The Assembly,

(i) Recognising that, with the adoption of the document "European security: a common concept of the 27 WEU countries" in Madrid on 14 November 1995, a first step has been taken in assessing how these countries can contribute to security and stability in Europe and elsewhere in the world, particularly by intensifying political dialogue and enhancing European capabilities in the field of crisis prevention and management;

(ii) Welcoming the decisions taken in Madrid on 14 November 1995 to strengthen further WEU's operational capabilities;

(iii) Welcoming the decision to establish a new politico-military group insupport of the Council and to provide WEU with a situation centre and an intelligence section in the Planning Cell;

(iv) Welcoming the Secretary General's study on the Situation Centre and the Intelligence Section in the Planning Cell and the preparatory measures for its implementation, but regretting that too little progress has been made in this field;

(v) Welcoming the fact that there is an increasing number of "forces answerable to WEU", strengthening Europe's own military capabilities for operations conducted pursuant to the Petersberg Declaration;

(vi) Endorsing the Council's decision to establish the Satellite Centre as a permanent WEU body and its objective to develop WEU's capability to use satellite imagery for security purposes;

(vii) Stressing the importance of the ministerial decision to instruct the Space Group to continue its activities and define the basic conditions for possible WEU participation in a developing multilateral European programme and to study questions related to a possible WEU ground segment;

(viii) Aware that there is still a considerable gap between the implementation of the initial political idea which resulted in the creation of the WEU Satellite Centre and the security constraints connected with the provision and use of data from the Helios 1 satellite;

(ix) Noting at the same time that satellite intelligence is important and extremely useful, but that it is only one of the many different elements enabling a complete assessment of a specific situation to be made;

(x) Aware of the existence of the document on "Intelligence support to the Planning Cell: short-term measures";

(xi) Attaching great importance to the common reflection on new European security conditions of the 27 WEU nations which has already resulted in identifying their common interests as well as potential risks to European security;

(xii) Noting that WEU can only be promoted as a useful forum for analysis and consultation on the defence implications of security issues of the common foreign and security policy and as an instrument to facilitate the formulation and implementation of EU decisions and actions related to the Petersberg tasks if it can rely upon a common European intelligence policy;

(xiii) Noting that there is a need for intensified intelligence cooperation within the framework of WEU due to the fact that European armed forces are being prepared for the implementation of Petersberg tasks, possibly without the support of United States assets;

(xiv) Noting that European intelligence efforts would have to concentrate on possible new risks and threats;

(xv) Aware that the existing bilateral cooperation between different WEU member states in intelligence questions is not a satisfactory basis for a common European intelligence policy;

(xvi) Aware that some WEU member states have established specific links with the Planning Cell in order to provide it with information on current affairs;

(xvii) Noting that there is a need to enlarge the size of the intelligence section in the WEU Planning Cell, as is now being planned, in order to enable the Planning Cell to perform its planning task properly;

(xviii) Considering that if member states seriously wish to enhance the operational capability of WEU, they should improve the effectiveness of the Planning Cell by agreeing to second a correspondent from their national intelligence services to the Planning Cell;

(xix) Recognising that NATO has a data base at its disposal with indispensable information which could help WEU to make a thorough assessment and analysis of the politico-military situation in Europe, if need be;

(xx) Considering that the links between WEU and NATO must be strengthened in order to share the intelligence required for operational planning and activities of European armed forces in the framework of Petersberg tasks;

(xxi) Aware of the difficulties encountered in implementing the combined joint task forces concept which was adopted almost two years ago at the NATO summit of January 1994 and, at the same time, of the fact that too little progress has been made in the discussions on WEU-NATO cooperation regarding intelligence;

(xxii) Stressing that under these circumstances WEU cannot afford to rely completely on the eventual availability of the Atlantic Alliance's assets and capabilities and that, as a consequence, it will have to develop - among other things - a common European intelligence policy;

(xxiii) Noting that the national governments of WEU member states are increasingly less able to assess independently the different risks and threats to the security of Europe as a whole and that, as a consequence, they will be obliged gradually to build a multilateral European network for the permanent sharing of intelligence data and resources;

(xxiv) Recognising that an increased synergistic European intelligence capacity would be an important contribution to the status of Europe as an equal partner in the transatlantic relationship;

(xxv) Stressing that for a full assessment of risks and threats to Europe's security, political and military intelligence must go hand-in-hand with intelligence on economic, financial, social and environmental developments;

(xxvi) Aware that intelligence cooperation, let alone the establishment of a common European intelligence policy, are sensitive issues where, due to many psychological and political obstacles and deep-rooted mistrust, no spectacular progress can be made overnight,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

(xxvii) Strengthen the links between WEU and NATO with a view to sharing the intelligence required for operational planning and activities of European armed forces in the framework of Petersberg tasks;

(xxviii) Ask each WEU member state to second a correspondent from their national intelligence system to the Planning Cell in order to improve its capabilities in making up-to-date assessments and analyses of the situation in potential Petersberg task theatres of operation.