Congressional Research Service: Report for Congress, 94-347 SPR March 29, 1994 -ti- Space Activities of the United States, CIS, and Other Launching Countries/Organizations: 1957-1993 (Selected Sections) By Marcia S. Smith, Specialist in Science and Technology Policy Science Policy Research Division SPACE ACTIVITIES OF THE UNITED STATES, CIS, AND OTHER LAUNCHING COUNTRIES/ORGANIZATIONS: 1957-1993 SUMMARY More than three decades of American-Soviet rivalry in space ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. The space activities once conducted by the Soviets are now conducted by Russia and other former Soviet republics. Ten of the former republics signed an agreement under the aegis of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) to cooperate in space activities. Hence, these activities must be considered that of an organization rather than a single country, even though Russia is by far the dominant player (Ukraine and Kazakhstan are also important participants) and "CIS" is not really an organization at all. For this report, the launching countries and organizations are: China, CIS, the European Space Agency (ESA, a group of 13 European countries), India, Israel, Japan, and the United States. Since the Soviet Union orbited the first satellite in 1957, satellites have become commonplace for applications such as communications, navigation, and weather forecasting and other forms of remote sensing of the Earth. Both the military and civilian sectors utilize these types of satellites, and the military aspects are generally not controversial. During the 1980s, concern grew about the possible "weaponization" of space, but to date, no country has based weapons in space. Both the United States and Soviet Union developed antisatellite weapons to enable them to destroy each other's space assets in times of crisis, although neither side has used them against the other's satellites. The U.S. Department of Defense long considered one Russian/CIS ASAT system to be operational (though it was last tested in 1982), while the U.S. does not have an operational ASAT system. In the fields of science and exploration, spacecraft have also become familiar. Probes have visited Mercury, Venus, Mars, Jupiter, Saturn, Uranus, and Neptune. Spacecraft have studied comets at close range, and observatories in Earth orbit study the universe in wavelengths that cannot penetrate Earth's atmosphere, adding considerably to scientific understanding of cosmology. Other satellites study interactions between the Sun and Earth. Only the United States and CIS are capable of placing people in orbit and through the end of 1993, 306 individuals had been launched into space, representing 25 countries. Twelve Americans walked on the surface of the Moon between 1969 and 1972; no Soviets visited the Moon. Today, the United States has a space shuttle, while the CIS is operating its seventh successful space station. In 1993, the two countries decided to join forces and build a single space station for the future that also includes European, Canadian and Japanese participation. The U.S. Government will spend approximately $29.5 billion on space in fiscal year 1994 ($14.6 billion for NASA; approximately $0.5 billion for other civilian agencies; and an estimated $14.5 billion for DOD). ---------- TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION 1 SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES IN 1993 2 United States: A Troubled Year That Finished on a High Note 3 Russia and Other CIS Countries: Troubling Undercurrents, But Still the Highest Launch Rate 5 Europe: A Good Year for Ariane, but not for ESA 7 Asia: China, India and Japan 7 A New Direction for the International Space Station 8 STATISTICAL DATA ON LAUNCHES: 1957-1993 11 PART ONE: AMERICAN AND RUSSIAN/CIS SPACE ACTIVITIES .... 17 CHAPTER 1: PREFACE 17 CHAPTER 2: HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT 21 SHOOTING FOR THE MOON 21 Early Flights: 1961-1966 21 1967: Double Tragedies 22 The United States Wins the Moon Race 22 DETENTE IN SPACE: THE APOLLO-SOYUZ TEST PROJECT (ASTP) 23 SPACE STATIONS 23 Russian/CIS Space Stations 23 The First Generation: Salyut 1-5 23 The Second Generation: Salyut 6 and 7 25 Third Generation: Mir ("Peace") 27 1986-1987 28 1988-1989 30 1990-1991 31 1992-1993 33 U.S. Space Stations 34 Skylab 34 The U.S./International Space Station Program 34 Space Station Freedom: 1984-1993 35 Space Station Alpha: Merging the Russian and American Space Stations 36 Congressional Action 39 Future Space Stations 39 REUSABLE SPACE VEHICLES 40 The U.S. Space Shuttle 40 The Challenger Tragedy 40 Pre-Challenger Shuttle Missions 41 Return to Flight 42 U.S. Hypersonics Research and the National Aero-Space Plane (NASP) 44 Russian/CIS Space Shuttle "Buran" 44 ---------- CHAPTER 3: SPACE APPLICATIONS FLIGHTS 73 COMMUNICATIONS 73 NAVIGATION 75 GEODESY AND MAPPING 77 SEARCH AND RESCUE 77 METEOROLOGICAL SATELLITES 77 REMOTE SENSING 78 MISSION TO PLANET EARTH AND THE EARTH OBSERVING SYSTEM 81 CHAPTER 4: SPACE SCIENCE 83 EARTH-ORBITAL SPACE SCIENCE 83 AUTOMATED LUNAR EXPLORATION 85 PLANETARY MISSIONS 86 FUTURE SPACE SCIENCE MISSIONS 90 CHAPTER 5: MILITARY SPACE ACTIVITIES 93 MILITARY VERSUS CIVIL SPACE MISSIONS 93 MILITARY SPACE PROGRAMS 93 SATELLITES IN SUPPORT OF THE PERSIAN GULF WAR 96 SPACE WEAPONS 97 Early U.S. and Soviet Antisatellite Programs 97 The Soviet Co-Orbital ASAT Device 98 U.S. F-15 Miniature Homing Vehicle ASAT Device 98 Other Antisatellite Devices 99 Soviet Fractional Orbital Bombardment System 100 CONCERNS ABOUT THE MILITARIZATION OF SPACE AND "STAR WARS" 100 FUTURE PROSPECTS 101 CHAPTER 6: SPACE PROGRAM MANAGEMENT AND RESOURCES 103 SPACE EXPENDITURES 103 MANAGEMENT OF SPACE PROGRAMS 104 U.S. Government Organization 104 The CIS and the Minsk Agreement 105 Russia 106 LAUNCH SITES 107 LAUNCH VEHICLES 109 U.S. Launch Vehicles 109 U.S. Launch Vehicle Policy 110 Russian/CIS Launch Vehicles 111 Vostok, Soyuz, Molniya, Cosmos, Proton and Cyclone 112 Zenit and Energiya 112 Decommissioned Missiles 114 Number of Launches Per Launch Vehicle 114 ---------- SPACE ACTIVITIES OF THE UNITED STATES, CIS, AND OTHER LAUNCHING COUNTRIES/ ORGANIZATIONS: 1957-1993 INTRODUCTION During the first era of space activities, only the United States and the Soviet Union had the ability to place satellites in Earth orbit or send them off to distant planets. As early as 1965, this monopoly was challenged by France, but the launch vehicle it developed could only orbit very small payloads, and its use ended ten years later. Britain also developed its own launch vehicle, but it was used only twice. Both Britain and France later joined with other European countries to form the European Space Agency (ESA), which now has a launch vehicle called Ariane. Four other countries--China, India, Israel, and Japan--also have independent launch capabilities. Shortly after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991, 9 of the 11 former Soviet republics who formed the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) signed an agreement to cooperate in space activities; a 10th (Ukraine) signed later. Thus, the CIS now counts as an "organization," rather than a single country, with the ability to launch satellites. Russia is by far the dominant CIS member-state involved in space, although Kazakhstan and Ukraine also have important roles. For example, one of the two former Soviet space launch sites is in Kazakhstan. Many Western analysts today refer to the former Soviet space program simply as the Russian space program, but since launches take place from Kazakhstan and Ukraine produces some of the rockets and spacecraft components, the terminology is misleading. In this report, references to ongoing space activities begun by the Soviet Union and continued by Russia and other CIS members are referred to as Russian/CIS. Activities undertaken by a single former republic such as Russia on its own are so identified. Programs begun and completed by the Soviet Union will continue to be referred to as Soviet activities. This report summarizes the programs of the United States and the other "launching" countries or organizations. Launches by commercial companies are included with the country where the company is headquartered; Arianespace (a French company) is addressed together with ESA. In general, however, commercial space activities are not discussed in this report; other CRS reports address that topic (see below). A statistical summary of launches and payloads since 1957 is shown in tables 1 and 2 [PLEASE CONTACT GATEWAY JAPAN FOR THESE TABLES]. CRS has prepared many other reports on space activities which the reader may wish to consult for further information. A series of studies entitled Soviet Space Programs was prepared for the Senate for two decades. The most recent edition (in two parts), covering 1981-1987, was published by the Senate ---------- page 2 Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee in 1988 and 1989. United States Civilian Space Programs 1958-1978 (Volumes I and II) was written for and published by the House Science and Technology Committee in 1981 and 1983. World-Wide Space Activities, which provides detailed information on the space activities of all countries in the world except the United States and Soviet Union, was prepared for and published by the House Science and Technology Committee in 1977. CRS Report 93-575 SPR, Space Activities of the Non-Launching Countries: A Fact Book, updates information on countries which use space but do not have an indigenous launch capability. As noted earlier, commercial space activities are not the focus of this report. Several other reports are available on commercial space topics, including Commercial Space Launch Services: The U.S. Competitive Position, prepared for and published by the House Science, Space and Technology Committee in 1991; CRS Report 92-933, Space Launch Services--The Competitive Playing Field: A Primer; CRS Report 92-125 SPR, U.S. Commercial Space Activities; and CRS Report 91-835 SPR, Commercial Space Activities in Europe. Other CRS reports and issue briefs are also available on specific space topics and are referenced herein. This report has been revised and updated by Marcia S. Smith, Specialist in Science and Technology Policy. Mr. Geoffrey Perry, M.B.E., head of the Kettering Group in England, provided data for the tables and other information. Daniel Gauthier provided the illustration of the Mir space station and the "Human-Tended Capability" phase of the Alpha space station. Information in the tables is current through December 31, 1993. The report is based on analysis of information contained in the numerous, unclassified sources cited in the above committee prints and reports, and on earlier editions of this report written by the late Charles S. Sheldon II, formerly a Senior Specialist in Space and Transportation. Detailed citations are omitted for the purpose of keeping this as brief as possible. The most frequently used printed sources, however, are publications as provided through the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), and trade publications such as Space News, Aviation Week and Space Technology and Aerospace Daily. SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES IN 1993 The bold plans of the major space-faring countries formulated in the 1980s continued to fall victim to economic realities during 1993, though the retrenchment in future space plans is not yet evident statistically. Although there were fewer launches this year, the decline can be attributed primarily to better technology that enables satellites to last longer (particularly in Russia's case), rather than resource scarcity-driven policy decisions by the launching countries to launch fewer spacecraft -- the impact of those decisions will not be noticeable in launch statistics for several years. The five countries (United States, China, India, Israel and Japan), and two organizations (the Commonwealth of Independent States and the European ---------- page 3 Space Agency) that launch satellites conducted a total of 79 successful launches in 1993, down from 94 in 1992. The United States had two launch failures, and Russia/CIS had one. India encountered yet another failure in its launch vehicle development program when its new PSLV rocket failed. Israel conducted no space launches. Though there were many more successes than failures during the year, the good news was overshadowed by the troubles almost every country encountered. Unquestionably, the most dramatic development during the year was the decision to merge the U.S.-led international space station (involving the United States, Europe, Japan, and Canada) with Russia's. This subject has such broad international dimensions that it is discussed separately below, rather than under the heading of a particular country. United States: A Troubled Year That Finished on a High Note Without question, 1993 was a difficult year for the U.S. space program. The three major U.S. government agencies that conduct space activities each suffered significant losses. In March, the first of the Department of Defense's (DOD's) new UHF Follow-On communications satellites was placed into an unusable orbit by its Atlas Centaur rocket. In August, a Titan IV rocket exploded shortly after liftoff, destroying its classified payload, reportedly four ocean surveillance satellites. Later in August, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) lost contact with its Mars Observer spacecraft just before it was to have entered Mars' orbit after an 11 month journey. The same day, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA, part of the Department of Commerce) lost contact with its NOM-13 weather satellite. In October, the long-awaited launched of NOM's Landsat 6 land remote sensing satellite ended in failure. Throughout the year, the space station program was not simply redesigned again, but went through a metamorphosis in which Russia is now an integral part of the program. All this while NASA's and DOD's space budget futures grew more cloudy with attempts to get the budget deficit under control. ---------- page 4 These difficulties obscured the success stories. For example, there were seven successful space shuttle launches in 1993, ending with a mission that repaired the Hubble space telescope. Two sets of two astronauts performed five EVAs (one nearly 8 hours long) to repair the myopic telescope, launched in 1990 with a flawed primary mirror. The success of the shuttle crew seemed to repair NASA's image (at least temporarily) as much as the telescope itself. The other six shuttle flights were for deploying a data relay satellite, conducting atmospheric studies (ATLAS), conducting two Spacelab missions (Germany's Spacelab D-2, and NASA's Space Life Sciences-2), retrieving Europe's Eureca platform, and deploying NASA's Advanced Communication Technology Satellite. Several EVAs were conducted to practice techniques either for repairing Hubble or for constructing the space station. The Department of Defense (DOD) also had something to cheer about in 1993: its NAVSTAR Global Positioning System (GPS) reached "initial operational capability." Though