The combat efficiency of forces can be increased by reducing the physiological and psychological effects of operating in a CB-contaminated environment by possessing the ability to constantly monitor for the presence of CB warfare agents. Information provided by a CB warfare agent contamination avoidance network that can detect, identify, map, quantify, and track the threat in the operational theater will provide commanders with the situational awareness necessary for command decisions. A real-time contamination avoidance network composed of various sensors integrated into a variety of platforms ranging from individual battledress, weapon platforms, and standalone units linked to the C4I system will process and integrate sensor data with geographical, meteorological, and intelligence data to provide an up-to-date and time-projected CB warfare situational threat analysis. The network will provide situational awareness on different levels depending on the need.
In the short term (within the next 2 years), the warfighter will require the capabilities that are described in the operational requirements of the Joint Chemical Agent Detector (JCAD)— formerly the Joint Service Chemical Miniature Agent Detector—and the Joint Biological Point Detection System (JBPDS). The Joint Service Lightweight Standoff Chemical Agent Detector (JSLSCAD) transitioned to engineering, manufacturing, and development in FY96. These will provide capabilities in chemical vapor detection for personal safety, interiors of cargo aircrafts, ground vehicles, ships, and survey monitors; in automated biological agent detection; and in an early warning system for chemical agent vapors, respectively.
In the mid term (3-5 years), the needs are for a Joint Chemical/Biological Agent Water Monitor (JCBAWM) and a Joint Biological Remote Early Warning System (JBREWS). The capabilities described in JBREWS and JCBAWM are to provide an early warning to the presence of biological warfare agents and to detect the presence of contaminants in water.
In the far term (6 years and beyond), the needs will be for capabilities in universal biological agent detection, detection of liquid contaminants on surfaces, and long-range (in excess of 50 km) detection of chemical agents.
3.1.2.1 Goals and Timeframes. The goal of the detection subarea is to provide a real-time capability to detect, identify, map, quantify, track, and disseminate information on the presence of all CB warfare agent threats at levels to protect against incapacitation/physiologically significant effects. Current emphasis is on multiagent sensors for CB point and early warning detection. Within the next 2 years, technology is being transitioned to engineering manufacturing and development phase for JCAD and JBPDS. The technologies will be for a number of sensors that are targeted against either chemical or biological agents. In particular, a pocket-sized chemical vapor point detector (JCAD), an automated biological point detection system (JBPDS), and a passive infrared chemical agent detection system (JSLSCAD) will be available in this timeframe. In the mid term (3-5 years), technology will be available for detecting contaminants in water (JCBAWM) and for providing an early warning to the presence of biological warfare agents (JBREWS). In the far term (6 years and beyond), the technological goals will be for concepts in universal biological warfare agent point and remote detection, detection of liquid contaminants on surfaces, long-range (in excess of 50 km) detection of chemical warfare agents, and an artificial intelligence in a global networked system to provide a complete situational awareness of the operational theater.
3.1.2.2 Major Technical Challenges. The CB detection subarea includes a number of different technologies including analytical and materials characterization techniques such as various forms of spectroscopy and bioassay technologies, materials development, engineering concepts, and information technology (computer and communication hardware and software). The technical challenges are to enhance sensitivity and selectivity; increase number of detectable CB agents; decrease response time; enhance sampling techniques; discriminate from naturally occurring background materials; develop advanced signal processing for detection algorithms; reduce size, weight, and power requirements; integrate data with threat models; integrate sensor systems into C4I systems; increase computational/communication capabilities; reduce cost; and minimize logistical requirements.
These technical challenges are being met through the development of new immunoassay systems, deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA or genetic) probes, materials for coatings, infrared/ultraviolet (IR/UV) lasers, mass spectrometric technologies for biologicals as well as chemicals, improvements in previously explored technologies such as surface acoustic wave technology, and nonradioactive ionization sources, optics, and pre-concentrators. Nonspecific concepts/ strategies are investigating whole cells as a detector, naturally occurring chemical markers in biological materials, enhanced Raman spectroscopy techniques for liquid contaminants on surfaces or contaminants in water, or sampling techniques for collection or introduction into various point detection systems. There are also efforts to understand and characterize biological/chemical/physical properties and physiological effects of CB agents. In addition, technologies are being explored for micromechanical fluidics technologies for sample processing and for imbedding separation and identification technologies in chip-sized devices.
