C. COMBAT IDENTIFICATION

1. Definition

Combat Identification (CID) is the capability to differentiate potential targets—mobile and fixed, over large areas with corresponding long distances—as friend, foe, or neutral in sufficient time, with high confidence, and at the requisite range to support engagement decisions and weapon release.

2. Operational Capability Elements

U.S. forces must be able to positively identify all targets in the battlespace for all combat mission areas—air to air, air to surface, surface to surface, and surface to air. Surface includes land, sea, and subsurface—otherwise known as ground and maritime (Figure IV.C-1). The CID need is essential in order for commanders to effectively field, at any time, fighting forces that can rapidly and positively identify enemies, friends, and neutrals in the battlespace; manage and control the battle area; optimally employ weapons and forces; and minimize the risk/occurrence of fratricide.

In 1992, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) validated the Joint Mission Need Statement (MNS), which defines the broad-based requirements for CID. These include positive, timely, and reliable identification of friends, foes, and neutrals; classification of foes by class, type, and nationality; and interoperability required among the U.S. military and desired with allied nations. The challenges presented by the requirements necessitate a CID architecture that blends both nonmateriel and materiel solutions.

Nonmateriel solutions include doctrine; tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP); and training. From a cost perspective, the nonmateriel solution to resolving a CID deficiency is compelling if it does not carry untenable constraints on the warfighter. However, nonmateriel solutions often need to be augmented by materiel solutions. These can be characterized as cooperative/noncooperative sensor systems and command, control, and communications (C³) systems—in particular, digital datalinks and radios, each of which contributes a portion to the CID solution. As such, CID is viewed as a capability, not a single system or program. A "system-of-systems" approach is required.

CID is the result of a process that appropriately and accurately characterizes the entities present in a combatant's area of responsibility. Effective CID can take place with varying degrees of target identification, depending on the conditions of the battlespace. At times, the extent of required identification is only to rapidly distinguish among friendly, neutral, and adversary forces with high enough confidence to support weapon employment decisions. At other times, identification of target class (e.g., cruise missile, fighter, or bomber) or target recognition (e.g., target vs. decoy) is required to select the correct defensive or offensive tactical weapon response. In other cases, a more extensive characterization that identifies specific target parameters, such as platform type (e.g., MiG-29 vs. MiG-21) and intent (e.g., an active interceptor vs. a defector) is required to select optimal defensive weapons and to support weapon release decisions. In all cases, the goal for CID is to provide the necessary level of identification to make correct weapon decisions. This CID approach supports the attainment of military objectives while minimizing total casualties.

The primary objective for CID is to correlate and assign a foe, friend, or neutral identification label to a "target." The identification label can be assigned at any time from initial detection of the potential target to weapon employment. To be useful for a direct-fire engagement, the correct target label must be correlated to a sensor return that is in a "weapon sight" (e.g., radar, laser, or thermal sight). Indirect-fire weapons or supporting fire weapons operate from a different perspective as they cannot "see" the target. The identification is made and sent to the weapon by the fire requestor or a surveillance/reconnaissance platform; the weapon is correlated to the specified target position.

As discussed earlier, there are two classes of materiel solutions:

• Sensors—the target is characterized either noncooperatively (e.g., jet engine modulation, high-range resolution radar, or electronic support measures) or cooperatively (e.g., MK XII identification friend or foe (IFF) system or Battlefield Combat Identification System (BCIS)).

• C³ (particularly digital datalinks and radios)—the target declares (either periodically or when queried) its identification and position in a reference frame that the "shooter" can correlate with its own weapon and sensor system (e.g., Link 16).

Both approaches have their strengths and limitations. If the identification is determined by an offboard sensor, there is the added necessity to pass and correlate the required information in a timely fashion. This requirement to correlate an identification label with a sensor return in the "weapon sight" is a key discriminator and a source of significant cost for the systems.

