1. Strategic Force Integration

a. Effective Integration. To effectively integrate nuclear operations into a coherent whole is a fundamental national requirement: the most efficient use of available resources to ensure national security. By eliminating duplicate target coverages and ensuring optimal tasking and synchronization of US nuclear forces prior to and during conflict or war through systematic and thorough coordination of mission planning, commanders can promote economy of effort.

b. Integrated Operational Planning. An integrated operational plan, or a series of sequential plans, predicated on commonly agreed strategic objectives, is an absolute prerequisite to unity and, hence, economy of effort. Clarity of joint operational guidance as well as a common appreciation of its fundamental objectives are vital prerequisites to a more effective identification, prioritization, and assignment of targets, and the deconfliction of their associated means of coverage.

c. Global Force Integration. United States Strategic Command accomplishes detailed analyses of weapons effects and targeting systems and optimizes weapons application. These targeting functions include deconflicting nuclear operations by time, space, and geography.

(1) Integration of aircraft forces should be accomplished for the employment of nuclear weapons in support of the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) and theater nuclear options. Aircraft and air-launched missile planning factors should be developed to include pre-launch survivability, probability to penetrate, weapons systems reliability, circular error probable, weapon system performance characteristics, and sortie separation criteria.

(2) ICBMs or SLBMs should be employed based on an analysis of weapon-system characteristics, capabilities, and limitations. ICBM or SLBM pre-launch survivability and probability to penetrate planning factors must also be developed. Analyzing the effects of nuclear environments before and during launch, in powered and ballistic flight, and during reentry is essential. Equally important is consideration of the effect of enemy defense capabilities and limitations.

(3) Strategic nuclear forces may also be used to target and hold regional targets at risk.

a. General. The employment of NSNF such as dual-capable aircraft and nuclear TOMAHAWK land-attack missiles is bound by the same nuclear policy constraints as strategic nuclear forces. Approval for their use rests with the President. Weapons and systems may be deployed into theaters, but local commanders have no authority to employ them until it is specifically granted. NCA control and constraint of NSNF weapons has seven elements:

(1) A decision to use nuclear weapons.

(2) The number, type, and yields of weapons.

(3) Types of targets to be attacked.

(4) Geographical area for employment.

(5) Timing and duration of employment.

(6) Damage constraints.

(7) Target analysis.

b. Theater Nuclear Posture. Nuclear forces deployed to or tasked to support theater nuclear requirements link conventional forces to the full nuclear capability of the US. This linkage must be strong and visible to the extent of being capable of deterring a potential enemy from believing political and/or military advantage can be achieved by means of threats to employ nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons or by the threatened or actual execution of an all-out conventional offensive. Specific conditions for employment are provided in Annex C to JSCP.

c. NSNF Employment. In the event of a deteriorating military situation, employment of NSNF weapons must be capable of favorably altering the operational situation to the advantage of the user. Otherwise, the risks of using nuclear weapons might outweigh any conceivable advantage. Complete destruction of enemy forces is not necessarily required to achieve the desired objective; rather, containment and a demonstrated will to employ additional nuclear firepower toward a specific goal is the preferred method. Employment of weapons and yields must be kept at the lowest level possible to reduce the possibility that the enemy will in turn escalate the conflict.

d. Employment Options. NSNF employment options define the type and number of weapons as well as the employment area. Options can range from the selective employment of a limited number of nuclear weapons against a carefully constrained preplanned or emerging target set to a general laydown of weapons against a larger and/or more diverse set of targets. An option or portion of an option can be be used to send a signal. Such an option should be very restrictive, with tight limits on area and time so that the adversary will recognize the "signal" and not simply assume that we have moved to general nuclear war.

e. Planning and Coordination

(1) The employment of nonstrategic nuclear weapons is constrained, both politically and militarily, to a greater degree than employment of conventional weapons. High-level political and military decisions, treaties, and agreements dealing with employment of nuclear weapons will continue to cause the evolution of nuclear weapon employment doctrine. However, advance planning and coordination must be part of employment.

(2) Theater combatant commanders are responsible for defining theater objectives, selecting targets, and developing plans required to support those objectives. Detailed mission planning, when required, is generally accomplished at the theater combatant commander level, with USSTRATCOM assistance where appropriate. Combatant commanders may also be tasked to develop adaptively planned options to strike previously unidentified targets. Because the strike is meant to be decisive, it takes precedence over other missions.