widely used for years by the civilian and military sectors (notably in the Persian Gulf War), the system only now can provide positioning information anywhere in the world, 24 hours a day, regardless of the weather. Two of the NAVSTAR launch vehicles carried NASA experiments to test the deployment of tethers (called SEDS) in the wake of the unsuccessful Italian tethered payload deployment last year from the shuttle. The Department of Energy (DOE) also sponsored a satellite in 1993 called Alexis (Array of Low Energy X-ray Imaging Sensors), and another experiment-VHF Spectrum Utilization Experiment (VSUME) was attached to the rocket that placed the satellite in orbit. After several weeks of brief, intermittent contact with Alexis that led many to conclude the satellite was a loss, ground controllers were able to coax the satellite back into full operation. In summary, the United States suffered two launch failures (a term used in this report to mean the satellite did not attain orbit), the Titan IV and Landsat 6; the failure of two satellites in orbit, the UHF 1 communications satellite (counted here as a payload failure since it did attain orbit, even though the fault was with the launch vehicle, not the satellite) and the NOAA-13 weather satellite; and the failure of Mars Observer as it approached Mars. Since NASA is by far the most visible U.S. agency involved in space, the public perception appeared to be that all these failures were NASA's. In fact, only the Mars Observer spacecraft was owned by NASA, though NASA had been the contracting agent for the procurement and launch of NOAA-13. NASA was not involved in the other three failures which were, as noted, NOAA's (Landsat 6) or DOD's (UHF 1 and Titan IV). How much NASA's and DOD's images are restored with the successful Hubble repair mission and the successful Titan IV launch in February 1994 remains to be seen. Amidst the well publicized failures, it is important to remember that there were 23 successful launches. ---------- page 5 Russia and Other CIS Countries: Troubling Undercurrents, But Still the Highest Launch Rate The December auction of Soviet space artifacts by Sotheby's in New York created a wide-spread perception that the Russian space program had gone out of business. This is hardly the case, as the statistics in the accompanying table show [PLEASE CONTACT GATEWAY JAPAN FOR THIS TABLE]. Russia, working with other former Soviet republics (notably Kazakhstan and Ukraine), continues to have the highest launch rate in the world. With 47 successful launches in 1993, the Russians are launching at only half the rate that they did during the peak years of the Soviet space program, but to some extent that is accounted for by the longer lifetimes of their newer satellites -- they do not have to be replaced as often. Replacement crews were sent to the Mir space station, which continues to be permanently occupied. One of the crews included a Frenchman who visited the station for three weeks. An SS-25 mobile missile was converted into a space launch vehicle, called Start-1 (after the START Treaty that required SS-25s to be decommissioned), and successfully placed a satellite in orbit (although the satellite apparently did not function as planned). Communications, navigation, weather, remote sensing, photographic reconnaissance, electronic ocean reconnaissance, early warning, and electronic intelligence satellites all were launched during the year. Although no scientific satellites were launched during 1993, funding was provided for spacecraft to be launched in 1994 (a solar physics satellite, Coronas, and the Mars-94 probe). In fact, the only space program that appears to have been cancelled since the demise of the Soviet Union is the Buran space shuttle and its Energiya launch vehicle. Even there, conflicting statements have been made by Russian officials about the fate of those programs. This high-level of activity creates a misperception that everything is fine in the former Soviet space program. While superficially the space program looks healthy, it may more closely fit the analogy of a levee on the flood-swollen Mississippi -- visibly strong on the surface, but slowly eroding at the base. As an example of the troubling undercurrents that could affect the space program in 1994 were supply problems in obtaining required engines for Soyuz rockets. In two cases, engines were not available for launch vehicles needed to support the space station program. First, a rocket was not available to launch a cargo resupply spacecraft, Progress M-20, in the fall. An older version of the rocket had to be "borrowed" from the Hydrometeorological Committee (which had procured some in the past for launching weather satellites). Then, a rocket could not be found to launch the three-man Mir replacement crew in November. Since the rockets owned by the Hydrometeorological Committee are less capable than the ones in use today, one could not be utilized for launching the crew unless only two cosmonauts were launched instead of three. Rather than reducing the crew size, the launch was slipped from November 1993 to January 1994 so the company that makes the rocket engines could be paid and the engines delivered to the rocket production factory. (The new crew was launched on January 8.) ---------- page 6 The health of the Baikonur Cosmodrome in Kazakhstan also is a concern. Russian and Kazakh press reports have consistently painted a picture of deteriorating conditions there since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Kazakh troops have rioted because of poor working and living conditions. During 1993, conditions worsened, especially in Leninsk, the city that services the launch site. For example, as the three-man crew of Soyuz TM-17 were getting ready for launch, they were unable to stay at Baikonur during the days prior to the launch because "there is a problem with potable water at Baykonur [sic]. Things were never very good, but never as bad as today. So they will have to return to Moscow." (Moscow Ostankino Television, June 8, 1993). By the time the Clinton White House announced that the United States would merge its space station program with Russia's, Western analysts of the Russian space program were painting a bleak picture of conditions at Baikonur based on these types of reports. While Baikonur certainly is capable of supporting launches (it supported 21 successful launches in 1993, plus one failure), the question is what the site will be like in 1997 and beyond when it would be needed to support building and operating a new space station. Concerned about the bad publicity, the White House hired a U.S. consulting firm, ANSER, to visit the site. Two ANSER representatives from the firm's Moscow office visited Baikonur and reported that the launch pads and associated infrastructure were in good working order, while allowing that Leninsk was in poor condition. (In a February 1994 article in Rossiskaya Gazette, the head of Baikonur, General Alexandr Shumilin, sharply criticized the ANSER report for being superficial. Shumilin said Baikonur "is in need of serious assistance to maintain impeccable technical readiness.") Because of the conflicting reports about conditions at the site and its critical role in the joint U.S.-Russian space station program, a delegation from the Committee on Science, Space and Technology of the U.S. House of Representatives visited Baikonur in December. Upon his return, the committee's chairman, Rep. George Brown (D-CA), reported that the launch facilities he visited (a Proton launch pad and its associated processing facility, and the Energiya processing facility) seemed in good condition, but that the site clearly needed financial investment in order to maintain its readiness. NASA insists that it considers conditions there acceptable, and not a threat to the NASA astronaut who will be launched to Mir from Baikonur in 1995 (two Americans, Norman Thagard and Bonnie Dunbar, are training for the mission; Thagard is expected to make the flight, with Dunbar as his backup). Although Russia and Kazakhstan already have signed two agreements concerning the use of Baikonur, they apparently are not being implemented well. On December 26, the two countries agreed to meet again to discuss Baikonur's future, this time to consider a proposal for Russia to lease the facility. Meetings were held in February and March 1994, but no agreement had been reached by the time this report was written. ---------- page 7 Europe: A Good Year for Ariane, but not for ESA Arianespace had a very successful year, with seven successful launches and no failures. The seven launches placed 17 satellites, primarily communications satellites, in orbit. (An Ariane launch failure in January 1994, is not expected to have a major affect on Ariane's launch schedule; flights are expected to resume in May.) The European Space Agency (ESA), however, found itself again revising its long-term plans in response to worsening economic conditions in Europe and the ever-changing international space station program. A new long range plan proposed by ESA's Director-General, Jean-Marie Luton, was rejected by the ESA Council in October as too expensive. When the Council met again in December, long-standing difficulties over dealing with currency exchange rates that would have placed additional financial demands on weak-currency countries (Britain, Italy and Spain) could not be resolved. Coupled with an on-going German- French argument over financial commitments to ESA's part of the space station program, decisions were again delayed. At the end of February 1994, the ESA Council agreed on a FY 1994 funding level of $2.9 billion, 10 percent less than FY 1993. Exactly how this will affect ESA's plans was still being determined as this report was being written. Apparently, ESA will conduct studies proposed at the October meeting of a "Manned Space Transportation Program" that incorporates a smaller version of the Columbus Attached Pressurized Module (renamed "APM-5") as part of the international space station, a Crew Transport Vehicle (CTV) for taking crews and cargo back and forth to the station, and an Automated Transfer Vehicle (ATV), or space tug, for tasks such as delivering space station components to their destination. No decision on whether to proceed with construction of these vehicles will be made until 1995. Space science, environmental, communications and data relay satellite programs fared better than those involving human spaceflight, though these activities are also stressed for funding. For example, ESA does not currently have sufficient funding allocated to keep its ERS-1 radar satellite operating until its successor, ERS-2, is launched. ESA officials are hopeful that member countries will come forward with the estimated $10 million to prevent a data gap of seven months. Asia: China, India and Japan China and India had their own bad luck in 1993. China conducted only one launch, of a recoverable satellite, in October. The satellite's reentry capsule was pointed in the wrong direction when its engine fired to return the capsule to Earth, however. The capsule went higher in altitude rather than returning to Earth. It is still in orbit, expected to reenter naturally (uncontrolled) in 1994. On a different front, new sanctions against China by the United States continued to complicate China's launch services marketing business during the last half of the year. ---------- page 8 India's test of its new Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV) ended in failure in September. An agreement to purchase Russian cryogenic rocket engines and associated technology and know-how was altered by Russia's decision to adhere to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in order to obtain increased space cooperation with the United States. Russia will still sell the engines to India, but not allow the direct transfer of technology and know-how. Japan was the only one of the three Asian countries that did not suffer a failure in 1993, but it had a quiet year while awaiting the first launch of the new H-2 rocket (which was successfully accomplished in February 1994). Hence, there was only one Japanese launch, of Astro D, a U.S./Japanese x-ray astronomy observatory. The Japanese space budget is expected to rise in 1994, but the schedules for several Japanese space missions slipped during 1993. The commercial side of Japan's space activities suffered from the economic downturn, with two of its three private communications satellite companies (JCSAT and SAJAC) deciding to merge. A New Direction for the International Space Station The ever-changing space station program took yet another twist in 1993, this one redefining the fundamental rationale for the program. Sold for years as "the next logical step" for NASA, the program has now become part of the U.S.-Russian foreign policy agenda. As he assumed office, President Bill Clinton learned that NASA was conceding a $1 billion overrun in the space station Freedom program, a joint effort among the United States, Europe, Canada and Japan. Begun by President Reagan in 1984, NASA spent $11.2 billion on Freedom from FY 1985-1993. Though he supported the program during his campaign, the news of the overrun (or "cost growth" as NASA called it) and realization of how expensive the program would be over its 30 years of operation, led President Clinton to direct NASA to redesign the station to be more cost-effective. The station already had been through several major redesigns (1986, 1987, 1989 and 1991). The initial 90-day redesign activity resulted in three options (A, B and C). In June, President Clinton chose a combination of the A and B designs. Another NASA team then developed a new, merged design, tentatively called Alpha, that was released on September 7. (The name Freedom was dropped.) However, five days earlier, on September 2, Vice President Gore and Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin announced they had reached preliminary agreement to merge the Russian and American space station programs. A primary U.S. motivation for merging the two programs was persuading Russia to adhere to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), designed to stop the proliferation of ballistic missile technology. Russia had signed an agreement to sell rocket engine technology to India, which the United States claimed violated the MTCR. Russia indicated that it wanted increased space cooperation as well as an agreement allowing Russia to compete in the commercial space ---------- page 9 launch services market, and the United States made clear that adherence to the MTCR was a prerequisite. Russia agreed to adhere to the MTCR and renegotiate its contract with India so that technology and know-how would not be transferred. The United States agreed to pay Russia $400 million for space cooperation, the same amount Russia said it would lose by changing the contract with India. The original international partners in the program (Europe, Canada, and Japan), already buffeted by the repeated redesigns, were caught unawares by this new proposal. After three high-level government meetings in the fall of 1993, however, the United States convinced them to invite Russia to join the project. Russia accepted on December 16, 1993. Paperwork officially bringing Russia into the space station program as a partner is still being created (the original partners want to avoid reopening the Intergovernmental Agreement which governs the program since it must be ratified by the member governments), but NASA signed a contract with the Russian space agency (RKA) on December 16 that sets the stage for space station cooperation. (The contract is for the $400 million the United States agreed to pay Russia.) Meanwhile, Europe and Canada are experiencing their own domestic budgetary problems. As noted above, Europe is scaling back the size of its laboratory module and will not decide for certain until 1995 whether to build it at all. Canada announced in February 1994 that it would restructure its commitment to the space station program as well, deciding that it cannot afford to build the Mobile Servicing System. (Reportedly Canada had decided to withdraw from the program completely, but the U.S. Government convinced it to look at options for restructuring its participation instead.) Agreements signed by Gore and Chernomyrdin in September and December 1993 outline three phases of U.S.