The vision is a fielded CID capability that ensures that all combatant platforms will have available the required identification information in a timely fashion that is commensurate with the range and lethality of the platforms' weapons and sensors. The approach toward realizing this vision is through an integrated CID architecture that combines noncooperative and cooperative identification sensors and systems with C³ (particularly digital datalinks and radios) capabilities. Such an architecture supports the development of situational awareness—the overall, general knowledge of the tactical battlefield environment, including the location of friendly, neutral, and enemy forces as well as the plan of action for battle. The required operational capability will then be achieved by combining onboard data from multiple sensors and systems with indirectly supplied offboard information.

Due to the fundamental differences of their operating environments, the operational capability elements can be aggregated into three categories: air, ground, and maritime target platforms. Air platforms are more dispersed, move at much higher speeds, and are engaged at relatively long ranges with imaging or nonimaging sensors. Ground platforms are closely spaced, move slowly, and are engaged at close ranges with imaging sensors. Maritime platforms are relatively slow compared to air platforms, can be either closely spaced (i.e., several hundreds of yards) or more dispersed (i.e., several nautical miles), and are engaged at longer ranges compared to ground platforms due to the nonimaging sensors indigenous to the maritime platform or the imaging/nonimaging sensors of the aircraft attached to the maritime unit.

In general, the current CID capability against all platforms must be improved. The current CID capability in many cases does not allow for maximum use of a weapon's range and engagement of targets in highly mixed, fast-moving environments. The result is that combat effectiveness is often restricted by confining rules of engagement and procedures.

For ground targets (air-to-surface and surface-to-surface mission areas), the current capability is extremely limited. The objective is to have an initial level of high confidence CID capability fielded for all early-deploying, first-line combatant platforms within 10 years. The CID capability must provide the required identification information with very high confidence.

For air targets (surface-to-air and air-to-air mission areas) as well as maritime targets (surface-to-surface and air-to-surface mission areas), CID needs improvement in some areas. In some cases, effective systems have been developed that could fill some of the needs but are not widely fielded. In other cases, noncooperative sensor/technique databases need to be updated and more fully populated. In still other areas, correlation/fusion issues need to be resolved. The objective is to provide nearly perfect identification information.

With respect to CID, automatic target recognition (ATR) is best viewed as an enabling technology tool that contributes, in part, to an operational CID capability, as already defined. ATR pertains to the implementation of cooperative and noncooperative sensor systems. The need for ATR systems stems from the increased complexity of tactical and strategic battlespaces, the unprecedented amount of raw information produced by modern sensor systems, and the effectiveness of C³ systems. Collectively these can overwhelm the capability of human operators and decisionmakers. The magnitude and rate of information produced may exceed the operator's ability to absorb and process it in a timely fashion; performance declines with operator fatigue and varies with operator training. Consequently, ATR systems are being developed to provide an assortment of technological services that range from operator prompting (cueing) tools to fully automated ATR systems requiring no human operator intervention.

More precisely, the goal of ATR is to support rapid and reliable detection, geolocation, tracking, recognition, and prioritization of targets. In general, the output will provide a human operator or decision maker with target recommendations, weapon options, and the level of confidence associated with each proposed action.

The degree to which the constituent functions can or should be automated depends not only on the efficacy of the ATR technology but also on sensor performance, target complexity and density, target environment, mission requirements, and required response times. For example, particular mission or battlespace conditions may only require an ATR system to sort through a very large potential target density and alert an operator to the presence and location of a change in battlespace conditions (e.g., deployment of troop positions or bomb damage assessment) since the previous battlespace analysis. In this example, image analysts would be required to infer appropriate information from the data; such systems, which are predicated on active human participation, are sometimes referred to as assisted target recognition or aided target recognition.

In summary, ATR provides enabling technologies for CID. The amount of automation that can be provided by ATR relates to the varying degrees of target identification required for a functional CID capability. For additional information on ATR, see Defense Technology Area Plan, Chapter VII, Sensors, Electronics, and Battlespace Environment.

3. Functional Capabilities

The functional capabilities for CID include foe identification (including platform type, class, nationality, allegiance, and intent information), friend identification, neutral identification, and interoperability (for cooperative sensors, C³ datalinks/radios, and databases on noncooperative sensors and techniques). The functional capabilities required to meet the CID operational capability elements and the strength of their support are shown in Table IV.C-1. The relative importance of these functional capabilities to the operational capability elements varies due to the fundamental differences in the missions and the operating environments of the potential targets.

