage, and terrorism. The following topics are covered during the CSP examination: (1) Involvement with a foreign intelligence/security service, involvement in espionage; (2) Involvement in terrorism; (3) Unauthorized foreign contacts; (4) Deliberate failure to protect classified information; and (5) Damaging/sabotaging government information systems, clandestine collection, or defense systems. These CSP topics meet the needs of both DoD and the Intelligence Community facilitating the transfer of security clearances.
The Department published a handbook for federal polygraph examiners standardizing techniques and procedures for conducting polygraph examinations. The handbook also outlines the Quality Assurance Program (QAP) wherein DODPI inspects federal polygraph programs to ensure compliance with the techniques and procedures taught at the Institute. DODPI trains all federal polygraph examiners. This allows for standardization and promotes reciprocity, thus eliminating unnecessary polygraph examinations.
Public Law 100-180 authorizes DoD to administer CSP examinations to persons whose duties involve access to information that has been classified at the level of top secret or designated as being within a special access program under section 4.4 of Executive Order 12958. This includes military and civilian personnel of the Department and personnel of defense contractors. The number of CSP examinations has been limited to 5,000 per fiscal year since Fiscal Year 1991. For Fiscal Years 1988 through 1990 the ceiling was 10,000. The quota reduction took place two years after new exemptions for cryptographic and reconnaissance programs were adopted. Public Law 100-180 exempts certain intelligence agencies and functions from the 5,000 quota: (1) individuals assigned, detailed or under contract with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), (2) persons employed, assigned, detailed, under contract or applying for a position in the National Security Agency, (3) persons assigned to a space where sensitive cryptographic information is produced, processed, or stored, and (4) persons employed by, assigned or detailed to, an office within the Department of Defense for the collection of specialized national foreign intelligence through reconnaissance programs or a contractor of such an office.The following table reflects CSP examinations conducted by the Department of Defense in accordance with Public Law 100-180.
(1) Special Access Programs 2,636 (2) DIA Critical Intelligence Positions 1,316 (3) TOP SECRET 0 (4) Examinations for Interim Access to Sensitive Compartmented Information 21 Total Examinations Conducted Under the Congressional Ceiling 3,973 Exempted Examinations* 4,811 DoD Counterintelligence-Scope Polygraph Program TOTAL** 8,784
*NOTE: Includes detailees to CIA and NSA, assignees to cryptographic information processing spaces, persons in non-NRO reconnaissance programs.
**NOTE: Does not include polygraph examinations conducted by NSA. A table of polygraph examinations conducted by NSA is contained in a classified annex to this report. Nor does it include examinations conducted by the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), which are conducted under the authority of the Director Central Intelligence.
In Fiscal Year 2001, no one declined CSP testing required as a condition of access to certain information. Department of Defense policy states those persons who decline to take the examination are denied access to the classified material in question, but are retained in their position or transferred to other positions in the organization of equal pay and responsibility, commensurate with the clearance level held before the declination.
Specific CSP Examination ResultsThe polygraph examination results for the 8,784 individuals tested under the Department of Defense Counterintelligence-Scope Polygraph Program are as follows:
Two hundred ten individuals required more than two series (a series is defined as the collection of at least two polygraph charts on an examinee). A total of 92 examinations required more than one day to complete.
There were 8,494 individuals whose polygraph examination results were evaluated as no significant response to the relevant questions (non-deceptive). The remaining 290 individuals yielded significant responses and/or provided substantive information.
Two hundred sixty-two individuals made admissions relevant to the issues being tested, and through further testing, the examiner was able to resolve all relevant issues favorably to the subject.
Twenty-six individuals made admissions relevant to the issues being tested and continued to be evaluated as deceptive during further testing.
Of the 290 individuals who yielded significant responses and/or provided substantive information, 271 received a favorable adjudication, five are still pending adjudication, fourteen are pending investigation, and no one received adverse action denying or withholding access.
Significant Information Developed
The following cases reflect significant information developed during DoD CSP examinations covered by this report. It should be noted that all these individuals had been interviewed previously by security professionals and investigated by other means without any discovery of the information obtained by the polygraph examination procedure. In most cases, the information was elicited from the subject in discussion with the examiner.