(3) After conflict occurs, combatant commanders may also be tasked to develop adaptively planned options to strike targets not previously identified. Nuclear weapons planning is continuous and is fully integrated with planning for conventional weapons. Each commander with a nuclear planning capability identifies and requests authorization to strike any targets necessary to accomplish his mission. Individual nuclear target requests are further refined, approved, or disapproved and combined at each command echelon into an option or sub-option. Ad hoc planning can also use preplanned options as starting points and modify the preplanned option or sub-option given the situation actually experienced. When recommendations from combatant commanders and the situation result in a Presidential decision to escalate the conflict to employment of nuclear weapons, specific guidance, including target identification, refinement, and constraints, along with selected number of weapons are released to the theater combatant commander for employment. If the decision is to disapprove escalation or employment of nuclear weapons, the planned strikes may be retained as a basis for further target planning or for strike by other weapons.

(4) Joint nuclear operations are planned, coordinated, and controlled by the combatant commander. Component commanders also plan and coordinate execution of their portions of the joint operation. The possibility that conventional theater operations may escalate to use of nuclear weapons within the theater must be a key planning consideration. Planning should consider enemy capabilities and intentions and the vulnerability of US forces to those capabilities. Planning should also encompass recommendations for response to an enemy first use of any weapon of mass destruction, a battlefield asymmetry, or an operational-level situation offering potential for conflict termination.

(5) The planning and coordination of multinational military operations is extremely complex, owing to differences in tactical and operational doctrine and the diversity of kinds of combat and combat support systems employed by the various national forces. Nuclear operations will compound the complexity inherent in coalition operations. Standard combined nuclear operational procedures and terminology, organization of liaison teams, and combined training must be developed and its use encouraged. Commanders must anticipate that combined NSNF operations will prove difficult to plan, coordinate, and execute but must be prepared to carry out these operations as directed by the NCA.

(6) Theater-level combined and joint planning of nuclear resources must include consideration and evaluation of certain basic parameters:

(a) The quantity of nuclear weapons available (NSNF generation and reconstitution capabilities of the Services), characteristics of these weapons, and the delivery requirements to place them over approved targets at the correct time.

(b) The trade-off considerations on selection of delivery systems for nuclear weapons for specific targets; i.e., flexibility, mobility, mission survivability, availability, and competing mission requirements.

(c) Weapons and delivery systems that should be kept in reserve.

(d) The expected survivability and vulnerability of remaining and reserve assets.

(e) Deconfliction criteria and measures to prevent or reduce fratricide.

(f) Collateral damage restrictions consistent with target damage criteria.

(g) The magnitude and nature of follow-on conventional, nuclear, or mixed operations.

(h) The expected retaliation--conventional, nuclear, biological, or chemical.

(7) Basic employment considerations are closely tied to the capabilities of assigned nuclear weapons systems (assigned forces are those weapons, delivery systems, and supporting systems under the combatant command (command authority) of the combatant commander). Dual-capable aircraft can strike a variety of targets in the battle area as well as deep targets. Sea- and air-launched cruise missiles also provide the capability for nuclear strikes against targets of known location.

3. Offense-Defense Integration

a. General. Offensive and defensive forces should be integrated to ensure interoperability. For integration to be successful, offensive and defensive forces should be doctrinally and procedurally linked. Defensive systems include space warning and defense capabilies, air defense warning and interceptors, ballistic-missile defense warning, and a worldwide Integrated Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment (ITW/AA) system. These systems, coupled with additional passive defense measures, offer a damage limitation potential to US warfighting capabilities. Active theater ballistic-missile defense interception capabilities add an additional dimension to defense capability. Defensive forces can directly support offensive forces in five important areas.

(1) In a strategic application, strategic defensive systems offer the potential of improving US deterrent posture by increasing the enemy's uncertainty of achieving its attack objectives.

(2) In regional conflicts, missile defense offers protection against potential adversaries acquiring ballistic-missile technology. Although offense is necessary for retaliation and conflict control, defense may also play an important, complementary role in nonstrategic applications (e.g., irrational actor scenarios).

(3) In a synergistic application, defenses allow a regional commander to consider employing offensive counterforce strikes on the enemy, while enjoying some sense of security from catastrophic results if the enemy launches under attack.

(4) Early warning forces include an integrated tactical warning and assessment capability, providing the NCA with enough warning to maximize the survivability of US and allied forces. Deterrence is, therefore, enhanced because of the increased survivability of US retaliatory force.

