1. INTRODUCTION

In recent years, proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), specifically chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, has increased. In response to this danger, the Joint Chiefs of Staff designated Counterproliferation of WMD as one of the top five Future Joint Warfighting Capabilities. Developing effective capabilities to deal with WMD proliferation threats is also a key element of U.S. strategy, as articulated by the President in The National Security Strategy of the United States (February 1996, pp.Ê19-21). The bipolar warfighting scenarios which permeated our Cold War strategy in Central Europe have given way to a new force projection strategy, and U.S. forces must be prepared for conflict in a Chemical-Biological & Nuclear (CB&N) warfare environment in a Global Reach concept. Developing the required capability to project military power to unprepared battlefields has led to a fundamental change in the S&T requirements for the CB&N community. The ready availability of CB and nuclear radiological weapons has expanded the WMD threat spectrum from the traditional organized enemy force to include amorphous threats such as terrorism.

1.1 Definition/Scope

The Chemical, Biological Defense and Nuclear Technology Area is devoted to the development of technology to counter the threat of WMD and to ensure the safety and mission effectiveness of U.S. forces. This technology area is subdivided into non-medical Chemical and Biological Defense (CB Defense), and Nuclear program areas, with eight subareas as shown in Figure II.1. Medical CB Defense technology efforts are included in Chapter VI, Medical and Biomedical. Additional information can also be found in the Joint Warfighting Science and Technology Plan (JWSTP), Chapter IV, sections J and L. See Resource Appendix for funding of this Defense Technology Area.

Figure II.1. Planning Structure - Chemical, Biological Defense and Nuclear

1.2 Strategic Goals

The strategic goal of CB Defense is the seamless integration of technologies from its four subareasÑdetection, protection, decontamination, and studies, analysis and simulationÑinto a system of systems for horizontal integration across the spectrum of combat and support systems. The basic and primary concept of operations is early detection and warning to provide situational awareness and permit forces to avoid the threat. The detection capability will enable commanders to activate/deactivate protective/avoidance measures in a timely fashion. This capability can be provided by a real-time sensor network to detect, identify, map, quantify, monitor, and disseminate information on the presence of CB warfare and radiological threats at/below incapacitating/physiological effect levels in the operational theater.

When avoidance is not possible, integrated protection for CB warfare will allow U.S. forces to maintain operational effectiveness in a contaminated environment with minimal impact on logistics. Decontamination may be required in CB warfare conflicts, especially for personnel, mission essential assets and areas, as well as for retrograde and resupply operations.

The entire CB Defense strategic goal is supported by studies, analysis and simulation which supports each of the other three CB Defense subareas and aids in the assessment of Joint Service doctrine, training and materiel development, equipment design, and enables commanders to integrate and interpret real-time data.

The goal of the Nuclear program area is to provide technologies needed for an effective, survivable nuclear force that will contribute to the national goal of deterring the threat or use of nuclear weapons. A complementary objective of this program area is to ensure that forces and equipment, especially C4I systems, are protected against the effects of a nuclear weapon detonation, e.g., transient radiation effects on electronics (TREE) and total neutron dosage. The technologies being developed under this area are designed to prevent such disruptions through the development of radiation-tolerant microelectronics for satellites, as well as the development of affordable, integrated protection of ground-based C4I systems, including those that use off-the-shelf equipment.

1.3 Acquisition/Warfighting Needs

The objective of the CB Defense and Nuclear (or NBC) technology program is to enable our forces to survive, fight and win in an NBC warfare environment by ensuring a superior defensive posture which protects our forces and equipment, and makes CB or nuclear warfare a high risk, low payoff alternative for opposing forces.

To achieve this objective, the warfighter needs to be able to detect, protect, and decontaminate CB warfare and radiological threats with minimal logistics burdens. Chemical detection sensors would be integrated into a variety of platforms ranging from individual battledress to autonomous reconnaissance systems. All of these detection capabilities must be integrated to provide a cohesive picture of the operational theater through the use of information technologies, such as simulation, to provide operational commanders with the required situational awareness needed for command decisions.

Protection applications range from personal ensembles to filtration systems for vehicles and large-area enclosures, including ships and command posts. Ensembles and respiratory protection that will minimize physiological and psychological burdens are required to maintain peak operational performance capabilities for individual warriors. New materials and filtration systems are needed to reduce the logistics burden for ground vehicles, ships, aircraft and large-area enclosures. Decontamination capabilities are required to sustain operations in a contaminated environment, to clean up personnel and wide areas, for retrograde and resupply operations and to reconstitute individual equipment, vehicles, sensitive equipment, and weapons platforms.