Most of the information developed during CSP examinations relates to the removal of classified material and computer media to residences and unauthorized foreign contacts. In some of those cases, classified material was comingled with personal papers, and often when discovered was either destroyed or returned to government control. In some cases, the classified material was deliberately taken home to prepare a briefing or to meet a deadline. Admissions of removal of classified material were followed-up with additional polygraph testing to determine whether the material was compromised, or if any other material was still outside of government control, or if the extent and nature of the foreign .contacts were different than reported. Following subsequent polygraph testing the results were provided to appropriate security officials for adjudication.
During a CSP examination, the examinee admitted that she routinely made courier runs between Charlottesville, VA and Washington, DC. During these courier runs, she would routinely leave classified information in the trunk of the car while having lunch at a local restaurant. She stated that there was never any compromise of the information. She favorably completed her polygraph examination.
During CSP testing, examinee admitted while attending 98J training at Fort Huachuca, AZ, he maintained several copies of a SECRET document in his barracks room for use as a study guide. Another student removed the classified document from a SCIF. Examinee believed the document was returned to the SCIF and placed in a classified burn bag for destruction. Examinee favorably completed his polygraph examination.
During a CSP examination, the examinee admitted he transported classified information aboard a commercial airliner without authorization. Examinee explained that he maintained secret documents in his personal papers outside of US government control. Once he discovered the classified documents at his residence, he returned the documents to his workplace and properly shredded them. Additionally, he stated that while working as a Foreign Area Officer, he told an officer of a foreign country that the US was collecting information on that country. Final adjudication is pending.
During CSP testing, examinee admitted that while traveling on a commercial airliner in a leave status, he disclosed to a passenger, who appeared to be a foreign national, his active duty status in the Navy. Examinee reported the contact to his command. Following this explanation, he successfully completed his polygraph examination.
During CSP testing, examinee provided information regarding his personal and social relationship with a foreign national over an extended period of time. The examinee successfully completed his polygraph after this admission.
During CSP testing, examinee admitted concerns about his actions resulting from emergency procedures of the potential crashing of his EP3 aircraft. After consulting with command officials, it was determined that the Examiaee's actions were within protocols as well as his subsequent interviews. After this admission, examinee was able to successfully complete his polygraph examination.
During a CSP examination, a contract employee admitted that while he was on active duty in the U.S. Navy, he had provided classified information to fellow Navy members that he had obtained through the unauthorized intrusion into a Navy Commander's e-mail. Examinee related that he and his shipmates used the information to their own benefit and could have resulted in the compromise of classified port-of-call information. Examinee also stated that he was having contact with an individual from what might possibly be a required reportable country. After these disclosures, Examinee successfully completed his polygraph examination.
During a CSP examination, examinee a civilian employee admitted that approximately two and one-half years ago, while assigned to an aircraft carrier, he used his personal laptop computer to type a SECRET document regarding a weapons system. He could not recall if he ever deleted the document from his computer's hard drive, which was at his private residence. This matter was referred to NCIS for follow up.
During CSP testing, examinee a civilian employee, advised that while assigned to two separate DoD Agencies in the mid 1990's, he returned from overseas investigative trips and stored classified notes at his residence over a weekend. He then delivered the classified material and notes to his office on the next duty day. He also admitted taking classified material, probably SCI, to his residence once or twice a month while assigned to a DoD Agency. He explained that he did not have enough time to review the material during his duty day. Following the above admissions, he successfully completed his polygraph examination.
During her CSP testing, a civilian employee admitted that while assigned to an overseas location in 1998, she printed a hardcopy of a classified manual. The manual was inadvertently packed in her household goods when she separated from the military in 2000, and was delivered to her CONUS residence. She realized the document was in her household goods when she unpacked, but believing she would be hired by the government, decided to retain the document. The document was not returned to government control at the time of hire in late 2000, but retained in her apartment. The document was returned to government control and the polygraph testing was then successfully completed.
Utility of the Investigative Polygraph
During Fiscal Year 2001, DoD investigations obtained unique and significant information from interviews conducted with the aid of the polygraph. In all illustrated instances, the polygraph examination process produced significant security or criminal information, which would not otherwise have been secured for the specific investigation. The polygraph examination process was also valuable in helping to establish the innocence of persons charged with serious infractions.
