Some of the important activities to be verified are summarised in the table below. Thus, with the current commercial satellites, it may be possible to observe the effects on the environment due to chemical weapons testing. Also such chemical facilities as weapons storage and destruction plants could be observed from space. As in the case of the IAEA, the OPCW could look for help from the WEU Satellite Centre until it is established and has acquired its own expertise in the management of satellite data.

What is to be verified?

Activites to be monitored	Chemicals to be inspected	Facilities to be inspected
Destruction of chemical weapons; destruction or destruction conversion of production facilities; production acquisition and transfer of chemicals; use of chemical weapons	Some 43 toxic chemicals and some 1,000s of precursors	Weapons production, storage and facilities; dual-use chemical production, processing and consumption facilities

(e) Conclusion

From the preliminary study, it is clear that current generation commercially available panchromatic images from civil satellites can detect and in some cases identify nuclear and chemical facilities that might be engaged in military activities. Together with these, the use of multispectral images would add more information on the operational characteristics of nuclear facilities and possibly determine whether a chemical destruction plant or a plutonium production reactor is operational or not. Observations from space will not give answers to all the questions on a state's nuclear or chemical activities, but, together with other collateral information, it can help verification agencies such as the IAEA, the WEU Satellite Centre or the OWPC. It can contribute considerably to triggering further investigations, such as challenged inspections.

The importance of the WEU Satellite Centre can also be realised now. Should the multilateral verification agencies controlling the spread of weapons of mass destruction need any assistance at present, only the WEU Satellite Centre is capable of helping.

European security needs: space-based observation

Mr. FOURRE (Chairman of Eucosat).- On behalf of the political and industrial and individual national and European members of Eucosat, I should like first to thank Senator Lopez Henares for his invitation to attend this colloquy and to conclude this first political sitting on European security and space.

Eucosat in the European context of space-based observation for security purposes

Here I wish to recall the beginnings of Eucosat and the initial idea behind the creation of our European organisation to promote a European Satellite Control Agency, ten years after my first speech on the subject in the Council of Europe and in WEU. When Eucosat was formed in October 1990 our ambition to promote this European agency was to be shared by many industrial and political leaders and was to guide Eucosat's activities. As an independent European non-profit- making body, we had a clearly-established aim: to promote the manufacture and use of systems of satellite observation in Europe for reasons of security and autonomy, principally in the context of the following tasks:

- management of crises and local conflicts;

- verification of compliance with international disarmament agreements;

- surveillance and management of environmental disasters.

Through experts' meetings, the publication of various reports and the organisation of our first colloquy: Towards a European satellite control agency, at the Senate in Paris, in June 1993, Eucosat has shown its ability to generate proposals and act as a European forum on satellite surveillance. At our General Assembly in September 1993, we took a unanimous decision to produce a document summarising our thinking on proposals for a European system of control by satellite. This document was released to all our partners and to the press in June 1994. A true guide-book for every Eucosat member, it subsequently enabled us to make a tour of major European capitals to sound out the feelings of each country, take stock of the challenges and raise awareness among new partners that might be prepared to join us on these bases. From London to Las Palomas, via Amsterdam, Bonn, Brussels and Rome, we endeavoured to show that Eucosat, beyond its Paris offices, is an important forum in Europe on surveillance by satellite, bringing together political, industrial, military and scientific leaders at European level.

Through close relations with the WEU Assembly and its committees and also with European and national parliaments as a whole, Eucosat is establishing essential links with the industrial world and national or European space agencies to shed light on the true situation of multilateral or European-based initiatives in observation by satellite for security purposes. Our message, proposals and activities in the area of satellite surveillance are profoundly European and based on our conviction at Eucosat of the need to develop systems of observation by satellite for security reasons but also for reasons of European autonomy. This conviction is widely shared among European countries as a whole and comes from an awareness of the needs and usefulness of such systems. It is necessary to explain the strategic context, to make what is at stake understood by providing information on the programmes and activities under way, the systems to be installed, potential users, known or yet to be identified, existing organisations and co-ordinating structures to be promoted or created. It involves educating, demonstrating, up-dating, creating an awareness of what is at stake, in order to convince, and decide, start or continue working together.

Information needs: autonomy and security

The new strategic context is leading to a shared need for situation intelligence in Europe; space-based systems can meet this need in part and represent a challenge for Europe. Major upheavals have undoubtedly reduced the risk of world conflict but have also given rise to many new threats and increased instability. Such instability can then very quickly turn into local crises whose location, extent and timing are uncertain until the crisis starts. These new threats call for the communication of continuous, virtually real-time information, to political leaders for them to respond to any developments and prevent any escalation.