Chemical and Biological Defense and Nuclear technology development responds directly to the Counterproliferation and CB Warfare Detection required operational capabilities identified in the JWSTP and in the national report on these activities, as submitted to Congress in May 1995 by the Counterproliferation Program Review Committee. In confrontations involving WMD proliferants, personnel and systems must be survivable; similarly, effective nuclear forces are required to support deterrence both prior to and during conflicts. The recent Tokyo subway attack is an example of new threat scenarios we are likely to encounter in the future given the ready access to CB and radiological weapons by Third World and terrorist organizations.

The CB Defense and Nuclear technology area plays an important supporting role for other technology areas. Additional JWSTP objectives involve applications of electronic, optical, and computer technologies (e.g., for Information Superiority, Precision Force, Combat Identification, Information Warfare, Joint Theater Missile Defense, and Electronic Warfare). CB Defense and Nuclear technology development ensures that the critical systems employed can accomplish their missions if proliferants employ WMD. Some examples of CB Defense and Nuclear Transition Opportunities can be seen in Figure II.2. This technology base also provides much of our capability to model the propagation of signals and information within weapon-effect-disturbed environments.

Subarea

Current Baseline 5 years 10 years 15 years
CB Detection
  • Limited number of detectable agents, multiple point sensors
  • Interim Biological Detection System
  • Chemical detection from 1-5 km
  • Aerosol detection from 30 km
  • Voice alerts
  • Limited availability of digitized data; analog communications
  • Multiple detectable agents, fewer point sensors
  • Ultra-low dose chemical interior monitor
  • Automated point biodetection system
  • Early Warning Bio-aerosol detection from 1-5 km
  • Early Warning Aerosol Cloud detection to 50 km
  • Availability of digitized data
  • Global access of CB data
  • Joint warning and reporting network
  • CB water and surface contamination monitor
  • Small lightweight chemical monitor
  • Man-portable point biodetection system
  • Chemical detection from 20 km
  • Early Warning Bio-class aerosol detection
  • Early Warning Aerosol Cloud detection to 100 km
  • Real-time data and time-projection access for operational theater
  • Limited access to virtual reality
  • Man-portable integrated CB detection system
  • Chemical sensor integrated into clothing
  • Early Warning Chemical and biological aerosol detection
  • Global access to virtual reality of operational theater
CB Protection
  • Battle dress overgarment, butyl gloves, vinyl overshoes
  • M40 and MCU-2/P Masks; C2 canister
  • Single-pass carbon CP filters
  • Ltwt garments and breathable gloves
  • Improved agent resistance, vision, and compatibility; lower breathing resistance and bulk/weight
  • Improved filter life
  • Regenerative filtration for armored vehicles
  • Low cost, ltwt garments
  • CB duty uniform 50% lighterweight than JSLIST I uniform/overgarment
  • Integrated helmet/ respirator with visor display, positive pressure breathing, compatibility with weapons sighting systems
  • Non-carbonaceous CP filtration
  • Integrated duty uniform with CB and environmental protection, signature reduction, decontaminable for reuse
  • Hybrid CP systems
CB Decontamination
  • DS2, STB and improved sorbent technologies
  • DS2 replacement
  • Concepts for aircraft interior decon
  • Concepts for wide area/fixed site decon
  • Supercritical fluid-based decon for sensitive equipment; Demo enzymatic decon
  • Strategic modular decon systems and approaches
CB Studies, Analysis and Simulation
  • Transport and diffusion models with terrain features
  • Microgeography and micrometeorology for CB hazard prediction
  • Collateral effects predictor
  • CB effects into simulators
  • Trade-off models to assess value added of CB capabilities
  • Real-time computation of hazards
  • Virtual reality simulators
Warfighter Support (Nuclear)
  • Refocusing of capabilities to respond to proliferation threats underway
  • Demonstrate and validate initial adaptive planning for counterproliferation
  • Complete initial dual-revalidation of nuclear stockpile in collaboration
  • Continuous adaptation to new requirements as identified by CINCs
Systems Effects and Survivability (Nuclear)
  • In process of identifying what must be done to adapt to new, post-cold war, protection requirements
  • By FY98, qualify production ready radiation tolerant 4M SRAM
  • By FY00, demo radiation tolerant 100k gate array and 16M SRAM using 0.35 micron SOI technology
  • Adaptation of survivability practices to respond to future threats and to take advantage of new technologies
Test and Simulation Technology (Nuclear)
  • Consolidation and refocusing on new requirements; incremental improvements to existing capabilities
  • IOC for LB/TS with non-ideal airblast simulation capability and implement initial component of new DECADE radiation simulator
  • Adapt investment strategy to take advantage of technical progress, e.g., new laser sources
  • Take advantage of developments in advanced physics programs, e.g., favorable results from National Ignition Facility
Scientific and Operational Computing (Nuclear)
  • Current generation super-computer
  • Transition to HPC architecture and departmental machines
  • Interface with ASCI; more emphasis on virtual experiments supported by physics understanding
  • TBD - timeframe approximates 7+ generations of change in base technologies

Figure II.2. CB Defense and Nuclear Technology Transition Opportunities