An investigation was initiated regarding the theft of a rental vehicle valued at $20,000, from a parking lot on a military installation. The military member who rented the vehicle stated he had given another individual a ride in the vehicle and it was also learned that there was a spare key to the vehicle in the glove compartment of the vehicle. The suspect who accepted the ride denied stealing the vehicle and agreed to polygraph examination. The results of the polygraph concluded the suspect was deceptive. The suspect subsequently admitted stealing the key and later stole the vehicle. The suspect assisted in the recovery of the vehicle.
An investigation was initiated regarding four suspicious fires at various locations in military barracks housing. During the course of the investigation, a service member was identified as a suspect, and denied any involvement in the arson investigation. The suspect agreed to polygraph examination that indicated he was practicing deception. Subject ultimately admitted to starting all four of the fires.
An investigation was initiated when a military member reported $1,700, stolen from his wall locker. The victim's roommate was interviewed and denied stealing the money and in fact reported $500 of his money was stolen. The roommate agreed to undergo a polygraph examination, during which he indicated deception. During the polygraph interview, he admitted stealing $450 from the wall locker. The initial Victim admitted inflating the amount of money that was stolen.
A military member faked his death in a camping trailer fire to avoid military criminal chiarges and to collect a $200,000 insurance death benefit along with other benefits. Several years later, the man was arrested under an assumed name and his true identity was discovered. The subject was found to be living with his former wife and three minor daughters, and they were found to be receiving military survivor benefits since the time of his "death". The subject's ex-wife claimed that she did not learn that Subject was alive until after she had filed a claim for his benefits for the daughters. She claimed that she learned that he was alive from members of his family and that the subject's mother had deposited $50,000 into a joint account for her future use. The ex-wife then claimed she began receiving instructions from the subject and finally joined him in another state. During interview, the ex-wife claimed to have no information regarding the faked death plan. She submitted to polygraph examination during which she admitted that subject's family (mother, sister, and two brothers) shared in the proceeds of the insurance. She continued that she knew that the subject's ex-sister-in-law had assisted the subject by delivering a boat to him to escape the scene of the trailer fire and had met him with a truck on the other side of the lake for his escape. She also admitted that she had known that the subject was not dead before his funeral and she had known that when she applied for the survivor's benefits for her daughters. One of the brothers was tested and further implicated the family members.
Subject, a licensed day-care provider at a military installation, was alleged to have caused burns to the hands of a two year old daughter of an active duty military member. Subject stated Victim received injuries to her hands when she fell. Medical personnel determined the injuries appeared to be 2nd degree burns. Subject agreed to undergo polygraph examination. Subject indicated deception during testing. Subject admitted disciplining the Victim by having her wash her hands in hot water.
Subject, an active duty military officer made illegal purchases with a government IMPAC card totalling approximately $25,000. The purchases were made for electronic equipment that was provided to a civilian who worked with Subject. A Federal search warrant was executed and several of the illegally purchased items were recovered from the home of the civilian employee. Subject denied any wrong doing and agreed to polygraph examination. Subject admitted improperly purchasing the items for his personal use. He furthered the scheme by falsely identifying items so the purchases would not be questioned.
An investigation was initiated regarding an eight month old female dependent daughter of an active duty military member who was determined to be the victim of shaken baby syndrome. Victim was taken to the military hospital and medical officials diagnosed her injuries of brain damage and impaired vision to be non-accidental. Investigation disclosed that Victim had been in the care of four adults during the period of injury. Her father was developed as a subject, and he denied any knowledge or involvement in the injury to Victim and agreed to polygraph. During testing, he practiced deception and admitted shaking the Victim out of frustration because she was crying.
During non-judicial punishment appellate process, an active duty military member requested a post-conviction exculpatory polygraph in an effort to support his denials of guilt. Subsequent to deceptive results, Subject admitted culpability.
An active duty military member was accused of forcibly raping a female active duty member. Subject denied culpability and agreed to polygraph examination. Subsequent to deceptive results, Subject admitted he was told to "stop" by Victim.