Noncooperative identification sensors and systems have the advantage of identifying foes, friends, and neutrals. Cooperative identification sensor systems, which only identify friends, have the advantage of less technical challenge; however, they require all friendly potential targets to be equipped with the same corresponding identification equipment. C³ systems (particularly digital datalinks and radios) are also cooperative systems that provide (1) friend identification automatically (for all participants on the network), (2) a medium for passing hostile/neutral identification generated from other sensors/sources, and (3) a medium for passing friend identification (for those platforms not on the network) generated from other sensors/sources. In addition to doctrine/TTP, all of these systems are critical contributors to a system-of-systems approach in providing both situational awareness and identification to use lethal weapons in the battlespace. The functional capabilities of all CID systems must work synergistically to provide a robust, high-confidence CID capability.

4. Current Capabilities, Deficiencies, and Barriers

The U.S. baseline varies according to operational capability element mission area. Some technological capabilities have not been fielded while others have only been fielded to a small segment of the force.

Current Air-to-Surface Capability

Foe Identification

• Use of tactical reconnaissance or surveillance aircraft to exploit electronic signals emitted by a set of targets (e.g., electronic support measures (ESM)).
• Recognition of classes of maritime platforms using inverse synthetic aperture radar (ISAR).
• Recognition of classes of ground platforms using synthetic aperture radar (SAR).
• Communication by ground or air forward air controller (FAC)—via voice or automated ground target information passing systems (e.g., Improved Data Modem or Automatic Target Handoff System)—for close air support (CAS) information, including target location and identification, nearest friendly position, and clearance to drop ordnance.

Friend Identification

• Use of marking schemes for ground platforms that can be readily detected visually or via available sensors.
• Query and identification of maritime platforms with cooperative sensor/C³ system (e.g., MK XII Mode 4 or Link 16, the latter still being fielded).

Neutral Identification

• Visual identification only.

Interoperability

• Voice communications.
• Digital links (limited; fielding still in progress).

Foe Identification

• Visual identification of ground platforms.
• Classification of maritime platforms via radar returns, exploiting electronic signals emitted by target (e.g., ESM).

Friend Identification

• Query and identification of potential targets with cooperative sensor/C³ system (e.g., for ground platforms, Battlefield Combat Identification System, not yet funded for production; for maritime platforms, MK XII Mode 4 or Link 16).
• Use of marking schemes for ground platforms that can be readily detected visually or via available sensors.
• Classification of maritime platforms via radar returns, exploiting electronic signals emitted by target (e.g., ESM).
• Improved location of friendly ground forces using Global Positioning System (GPS).

Neutral Identification

• Visual identification of ground platforms.
• Classification of maritime platforms via radar returns, exploiting electronic signals emitted by target (e.g., ESM).

Interoperability

• General location of friendly ground battle participants based on tactical radios and Enhanced Position Location and Reporting System (EPLRS), which is still being fielded and is not yet interoperable with the tactical radios.
• Location of friendly maritime battle participants based on digital datalinks (e.g., legacy Link 11 and current/future Link 16), which have mixed levels of interoperability.

Foe Identification

• Classification of platform type via detailed analysis of radar return (e.g., jet engine modulation (JEM), radar painting).
• Exploitation of electronic signals emitted by target (e.g., ESM).

Friend Identification

• Query and identification of potential targets with cooperative sensor/C³ system (e.g., MK XII Mode 4 or Link 16).

Neutral Identification

• Classification of platform type via detailed analysis of radar return (e.g., JEM, radar painting).
• Exploitation of electronic signals emitted by target (e.g., ESM).

Interoperability

• Big picture of battlespace via Link 16 and other legacy datalinks that are not yet interoperable across services.
• Voice communications with other agencies and sensors.

Foe Identification

• Classification of platform type via detailed analysis of radar return (e.g., JEM, radar painting.).
• Exploitation of electronic signals emitted by target (e.g., ESM).