-Russian space station cooperation (other cooperative space agreements were also signed): Phase I (1994-1997) involves U.S. use of the existing Russian space station, Mir, and flights of Russian cosmonauts on the U.S. space shuttle; Phase II (1997-1998) involves building a Russian-American space station; and Phase III (1998-2002) envisions that space station evolving into a multi-national facility that includes the European, Canadian and Japanese components once envisioned for Freedom. Once assembly of the station is complete, it would be operated for 10 years. NASA's most recent design and cost estimate (February 1994) shows the station costing the United States $17.4 billion from FY 1994-2002, not including shuttle launch costs. Operational costs of $1.3 billion a year for 10 years are anticipated. At the time Congress was voting on NASA's FY 1994 funding bills, NASA was insisting that it planned to build the September 7 version of Alpha (without major Russian involvement), even though the Gore-Chernomyrdin announcement already had been made. Uncertain about what space station design it was funding, Congress fenced approximately half of NASA's space station funding for FY 1994 ($1 billion of the $2.1 billion provided) until March 31, 1994 when NASA must report to Congress on the program. ---------- page 10 Congress also directed NASA to ensure that Russian cooperation "enhance and not enable" the space station, but the most recent design (February 1994) shows a station dependent upon Russian systems for guidance, navigation and control (GN&C) as well as other functions such as reboosting the station periodically to maintain the correct altitude (to compensate for atmospheric drag). NASA says it has a fall-back position (the September 7 Alpha design) in case Russia withdraws from the program. On the positive side, joining with the Russians is a symbol of the end of the Cold War; has emotional appeal for space enthusiasts who have long wanted to merge the capabilities of the two space superpowers; gives NASA and its original partners access to 20 years of Russian space station experience; and is a tool of U.S.-Russian foreign policy. NASA also asserts that the space station will be ready sooner, cost U.S. taxpayers less, and be more capable than the September 7 Alpha design. On the negative side, the current plan makes the United States dependent on Russia for critical aspects of the program, notably the guidance, navigation and control function, and reboost. Hence, if something goes awry with Russian cooperation, the United States would have to reformulate the program again. The station will take from now until 2002 to be built, and then is expected to operate for 10 years -- an 18 year commitment. What if Russia violates the MTCR? Would the United States terminate Russia's involvement, or would it look the other way in order to preserve the program? The economic and political stability of Russia are uncertain. Since the launch site Russia uses to support space station activities is in Kazakhstan, not Russia, the economic and political stability of Kazakhstan are of concern, as is the relationship between Russia and Kazakhstan. The health of the infrastructure at that launch site, the Baikonur Cosmodrome, is worrisome, as already discussed. The traditional issues that have framed the space station debate for the past several years are unresolved as well: can NASA afford the space station without sacrificing other mission priorities; can the United States afford the space station and balance the budget at the same time; and how many jobs are involved in this new, down-sized space station program, an important aspect of political support in Congress? But during 1994, the issue that undoubtedly will take center stage is the wisdom of Russian involvement. This argument pits foreign policy against space policy. If the goal is to use space as a tool of foreign policy, then the agreement with Russia appears to have merit. Russia agreed to abide by the MTCR, at least $400 million in economic support is being provided to Russia through nonforeign aid channels, and Russian scientists and engineers will be employed in the "peaceful" pursuit of building a space station rather than building missiles, for example. In this context, whether the space station is actually built or not is unimportant. If the goal is to build a space station, however, Russian involvement complicates a complex program already at risk. Were NASA beginning to build ---------- page 11 a space station now, working with Russia would seem to make eminent sense because of Russia's long experience in this field. But NASA's space station program already has withstood five major redesigns (1986, 1987, 1989, 1991 and 1993). If something goes awry with Russian cooperation, Congress may not have the patience to entertain yet another redesign with associated increased costs. Loading weighty foreign policy issues onto the shoulders of a program that already has consumed 10 years and $11.2 billion without any space station components yet in orbit (and the first launch still four years away) does not seem likely to help the space station reach fruition. Congress will have to decide whether foreign policy or space policy should be the primary rationale for proceeding with, or terminating, the space station program. STATISTICAL DATA ON LAUNCHES: 1957-1993 The following tables [PLEASE CONTACT GATEWAY JAPAN FOR THESE TABLES] provide data on total launch successes and failures and payload successes for all countries, and types of payloads launched by the United States and Soviet Union/CIS, from 1957 to 1993. Footnotes explain some of the cautions to be observed in using the tables. For example, launch "success" indicates only that a payload achieved orbit, not that it achieved the intended orbit. If a payload is placed in an incorrect orbit, it is counted as a launch success, but a payload failure, even though the launch vehicle may have been at fault. ---------- page 12 Table 1a Worldwide Record of Successful Space Launches ---------- page 13 TABLE lb. Worldwide Record of Known Space Launch Failures ---------- page 14 Table 1c Worldwide record of Payloads Successfully Launched ---------- page 15 TABLE 2. Summary of U.S. and Russian/CIS Payloads by Mission o o Assignments are arbitrary to some extent and subject to revision each year as more information becomes available. This table is meant to provide only a general level of effort for each country and should be used cautiously. ---------- page 73 CHAPTER 3 SPACE APPLICATIONS FLIGHTS Applications satellites are those spacecraft whose functions provide direct applications to a user community, including communications, navigation, weather and other types of remote sensing, and geodesy. While the term is usually applied to civilian satellites, they are close cousins of military satellites, and in most cases it is extremely difficult to distinguish whether a particular satellite should be counted as military or civilian. Military space activities in general are discussed in chapter 5. COMMUNICATIONS The United States was the first country to experiment with communications satellites. At first, satellites which could store information for later relay to Earth (called store/dump) were used and, at about the same time, passive balloon reflectors (Echo, for example). Beginning in 1963, the United States started placing communications satellites in geostationary orbit (GEO) at 35,880 kilometers altitude above the Equator (a satellite in this orbit will maintain a fixed position relative to a given point on the ground). This type of communications satellite has devices called transponders that receive signals transmitted from a ground station, boost the power of the signals and instantly retransmit them to another ground station (or sometimes multiple ground stations) hundreds or thousands of kilometers away. Only three properly positioned geostationary satellites are needed to provide global communication (except for the polar regions which are difficult to reach from an equatorial orbit because of the curvature of the Earth). Communications satellites are used today to send television signals, telephone calls and data around the world. Costs for using satellites have diminished as capacity has grown. Commercial and Government satellites are regularly launched to serve the military, civilian and commercial sectors. Though geostationary satellites have been the staple of commercial satellite systems for two decades, interest is growing in using "constellations" of satellites in low Earth orbit (LEO) for many mobile communications services (such as car telephones). Several U.S. companies have applied to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) for licenses to operate systems that include several dozen satellites. Perhaps the best known is Motorola's proposed Iridium system of 66 (originally 77) satellites. A signal would be transmitted up to a satellite and then forwarded from satellite to satellite until it reached the proper destination. Hence, these are called "store and forward" systems. ---------- page 74 NASA has also established the geostationary Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS) for relaying communications between spacecraft in lower orbits and ground controllers. The signal travels from the spacecraft to a TDRSS satellite and then to the ground controller (or vice verse). Consequently NASA was able to close most of its ground-based tracking stations around the world and the amount of time ground-controllers can be in contact with spacecraft in low orbits increased from 15 percent to 85 percent. (NASA's Deep Space Network of ground-based tracking stations in California, Spain and Australia, used to track spacecraft in extremely high orbits or elsewhere in the solar system, continues to operate.) NASA launched the Advanced Communications Technology Satellite (ACTS) in 1993 to demonstrate new technologies for communications satellites generally. The program was controversial for years because the Reagan Administration believed that the private sector should fund this research, while Congress consistently supported the view that such activities are too expensive for the private sector to pursue alone, and that in order to maintain U.S. competitiveness in these technologies, Government support is needed. The private sector paid for part of the ACTS program, but the majority of the funding is from NASA. The United States initiated creation of the International Telecommunication Satellite Organization (INTELSAT), established in 1964 to provide for an international communication satellite system. Today, 123 countries belong to INTELSAT. Originally the Soviet Union did not belong to INTELSAT, instead creating its own system called INTERSPUTNIK (see below), but finally joined INTELSAT in 1991. Today, several of the former Soviet republics, including Russia, are members. The success of INTELSAT spawned creation of the International Maritime Satellite Organization (INMARSAT) in 1979 for maritime communications and it now has 73 members. The Soviet Union was a founding member of INMARSAT, and several former Soviet republics are now members. INMARSAT is the secretariat for the search and rescue satellite system COSPAS/SARSAT (see below), and is expanding its activities to include other forms of mobile communications than for maritime purposes. The Soviets established the first domestic communications satellite system (as opposed to an international system like INTELSAT) beginning in 1965. The Soviets used a different approach to communications satellites, deploying their Molniya satellites in highly elliptical orbits with an apogee of approximately 40,000 kilometers over the northern hemisphere and a perigee of approximately 500 kilometers over the southern hemisphere, rather than in geostationary orbit. This provides a long linger time over the northern hemisphere (8 hours), and four of these satellites can provide 24 hour coverage within the former Soviet Union. The Molniya type of orbit is better than geostationary orbit for communicating at high latitudes where the curvature of the Earth makes it difficult for signals to reach from the Equator. ---------- page 75 Although the Molniya orbit is good for internal communications in the former Soviet Union, geostationary satellites are better for international communications and in 1974, the Soviets launched their first geostationary satellite. Ultimately they developed three different geostationary satellite systems: Raduga (1975), Ekran (1976), and Gorizont (1978). Raduga is used by the military, while Gorizont is primary civilian. Ekran satellites were used for direct television broadcasting, but the system is scheduled to be replaced by satellites called GALS (the first GALS launch was in March 1994). The Soviets also launched geostationary satellites with experimental systems using higher frequencies. The Soviets launched their own data relay satellites beginning in 1986 and use them for data relay between the space station Mir and ground control. A full system like the U.S. TDRSS has not been deployed, however. They have also retained the old store/dump type of communications satellite for tactical and theater operations. Russia and other members of the CIS continue to place great importance on communications satellites since it is apparent that attempts to attract foreign businesses require state-of-the-art communications systems. Also, they are striving to convert military communications satellite systems to civilian purposes, including the Raduga geostationary satellites and the low Earth orbit store/dump systems (two competing commercial versions are Coscon and Gonetz). Between these conversion efforts, interest by Russia and foreign countries in developing new communications satellite systems, and membership in INTELSAT and INMARSAT, it can be expected that communications