An active duty military member was accused of using various "hacking" programs to intrude upon U.S. Government computers. The "hacking" programs were discovered on his assigned government computer along with other unauthorized networking programs. After the administration of a multiple series polygraph examination, it was determined that Subject was not being truthful. Subsequently, subject admitted to an act of unauthorized access to a government computer with the aid of a "hacking program".
An investigation was initiated regarding an allegation that a military member had sexually molested his four-year-old stepdaughter. The military member denied any sexual contact with the victim, and agreed to undergo a polygraph examination. The polygraph examination was evaluated as deceptive. Subsequently, the military member admitted to sexually molesting his stepdaughter.
Subject, an active duty military member assigned to an overseas location, was accused of sexually abusing six foreign national boys between the ages of 11 and 13. Subject admitted to oral sex with the boys but denied any anal sex. Subject agreed to polygraph and practiced deception. Subject admitted to anal sex with two of the Victims.
Subject, a civilian employee was questioned concerning her knowledge of receipt of gratuities, bribes and gifts received by Civil Engineering personnel from DoD Contractor personnel. Subject denied any knowledge of such activity and agreed to polygraph examination. Subject practiced deception and admitted receiving gifts from contractors. Subject also provided information concerning her supervisors receiving gifts, stealing government property and mischarging overtime on their time cards.
An investigation was initiated when it was learned that a number of U.S. Government vehicles had been tampered with by removing the gas cap, placing paper in the filler neck, and igniting the paper. Except for one vehicle, that was totally destroyed, the fires only scorched the area around the gas fillernecks, but did not progress to substantial fires. During the course of the investigation, it was learned the Commanding General's vehicle had been stolen and wrecked in the same area. A subject was developed and denied any criminal wrongdoing and agreed to polygraph examination. Subject was practicing deception and subsequently admitted starting the fires, and stealing and wrecking the vehicle.
An investigation was initiated when a two-month-old military dependent child was taken into a military hospital with swelling in his right leg. A medical examination revealed the child was suffering from a broken leg, fractured skull, ribs, and left tibia, scapula (shoulder blade) and left upper arm. Injuries were diagnosed as non-accidental trauma. The father was developed as a subject; he denied culpability and agreed to undergo polygraph examination. Subject practiced deception during the examination, and he admitted to causing all of the injuries.
IVThe Department of Defense maintains very stringent standards for polygraph examiners. The Institute's basic polygraph program is the only program known to base its curriculum on forensic psychophysiology, and conceptual, abstract, and applied knowledge that meet the requirements of a master's degree-level of study. Candidates selected for DoD polygraph positions must meet the following minimum requirements:
Training and Qualification Standards for
Department of Defense Forensic
Psychophysiologist (Polygraph Examiners)
1. Be a United States citizen.All federal polygraph examiners receive their basic polygraph training at DODPI. In Fiscal Year 2001, the Institute trained 62 new polygraph examiners. After completing the basic polygraph training, DoD personnel must serve an internship consisting of a minimum of six months on-the-job-training and conduct at least 25 polygraph examinations under the supervision of a certified polygraph examiner before being certified as a DoD polygraph examiner. In addition, DoD polygraph examiners are required to complete 80 hours of continuing education every two years. To help meet this requirement, the Institute offers various specialized courses in forensic psychophysiology and related disciplines. In Fiscal Year 2001, approximately 555 students attended the specialized courses.
2. Be at least 25 years of age.
3. Be a graduate of an accredited four-year college or have equivalent experience that demonstrates the ability to master graduate-level academic courses.
4. Have two years of experience as an investigator with a federal or other law enforcement agency. Two years of comparable experience may be substituted for this requirement.
5. Be of high moral character and sound emotional temperament, as confirmed by a background investigation.
6. Complete a DoD-approved course of polygraph instruction.
7. Be adjudged suitable for the position after being administered a polygraph examination designed to ensure that the candidate realizes, and is sensitive to, the personal impact of such examinations.
Department of Defense Forensic Psychophysiologists
(Polygraph Examiners)Average Number Fiscal Year Of Examiners 1994 192 1995 176 1996 164 1997 153 1998 147 1999 144 2000 138 2001 163
VDoDPI continues its effort to broaden its presence in the scientific and academic communities and enhance the credibility of polygraph research. To this end the Research Division of DoDPI continues to seek collaborative support for the conduct of research. In 2001, the Research Division obtained research funding from the Personnel Security Managers Research Program, and financial support from the Technical Support Working Group. This additional support resulted in support for eight research projects that otherwise would not have been conducted or continued. Since 1999, external support for research has more than tripled the internal R&D budget.
