XI - CONCLUSION



This analysis clearly refutes justifications for the imbalance in concern over the ballistic missile proliferation relative to that of attack aircraft. What has not been articulated, however, are the consequences. By focussing attention and resources on the proliferation of only one particular technology, the unbridled arming of developing nations with other, yet equally de-stabilizing, technologies is implicitly endorsed. The sheer scope of aircraft sales, co-production agreements and developing world indigenous production supports this conclusion.

Attempts to control the spread of attack aircraft cannot exist in a vacuum. They must be consistent with US interests and woven into the broader fabric of US foreign policy. During the Cold War conventional weapons non-proliferation policy was usually sacrificed on the altar of other national security policies.

Today, no single path will suffice to reduce the dangers posed by the geometric spread of sophisticated attack aircraft, and the United States must forge a melange of carrots and sticks into one coherent policy. One point is clear, however: the present policy of unbridled attack aircraft sales is unsatisfactory.



Can prioritize the melange of policies

- emphasize diplomacy/control measures

-- more diplomacy where/when I can't control the technology or acquisition

-- more control measures where the diplomatic measures are least fruitful

- defenses are a "defeatist" approach; says that I can't or do not have confidence that I can stop AC proliferation by other means

-- approach of last resort

Effect the competing policies have on aircraft proliferation

- diplomacy tries to eliminate the cause of attack aircraft proliferation

- control tries to remove the weapons, or slow their acquisition

- defenses do neither; only try to reduce the consequences of the use of the weapons