Although no two conflicts are ever identical, the Gulf War might be considered as an example of the importance of information in future conflicts. In particular it revealed that in crisis situations those with the knowledge have the upper hand. Information, in its widest sense, has always been a challenge; it has now become crucial.

Political Europe is still very weak and lacking in coherence in the face of changes in the attitude of the United States towards its involvement in Europe's defence. The present direction of United States policy obliges us to consider a factor which moreover should never have escaped us, namely the obligations of our American allies are determined solely by their own constraints and hence by their own choices. Europe must consequently take account of this, co-operate with its allies, but retain its power of decision. It must therefore find a common will and organise in terms of access to information, an essential factor in decision-making.

Europe must be in a position to have its own independent sources of situation intelligence. There are various means of obtaining such intelligence and, among these, space-based systems have now become essential.

Space-based surveillance systems undeniably possess essential advantages for assessing situations:

Satellites are the sole means of gathering data rapidly over any given area of the globe and retransmitting it to the operator within a time-frame that varies from some tens of hours to only a few, depending on whether one or several satellites are used.

From the highest point of their orbit, satellites observe large areas of the globe and are ideal monitoring instruments.

Satellites are the only instruments capable of overflying a region legally and rapidly without prior authorisation. They allow access to areas denied in times of peace to other means.

In the event of crisis, on-board sensors are directly available, thus permitting rapid intervention.

Satellites provide their operators with information whose accuracy cannot be challenged. The information gathered can be confirmed by repeated passes, giving it a high level of credibility.

Although other sources can be used for intelligence missions, satellites can invariably help fill the gaps and add synergies to traditional means.

It would be wrong to claim that a space-based observation system is sufficient in itself. Satellites cannot observe everything but they do provide indications of activity necessary for evaluating a situation. Moreover, several satellites are needed to obtain additional information from one another.

Thus different observation technologies are often complementary. Optical observation, which is very much suited to information gathering is nevertheless dependant on weather conditions. Radar allows all-weather observation and the interpretation of its data, although more complicated, can enhance and complement data obtained from optical observation. Other space-based tasks (using electronic listening devices or early warning systems) might also be envisaged, helping detect many military developments. The capabilities of space- based systems, especially for observation, thus enable them to carry out various tasks in response to information needs.

The most important of these missions, in the framework of the new strategic context, is of course crisis-prevention and management. Every conflict situation involving embargoes, cease-fires, disarmament agreements, agreements on the division of territory, compliance with international agreements then becomes an important mission to which space-based means may contribute. Moreover, the new threat of proliferation of various types of technologies necessitates close monitoring.

The importance of dual systems

Furthermore these missions have natural fallout in the civil area. Such space-based means can play a basic role in monitoring natural disasters and in civil defence. Finally, in areas as wide- ranging as maritime transport, agriculture or poppy cultivation, space-based means can contribute to controlling illegal activities.

A form of synergy exists between civilian and defence activities when security systems have technological spin-off for civilian use. Surveillance of the environment and detection of natural disasters today involve mobilising resources on a truly national and international scale; military organisations given their structure and means, become natural partners, in a state of emergency, in combating disruptions experienced by populations. At a time when governments are having to review their budget priorities in the light of financial constraints, the notion of duality of systems provides appropriate responses to the need for better control of public expenditure.

This duality of systems of observation by satellite is central to Eucosat's concerns. Some technologies are shared. The same industrial companies work on both civilian and military systems; joint development of civil and military satellite networks are in progress and planned; close co-operation between military and civil agencies has been established on national bases.

Recent experience has shown that certain civilian space-based systems (commercial or scientific) have a potential for synergy, be it at platform or ground sector level, with defence systems (the Gulf War was a particularly telling example).

Even if purely military systems have to meet more demanding specifications than civilian systems, in particular as regards redundancy, protection, life-span or scrambling, rules of confidentiality in data-use and dissemination, they can contribute much useful information for identifying, forecasting, controlling and managing a crisis, whether man-made (of an economic, cultural, religious or ecological nature) or the outcome of a natural disaster (an environmental crisis such as the Chernobyl disaster).