Friend Identification

• Query and identification of potential targets with cooperative sensor/C³ system (e.g., MK XII Mode 4 or Link 16).
• Classification of platform type via detailed analysis of radar return (e.g., JEM, radar painting).
• Exploitation of electronic signals emitted by target (e.g., ESM).

Neutral Identification

• Classification of platform type via detailed analysis of radar return (e.g., JEM, radar painting).
• Exploitation of electronic signals emitted by target (e.g., ESM).

Interoperability

• Big picture of battlespace via Link 16 and other legacy datalinks that are not interoperable across services.
• Voice communications with other agencies and sensors.

The JROC has reviewed the CID joint warfighting needs by mission areas and has stated a need for CID in all mission areas. Additionally, the JROC ranked the mission areas in terms of available CID equipage from the most deficient to the least deficient as follows:

• Air-to-surface
• Surface-to-surface
• Surface-to-air
• Air-to-air.

The JROC noted that many U.S. platforms are currently deficient in CID systems and datalinks. No ground combatants have a long-range identification capability, and many maritime and air platforms have only limited CID suites.

There are two principal barriers to having universal CID capability on all air, maritime, and ground platforms: affordability and signature exploitability.

Affordability. The cost of CID suites that are properly integrated with the weapon sight (both cooperative and noncooperative) are usually prohibitive if they are not a P³I of an existing sensor or system. Additional functionality in the form of communications, situational awareness, or sensing is helpful in making CID more affordable. The affordability of a system will also vary significantly depending on the environment in which it is considered. Aviation/maritime systems are generally more expensive than ground-based systems. As a result, solutions that are programmatically "affordable" for aircraft/maritime platforms are often prohibitively expensive for combat vehicles. Technology that eases the integration overhead of a CID-related system or reduces its component cost is required.

Signature Exploitability. Noncooperative techniques of identification are most attractive to warfighters due to their ability to generate labels for foe, friend, and neutral contacts, and because they can provide additional identification information on adversaries (e.g., platform type, class, nationality). For air/maritime targets, the current capabilities of these systems are limited in range, aspect, and timeliness of reporting. The result is that the indications from this class of systems are frequently in the "unknown" or "not available" state. Improvements in sensors and target databases that expand the envelope of performance for these systems are necessary. For combat vehicles, the signal environment is such that reliable identification at maximum weapon range remains a significant technical challenge. Limitations in sensor resolution—coupled with variations in target aspect, state, countermeasures, and the battlespace signal propagation environment—complicate the job of target labeling. Technology improvements for improved sensors and automatic target recognition that can interpret imaging and nonimaging sensor data to reliably identify the platform type are necessary. The key technologies for reaching the combat identification joint warfighting capabilities are shown in Table IV.C-2. Several Defense Technology Objectives (DTOs) in the Sensors, Electronics, and Battlespace Environment area of the DTAP also support Combat Identification. These include Multifunction Electro-Optical Sensor Signal Processing (SE.06.01), Affordable ATR via Rapid Design, Evaluation, and Simulation (SE.19.03), Enhanced Moving Target Detection Development (SE.03.01), ATR for Reconnaissance and Surveillance (SE.02.01), Multifunction Laser (SE.09.02), and Advanced Focal Plane Array Technology (SE.33.01)

CID can be highly useful only when it is fully integrated with both C³ and weapon systems. It often develops time-urgency far exceeding that for most other C⁴I functions. In addition, CID requirements need to be refined through simulation and military exercises. If not defined within that sort of environment, past history suggest that some requirements will be so stringent as to discourage serious development, while others may not be sufficient to satisfy the needs.

CID requires effective and timely synchronization of communications systems with data from real-time surveillance, target tracking, and intelligence systems. The CID output must be coupled with the weapon systems in real time to maximize their effectiveness against enemies. In the past, inability to take advantage of all available information has made CID systems add-ons rather than integrated features of all tactical systems.

CID capabilities are also vulnerable to enemy exploitation or countermeasures. Vulnerability analyses and evaluations must accompany system design and test programs.