in the CIS will continue to improve. As noted above, instead of joining INTELSAT, the Soviet Union formed INTERSPUTNIK in 1971 as a competitor. At its peak, 15 countries were members of INTERSPUTNIK, primarily members of the Soviet bloc plus Soviet allies. INTERSPUTNIK reportedly is now being operated as a commercial enterprise and is run primarily by Germans (Germany took over East Germany's membership in the system after reunification). Many countries have their own dedicated communications satellites (in addition to using the INTELSAT system). After the Soviets, Canada was next to have a domestic communications satellite system, followed by the United States. Japan, India, Europe (collectively and individual countries), Indonesia, China, Mexico, Brazil, Australia, the members of the Arab League, and Thailand are among those who have bought and/or launched their own communications satellites. NAVIGATION The United States has two navigation satellite systems. The older system is operated by the U.S. Navy and is expected to be phased out in 1996. Originally called Transit, it was renamed the Navy Navigation Satellite System (the satellites are sometimes called Oscar) and provides two-dimensional data ---------- page 76 (latitude and longitude). The system has been widely used by the civil sector in addition to its primary purpose of supporting military users. A new, improved system is now available, however. The NAVSTAR Global Positioning System (NAVSTAR GPS) provides three-dimensional data (latitude, longitude, and altitude), 24 hours a day, anywhere on the globe, in all weather conditions. The satellites have two channels that were designed to operate at different levels of accuracy, a "coarse" level telling users their position within 100 meters, and a "precise" level with 16 meter accuracy. The coarse level turned out to be better than DOD expected, however, so DOD now employs a process called "Selective Availability" (SA) in which it deliberately degrades the quality of the signal so that 100 meter accuracy is provided to the civil sector. Since military NAVSTAR GPS receivers (with special decoding equipment to circumvent SA) were not widely available at the time of the Persian Gulf War, however, civilian receivers were used by DOD, and SA was discontinued. All users thus had access to 16 meter accuracy. After the war was over, DOD reinstated SA, angering many civilian users who want the more precise data. This issue and others (such as whether DOD should continue to operate the system since so much of its use is by the civilian sector) are currently being debated. (See CRS Report 94-171 SPR, GPS: Satellite Navigation and Positioning and the DOD's Narstar Global Positioning System.) Russia/CIS has a navigation satellite system similar to Transit. Some of the satellites are used for civilian purpose and others for the military. At one time, the Soviets exhibited one of the civilian satellites at a conference with a placard stating its name as "Tsikada," but the first satellite carrying that designation was not launched until January 1993. In 1989, the Soviets began naming these satellites "Nadezhda." The military satellites, apparently of the same design, simply receive a generic "Cosmos" designation like most other Russian/CIS military satellites. Russia/CIS is also developing a three-dimensional navigation satellite system like NAVSTAR. Their system is called GLONASS, and the satellites usually are launched three at a time. (In 1989, two GLONASS launches involved only two GLONASS satellites, while the third in each case was a geodetic satellite designated Etalon.) GLONASS satellites have been launched since 1982, but these are part of a developmental program; the Soviets had expected the system to be fully operational in 1995. The CIS continues to launch GLONASS satellites and may still be aiming at 1995 as an operational date. The similarity between NAVSTAR GPS and GLONASS and their ability to provide altitude data in addition to latitude and longitude has led to plans by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and other aviation groups to discuss a Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) relying on both systems. Northwest Airlines and Honeywell have tested both NAVSTAR GPS and GLONASS receivers, and receivers that can use either system are being developed. Technical and policy issues remain to be resolved before the international aircraft community begin to rely on a joint system. In 1993, ICAO decided to use GLONASS rather than NAVSTAR GPS as the basis for GNSS ---------- page 77 allegedly because NAVSTAR GPS is operated by a military organization (DOD). GLONASS does not appear different in this regard, however, since it is operated by Russia's Ministry of Defense, so the ICAO position in perplexing. GEODESY AND MAPPING The United States has flown many geodetic space missions in the interest of tying together maps of different parts of the world and for basic scientific studies to understand better the true shape of the planet. (Such data are needed for many purposes, including missile targeting.) If there have been mapping flights as well, the results have not been published. Among the U.S. geodetic flights was LAGEOS (Laser Geodynamic Satellite) launched in 1976. A follow-on, LAGEOS-2 (built by Italy), was launched in 1992. The Soviet Union made few public statements about such flights, though clearly it also has an interest in such data. Some flights in the Cosmos series have orbital characteristics which would support such missions. As noted above, two Etalon geodetic satellites were launched in 1989 in conjunction with GLONASS launches. SEARCH AND RESCUE In 1984, the Soviet Union and the members of SARSAT (the United States, Canada and France) signed an agreement providing for the operational phase of the COSPAS/SARSAT system which is used to locate ships and aircraft in distress. Transponders on Russian/CIS navigation satellites and U.S. NOAA weather satellites pick up signals from emergency locator transmitters on ships and aircraft in distress and relay them to ground stations and control centers in Russia, the United States, Canada, France, Norway and Britain from which rescue forces are deployed. The COSPAS transponders were developed by the Soviets; the transponders on the U.S. satellites are developed cooperatively by the United States, France, and Canada and are called SARSAT. INMARSAT serves as the secretariat for COSPAS/SARSAT. METEOROLOGICAL SATELLITES The United States has an operational weather satellite system using two satellites in Sun-synchronous polar orbits (called NOAA for the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration which operates them), and (normally) two Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites (GOES) in geostationary orbit. (Each time a satellite in a Sun-synchronous orbit passes over any given location on Earth, it is precisely the same time as when it last passed over that site, e.g., 9:30 a.m., thus providing data with the same Sun angles which makes analysis of the data much easier.) NASA developed a low-cost ground terminal for receiving data from the polar orbiting satellites, called APT (automatic picture transmission) equipment, which is now available through a variety of companies to anyone in the world. The U.S. Department of Defense has its own polar orbiting weather satellites, called the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP), although at the end of 1993 the ---------- page 78 House of Representatives approved a proposal to merge the NOAA and DMSP programs (and part of NASA's EOS program, see below) in the hope of saving program costs. Only one GOES satellite is currently working, and problems were encountered in building the next generation (called GOES-NEXT). NOAA (part of the Department of Commerce) is using a European geostationary weather satellite (Meteosat-3) for coverage of the east coast of the United States as a backup until the first GOES-NEXT can be launched (currently scheduled for April 1994). [For further information, see CRS Report 91-634 SPR, Development Problems of the Next Generation Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites (GOES-NEXT) and CRS Issue Brief 92082.] Russia/CIS has polar orbiting weather satellites called Meteor, but these are not in Sun-synchronous orbits. Russia/CIS does not have geostationary weather satellites, although they had promised to launch such a satellite as part of an international weather program in 1979. In late 1991, a Western report asserted that the satellite, GOMS, would be launched in 1992, but it had not occurred even by the end of 1993. In August 1991, the Soviets launched a Meteor-3 satellite that carried a U.S. sensor to study the ozone layer, called TOMS (Total Ozone Mapping Spectrometer). At the time, the Soviets announced that no more Meteors would be launched unless the program could become financially self sufficient, but a new Meteor-2 was orbited in 1993. Japan and India also have geostationary weather satellites; China launches polar orbiting weather satellites. REMOTE SENSING Remote sensing satellites are designed to look down at the Earth from space. Although weather satellites also fall into the category of remote sensing, the term is more often applied to satellites that provide data on mineral deposits, pollution sources, crop forecasting, land management, or the oceans, for example. From 1972 to 1984, NASA launched five Landsat satellites for land remote sensing. Data from the Landsat spacecraft were made available on a nondiscriminatory basis to anyone for a fee. The first three Landsats had 80 meter resolution; Landsat 4 and 5 have 30 meter resolution (resolution is the ability to "see" an object, so a 30 meter resolution means that you can detect objects larger than 30 meters in diameter). Landsat 4 and 5 are still operating, though they have far exceeded their design lifetimes. The U.S. Government decided not to launch any more Landsat satellites, expecting the private sector to take over the program since the technology had become mature. Legislation passed Congress in 1984 (P.L. 98-365) to facilitate transfer of the remote sensing program to the private sector. NOAA (which was ---------- page 79 given operational responsibility for the Landsat series as well as for the weather satellites) selected a contractor, EOSAT, to commercialize the system, but the "privatization" of Landsat was complicated by disputes between the Executive Branch and Congress over promised Government subsidies to EOSAT. The issue was especially controversial in 1989, and was reviewed by the National Space Council which decided that the U.S. Government would support the Landsat program. EOSAT built Landsat 6 for NOAA, and it was launched in October 1993. For reasons still not clear, the satellite did not enter orbit and the mission was lost. The future of the Landsat program remains in doubt after more than a decade of turbulence. In 1992, Congress and the Bush Administration decided that NASA and DOD would assume responsibility for building and operating Landsat 7 and any other Landsat satellites. At the end of 1993, however, the two agencies were deadlocked over funding issues and the matter was remanded to the White House for resolution. In February 1993, DOD announced that it had terminated its involvement in the program; NASA is now developing a plan to take over sole responsibility for the program. Budget constraints at NASA call into question whether the agency can afford Landsat, however, unless it is willing to cancel some other program. Meanwhile, several commercial companies are interested in building and operating satellites with better resolution than Landsat (though not in all the spectral bands Landsat would provide), as good as 1 meter. Tenacious policy issues, primarily based on national security concerns about the high quality of the images, delayed a Clinton Administration decision on whether to permit such systems until March 1994, but it now appears that companies can proceed within the boundaries of the new policy. What impact this will have on Landsat planning remains to be seen. Congress passed a new remote sensing law in 1992 (P.L. 102-555) which repealed the 1984 law. Among other things, while the Government presumably builds the satellites, data are to be provided to certain types of users (such as government scientists) for nominal charges, while a commercial distributor (perhaps EOSAT) will sell "value-added" data to commercial users (such as corporations). The "non-discriminatory" language of the 1984 law was dropped. Commercial companies interested in building remote sensing system must get an operating license from NOAA according to the Act. The United States also pioneered in ocean remote sensing. In 1978, SEASAT was launched carrying a synthetic aperture radar (SAR) and other instruments to make oceanographic observations and measurements (ocean waves, ice fields, coastal conditions, surface temperature, and others). The spacecraft suffered a malfunction after only 100 days in orbit, however. Similar radars were flown on the space shuttle (SIR-A and SIR-B) and additional flights are planned in 1994. The shuttle can stay in orbit for only several days, however. Attempts to build a follow-on to SEASAT failed because of budgetary considerations. NASA developed an instrument, called a scatterometer, that was to have flown on one of the proposed follow-on satellites. That instrument, now ---------- page 80 designated NSCAT (NASA Scatterometer), is expected to fly on a Japanese spacecraft called ADEOS in 1996. NASA also developed the TOPEX (Ocean Topography Experiment)/Poseidon satellite in conjunction with France. It was launched in 1992. The Soviet Union developed a great interest in remote sensing. Crews on Salyut 6 and 7 from 1977-1986 spent a considerable amount of time performing Earth resources investigations with a variety of cameras, including a six channel multispectral camera (MKF-6M) developed by East Germany. A version of the MKF is installed on the new Mir space station, and crews perform remote sensing observations using hand held cameras and a topographic camera called KATE-140, also. One of the modules scheduled to dock with Mir is devoted to remote sensing studies. Called Priroda, the launch date has slipped several times; the latest plan apparently is to launch it in 1995. The Soviets also launched several experimental Landsat-type satellites in the Resurs-O series. A third series of remote sensing flights, Resurs-F, uses satellites that are indistinguishable from military reconnaissance flights in terms of orbital parameters and lifetimes. The spacecraft remain in orbit for only two to four weeks, after which a capsule containing exposed film is deorbited. Although some Western analysts count these as reconnaissance rather than Earth resources missions, this report classifies them as remote sensing since there is no logical reason for the Russians to specify that these flights, in particular, are for remote sensing, when ordinarily they would simply say nothing about their mission. Russia offers data, with 5 meter resolution, from these satellites on the