Polygraph (Forensic Psychophysiology) Research
Through the Broad Agency Announcement (BAA) and staff solicitation, Research Division accepted 11 new proposals for review and awarded funding to 2 while continuing 3 projects from 2000. Additionally, there are 7 in the review process waiting funding. All totaled, 19 new projects were processed in CY 2001 with the total number of active projects equal to 37 as compared to 23 in 2000 and 17 in 1999.
Research projects during CY 2001 resulted in 22 scientific papers and/or reports published and available to the community. This is the third consecutive year DoDPI Research Division has increased its production of deliverables to our customers. The progressive increase in activity is a direct result of the recruitment and partnership development with external laboratories.
Current Research ProjectsAn Examination of Response Parameters of Electrodermal Recording (EDR) to Standard Stimuli. The objective of this project is to investigate whether equivalent electrodermal responses are obtained to equivalent psychological stimuli presented at different electrodermal tonic levels. The outcome will determine whether resistance or conductance is a more accurate measure during PDD examinations. Data collection has been completed and a report is in production.
Effects of Augmented Physiological Feedback on the Detection of Deception. This project will determine if augmented feedback improves the accuracy of PDD examinations. Data collection for this project has been completed and a report is in production.
Scaled P300 Scalp Profiles in Detection of Deception. Previous electroencephalographic (EEG) studies of deception have been limited to changes in the amplitude of responses to specific questions. An investigator at Northwestern University has been awarded funds to pursue an innovative and unique measure for the detection of deception, the distribution of EEG activity over the scalp. A final report has been submitted for review.
High Definition EEG/ERP Recordings and the Detection of Deception. The University of South Carolina is conducting research on brain activity as it relates to the detection of deception. The project uses high-density EEG/ERP recordings and correlates these findings with current autonomic nervous system recordings during a PDD examination. Preliminary results are promising and results of one study have been presented to the scientific community for discussion.
Remote Sensing of Emotion and Stress Using Laser Doppler Vibrometer. This project involves the use of emerging technologies to develop methods for deriving simultaneous information from the laser Doppler signal regarding multiple physiological functions including body tremor, respiration, cardiac function, muscle contraction, and sweating. Laser Doppler Vibrometry recording methods do not require the attachment of physical transducers, and could be adapted to multiple-examination settings. Preliminary data has been collected and preliminary findings have been presented to the Federal and scientific community. Further reports are pending.
Non-invasive Detection of Deception methods for Field Use. The search for an effective non-invasive method of lie detection has persisted for many decades. Previous research on voice-based detection of deception methods has met with limited success. A new voice-based device, called Vericator, has been developed by a private company. Capable of multiple modes of operation, Vericator offers a versatile package that cen be used in a wide array of environments and situations, ranging from strict questions/answer format demanded of the polygraph, to free-flowing conversation occurring on the telephone. The current project will assess the validity of the Verificator's on-line mode of operation. A check point scenario with smugglers was conducted. Analysis of this data as well as analysis of data from Vericator's off-line mode is currently being conducted.
Development of an Expert System for Human Assisted and Automated R/I Polygraph Scoring. This project intends to develop a novel waveform application for the scoring of Relevant/Irrelevant test format polygraph data. A number of advanced statistical methods have been developed for the analysis of complex electroencephalographic (EEG) and magnetoencephalographic (MEG) signals which may also be applied to polygraph physiological data. The goal of this project is to use traditional polygraph data and combine the data into a novel waveform that will enhance the accuracy of the PDD examiner decision. This technique has been shown to be highly accurate and reliable for single-trial analysis of EEG and MEG signals and should be adapted to similar datasets collected from polygraph examinations.
Screening Validation Methods Phase I TES is one of the primary counterintelligence security screening polygraph techniques used in the federal government. Two previous research studies found that TES had an accuracy rate in the range of 80-90%. However, the sample sizes were rather modest. A subsequent study with a larger sample did not produce accuracies as high. It is unknown if the disparity in accuracy between the studies was associated with participant variables, experimental conditions, or the test format. Two pilots have since been conducted with a new methodology that closely approximates real world espionage activities and produces subject samples that better represent the typical TES candidate in the government setting. The goal is to conduct studies that have the best generalizability to government's use. A full study was completed and a report is under review.