5. Technology Plan

The roadmap for developing and demonstrating these technologies has two main elements: surface target identification and air target identification. Each element addresses both the affordability and signature exploitability barriers. An overview of the relationship of the CID operational capability elements, functional capabilities, demonstrations, and supporting technologies is shown in Figure IV.C-2.

The primary Defense Technology Objectives (DTOs) and their corresponding demonstrations that address the CID operational capabilities are shown in Tables IV.C-3 and IV.C-4. Additionally, the Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT) ACTD (E.02) will explore small-unit operations in an urban terrain and will include some CID issues. The DTO CID roadmap is shown in Figure IV.C-3.

Surface Target Identification. This element first addresses an integrated air-to-surface (ground) and surface-to-surface CID capability through the Battlefield Combat Identification (BCID) ATD (C.01), the Combat Identification ACTD (C.02), and the associated EW/Sensor Fusion/Integrated Situation Assessment Technology demonstrations. These demonstrations combine primarily friend identification and limited foe identification with improved battlefield situational awareness resulting from the Army's Force XXI initiative. The North Finding Module demonstration addresses a key technology needed for affordable correlation of identification labels within the weapon sight on ground platforms.

The next several steps focus on foe identification using noncooperative techniques. A number of ATDs are critical to this effort including the Target Acquisition ATD (B.05), Air/Land Enhanced Reconnaissance and Targeting (ALERT) ATD (B.06), and Enhanced Recognition and Sensing Laser Radar (ERASER) ATD (C.04). Furthermore, the DARPA/Air Force Moving and Stationary Target Acquisition and Recognition (MSTAR) Program and the Air Force System-oriented High-range resolution Automatic Recognition Program (SHARP) Program support the Advanced Identification ATD (C.03). Additionally, maritime targets are being addressed as part of the Specific Emitter Identification (SEI) ATD (C.06). Improving the ease of integration will allow for the CID solutions that are evolving or extant to be hosted within the architecture with a minimal expenditure of time or money. This element addresses the integration of multiple functions within a CID suite to reduce costs and improvements in the case of physical and functional integration onto combat platforms to achieve more rapidly deployable and affordable CID solutions.

The air target identification element represents a more information-rich approach. This element includes both fusion and noncooperative target identification techniques. The Advanced Identification ATD (C.03), ERASER ATD (C.04), Air Target Algorithm Development Program (part of C.01), and SEI ATD (C.06) address the signal exploitation issues associated with the noncooperative air target identification challenge. These efforts are multidimensional and proceed in parallel. They each include their own data collection efforts. These signature exploitability efforts are crucial to advancing the capability in noncooperative sensing to support all target identification. It is the intent of this path in the roadmap to have a wide variety of experiments to examine the issues of signature presence, discrimination, and reliability over a broad range of engagement scenarios and battlespace environmental conditions. Each of the integrated CID suite approaches would be used to demonstrate improved operations (enhanced effectiveness and reduced fratricide) in field exercises with both joint and combined forces.

All CID techniques have a limited period of operational effectiveness before they are degraded or compromised by enemy countermeasures. It is therefore necessary to have an ongoing process to overcome these vulnerabilities by developing new technologies for CID, demonstrating new capabilities in appropriate operational environments, and deploying new or upgraded CID appliqués to maintain a superior operational CID capability.

Identification issues associated with weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are addressed in Section J, Counter WMD.

6. Summary

Providing an accurate CID capability when and where it is needed requires an integrated architecture that includes noncooperative/cooperative identification sensor systems, C³ systems, and doctrine/TTP. Improvements in joint warfighting operational capabilities will be demonstrated using suites of the materiel capabilities on various platforms in joint operational environments.

A significant initial improvement is expected for ground target identification with the inception of new cooperative identification techniques combined with C³/digital datalinks and radios. This will later be augmented with a foe and neutral identification capability for selected weapon systems.

Air target identification improvements will be achieved by increasing the robustness of overall CID capabilities by improving noncooperative techniques, providing more capable datalinks, adding data fusion/correlation capabilities, and expanding the number of platforms equipped. The improvements in demonstrated warfighting capabilities over time are shown in Figure IV.C-4.