This duality is also and above all evident in applications. It is important to imagine the links and bridges to be built to enable national or European bodies for example, acting in the areas of civilian security or the environment to have access, under conditions as yet to be defined, to data from satellites developed in a military context. The Torrejon satellite centre has a fundamental role to play in this connection. However one must be mindful of the notion of the integrity of these systems since the primary aim is to meet security needs.

The authorities responsible for security at the political level have a great need for information about both types in order to prepare their decisions and actions. It is not really possible for the data collected to be divided into "civilian" and "military" intelligence. Both are integral components of political sovereignty in security matters.

Moreover, in spite of certain similarities, existing military and civilian space-based systems have been developed separately. Although their end-uses are different from an operational point of view, an awareness of the overall synergy in terms of technology and development should allow less expensive systems to be to be achieved.

Greater Europe: a true policy of European autonomy

While space-based systems alone do not claim to provide all the information that is necessary, they do enable assessments to be made of the essential aspects of crises or threats, whatever their geographic location. They are therefore crucial in terms of Europe's future.

The availability of reliable, up-to-date information is a decisive factor in political decision-making. Responsible political authorities need to be able to make assessments at operational or strategic level whenever a situation threatens a nation's essential interests.

If Europe wishes to control its own security and play an important role on the international scene, it must acquire suitable structures and means which it does not yet possess.

Space systems in large part meet this need and are technologically within Europe's reach. Having a universal task that owes little to the specific circumstances of individual states and based on a space industry used to working at European level, these systems are exceptionally promising and attractive in terms of co- operation.

Such projects moreover have a role in bringing Europe closer together over matters of joint security and provide major opportunities for space Europe, which is looking for projects with applications at operational level.

Europe must be self-reliant in essential areas. For gathering information, the acquisition of a satellite system would be the affirmation of a true policy of European independence.

This fundamental aim of an independent view in assessment and decision-making must be borne in mind at all times.

Here is a real challenge for European security and one that is within Europe's reach.

A progressive approach on the political and technical fronts based on specific achievements.

To implement this European system of observation by satellite various development scenarios may be envisaged in which the full range of capabilities required for a powerful and comprehensive satellite system are built up gradually. The second part of this colloquy will provide information on available technologies, industrial experience and above all the manufacturing options, costs and schedules for such a system. I shall therefore emphasise further the need for a realistic and pragmatic approach, drawing upon existing and projected programmes and co-operative ventures currently being established, which Eucosat welcomes.

It is necessary to develop in two directions : optical satellites and radar satellites. France, Italy and Spain are participating in Helios I, for which 1995 will be a vital year, with the launch scheduled for June. Negotiations between these countries to ensure continuity of operation through a new generation are in progress and a new partner, Germany, is showing clearly that it intends to play a part in the development of future generations and in particular to become involved in radar satellite development. An improvement in space-based intelligence capabilities is scheduled for the year 2001, with the launch of Helios II which will have infra-red all-weather search capabilities, whereas the launch date for the radar programme is expected to be around 2005. The weeks and months to come will be vital for commitment to these new stages. On the civilian side, earth observation is now a priority for many European countries, through national or European Space Agency programmes. Continuity of operational programmes and improving systems performance have now become priorities. France's decision last October to join the Spot 5 programme is an example of a political commitment towards pointing the way forward and guaranteeing continuity of systems. Civilian development of ERS radar satellites for scientific research is leading to acquisition of radar technology and know-how and serves to demonstrate the considerable advantages this type of data-imagery can offer. Major efforts still have to be made in exploiting data obtained from radar satellites in order to move to the operational phase. Communications and data relay systems also have to be designed and their performance evaluated in relation to the overall functioning of the system. Decisions taken on commitment to these programmes have shown and continue to show the importance of a basic political will at national and European level for continuing with these observation satellites and related infrastructure programmes, and especially for security applications. Creating, motivating and sustaining this political will are at the heart of Eucosat's activities.

European countries are following these developments closely and are kept informed of trends in co-operation, so that they can become involved when circumstances are right. A degree of openness and flexibility is therefore necessary. Eucosat is playing its part and our European tour provided an opportunity to welcome the initiatives taken by different countries and the work carried out to reach certain stages and to show what remains to be done.

Eucosat's programme and activities are directed towards encouraging other partners to define their needs, clarify possible directions for co-operation and to join forces with the partners that have already started. An enthusiastic and pragmatic approach and a strong political will for dialogue leading to commitment must guide these new European initiatives.

All these are brought together in WEU, where thought is being given to the political and operational framework necessary for implementing such European systems. This is why, and as a first step, important decisions must be taken very soon to ensure continuity for this first European corner-stone, i.e. the Torrejon Satellite Centre in Spain.

