3.5 Warfighter Support (Nuclear)
Weapons that are effective and appropriate for proliferation scenarios are needed. Particular emphasis is given to improving capabilities for defeat of hardened targets (especially those associated with WMD) with minimized collateral hazards. This RDT&E applies both to the post-cold-war nuclear mission and to the tasking from the Secretary of Defense to apply nuclear research expertise to improve understanding of advanced conventional munitions and weapon-target interactions.
3.5.2.1 Goals and Timeframes. The goals of the warfighter support (nuclear) subarea are as follows:
3.5.2.2 Major Technical Challenges. Long-term stockpile stewardship using only nonnuclear laboratory technologies, plus modeling and simulation, and probabilistic risk assessment is without precedent. Stockpile stewardship involves more than a physics package. DoD must address end-to-end operation of critical delivery and C3I systems. Planning capabilities must be adapted to proliferant contingencies including, as one example, the attack of a WMD target with conventional weapons in which collateral hazards result from the target. Full-physics effects models must be translated into operational planning/visualization tools. Human response models for single or combined exposure to chemical, biological, or radiological threats must be developed and validated to allow collateral hazards to be reliably assessed.
3.5.2.3 Related Federal and Private Sector Efforts. DOE stockpile revalidation and other Science-Based Stockpile Stewardship activities are critical for accomplishing DoD nuclear missions. Since FY96, DoD dual-revalidation teams have participated in these activities. Research demonstrating safety methodologies and providing better methods for predicting and mitigating collateral hazards has potential for technology transfer to the civil sector.
3.5.3.1 Technology Development. All of the activities in this subarea involve technology development; there are no basic research or technology demonstrations.
Stockpile Support. Initial dual-revalidation objectives have been defined. Safety research uses probabilistic risk assessment methodologies adapted to multiple-failure point analysis; there is close collaboration with Air Force customers for this work. Physical security R&D for nuclear systems is coordinated by OSD.
Planning Systems for Contingencies Involving Proliferants. Priorities are defined by U.S. CINC and SHAPE users. Target planning capabilities are being adapted to respond to proliferation contingency requirements. Survivability programs focus on the Nuclear Posture Review stockpile. A direct technical support capability has been established to provide support to theater operations, as done during Operation Desert Storm for WMD hazard prediction and target analysis.
Improving Weapons Effectiveness. Particular emphasis is given to evaluating options for defeat or functional disruption of buried and other hardened targets.
Collateral Hazards. Forecasting methodologies are being adapted to address WMD effects dispersion in situations in which local environmental factors dominate. This research contributes to the Joint Warning and Reporting Network DTO (CB.02.10) and to the Prediction and Mitigation of Collateral Hazards DTO (CB.14.07).