commercial market. In 1992, Russia began marketing data with 2 meter resolution that apparently are from military digital imaging reconnaissance satellites. Presumably, the data have better than 2 meter resolution originally, but are degraded to the 2 meter level to lessen national security considerations. In 1987, the Soviets launched a large satellite, Cosmos 1870, or Resurs-R, which carried a synthetic aperture radar (SAR). At the end of its two-year lifetime, the Soviets announced that it was the first of a series of SAR-equipped satellites called Almaz. The first satellite carrying that name was launched in March 1991, although it suffered a partial failure that year and was deorbited in 1992. Another Almaz was planned for launch in 1994, but reports at the end of 1992 suggested that such plans were contingent on financing. Almaz produces radar data with 15 meter resolution. (As noted in chapter 2, the design of this spacecraft originated with the space station program in the 1970s.) Russia/CIS also launches satellites with side-looking radars (SLRs) called Okean-O for remote sensing of the oceans and especially for guiding ships through the Arctic Ocean. France, China, the European Space Agency, India and Japan also have or are planning land and/or ocean sensing satellites. ---------- page 81 MISSION TO PLANET EARTH AND THE EARTH OBSERVING SYSTEM NASA and the world's scientific community have initiated a program called Mission to Planet Earth (MPE), which will provide data to help scientists better understand the Earth as a total system and what effect the human population has on the planet. Generically, this field of study is called global change research and includes such topics such as global warming, ozone depletion, and deforestation. The international scientific effort to study global change is called the International Geosphere-Biosphere Program (IGBP). NASA defines MPE as certain satellites and associated data systems needed to provide data for the global change research program. Originally, NASA planned four large, multipurpose spacecraft called "platforms" in polar orbit (around Earth's poles), five platforms in geostationary orbit, plus a variety of other satellites in different orbits from which special observations could be made (called "Earth Probes"). NASA would have provided two of the polar platforms (until 1989 they were part of the space station program, but later were separated), with the third from Europe, and the fourth from Japan. NASA would have replaced each of its two polar platforms at five year intervals to cover a total of 15 years; hence, six NASA platforms would have been launched between 1998 and 2013. Following a number of internal and external reviews and directions from Congress, NASA submitted a plan to Congress in March 1992 reconfiguring the program to involve more, smaller satellites rather than a few large ones, to reduce costs from $17 billion to $11 billion through FY 2000, and to focus the program on "the most important problem of global change--global climate change." Eighteen satellites will replace the six NASA polar platforms (the European and Japan programs are not affected by the reconfiguration), with launch dates between 1998 and 2013. These 18 satellites are called the Earth Observing System (EOS), and are in addition to the Earth Probes and the associated data system (called EOSDIS--Earth Observation System Data and Information System). Costs since have been reduced to $8 billion at congressional direction. The United States, Japan, Europe and others, individually or cooperatively, are planning other spacecraft that will contribute data to the Global Change research program in the nearer term. For example, the U.S. Upper Atmosphere Research Satellite (UARS), the U.S./French TOPEX/Poseidon, the European Earth Remote Sensing (ERS) satellite, the Japanese ERS (JERS) satellite and Advanced Earth Observing System (ADEOS) platform, the Japanese-U.S. Tropical Rainfall Mapping Mission (TRMM), and ESA's Envisat are all related to studies of the Earth and its environment. The first four of these already are in orbit. Several U.S. space shuttle missions carrying the European-built Spacelab module also will conduct studies under the Mission to Planet Earth program (called the ATLAS program--Atmospheric Laboratory for Science and Applications). The U.S. shuttle missions and probes such as UARS are now described by NASA as Phase I of the Mission to Planet Earth program, with EOS constituting Phase II. The Earth Probes, which will accommodate specialized instruments, span Phase I and II. ---------- page 82 For further information, see CRS Report 90-300 SPR, Mission to Planet Earth and the U.S. Global Change Research Program; CRS Report 91-89, Mission to Planet Earth; and CRS Issue Brief 92082, U.S. Ciuil Earth Obseruation Programs: Landsat, Mission to Planet Earth, and Weather Satellites. ---------- page 83 CHAPTER 4 SPACE SCIENCE Both the United States and the Soviet Union have sent probes to fly-by, orbit, and/or land on other planets. Other probes investigate the interplanetary medium and/or comets. So far, the United States has sent probes to Mercury, Venus, the Moon, Mars, Jupiter, Saturn, Uranus, and Neptune. The Soviet Union sent probes to Venus, the Moon, and Mars. A U.S. probe already in space was diverted to investigate a comet in 1985, and two Soviet probes intercepted Halley's Comet in 1986. The United States and Russia/CIS also have extensive programs for studying Earth's atmosphere, the interaction between the Earth and the Sun (solar-terrestrial relationships), and the universe using spacecraft in earth orbit. As discussed in part 2 of this report, Europe and Japan also have significant space science programs. EARTH-ORBITAL SPACE SCIENCE The history of Earth-orbiting satellites for space science studies began with the very first launches of spacecraft. As discussed at the beginning of this report, the decision to launch satellites was made as part of the International Geophysical Year (IGY), and both Sputnik 1 and Explorer 1 were launched in support of the IGY. The United States has conducted a large number of launches of Earth-orbiting space science missions. The Explorer program is a continuing series of relatively small satellites devoted to a particular scientific goal. Many of the Explorer missions involve international participation, and over 60 Explorer satellites have been flown. Some study the interaction between the Sun and Earth in disciplines such as air density, energetic particles, ionospheric research, magnetospheric research, and solar physics. Other Explorer satellites are dedicated to astronomy, including wavelengths in the x-ray, gamma-ray, ultraviolet, and radio ranges. Larger observatory-class satellites have also been launched by the United States. To date, these have included the Orbiting Geophysical Observatory (OGO), Orbiting Solar Observatory (OSO), Orbiting Astronomical Observatory (OAO), and High Energy Astronomy Observatory (HEAO) programs. NASA is now embarked upon the "Great Observatory" program, originally planned as four large space observatories. Two have been launched already: the Hubble Space Telescope for the visible and ultraviolet wavelengths, and the Compton Gamma Ray Observatory. The third, Advanced X-Ray Astronomy Facility (AXAF), was ---------- page 84 split into two satellites (AXAF-I and AXAF-S) for cost and technical reasons. In 1993, Congress cancelled AXAF-S; AXAF-I is scheduled for launch in 1999. Planning for the fourth, the Space Infrared Telescope Facility (SIRTF), was terminated because of the budgetary situation, and NASA is now assessing alternative methods of acquiring such data. Hubble is the first telescope in orbit designed to view objects in the visible wavelengths; it also carries ultraviolet sensors. After launch, NASA discovered a manufacturing defect in Hubble's main mirror that prevented achieving Hubble's main task of studying faint, distant objects. Nevertheless, Hubble returned excellent data in the ultraviolet range, and of near, bright objects in the visible range. In December 1993, a space shuttle crew installed corrective optics on Hubble (as well as new solar arrays, a new wide field/planetary camera, and other equipment) and in January 1994, NASA announced that the telescope was providing even better data than scientists had hoped. The Soviet Union launched its first geophysical observatory in 1958 (Sputnik 3), but has not used Earth orbit as a base for free-flying scientific spacecraft as extensively as the United States. Until the late 1980s, most Soviet scientific satellites were designated simply as Cosmos flights and few details were released about them. Projects involving international cooperation, such as those developed under the Intercosmos program with Soviet-bloc countries and allies, received broader distribution of results. As more and more Soviet space science projects included international partners, more information generally was made available. The Prognoz program, of which there were 10 flights beginning in 1971, involved observatory-class spacecraft performing multiple missions. The first eight of these concentrated on atmospheric studies, and Prognoz 10 made magnetospheric studies. Prognoz 9, launched in 1983, performed radio astronomy research. (In 1992, the CIS launched a satellite which it said was part of a program called Prognoz, but it is different from these scientific satellites. See the next chapter for a discussion of the new Prognoz satellite which may be related to the early warning program.) Also in 1983, the Soviets launched the Astron satellite, a large observatory-class satellite which performed research in the x-ray and ultraviolet wavelengths. Granat, built cooperatively with France, was launched in 1989 for astronomical research in the x-ray and gamma ray bands. (In early 1992, France agreed to fund operations at the Yevpatoriya tracking station in Ukraine to continue receiving data from Granat after Russia indicated that it could no longer afford to operate the site.) Gamma-1, launched in 1990, was devoted to gamma ray observations; its mission ended in early 1992. In March 1994, Russia launched the Coronas-I (comprehensive study of solar activity from near-earth orbit) satellite for solar physics studies. Space science research has also been conducted on the space stations launched by both the United States and Russia/CIS. For example, the U.S. Skylab carried the Apollo Telescope Mount dedicated to studies of the Sun, and ---------- page 85 a radio telescope was deployed from the Soviet Salyut 6. For the Soviets, the launch of the Kvant module to Mir in 1987 ushered in a new era of space station astronomical observations. Kvant incorporates instruments for both gamma-ray and x-ray astronomy, and the module is a permanent part of the space station complex. During 1987, the Soviets made many observations of the supernova in the Large Magellanic Cloud discovered by ground-based observers at the Cerro-Tololo Observatory in Chile. The Soviets also performed wideranging atmospheric studies using instruments on their space stations, and planned to launch a module dedicated to atmospheric observations (called either Optizon or Spektr) to dock with the space station Mir. Apparently the module is now scheduled for launch in 1995. AUTOMATED LUNAR EXPLORATION The first attempts to send spacecraft to the Moon were either fly-bys or probes that were intended to strike the Moon without surviving the impact. In 1958, the United States began a double series of Pioneer flights--one to photograph the far side of the Moon and the other to fly by it. All four launch attempts in that year failed to reach the Moon. In January 1959, the Soviets launched Luna 1 which apparently missed the Moon. The United States followed in March 1959 with Pioneer 4 which went by the Moon and circled the Sun. U.S. plans then were to follow up with four more, larger Pioneer series lunar orbit flights during the course of 1959 and 1960, but all of these failed to reach even Earth orbit. In fact, a U.S. probe did not reach the Moon until Ranger 4 impacted the far side in 1962. In September 1959, the Soviet Luna 2 struck the Moon near its visible center, delivering metal plaques bearing the Soviet coat of arms. In October 1959, Luna 3 flew by the Moon and took photographs of the far side, never seen before, which were returned to Earth by radio facsimile. Still later, the U.S. Ranger 7, 8, and 9 flights (1964-1965) returned spectacular TV pictures of the Moon up to the moment that they impacted the lunar surface. The next phase of automated lunar exploration used spacecraft to make survivable landings. The seven U.S. Surveyor spacecraft (1966-1968) returned almost 100,000 pictures of the lunar surface and dug holes in the surface by remote control to determine the chemical composition of the lunar soil. The Soviet Union attempted landings as early as 1963, but later admitted that Luna 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 failed to achieve a survivable landing. Additionally, one unnamed flight and Cosmos 60 were lunar failures which did not leave Earth orbit. When Luna 9 in 1966 finally reached the surface, its television camera returned 27 pictures of the surroundings--the first pictures from the surface of another solar system body. Luna 13 performed impact testing of the soil with an extendable arm. Orbiters were used at about the same time as the landers. The Soviet Luna 10 was the first spacecraft to achieve a successful lunar orbit (1966) and returned data about the composition of the lunar surface and gravity anomalies. ---------- page 86 Luna 12 in 1966 finally returned a few pictures to supplement earlier Soviet pictures taken of the far side by Luna 3 in 1959 and Zond 3 in 1965. Luna 14 (1968) was an extension of the work of Luna 10, neither of which took pictures. The five U.S. Lunar Orbiters (1966-1967) returned extensive data about the lunar surface that were used to select landing sites for the Apollo missions. The Apollo landings (see part 1, chapter 2) followed the U.S. automated lunar program, and no further automated lunar missions were launched by the United States until 1994 (see below). The Soviets continued to launch lunar probes until 1976. Zond 5 and 6, the 1968 automated precursors to projected later piloted flights, returned actual photographs to Earth in the same manner as Apollo 8. Zond 7 in 1969 and Zond 8 in 1970 performed tasks similar to those of the two preceding Zonds. Heavier satellites were placed in lunar orbit (Luna 19 in 1971 and Luna 22 in 1974) which remained under active control for more than a year, gathering a wide variety of data and some pictures. The Soviet Union launched two special types of lunar vehicles for exploration of the Moon in lieu of human crews. Three missions (Luna 16 in 1970, Luna 20 in 1972, and Luna 24 in 1976) returned a total of approximately 330 grams of lunar material to Earth (compared with 380 kilograms returned by the U.S. Apollo crews). Three other flights that may have been intended to return samples failed (Luna 15, 18, and 23). The other special Soviet program placed roving