The need for a structure for European co-ordination and organisational needs

Eucosat's role is therefore also to contribute towards convincing new partners to subscribe to the aims of European autonomy and commit themselves effectively to the development of observation systems, without which there would be no space component.

Frank co-operation and co-ordination are necessary between existing national and European institutions and organisations. Examples can be found of effective organisation on bilateral or multilateral bases and there is a need to build on such experience and to co-ordinate efforts to achieve the aim of European co-operation and efficiency. Through a co-ordination structure specifically dedicated to these observation programmes or broader tasks, European countries would learn to co-operate well upstream, from planned system definition, and to define the rules for their use. Thus if a country succeeds in having some of its requirements taken into account in the specifications and aims of the joint system that is to be set up, it will automatically be committed to joining, financing and promoting it. Systems for monitoring by satellite are especially suited to such co-operation arrangements since European countries have an undeniable common need for satellite information. However, procedures different to the rules governing the operation of purely civilian agencies must be considered in the context of these arrangements so as to take account of secrecy, security and operational restrictions between countries.

The European industrial context is adapting to the development of multilateral or European programmes but above all is itself changing in order to maintain its place in the world. Europe has substantial advantages in aeronautics and space, and today's challenges need to be understood by the European political community in both national and European parliamentary forums. Clear aims and a strong and manifest political will in the context of the development of a European security and defence identity in enabling Europe to acquire certain means, will also allow priorities to be established in terms of the backing to be given to European space industries. This will exists nationally and has produced a number of technological and commercial successes. We are therefore talking here about moving from national industrial policies towards awareness and gradual establishment of a European industrial policy. The stakes are high and answers must be found quickly to the questions we are raising on the basis of existing co-operation and present and future co- operation.

In this context, and specifically in relation to observation satellites, it seems appropriate to reflect on the framework of operation and decision-making at European level within this European co-ordinating and guiding structure.

Therefore the rules of operation, industrial return and above all confidentiality to be applied should be defined. Regarding the rules of industrial return, the limitations of certain structures became apparent once the number of partners increased. The challenges raised by these considerations are significant and at Eucosat we are encouraging all players to make their suggestions.

Preparing for the future

The overall aim of efficiency must not, however, be overlooked. The European dimension of this forum should also enable us to prepare the future so as to avoid any break in the continuity of programmes.

Eucosat participates in developing a framework for a European space policy by emphasising the importance of the aim of pragmatic and realistic stage-by-stage development, on European bases, of a European system of monitoring by satellite. European co-ordination at the highest level is necessary in defining and planning the next stages, using existing structures and envisaging the links to be established between them.

The future system of monitoring by satellite, currently established on a multilateral basis, will then become one of the first instruments to be referred to as a prime working example of the European security and defence identity. In 1995, European space activity will be punctuated by many meetings and events that will determine its future directions; let us contribute our views by affirming the need for European autonomy in satellite intelligence - a need to be automatically translated thereafter into achievements, programmes and structures.

Conclusion

To conclude, it is not only a question of ensuring that developments in space technology for security involved in setting up a European system of monitoring by satellite are placed at the top of priority lists and political agendas, but of regarding them as essential for European security and independence. WEU can and must offer a frame of reference for the medium and long term. In this way national political decisions might converge towards a global European objective that also serves national interests. These are important political decisions as they will no doubt entail budget commitments to the detriment of other programmes. However in Eucosat we feel that a European structure must come into being in the short term over and above the forum represented by Eucosat. For all these reasons, Eucosat will pay especial attention to the conclusions of this colloquy, since the status of the speakers should suffice as an indication of the political will guiding their decision today as to whether to create a truly autonomous European space-based observation system.

The European conference we are organising with the support of many of our national and European partners in Bonn, Germany, in September of this year, could mark a new step towards the aim of European independence in space-based observation by creating an appropriate structure. This colloquy will also provide an opportunity for new partners to make known their views on these projects and thus strengthen at the highest level the political will required to achieve this aim.

Mr. SINKA (Latvia) asked whether the satellite viewing of the test sites in Nevada and the distortions after underground tests also recorded lateral and vertical vibrations or oscillations, which could sometimes be of importance.