Process and materials engineering, thermal management, component integration, fluidics management, and other new engineering concepts are reducing system size, weight, power, and response time and optimizing detector configurations and logistical requirements. These new engineering concepts, combined with the efforts in the fundamental sciences, are producing advances in technology such as IR/UV detectors that are more uniform, have higher sensitivity and efficiency, and function under conditions close to ambient temperatures instead of -200(C; new lasers that have high outputs, use less power, are smaller in size and weight, and have wider frequency ranges; and selective sampling systems that are more efficient.
The information technologies are responsible for developing new signal processing techniques to analyze sensor data and integrating the information to the threat models along with geographical, meteorological, and intelligence data for dissemination in the C4I system. The information technologies must be able to handle a tremendous amount of data, both for processing and for manipulation through the network. The CB Defense and Nuclear technology area is responsible for the development and advancement of software algorithms for pattern recognition, signal processing, artificial intelligence, expert systems, virtual three-dimensional simulations, and computer-human interface. The actual computational/communication hardware (design of computer/electronic chips) is outside the scope of this technology area.
The affordability issue is an inherent parameter that is not addressed as a separate issue in the technical challenges. A large number of the efforts described are driven heavily by the affordability issue. Prime examples are nonradioactive ionization sources, detectors that function at ambient temperature instead of -200°C, and component integration.
3.1.2.3 Related Federal and Private Sector Efforts. Chemical and biological detection is a specialized subset of a much larger environmental health and safety area. All CB detection technology, in principle, can be modified to address the larger picture of environmental health and safety. The ability to detect, identify, map, monitor, quantify, and track industrial hazardous and medically infectious materials is considered highly desirable by the commercial sector. The potential benefits of dual-use for the CB detection technology are already being developed through collaborative efforts with environmental and medical groups. In many of these areas, the private sector is working on leap-ahead technologies that can be applied to CB defense problems. Modified versions of a DoD prototype detection system are being used or developed by other government agencies and the private sector for use in non-CB defense capacities.
There is a significant synergy that requires a continuing dialog between defense developers and private industry/academia. CB defense environments carry with them unique requirements in terms of ruggedness, power, and other logistical requirements. Thus, transition of technology from non-CB defense applications requires a significant reengineering effort. Basic research currently being pursued by the national laboratories, other government agencies, academia, and the private sector can be used as a foundation to build the future generations of CB defense detection systems.
One effort currently receiving increased emphasis is the cumulative effects on personnel exposed to subthreshold levels of chemical agents. This partnership between the national laboratories and the government came as a result of lessons learned in Operation Desert Storm. The development of a technology that would measure cumulative low-dose exposure to chemical agents would benefit the individual warfighter, people working in the industrial chemical industry, and first-responder teams.
3.1.3.1 Technology Demonstrations. All technology demonstrations that are related to contamination avoidance are in the JWSTP.
3.1.3.2 Technology Development. The technology development areas for CB detection are point detection, early warning detection, and information processing and dissemination. Point detection encompasses all sampling (in situ) detectors, both chemical and biological. In addition, the area includes early warning using remotely deployed point detectors (e.g., sampling detectors on an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) or positioned at a distance from the troops with communication via wire or radio link). Early warning detection is a technology that electromagnetically observes clouds at a distance including any non-in-situ techniques. Information processing and dissemination technologies will collect and process all detection system information and then disseminate it through the C4I network. The contamination avoidance subarea has been narrowed and focused from over 55 efforts into 11 areas by the recommendations of the Joint Detection Working Group.
3.1.3.3 Basic Research. Basic research efforts in CB detection are in mass spectroscopy techniques/technologies, optical spectroscopy (includes a wide range of techniques/technologies), olfactory-like chemical sensing, whole-cell-based biosensors, immuno and DNA assay, molecular approaches to optical sensors, and proximal probes. Additional efforts include work in aerosol sciences, micro-machines, and laser development; the physical/chemical/biological characterization of CB warfare agents; and the correlation of these characteristics to nonhazardous materials that can be used as simulants. Basic research relies on work performed by national laboratories, other government agencies, academia, and the private sector in addition to CB defense programs.