The Effects of Prior Demonstrations of Polygraph Accuracy on Outcomes of Probable Lie and Directed Lie Polygraph Tests. Investigators at the University of Utah are examining the usefulness of administering an acquaintance test during a PDD examination. An acquaintance test is used to familiarize examinees with the test procedure, and reassure the examinee that the PDD process is efficient. Unfortunately, there have been no systematic studies to determine the efficacy of this procedure, a deficit this project will address. The investigations will compare the accuracy of the tests administered using directed versus probable lie comparison questions where the acquaintance test is used and not used. The data collection phase of this study has reached completion. A report has been generated and is now under review.
Evaluation of DODPI Evaluation Techniques. Several laboratory studies, published by the University of Utah, have reported higher accuracy rates than DoDPI has found in its own laboratory studies. One of the possible sources of these differences is the method of chart interpretation. In the present study, the University of Utah decision rules will be compared to those of DODPI to determine how the differences in rules influence PDD decision accuracy. The study will attempt to determine the best combination of decision rules to maximize decision accuracy. This project has been completed and is in the process of being presented to the community.
Application of Thermal Image Analysis to Polygraph Testing. Infrared thermal imaging, non-intrusive and non-invasive technology may be used to determine if peripheral changes in skin surface temperature (SST) are related to psychological stress. Data collection is complete and two reports are under review. A third report combining thermal imaging and traditional polygraph is expected in FY 2002.
R/I Expert System. Each year the federal government performs thousands of multiple issue polygraph screening examinations on employees and prospective employees. One of the common testing techniques in this application of the polygraph is called the Relevant/Irrelevant (R/I) test. The R/I format intersperses relevant and irrelevant questions, with repetition, in a series that is unpredictable to the examinee. Currently, the R/I charts are interpreted globally by the examiner. The R/I technique is one of the last remaining techniques for which an accepted obective form of analysis has not been developed. An expert analytical system would enhance the consistancy of chart interpretation. The expert system is in the final stages of development.
TES Algorithm. The John Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory will develop and implement a computerized algorithm for evaluating the Test for Espionage and Sabotage (TES) polygraph screening examination, used extensively within the federal government. This effort will have an immediate impact on the reliability of the screening process. Development of this algorithm is nearing completion.
Polygraph Countermeasure Detection Expert Assistant. The primary purpose of this effort is to quickly field a countermeasure-screening tool. Polygraph experts will provide the knowledge necessary for the programmers to implement rules into the computer algorithm. The countermeasure-screening algorithm will be made available to federal examiners. Completion of this project is expected this year.
New Feature Development and Countermeasures Detection Improvement. This project is designed to develop improved methods of evaluating physiological data known as features in polygraph examinations. This research is also designed to improve the accuracy of the detecting polygraph countermeasures.
U.S. Library of Congress. As part of the mission objective to monitor foreign polygraph activity, the DoDPI collects research publications from foreign sources, and contracts with the U.S. Library of Congress to translate selected articles and publications.
Other DODPI Research. Cardio Element Analysis, The Confession Criterion, Field vs. Lab Data, Polygraph Database.
Research Projects in Review for FY 2002High Definition EEG/ERP Recordings and the Detection of Deception. This project will continue with a renewal of funding.
Remote Sensing of Emotion and Stress Using Laser Doppler Vibrometry. This project will continue with a renewal of funding.
Screening Validation Methods: External Validation. This project will be a replication of the Test for Espionage and Sabotage (TES) study. In order to obtain external validity of the findings this replication will be conducted by another agency.
Human and Computer Decision-Making in the Psychophysiological Detection of Deception.
Exploring Content Coding Procedures for Assessing the Truthfulness of Verbal Statements.
Methods of Defeating ERP-based Deception Detection in Personnel Screening Tests.
Polygraph Decision Support System for Relevant/Irrelevant Format Examinations.
Survey to Establish Theoretical Base for Psychophysiological Detection of Deception.