Mr. JASANI (Department of War Studies, King's College, London) answered simply "no". The satellite was an optical satellite and recorded only optical signature. However, studies were being concluded for recording vibrations by observing the ionosphere, because the vibration of the earth was transmitted to the ionosphere and if the changes in the ionosphere could be measured it would be possible to detect the change of the test. This could be done either with an ionospheric detector on the satellite or with over the horizon radars on the ground. Both were being investigated.

Mr. BAUMEL (Chairman of the Defence Committee, WEU) emphasised the political dimension of co-ordination between Europe and the United States. It was a question of political will. Europe had the industrial capability and financial means to develop an independent satellite system but the European governments had to decide to co- operate, particularly in regard to military applications and the need to define requirements.

Mr. KLINGER (Acting Deputy Under Secretary for Defence (Space), United States) said the United States had considerable experience of military space systems but still had difficulty in financing requirements which were open-ended. The use of space, however, was imperative for the future movement of information. Co-operation with Europe could be helpful since the ground already covered by the United States might avoid Europeans having to duplicate research and development, the benefit of which they could obtain from the United States at less cost.

Mr. BAUMEL (Chairman of the Defence Committee, WEU) pointed out, however, that United States industry might dominate Europe's space industry to the detriment of its independence. It was essential for Europe not to have to depend on the United States for access to information that might determine its security and defence policy.

Mr. KLINGER (Acting Deputy Under Secretary of Defence (Space), United States) believed that while satellites were a very important tool for gathering information, they were not a panacea for what is happening on the ground, an example being the Iraqi nuclear programme. Satellite-based imagery could not indicate what was going on. WEU and the European partners must decide what space capabilities they wanted. The point about the fusion of space and other types of capabilities was very important. The advantages that space could provide could be multiplied when fused with information gathered by other means such as airborne or terrestrial, but there were limits to its usefulness.

Colonel WILLEY (United States Air Force, International Programs Manager, OUSD/ACA, United States) addressed his question to Mr. Baumel. He felt extremely privileged to have been associated with WEU and to have been able to read and see some of its reports and attend the last plenary session. An important starting point in space matters or any other weapons system defence area was the requirement. The question that continuously arose in Europe was that of independence. What exactly did independence mean to Europeans? Was it having the industrial capability to build these space systems? Was it an independent operating capability, a European-built and European- operated satellite or satellite system? Was it the need to have an independent source of data? The follow-on to that question would then be why should it have to be a non-transatlantic co-operation system that would provide such capability? Would it not be possible to conceive of having a system jointly operated so that the data would be available to all parties without question? This had led to the question of whether the aim was one more example of the nuclear paradigm that had sufficed for the last forty years with independent British, French and United States capabilities in nuclear retaliation. This was a different operational and strategic political question. There was a danger of resources being squandered in an area that was proving to be extremely expensive in the United States on one more system where perhaps the answer this time was transatlantic co- operation. He referred to a report from WEU's last plenary session dealing with the operational status of airforces in WEU countries. Was it not a better use of European resources to ensure the viability of weapons systems already fielded or contemplated for fielding by using the scarce resources for such programmes and perhaps spending less from Europe and spending less in the United States on a jointly- developed and operated system dealing with observation?

Mr. BAUMEL (Chairman of the Defence Committee, WEU) preferred not to understand what Colonel Willey was implying. Although American democracy was acceptable, there could be no question of American hegemony. Financial resources in Europe would not be wasted but used to good purpose in maintaining the high level of European industry rather than "buying American" at the risk of Europe's space industry being smothered.

(The sitting was closed at 1.10 p.m.)

(1) . This paper, prepared for the WEU Assembly colloquy "Towards a European space-based observation system", 24th-25th March 1995, Gran Canaria, is based on work being carried out in collaboration with the Forschungszentrum Julich GmbH, Julich, Germany.

(2) . Joint statements by the President of the Russian Federation and the President of the United States of America on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means of their delivery, 14th January 1994. The statement is reproduced in Newsbrief No. 25, first quarter 1994 (programme for promoting nuclear non-proliferation). (3) . Text available from the Provisional Technical Secretariat of the Preparatory Commission for the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, The Hague, Netherlands.

(4) . CD document CD/1212, 10th August 1993.

(5) . B. Jasani "Military satellites", World Armaments and Disarmament, SIPRI Year Book 1978 (SIPRI/Taylor and Francis Ltd., London, 1978), pages 69-103.

(6) . UNGA 48/75L.

(7) . "Facts about waste and emission at OKG", Fact sheet produced by the Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Mangement Co. (SKBO, OKG Aktiebolag, 1992).

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