vehicles called Lunokhods on the lunar surface. Lunokhod 1 (Luna 17) landed on November 17, 1970, and continued to function until October 4, 1971, traveling 10,540 meters over the surface, and returning 20,000 television views, 200 detailed panoramas, 500 soil-property tests, 25 soil chemical analyses, and a number of astronomical observations with its x-ray telescope. Lunokhod 2 (Luna 21) in 1973 operated for 3 months, but traveled 37,000 meters in that time, and returned proportionately more data and pictures despite its shorter life. No probes were sent to the Moon from 1976 until 1994 when the United States launched Clementine. A DOD-NASA spacecraft whose primary purpose is to test DOD sensors related to ballistic missile defense, Clementine returned photographs of the Moon beginning in February 1994. After two months in lunar orbit, the spacecraft will begin a journey to the asteroid Geographos for a close fly-by scheduled for August 31. PLANETARY MISSIONS The U.S. Mariner program of three-axis stabilized probes involved the launch of ten vehicles, six of which returned planetary data. Mariner 2 and 5 brought back indirect readings of Venus. Mariner 4, 6, 7, and 9 brought back increasingly good pictures of the surface features of Mars. Mariner 10 not only returned good pictures of the cloud patterns of Venus, but made three photographic passes by Mercury. ---------- page 87 The Pioneer series of spin-stabilized spacecraft has seen 18 launch attempts, of which 12 were at least partially successful. Pioneer 1 and 3 did not reach their intended trajectories to the Moon, but did send back data about Earth's atmosphere. Pioneer 4 successfully returned data as it flew past the Moon and entered heliocentric orbit. Pioneers 5 through 9 studied the area of space between the Earth and Sun. Pioneers 10 and 11 were the first planetary probes of the Pioneer series, and were launched to investigate Jupiter, Saturn, and the interplanetary medium. Both probes sent back pictures of Jupiter in 1973 and 1974 respectively; Pioneer 10 then was placed on a trajectory out of the solar system, while Pioneer 11 continued on to a successful encounter with Saturn in 1979. In 1983, Pioneer 10 passed out of the solar system, the first object from planet Earth to do so, and continues to return data. Pioneer Venus 1 and 2 were launched in 1978 and reached Venus in December of that year. Pioneer Venus 1 is an orbiter (which continued to return data about Venus until 1992) and in 1986 also was used to collect data about Halley's Comet. Pioneer Venus 2 consisted of five separate probes, all of which descended through the Venusian atmosphere to make in situ measurements of its characteristics. Although they were not designed to withstand landings on the planet, two of the probes did survive and transmitted data for as long as 67 minutes after impact. Viking 1 and 2, launched in 1975, each were orbiter/lander combinations. The orbiters mapped the surface of Mars and collected clear views of Deimos and Phobos, the two Martian moons. The landers sent back color pictures from the surface, and their on-board laboratories conducted a search for life with inconclusive results. The last of the Viking spacecraft (the Viking 1 orbiter) returned data until 1983. NASA has now turned ownership of that lander over to the Smithsonian Museum. Voyager 1 and 2 were launched in 1977 toward Jupiter and the outer planets. During 1979, they returned astonishing color pictures not only of Jupiter, but also of its larger moons, each unique and unexpected in appearance. In 1980, Voyager 1 returned equally exciting pictures of Saturn and its moons, including Titan, and Voyager 2 returned data on Saturn in 1981. Voyager 2 reached Uranus in January 1986 and Neptune in August 1989, returning more data to astound Earth-bound scientists. In 1989, NASA launched the Magellan mission to Venus, where it arrived in August 1990. Magellan carries a synthetic aperture radar for mapping the Venusian surface. Its primary mapping mission has been completed, and the spacecraft is currently engaged in activities related to measuring Venus' gravity. NASA also launched the Galileo probe to Jupiter in 1989; it will arrive there in 1995. One section of the spacecraft will descend through Jupiter's atmosphere, while another will orbit the planet and then make a tour of several of Jupiter's moons. Unfortunately, the main (high gain) antenna on Galileo has not fully deployed despite repeated attempts by NASA controllers to unjam it. NASA is ---------- page 88 studying how to best transmit and receive scientific data from the spacecraft using the smaller (low-gain) antenna. Mars Observer, the most recent U.S. Martian probe, was launched in 1992. Designed to orbit the planet and provide data on the climate and geochemistry of Mars, all contact with the probe was lost three days before it was to enter Mars orbit. The spacecraft's communications system had been deliberately turned off while the fuel tanks were being pressurized in preparation for entering Mars orbit. The spacecraft was not heard from again. An investigation panel, hampered by lack of data, identified several possible causes, but cautioned that what actually happened may never be known. The panel concluded that the most likely cause was that fuel leaked past check valves during the 11 month trip to Mars and when the tanks were pressurized, the fuel and oxidizer mixed inside the tubing, rather than in the engines. They speculate that the resulting forces caused the spacecraft to begin spinning at a high rate of speed, and either broke apart, or became so disoriented that the solar panels no longer pointed at the Sun and the power was drained. The United States has launched several probes to investigate the interplanetary medium. One of special note was launched in 1978 as International Sun-Earth Explorer 3, part of a series of satellites for studying solar-terrestrial relationships. In 1983, it was redesignated ICE, or International Cometary Explorer, and was moved from its position between the Earth and the Sun to fly by Comet Giacobini-Zinner in September 1985. Data from this encounter was compared with that obtained by other spacecraft about Comet Halley. The United States did not send a probe to Halley's Comet. In 1961, the Soviets launched their first Venus probe, Venera 1, but it was not operating when it reached the planet. In 1962, there were three more Venus attempts and three Mars attempts, with five of these payloads stranded in Earth orbit, and the sixth, Mars l, not operating when it reached the vicinity of that planet. Zond l, Venera 2, and Venera 3 were not in operating condition when they reached Venus. Zond 2 made a close fly-by of Mars in a non-operating condition. Zond 3 was a test flight which took pictures of the far side of the Moon and rebroadcast them to Earth as it traveled as far as the orbit of Mars. Results improved for the Soviets when Venera 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 all functioned and returned direct readings of Venus' atmosphere. Venera 7 survived a Venus landing and broadcast for 23 minutes from the surface. Venera 8 had similar success, plus performing soil analyses. In 1975, two larger Soviet Venus probes, Venera 9 and 10, reached their destination and became the first spacecraft to return pictures from the surface of another planet. The orbiters returned pictures and other data for many months in orbit. The landers operated for about an hour on the surface, and their cameras returned good pictures of the far side surface, relayed via the orbiters. This was a remarkable feat, considering the 485øC temperature and surface pressure 90 times that on Earth. ---------- page 89 Venera 11 and 12 were sent to Venus in 1978, at approximately the same time as the U.S. Pioneer-Venus probes. No photographs were returned by these spacecraft, and Soviet scientists have indicated that the imaging systems failed. Data were returned on other aspects of the Venusian atmosphere and surface. Venera 13 and 14 landed in 1982 and sent back color photographs of the surface, and used drills to obtain core samples for chemical analysis. In 1983, the Soviets launched Venera 15 and 16 which, instead of carrying the traditional landers, were equipped with side-looking radars to study the surface of Venus from orbit. Venera 15 entered orbit around Venus on October 10, followed four days later by Venera 16. The radars had a resolution of 1-2 kilometers, and were in polar orbits around the planet to provide data on parts of the planet not seen by the U.S. Pioneer-Venus orbiter or from Earth-based telescopes. In December 1984, the Soviets launched two VEGA spacecraft to study both Venus and Halley's Comet. At Venus, the two spacecraft dropped off landers and balloons developed by French scientists which slowly drifted through Venus' atmosphere to make in situ measurements. The main part of each spacecraft continued on to an encounter with Halley's Comet in March 1986. VEGA 1 was the first probe to arrive there; others were launched by the European Space Agency and Japan. The Soviets were plagued with problems in their Mars program. In 1971, two orbiter/lander spacecraft, Mars 2 and 3, were launched. Mars 2 landed on the surface but no further mention was made of it by the Soviets, suggesting that it failed; Mars 3 made a survivable landing, but signals ceased after 20 seconds, before the first complete picture was received on Earth. The orbiters did return data. In 1973, four spacecraft (Mars 4, 5, 6 and 7) were launched. Mars 4 and 5 were intended as orbiters working with the Mars 6 and 7 landers. Of these four only Mars 5 attained an orbit and Mars 6 a landing. Mars 6 returned direct readings within the atmosphere, but signals ceased before it reached the surface. Thus, of all these missions, only Mars 5 can be counted as a complete success by Western standards. In June 1988, after a 15 year hiatus in sending probes to Mars, the Soviets launched two Mars probes, Phobos 1 and 2. The spacecraft included a large number of international experiments, and were almost identical. The primary objective for the Phobos project was to study Phobos, one of the two moons of Mars, although studies also were to be made of Mars itself. The bad luck indicative of the Soviet Mars exploration program evidenced itself with this project as well. On August 29, 1988, a Soviet ground controller sent an incorrect command to Phobos 1, telling it to turn off its stabilization systems. The error was not detected until three days later when attempts at contacting the spacecraft were unsuccessful. The Soviets speculated that with the attitude stabilization system turned off, the spacecraft lost its correct orientation toward the Sun to keep the batteries charged, and the spacecraft died. ---------- page 90 Phobos 2 completed its journey to Mars uneventfully, reaching Martian orbit at the end of January 1989. The probe successfully returned data about Mars, but as it was maneuvering to make its studies of Phobos, contact was lost with the spacecraft. The Soviets narrowed the cause to three possibilities, but feel they may never know exactly what happened. Thus, Phobos 2 failed in its primary objective (studying Phobos), but was successful in returning data about Mars and thus is categorized as a partial success. FUTURE SPACE SCIENCE MISSIONS As noted, the Hubble Space Telescope and the Compton Gamma Ray Observatory are the first two of NASA's "Great Observatories." Third is the Advanced X-Ray Astrophysics Facility (AXAF), and fourth was to be the Space Infrared Telescope Facility (SIRTF). AXAF encountered technical and cost difficulties, so its launch date slipped repeatedly. NASA divided the mission into two parts in 1992. Some of the instruments were to be launched on one spacecraft and others on a separate satellite (still others were eliminated entirely). The two spacecraft, AXAF-I (imaging) and AXAF-S (spectroscopy) were scheduled for launch in 1999 and 2000, but Congress cancelled AXAF-S in NASA's FY 1994 budget because of fiscal constraints. AXAF-I is still scheduled for launch in 1999. SIRTF was never begun, and plans to build an observatory-class spacecraft for infrared observations have been terminated. NASA is assessing alternatives for acquiring such data. More Explorer satellites are also being planned. NASA initiated a "small Explorer" program in FY 1989 for satellites smaller than the typical Explorer satellite that requires a Delta-class launch vehicle. The first small Explorer, SAMPEX (Solar, Anomalous, and Magnetospheric Particle Explorer) was launched in 1992. An international armada of Earth-orbiting satellites is in the process of being launched to support the International Solar-Terrestrial Physics (ISTP) program to study the interaction between the Sun and the Earth. Japan's spacecraft, Geotail, was launched by NASA in 1992. The U.S. contribution to ISTP is called the Global Geospace Science (GGS) program and involves the launch of two spacecraft called Wind and Polar. Europe is providing two spacecraft, Cluster and SOHO. Wind and Polar were scheduled for launch in 1994, but at the beginning of the year, technical reviews identified problems with both spacecraft and their launch dates are now uncertain. Cluster and SOHO are scheduled for launch in 1995. Two new planetary missions were begun in 1989: the Comet Rendezvous-Asteroid Flyby Mission (CRAF) and Cassini, to study Saturn and its moon, Titan. The two probes were to use the same spacecraft design and were requested jointly by NASA, so were often referred to as though they were one project--CRAF/Cassini. However, NASA terminated the CRAF program in its FY 1993 budget because of fiscal constraints. Cassini's launch date was delayed by one year and is now scheduled for 1997. Cassini includes an ESA-built probe (called Huygens) that will descend through Titan's atmosphere. ---------- page 91 The United States had been planning to send a series of small landers to Mars in the 1990s and early 2000s as part of a program called MESUR (Mars Environmental Survey). The lander design uses an innovative method of landing on the surface, airbags, and the entire program was based on the "smaller, cheaper, faster" philosophy. To test the lander technology, NASA was planning to launch the "MESUR Pathfinder" mission in 1996, followed by the "MESUR Network" of up to 16 landers. Data from Mars Observer was needed to support the MESUR program, however, so NASA had to revise its Mars exploration strategy when that spacecraft was lost. In its FY 1995 budget request, NASA is proposing a "Mars Surveyor" program that first would recoup some of the data that Mars Observer would have provided, and then proceed with a revised form of the MESUR Network, though that name has been dropped. MESUR Pathfinder, renamed Mars Pathfinder, is still planned for launch in 1996 as a technology test of both the landing system and a "minirover." That same year would witness the first Mars Surveyor launch, a small orbiter carrying backup versions of some of the Mars Observer instruments. In 1998, another small orbiter (for communications and atmospheric science) plus a lander