(5) Air defenses against an air breathing threat also serve to enhance our deterrent capabilities by increasing the enemy's uncertainty that weapon systems will arrive at their targets.

(1) Flight Corridors. When strategic offensive nuclear forces launch, ballistic missiles and aircraft could be in the same flight corridors simultaneously. Blue-on-blue engagements over the friendly territory could affect both strategic aircraft and ICBM flyout. Commanders should create and ensure strict adherence to flight plans through corridors that avoid potential enemy launch sites and defense intercept areas. This planning should include using alternate landing sites (in case the primary runway is under attack during the return flight) and (when friendly defenses are active) immediately identifying and transmitting ingress and egress routes. These routes should avoid areas scanned by defenses to reduce potential execution against friendly aircraft.

(2) Land, Air, and Sea Forces. The employment of land, air, and sea forces into or through an area that has a high probability of having enemy nuclear warheads or nuclear delivery systems must be avoided to the maximum extent practical. These areas may be high-priority targets and, therefore, have the greatest potential for nuclear detonations (NUDETs), as the result of attack operations or defensive intercepts.

(3) Utilize Impact Point Prediction Information. Ground and space systems can provide the commander near-real-time IPP information following the launch of enemy missiles. Dependent on the location of forces, the commander can use the IPP data to move threatened forces or other targets, execute intercept of enemy missiles, or allow a missile to reach its predicted impact point when it is expected to detonate in a nonthreatening area (e.g., desolate, uninhabited land or waters).

(4) Defended Assets and Enemy Targets. A priority list for defended assets and enemy targets must be maintained. This list should help commanders in their decision process for employment of forces as resources are reduced over time in a conflict including execution of passive protection measures. (Based on these priorities, active defenses should be deployed near the highest priority resources to maintain effective execution of offensive forces). Priority lists for defended assets should include protection of C4 nodes, supply points, and population centers.

(5) Decision Timelines. The decisionmaker may be required to review and select defensive and offensive actions within severely compressed timelines. Consideration must be given to procedures and equipment allowing informed decisions in this environment. Predelegated defensive engagement authority should be considered under certain conditions to permit efficient engagement of ballistic-missile threats. The commander must evaluate the situation, weigh the options, and execute the optimum offense-defense force in a relatively short period of time. The time is limited because of the relatively short flight time of tactical missiles (TM) and potential increased uncertainty of mobile offensive force target locations. Deployment of air defenses against an air-breathing threat should be accomplished early enough to send an unmistakable signal of NCA concern and resolve, thereby maximizing the deterrent potential of these forces.

(6) Employment Concepts

(a) Command. Normally, unity of command is greatly desired. However, strategic offense or defense integration may be a case where the United States must promote integrated operations without requiring absolute unity of command. Very short timelines impact decisions that must be made. In a matter of seconds for the defense, and minutes for the offense, critical decisions must be made in concert with discussions with the NCA. It may be beyond the capability of one commander to do this for both strategic offensive and strategic defensive forces. However, force commonalities must be considered and conflicts avoided. Nevertheless, the joint force commander should have access to near-real-time tradeoff analysis when considering the execution of any forces.

(b) Independent Operations. Independent operations should be employed to maximize the output of the offense and defense. Under situations where the offense and defense are not utilizing the same flight corridors or airspace, independent operations will allow both forces freedom to execute operations without restriction.

(7) C4I linkages. C4I linkages assets may be shared by both offense and defense to acquire information and get the execution orders to the forces. The offense and defense C4I nodes should maintain survivable (robust and redundant) communications with each other and be able to operate independently if enemy attacks eliminate individual nodes (for this reason, collocation of offense and defense nodes should be avoided). In addition to providing warning of a nuclear attack and the data necessary to initiate a defensive response, defensive C4I systems also provide valuable information to update the offensive commander regarding counterforce targeting options. C4I systems and processing nodes: Near-real-time data receipt and processing will be necessary to target the TM threats and their launchers (for counterforce actions). Adequate surveillance systems and associated C4I systems are required to provide timely warning of a bomber or cruise missile and ballistic-missile attack. Certain processing nodes will be required to analyze the proper intercept locations of launched enemy TMs and provide tradeoff information to the decisionmaker if deconfliction is required between offensive and defensive forces.

07-10-1996; 15:30:15