Joint Vision 2010 defines full-spectrum dominance as the key characteristic needed by U.S. forces in the 21st century. Chemical and biological defense and nuclear technology programs are critical for establishing the full dimensional protection that is a precondition for establishing full-spectrum dominance. Developing effective capabilities to deal with weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation threats is also a key element of U.S. strategy, as articulated by the President in The National Security Strategy of the United States (February 1996, pp 19-21). The bipolar warfighting scenarios that permeated our cold war strategy in Central Europe have given way to a new force projection strategy, and U.S. forces must be prepared for conflict in a nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) warfare environment in a global reach concept. Developing the required capability to project military power to unprepared battlefields has led to a fundamental change in the S&T requirements for the Chemical/Biological Defense and Nuclear area. The ready availability of CB and nuclear and radiological weapons has expanded the WMD threat spectrum from the traditional organized enemy force to include amorphous threats such as terrorism.
The Chemical/Biological Defense and Nuclear technology area is devoted to the development of technology to counter the threat of WMD and to ensure the safety and mission effectiveness of U.S. forces operating within a contaminated environment with minimal impact on logistics. This technology area is divided into nonmedical CB defense and nuclear program areas, with eight subareas as shown in Figure II-1. Medical CB defense technology efforts are included in Chapter VI, Biomedical. Additional information can also be found in the Joint Warfighting Science and Technology Plan (JWSTP), Chapter IV, Section I.
A glossary of abbreviations and acronyms used in this chapter begins on page II-28.
The strategic goal of CB defense is the seamless integration of technologies from its four subareas—detection, protection, decontamination, and studies, analyses, and simulations—into a system of systems for horizontal integration across the spectrum of combat and support systems. Detection and warning capabilities must be integrated to provide a cohesive picture of the operational theater through the use of information technologies, such as simulation, to provide operational commanders with the required situational awareness needed for command decisions. When avoidance is not possible, integrated protection for CB warfare will allow U.S. forces to maintain operational effectiveness in a contaminated environment with minimal impact on logistics. Decontamination may be required for personnel, mission-essential assets, and areas in CB warfare conflicts, particularly for power projection supply and retrograde operations.
The strategic goal of the nuclear program area is to provide technologies needed for an effective, survivable nuclear force that will contribute to the national goal of deterring the threat or use of nuclear weapons. A complementary objective of this program area is to ensure that forces and equipment, especially C4I systems, are protected against the effects of a nuclear weapon detonation (e.g., transient radiation effects on electronics (TREE), and total neutron dosage). The technologies being developed under this area are designed to prevent such disruptions through the development of radiation-tolerant microelectronics for satellites and of affordable, integrated protection of ground-based C4I systems, including those that use off-the-shelf equipment.
The entire CB defense and nuclear strategic goal is supplemented by studies, analysis, testing, and simulation in the assessment of NBC threats, joint service doctrine, equipment design/development, soldier/system survivability, and training as well as in providing commanders with decision aids based on the integration and interpretation of real-time data.
1.3 Acquisition/Warfighting Needs
The objective of the CB Defense and Nuclear technology program is to enable our forces to survive, fight, and win in an NBC environment by ensuring a superior defensive posture that protects our forces and equipment and makes chemical, biological, or nuclear warfare a high-risk, low-payoff alternative for opposing forces. To achieve this objective, the warfighter needs to be able to detect, protect, and decontaminate/neutralize CB warfare and radiological threats with minimal logistics burdens.
The basic concept of operations in an NBC-contaminated environment is early detection and warning to provide situational awareness and permit forces to avoid the threat. Chemical detection sensors would be integrated into a variety of platforms ranging from individual battledress to autonomous reconnaissance systems. Early detection and warning of CB threats will enable commanders to activate/deactivate protective/avoidance measures in a timely fashion. This capability can be provided by a real-time sensor network to detect, identify, map, quantify, monitor, and disseminate information on the presence of CB warfare and radiological threats at or below incapacitating/physiological effect levels in the operational theater.
Protection applications for personnel range from clothing/respirator ensembles to filtration systems for vehicles and large-area enclosures, including ships and command posts. Ensembles and respiratory protection that will minimize physiological and psychological burdens are required to maintain peak operational performance capabilities for individual warfighters. New filtration materials and systems are needed to reduce the logistics burden for ground vehicles, ships, aircraft, and large area enclosures.