would be launched. Two mini-landers carried by a single spacecraft and another communications orbiter would be launched in 2001. If these programs reach fruition (hardly certain, considering NASA's constrained budget), the United States would be making a considerable investment in Mars exploration for the rest of this decade and beyond. Magellan, Mars Observer, CRAF and Cassini were all recommended as the "core program" by NASA's Solar System Exploration Committee, which issued two reports (in 1983 and 1986) on the future of U.S. planetary exploration. NASA relies on internal and external advisory committees to prioritize space science objectives. The Ride report (see part 1, chapter 7) also gave a high priority to CRAF and Cassini. In addition to its own internal advisory committees, NASA uses the National Academy of Sciences to prepare advisory reports. In 1988, for example, the Academy released a 7-volume study entitled Space Science in the 21st Century: Imperatives for the Decades 1995-2015. The missions identified in these committee reports are proposals, not approved programs; it is up to NASA to ultimately decide which programs to request funding for and in what order. In October 1987, at celebrations marking the 30th anniversary of the launch of Sputnik, the Soviets announced broad proposals for planetary exploration that caused great concern among their Western colleagues. Although the Soviets emphasized that they were only proposals, not plans, some Western planetary scientists characterized the Soviet announcement as an indication that the Soviet Union was achieving a leadership position in planetary exploration. Even before the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the proposals were changed and scaled down considerably, probably because of additional discussions inside the Soviet planetary science community, coupled with a deteriorating budget situation. In August 1989, the Soviets listed the following missions as possibilities for the next 15 years: Mars'94 which would involve an ---------- page 92 orbiter, surface penetrators, surface rover, and French-made balloons; MarsAster'96, to fulfill some of the objectives of the Phobos missions and to study the asteroid belt; Mars'98, to land rovers on Mars; Mars 2001, to return samples of Martian soil to Earth; and an unnamed mission to Mercury in 2003. The Soviets made clear that only Mars'94 was an approved program, and in the spring of 1991, even that mission was altered to account for new budgetary realities. It is now planned as two missions, Mars'94 and Mars'96. Mars'94 originally was designed as an imaging orbiter that would also deploy two small landers and two penetrators. Mars'96 was designed to deliver a large Russian rover to the surface of the planet, with the possibility of carrying an American "mini-rover." Funding uncertainties in Russia and other countries participating in Mars'94 (France, Germany, and the United States, for example) have kept the program in a state of flux and many question whether it will be launched in 1994 or not. The Mars'96 mission reportedly has been slipped to 1998. Russia has been working on three other Earth-orbiting scientific satellites for several years: Interbol, a magnetospheric research mission which will involve the launch of two satellites, each with a Czech sub-satellite; SpectrumX/Gamma (or Spectrum-Roentgen-Gamma) for observations in the ultraviolet, x-ray and gamma ray bands (20 countries, including the United States, are participating in this project); and Radioastron, a group of three radio astronomy satellites planned for launch in 1995-1997. Russian scientists appear confident that Interbol will be launched, but the fate of the other programs is unclear. ---------- page 109 TABLE 5. World-Wide Successful Space Launches By Site Launch Site 1993 1957-1992 Total Plesetsk (CIS/Russia) 26 1,365 1,391 Tyuratam (CIS/Kazakhstan) o 21 920 941 VandenbergAFB (USA) 2 495 497 Cape Canaveral (USA) 20 453 473 KapustinYar (CIS/Russia) 0 83 83 Kourou (French Guiana) 7 56 63 Tanegashima (Japan) 0 24 24 Uchinoura (Japan) 1 20 21 Shuang Cheng-tzu (China) o 1 20 21 Wallops Island (USA) 0 19 19 Xichang (China) 0 10 10 Indian Ocean Platform (Kenya) 0 9 9 Hammaguir (Algeria) 0 4 4 Sriharikota (India) 0 4 4 Edwards AFB (USA) oo 1 2 3 Woomera (Australia) 0 2 2 Taiyuan (China) 0 2 2 Yavne (Israel) 0 2 2 Total 79 3,490 3,569 o Tyuratam is also known as the Baikonur Cosmodrome. Shuang Cheng-tzu is also known as Jiuquan. oo Departure point sometimes used for aircraft used to launch satellites (the Pegasus program). Prepared by CRS. ---------- page 115 TABLE 6. Worldwide Successful Launches by Basic First Stage Name Country/ 1993 1957-1992 Total Organiz. Soyuz/Vostok/ Molniya (A) CIS 25 1,352 1,377 Delta USA 7 418 425 Cosmos (C) CIS 6 391 397 Cyclone (F) CIS 8 279 287 Atlas USA 6 219 225 Proton (D) CIS 5 187 192 Titan USA 0 166 166 (B) CIS 0 144 144 Scout USA 1 86 87 Space Shuttle USA 7 51 58 Ariane ESA 7 50 57 Long March China 1 32 33 Mu Japan 1 19 20 Zenit (J) CIS 2 14 16 N Japan 0 15 15 Saturn V USA 0 13 13 Saturn I USA 0 13 13 Diamant France 0 10 10 H Japan 0 9 9 Pegasus USA 2 2 4 Redstone USA 0 4 4 Jupiter USA 0 4 4 Vanguard USA 0 3 3 SLV-3 India 0 3 3 Shavit Israel 0 2 2 Lambda Japan 0 1 1 Black Arrow U.K. 0 1 1 Energiya (K) CIS 0 1 1 ASLV India 0 1 1 Start-1 CIS 1 0 1 Total 79 3,490 3,569 Prepared by CRS. New analysis may alter totals for individual launch vehicles from year to year. ---------- page 135 PART TWO SPACE ACTIVITIES OF OTHER LAUNCHING COUNTRIES/ORGANIZATIONS For the first two decades of the space program, the United States and Soviet Union clearly dominated space activities. While they still are responsible for the vast majority of space launches today, five additional launching countries/organizations have emerged: China, the European Space Agency (ESA, a group of 13 European nations), India, Israel, and Japan. Four other countries--Australia, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom--are sometimes counted as launcher countries, but are not included here. Australia and Italy have both operated launch facilities. Australia launched its own satellite, Wresat, from Woomera in 1967. Since a U.S. rocket was used for the launch and no other Australian launches have been made, it is not counted here as a launcher country. Italy's facility (the San Marco Platform off the coast of Kenya) is still used occasionally, and Italy has launched five of its own satellites, but these also have used U.S. launch vehicles, so Italy is not counted as a launching country. France and the United Kingdom did develop their own launch vehicles. The French Diamant successfully placed 12 payloads in orbit from 1965 to 1975, but was then phased out of service. At first, the French launched from Hammaguir, Algeria. In 1970, they transferred operations to the Kourou facility in French Guiana, South America, used today by ESA and Arianespace. The British Black Arrow successfully placed one satellite (Prospero) in orbit in 1971 from Woomera, Australia, but the rocket was never used again for space launches. Since their indigenous launch vehicles are no longer in use, neither country is included here as a separate launching country, although both are now members of ESA. In 1989, Iraq launched a missile that it stated was a space launch vehicle, but no satellite was placed in orbit. The launch vehicle is designated Al-Abid. In the wake of the Persian Gulf War, it seems extremely unlikely that Iraq will be pursuing a space program in the near future; if it does develop a satellite and launches it into orbit, Iraq will be added. ---------- page 136 CHAPTER 1 CHINA China launched its first satellite in 1970. By the end of 1993, it had made a total of 33 successful launches, placing 36 satellites into orbit. The Chinese have not announced the missions for many of the satellites launched in the 1970s and early 1980s. Several of these were recovered on Earth after a few days in space, suggesting that they returned film images of the Earth (presumably for military reconnaissance purposes). Others were not recovered and their missions remain unclear. They could have been related to scientific research or to a different type of reconnaissance capability which does not require the spacecraft to be returned (electronic intelligence, for example). A few launches, including one in 1981 which placed three spacecraft into orbit simultaneously, definitely have been for scientific research. Others have placed communications satellites in orbit. China has successfully conducted several launches for other countries or companies since 1987: two materials processing payloads (for a French company and a German consortium), two communications satellites (Asiasat Inc.'s Asiasat-1 and Australia's Optus-B1), a Pakistani test satellite (Badr-1), and a Swedish scientific satellite (Freja). A second Australian satellite, Optus-B2, did not attain orbit intact (see below). Most Chinese launches have taken place from Shuang Cheng-tzu (41.2øN, 100.1øE) in the northern part of China (near Jiuquan). Versions of the Long March 2 (CZ 2) rocket are used at this site. In 1984, the Chinese introduced the Long March 3 (CZ 3) launch vehicle, which has a cryogenic (liquid oxygen/liquid hydrogen) upper stage. The vehicle inaugurated use of a new launch site at Xichang (28øN, 103øE) in southeastern China, also used today for the Long launch of the Long March 3 did not put the payload in the correct orbit and is counted in this report as a launch success, but a payload failure. Several more successful launches of the Long March 3 followed, placing communications satellites in geostationary orbit, but a December 1991 launch of the Long March 3 again placed the satellite in the wrong orbit. Like the 1984 launch, it is counted here ---------- page 138 as a launch success but a payload failure. (A new version, the Long March 3A, was successfully launched in February 1994.) In 1988, the Chinese launched their first weather satellite using a new version of their rocket, Long March 4 (CZ 4), and a new launch site, Taiyuan (38øN, 112øE). The satellite was placed into a polar orbit and apparently failed soon after launch. Another was launched in 1990 and seems to be operating properly. The Long March 2E was developed to serve the commercial communications satellite market, particularly for two Australian satellites, AUSSAT-1 and AUSSAT-2. The first flight of the Long March 2E in 1990 was only a partial success. Its primary payload (a "dummy" AUSSAT satellite) did not achieve the proper orbit, although a secondary payload (a Pakistani test satellite) did achieve the correct orbit. The first of the two AUSSATs (renamed Optus-B1 following the purchase of Australia's AUSSAT Pty. Ltd. by Optus Communications Pty. Ltd.) was about to be launched in March 1992, but an engine failure at the moment of ignition scrubbed the launch. It was successfully launched in August. Optus-B2 was launched in December 1992 but a malfunction caused an explosion enroute to orbit. Much of the satellite was found on the ground along the flight path, although some pieces and part of the rocket attained orbit. Since the satellite did not reach orbit intact, this is counted as a launch failure in this report even though other observers count it as a launch success since pieces attained orbit. After a lengthy investigation by the Chinese and Hughes Aircraft (manufacturer of the satellite), officials concluded that it was the satellite that exploded, but for unknown reasons. Little information about the Chinese space budget has been made available. A March 4, 1992 article in Jingyi Ribao asserted that from 1957 to 1987, the Chinese government spent an average of "10 jiao per capita each year of a population of 1 billion" on space; 10 jiao equal 1 yuan, so this would mean 1 billion yuan per year, or $184 million based on 1992 official exchange rates. This is in general agreement with a February 1994 article in the U.S. trade publication, Space News, based on interviews with Chinese officials, that reported that the annual civilian space budget is approximately 1.4-1.5 billion yuan ($168-180 million). DEVELOPMENT OF THE CHINESE SPACE PROGRAM The history of the Chinese space program is still shrouded in official secrecy, but occasionally information is released by the government. For example, the Chinese announced in 1984 that they had flown a puppy into space on a suborbital rocket in 1967. The puppy, named Xiao Bao (Little Leopard), was successfully recovered. They also reported that there had been a major explosion at one of their launch pads on January 28, 1978, which resulted in at least seven people being seriously injured, and a dozen or more people receiving burns to their hair, eyebrows, and faces. In addition, they honored as a martyr a young engineer who helped develop the first geostationary satellite, but died after 6 or 7 years of suffering the health effects of exposure to radiation during experiments related to that task. ---------- page 139 An article in the May 1991 issue of Space Policy by Yanping Chen sheds some light on the development of the Chinese space program, concluding that despite a constantly changing political and economic climate, the space program has remained relatively stable. Dr. Chen divides the program into four distinct periods: 1956-1966, when the space program was first established despite a number of "traumatic political events" including the Great Leap Forward and the withdrawal of Soviet support for Chinese science and technology; 1966-76, during which the space program was able to maintain its course even though "virtually all sectors of Chinese society were torn apart" by the Cultural Revolution; 1976-1986, a period when the space program was put on the back burner, but survived, while the country recovered from the Cultural Revolution; and 1986 to today, which Dr. Chen describes as the "heyday" of the program as the government has made space a "cornerstone of the national science and technology development effort." COMMERCIAL LAUNCH SERVICES Since 1986, the Chinese have been actively marketing launch services using the Long March family of vehicles through the China Great Wall Industry Corporation (CGWIC), part of the Ministry of Aerospace Industry. As noted earlier, the first launches for paying customers were of materials processing experiments using the Long March 2, first for a French company (Matra) in 1987 and a German consortium (Intospace) in 1988. The largest market for commercial space launch services is communications satellites, and China has focussed great attention on attempting to get contracts for these launches. Virtually all commercial communications satellites are made by U.S. companies or contain U.S. components, so export licenses from the United States are required for the satellites to reach China for launch. In 1988, the first such export license requests were made to the U.S. State Department for two Australian satellites, AUSSAT 1 and 2, being built by Hughes Aircraft, and one satellite named Asiasat-1 (owned by Asiasat Inc.), which is the refurbished Westar 6 satellite (also built by Hughes) recovered by a space shuttle crew in 1984 after it failed to achieve the proper orbit. In September 1988, the Reagan Administration approved export of the three satellites to China on the condition that China sign three international treaties concerning, among other things, liability for damage from space launches; negotiate a fair trade agreement with the United States regarding launch services; and reach agreement on protecting technology while each satellite is in China. All conditions were met by January 1989. Two of the conditions included in the agreement were that China would seek to launch no more than nine international satellites between 1989 and 1994, and that it would charge prices "on a par" with other launch services providers. Approval for the export of the AUSSAT and Asiasat-1 satellites was granted by CoCom, the Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls, whose members are all the NATO countries (except Iceland), Japan and Australia. ---------- page 140 Following the Tiananmen Square uprising in June 1989, however, the Bush Administration suspended all export licenses for items on the Munitions List, including the three satellites. Congress passed legislation, the FY 1990 Commerce, Justice, State and Judiciary appropriations (P.L. 101-162), prohibiting export of the satellites unless conditions improved in China, or unless the President certified to Congress that it was in the national interest of the United States to reinstate the licenses. In December 1989, the President made that certification to Congress. Asiasat-1 was launched by China in April 1990, the two AUSSATs, renamed Optus B1 and B2, were launched in 1992 (the B2 launch was a failure). The United States is concerned about Chinese policies in several areas-human rights and political freedom, adherence to the 1989 U.S.