3.5 Warfighter Support (Nuclear)

Technical activities and technology development that respond directly to warfighter requirements by ensuring confidence in the effectiveness, security, and safety of nuclear capabilities; and developing and demonstrating the planning tools and other resources needed to support operations in contingencies involving proliferants.

3.5.1 Warfighter Needs

Weapons that are effective and appropriate for proliferation scenarios are needed. Particular emphasis is given to improving capabilities for defeat of hardened targets (especially those associated with WMD) with minimized collateral hazards. This RDT&E applies both to the post-cold-war nuclear mission and to the tasking from the Secretary of Defense to apply nuclear research expertise to improve understanding of advanced conventional munitions and weapon-target interactions.

3.5.2 Warfighter Support Overview

3.5.2.1 Goals and Timeframes. By FY96, establish DoD dual revalidation teams at DOE nuclear weapon labs and IOC for DNA M&S center. By FY96, complete nuclear weapon safety assessment for strategic aircraft. By FY98, transition new physical security applications for nuclear systems to Army and Air Force; transfer new planning systems for contingency scenarios to NATO; demonstrate and assess options for functional defeat of hardened NBC and C3I facilities; and complete WMD theater-level engagement model. By FY99, demonstrate improved capability for forecasting hazards that might result from attack of a facility containing WMD. By FY00, complete 21st Century nuclear survivability plan and provide WMD models for JWARS/ JSIMS. By FY05, complete dual-revalidation of nuclear weapons stockpile.

3.5.2.2 Major Technical Challenges. Long-term stockpile stewardship using only non-nuclear laboratory technologies plus modeling and simulation and probabilistic risk assessment is without precedent. Stockpile stewardship involves more than a physics package. DoD must address end-to-end operation of critical delivery and C3I systems. Planning capabilities must be adapted to proliferant contingencies including, as one example, the attack of a WMD target with conventional weapons in which collateral hazards result from the target. Full-physics effects models must be translated into operational planning/visualization tools.

3.5.2.3 Related Federal and Private Sector Efforts. DOE stockpile revalidation and other Science-Based Stockpile Stewardship activities are critical for accomplishing DoD nuclear missions. DoD dual-revalidation teams are being assigned to participate in these activities, commencing in FY96. Research demonstrating safety methodologies and providing better methods for predicting and mitigating collateral hazards has potential for technology transfer to the civil sector.

3.5.3 Warfighter Support S&T Investment Strategy

3.5.3.1 Technology Development. All of the activities in this subarea involve technology development; there are no basic research or ATD/ACTD technology demonstrations.

Stockpile Support: Initial dual-revalidation objectives have been defined. Safety research uses probabilistic risk assessment methodologies adapted to multiple-failure-point analysis; there is close collaboration with USAF customers for this work. Physical security R&D for nuclear systems is coordinated by OSD.

Planning Systems for Contingencies Involving Proliferants: Priorities are defined by U.S. CINC and SHAPE users. Target planning capabilities are being adapted to respond to proliferation contingency requirements. Survivability programs focus on the new, Nuclear Posture Review, stockpile. A direct technical support capability has been established to provide support to theater operations, as done during DESERT STORM for WMD hazard prediction and target analysis.

Improving Weapons’ Effectiveness: Particular emphasis is given to evaluating options for defeat or functional disruption of buried and other hardened targets.

Collateral Hazards: Forecasting methodologies are being adapted to address WMD effects dispersion in situations in which local environmental factors dominate. A currently unfunded Army program would reduce radiation doses to military personnel.