Systems must also be protected against the effects of a nuclear weapon detonation, particularly sensitive electronic components. The focus is on preventing disruptions to system operations through development of radiation-tolerant microelectronics for satellites and integrated protection of ground-based C4I systems. The neutralization or destruction of buried or otherwise nuclear-hardened targets with minimal collateral hazard and the fielding of WMD contingency planning systems (including real-time dispersal prediction) is also a focus of warfighter support.
Decontamination capabilities are required to sustain operations in a CB-contaminated environment, to ensure power projection capabilities particularly for ports and airfields of departures, to clean up personnel and wide areas for retrograde and resupply operations, and to reconstitute individual equipment, vehicles, sensitive equipment, and weapon platforms.
Chemical/Biological Defense and Nuclear technology development responds directly to the Defense Guidance, to the Counterproliferation and CB Warfare Defense and Protection technology areas in the JWSTP, and to the Counterproliferation Program Reports to Congress. In confrontations involving WMD proliferants, personnel and systems must be survivable; similarly, effective nuclear forces are required to support deterrence both prior to and during conflicts. The recent Tokyo subway attack is an example of new threat scenarios we are likely to encounter in the future given the ready access to CB and radiological weapons by Third World and terrorist organizations.
The CB Defense and Nuclear technology area plays an important supporting role for other technology areas. Additional JWSTP objectives involve applications of electronic, optical, and computer technologies (e.g., for Information Superiority, Precision Force, Combat Identification, Joint Theater Missile Defense, and Electronic Combat). CB defense and nuclear technology development ensures that the critical systems employed can accomplish their missions if proliferants employ WMD. Some examples of CB defense and nuclear transition opportunities can be seen in Table II-1. This technology base also provides much of our capability to model the propagation of signals and information within weapon-effect-disturbed environments.
| Current Baseline | 5 years | 10 years | 15 years |
|---|---|---|---|
| CB DETECTION SUBAREA | |||
| Limited number of detectable agents, multiple point sensors Interim biological detection system Chemical detection from 1-5 km Aerosol detection from 30 km Voice alerts Limited availability of digitized data; analog communications |
Multiple detectable agents, fewer point sensors CB water and surface contamination monitor Small, lightweight chemical monitor Low dose chemical interior monitor Automated point bio-detection system Early warning bio-aerosol detection from 1-5 km Early warning aerosol cloud detection to 50 km Availability of digitized data Global access of CB data Joint warning and reporting network |
Manportable point biodetection system Chemical detection from 20 km Early warning bio-class aerosol detection Early warning aerosol cloud detection to 100 km Real-time data and time-projection access for operational theater Limited access to virtual reality |
Manportable integrated CB detection system Chemical sensor integrated into clothing Early warning chemical and biological aerosol detection Global access to virtual reality of operational theater |
| CB PROTECTION SUBAREA | |||
| Battle dress overgarment (BDO), chemical protective overgarment (CPO), butyl gloves, vinyl overshoes M40 and MCU-2/P masks; C2 canister Single-pass carbon collective protection filters |
Lightweight garments and breathable gloves Improved agent resistance, vision, and compatibility; lower breathing resistance and bulk/weight Improved filter life Regenerative filtration for armored vehicles |
CB duty uniform 50% lighter than JSLIST uniform/over-garment Integrated helmet/ respirator with visor display, positive pressure breathing, compatibility with weapons sighting systems Noncarbonaceous collective protection filtration |
Integrated duty uniform with CB and environmental protection, signature reduction, decontaminable for reuse |
| CB DECONTAMINATION SUBAREA | |||
| DS2, STB, and improved sorbent technologies | Concepts for aircraft/ship interior decon Concepts for wide area/fixed site decon |
Supercritical fluid-based decon for sensitive equipment Demo enzymatic decon DS2 replacement |
Strategic modular decon systems and approaches |
Table II-1. CB Defense and Nuclear Technology Transition Opportunities (continued)
| Current Baseline | 5 years | 10 years | 15 years |
|---|---|---|---|
| CB STUDIES, ANALYSIS, AND SIMULATION SUBAREA | Transport and diffusion models with terrain features | Microgeography and micro-meteorology for CB hazard prediction Collateral effects predictor CB effects into simulators Tradeoff models to assess value added of CB capabilities |
Real-time computation of hazards Virtual reality simulators |