-China agreement on launch services, and proliferation of ballistic missile technology-and has used the issuance of export licenses as leverage to influence Chinese actions. As noted above, Congressional concern about internal Chinese policies on human rights and political freedom was expressed in P.L. 101-162 and in the 1990-1991 Foreign Relations Authorization Act (P.L. 101-246). The issue of whether China is adhering to its agreement with the United States to charge fair prices for launch services was raised by a 1990 contract between China and the Arabsat Consortium for launching an Arabsat satellite for $25 million, much less than what many consider "on a par" with Western companies. The main competitor for the launch was Europe's Arianespace, which turned to both the French and U.S. governments to prohibit export of the satellite (the prime contractor for the satellite is French, and it includes American components). The United States took no formal action and the issue became moot in the spring of 1991 when the Arabsat Consortium terminated the contract with the Chinese and signed an agreement with Arianespace. The reasons have not been fully explained by any of the parties, and the issue of what constitutes pricing services "on a par" remains, since it is not specified in the U.S.-Chinese agreement. Language prohibiting the export of satellites to China unless the President certifies that China is complying with the 1989 agreement was included in the Export Facilitation Act of 1990 (H.R. 4653). That bill was vetoed by President Bush on November 17, 1990. Another bill in the 102d Congress (H.R. 3489) included the same language, but did not clear Congress. China argues that because their costs are so low, they can offer lower prices and still adhere to international norms as to what costs are included in setting the price. (This issue is expected to be a major factor in renewing the 1989 agreement, which expires in 1994.) The AUSSAT export licenses expired in March 1991, and on April 30, 1991, the Bush Administration renewed them and approved the export of components for a Swedish satellite (Freja) to be launched by China, but simultaneously denied approval for exporting components China wanted for building a new communications satellite because of concerns about China exporting ballistic missiles to other countries. Two months later, on June 16, the White House announced that because of China's ballistic missile proliferation policies, it would be "inappropriate for the United States to approve any further export ---------- page 141 licenses for commercial satellite launches at this time." On July 17, the State Department identified CGA1VIC as one of two Chinese entities engaged in missile technology proliferation activities that require the imposition of trade sanctions in accordance with the Arms Export Control Act, including denial of license applications for export items covered by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Although the MTCR does not cover satellites (only satellite launch vehicles, which are essentially interchangeable with ballistic missiles), the identification of CGWIC as a cause of concern to the U.S. Government complicated China's commercial space launch services marketing plans. China subsequently agreed to adhere to the MTCR, and the sanctions were lifted in March 1992. China's fortunes improved. In May 1992, the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT) agreed to launch one of its INTELSAT 7A satellites on a Chinese launch vehicle. On September 11, 1992, the State Department notified Congress that it was waiving legislative restrictions on U.S. exports for 6 satellite projects with China: APSAT, Asiasat2, INTELSAT 7A, STARSAT, AfriStar, and Dongfanghong 3. The first 5 are satellites China wants to launch; the sixth is components for a new generation of satellites (Dongfanghong 3) China itself is building (the same components which President Bush refused to export in his April 1991 decision). Many observers saw the move as a conciliatory gesture in the wake of the U.S. decision to sell F-16s to Taiwan. In 1993, the pattern repeated itself when the United States asserted that China was selling missiles to Pakistan and imposed sanctions, including the denial of satellite export licenses. This time, the issue became heated within the United States as Hughes and Martin Marietta (another satellite manufacturer) argued that the sanctions would hurt the American aerospace industry, not China. Noting that three of the satellites were not covered by the State Department's Munitions List, but by the Commerce Department's Commerce Control List since they did not contain techology of military concern, the companies and the Commerce Department succeeded in convincing the White House to overrule the State Department. The White House instructed Commerce to grant export licenses for those three satellites (APSTAR 2, Echostar and Asiasat). However, five others reportedly contain militarily-significant technology (such as encryption devices) and thus are governed by the Munitions List. Those licenses were not approved, although in March 1994, Hughes agreed to remove encryption devices from one it wanted to export (Optus B3), and the State Department agreed to reconsider its position. The fundamental lesson is that broad political issues unrelated to the space program have a significant effect on commercial space launch services. Chilly relationships between the United States and China over human rights and ballistic missile proliferation are likely to continue to complicate this business. ---------- page 142 OTHER DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL SPACE ACTIVITIES As already noted, China has launched several communications satellites for its domestic needs, and a new generation of satellites is now under development (Dongfanghong 3). The Chinese also are interested in land remote sensing satellites. They inaugurated use of a Landsat receiving station purchased from the United States in 1986, which was upgraded in 1993 so it can also receive data from European and Japanese radar satellites (ERS-1 and JERS-1). As discussed earlier, several Chinese satellites reportedly have been related to development of a remote sensing capability. Presumably, these involve using a film system (rather than scanners such as those on Landsat and SPOT), hence the need for the payload to be recovered. As discussed below, China is also developing remote sensing satellites in cooperation with Brazil. China undoubtedly is interested in remote sensing both for military and civilian purposes. The one Chinese launch in 1993 was a recoverable satellite that reportedly was for remote sensing and also carried a diamond-studded medallion of Mao Tse-tung. The satellite was improperly oriented when the engines fired for reentry, and the satellite went higher in orbit rather than returning to Earth. It is expected to make an uncontrolled reentry sometime in 1994. Some Chinese satellites have been for scientific purposes. In 1981, China launched three small satellites simultaneously for atmospheric physics studies. The two commercial launches that carried foreign materials processing experiments also carried Chinese materials processing experiments. As noted earlier, China 33 (which was recovered) carried a biological payload--more than 60 plants and animals (guinea pigs). Two balloons for making atmospheric measurements were launched along with China's second weather satellite, Fengyun 1-2, in 1990. A geostationary weather satellite, Fengyun 2, reportedly is planned for launch in 1994. China has had cooperative space agreements, primarily for general scientific and technical cooperation, with several countries, including Germany, Italy, France, and Australia. In 1991, a new agreement was signed with Italy that also raised the possibility of Italy using Chinese launch vehicles for small satellites. China's most extensive international cooperative project is with Brazil to jointly build two remote sensing satellites, CBERS-1 and -2 (China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite). The satellites are being designed to carry three imaging systems, including a CCD (charge-coupled device) camera with 20 meter resolution. Despite a number of problems in the program since its official initiation in 1988 (primarily lack of funding in Brazil), the two countries rejuvenated the program in 1993, signing a supplemental protocol. The first launch has been delayed from 1994 to 1996 (no date has been set for the second launch). Originally, the satellites would have been launched on Brazilian launch vehicles, developed with Chinese assistance, but instead they will be launched on Chinese Long March rockets. China is paying 70 percent of the project's cost ($150 million, including launch). Also, CG51VIC and Brazil's Avibras Aeroespacial ---------- page 143 signed a joint venture agreement in 1989 to create a company (INSCOM) specializing in satellite launches, tracking and networking. In 1993, China and South Korea signed an agreement to jointly build a small ("micro") satellite for remote sensing and communications purposes. The four-year project is expected to cost $25 million, with launch in 1997. As noted earlier, China launched an experimental Pakistani amateur radio satellite in 1990. The satellite, Badr-1, failed after one month in orbit. An agreement between the two countries for cooperation in peaceful applications of space technology was signed in December 1991. No formal government-to-government cooperation between the United States and China exists, although China does plan to fly some experiments on the U.S. space shuttle as "get away specials," small, comparatively inexpensive experiments that require no crew interaction. The first is expected to be launched in about two years. FUTURE PLANS It is difficult to forecast the future of the Chinese space program because they can change plans quite abruptly. During 1979 and 1980, they expressed ambitious plans for utilization of space, and even had astronauts in training. In late 1980 and early 1981, however, they retreated from their expansive plans because of a reassessment of the Chinese economic situation, and announced that their piloted space program had been postponed for at least the remainder of the decade. Today, they talk boldly about building space stations and a spaceplane. A plan released in March 1992 (Outline for China's Long and Medium-Term Development of Science and Technology) asserted that research into experimental spacecraft to carry crews into space would be completed by the year 2000. Chinese space officials again stated in 1993 that they planned to launch a crew in the year 2000, and also to develop a space shuttle (similar to ESA's now-cancelled Hermes) by the year 2010. These plans seem quite optimistic, however. ---------- page 144 TABLE 8. Chinese Space Launches PLEASE CONTACT GATEWAY JAPAN FOR THIS TABLE ---------- page 145 TABLE 8. Chinese Space Launches (continued) ---------- page 146 TABLE 8. Chinese Space Launches (continued) ---------- page 147 CHAPTER 2 EUROPEAN SPACE AGENCY AND ARIANESPACE The European Space Agency (ESA) was formed in 1975 by the merger of the European Scientific Research Organization and the European Launcher Development Organization, each of which had been created in 1964. Today, ESA has thirteen members (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom). Finland is an associate member, and ESA has a technical agreement of cooperation with Canada as well. As noted below, three East European countries have cooperative agreements with ESA as well. ESA's activities are all civilian; it is prohibited by its charter from conducting military space programs. Its 1993 budget was $3.1 billion; a 1994 budget of $2.9 billion was approved in February 1994. A major ESA activity has been development of an independent launch capability using a launch vehicle called Ariane. France played the lead role in developing Ariane, and the vehicle is launched from Kourou (5.2øN, 52øW) in French Guiana (South America). In addition, Arianespace, a private company which now markets Ariane and manages the launches, is incorporated in France. As a result, Ariane is often mistakenly referred to as a French launch vehicle. Arianespace, as noted above, is now responsible for operational Ariane launches. ESA continues to develop new versions of Ariane, and is responsible for test launches. Several ESA members (notably France, Italy and Germany) have their own strong indigenous space programs, but the nature of this report does not permit extensive discussion of them. ARIANE AND ARIANESPACE The French space agency, CNES, is a major shareholder in Arianespace (32 percent); the other shareholders are European companies and banks. Ariane space is the main competitor to U.S. launch services companies, and reportedly has garnered 60 percent of the market. Ariane enjoys a reputation for being quite reliable despite several failures. The ---------- page 148 Ariane 4 is the only version of Ariane currently available. Earlier models (Ariane 1, 2 and 3) have been phased out. The United States and ESA began negotiations in 1990 over "rules of the road" for offering commercial space launch services to ensure that everyone follows similar practices for determining prices to be offered. The negotiators have lo