| WARFIGHTER SUPPORT (NUCLEAR) SUBAREA | |||
| Refocusing of capabilities to respond to proliferation threats underway | Demonstrate and validate initial adaptive planning for counterproliferation | Complete initial dual-revalidation of nuclear stockpile in collaboration with DOE | Continuous adaptation to new requirements as identified by CINCs |
| SYSTEMS EFFECTS AND SURVIVABILITY (NUCLEAR) SUBAREA | |||
| In process of identifying what must be done to adapt to new, post-cold war protection requirements | By FY98, qualify production-ready, radiation-tolerant 4 M SRAM By FY00, demo radiation tolerant 100 k gate array and 16 M SRAM using 0.35-micron SOI technology |
Adaptation of survivability practices to respond to future threats and to take advantage of new technologies | |
| TEST AND SIMULATION TECHNOLOGY (NUCLEAR) SUBAREA | |||
| Consolidation and refocusing on new requirements; incremental improvements to existing capabilities (e.g., flyer plate facility) | IOC for LB/TS with non-ideal airblast simulation capability and implement initial component of new DECADE simulator | Adapt investment strategy to take advantage of technical progress (e.g., new laser sources, National Ignition Facility (NIF)) | Take advantage of developments in advanced physics programs (e.g., Laser Microfusion Facility (LMF) and ASCI) |
| SCIENTIFIC AND OPERATIONAL COMPUTING (NUCLEAR) SUBAREA | |||
| Current-generation super-computer | Transition to HPC architecture and departmental machines | Interface with ASCI; more emphasis on virtual experiments supported by physics understanding | TBD - timeframe approximates 6+ generations of change in base technologies |
1.4 Support for Combating Terrorism
The increase in terrorist incidents and activity, coupled with the ready availability of CB and nuclear radiological weapons, has made NBC terrorism a viable contingency in the expanding WMD threat spectrum. Whereas the focus of this program is on providing immediate capabilities for first-responder activities, including law enforcement, fire/rescue, and emergency care personnel, the full spectrum of CB defense and nuclear radiological technology base will be leveraged to provide near- and mid-term transitions to supplement these capabilities.
Within the CB mission area, enhancements in CB detection capabilities will be provided as technology inserts. Technology for standoff detection and mapping of chemical agent contamination and clouds will be provided (DTO CB.07.10) for protection of high-value, fixed facilities as well as for mobile reconnaissance by first responders. For individual protection, improved filtration materials and selectively permeable membrane clothing materials will minimize the impact of performance for first responders functioning in CB-contaminated environments (DTOs CB.06.12, CB.08.12, and CB.16.12). Improved, nontoxic, noncorrosive, and environmentally safe decontamination materials, such as foam-based catalytic enzymes (DTO CB.09.12), will enable first responders to deal with large or small CB incidents. CB modeling and simulation efforts in the area of hazard prediction will enable authorities directing first-responder activity to better assess potential or actual CB hazards and to aid in the development of realistic contingency plans.
Technology development within the nuclear subareas will also improve DoD and national capabilities for combating terrorism. Within the warfighter support (nuclear) subarea, activities include development and demonstration of physical security technologies suitable for protection of nuclear forces as well as force protection and other counterterrorist applications. Research on the effectiveness of munitions conducted as part of the Hard Target Defeat DTO (CB.13.07) has been adapted to develop an improved understanding of the threats posed by terrorist devices and of the effectiveness of countermeasures against such threats. The Prediction and Mitigation of Collateral Hazards DTO (CB.14.07) is developing improved capabilities for predicting the hazards that might result from terrorist use of WMD. Terrorist threats can be directed at systems as well as personnel. These technical efforts, whose primary purpose is to respond to military requirements, are examples of technologies that can be made available to civilian authorities and organizations responsible for combating terrorism involving CB and nuclear radiological weapons. The systems effects and survivability (nuclear) subarea develops the technologies needed for protection of critical systems as described in the Balanced Electromagnetic Hardening Technology DTO (CB.15.01). This DTO will develop the technologies needed to provide better, more affordable protection against a range of hazards. The test and simulation technology subarea provides unique capabilities for assessing the consequences of terrorist devices and evaluating the performance of protective measures that are described in the Nuclear Hardness and Survivability Testing Technologies DTO (CB.10.07).
