II. VISION AND STRATEGY

A. Joint Vision 2010

Joint Vision 2010 is the conceptual template that provides a common direction to help the Military Services develop their unique capabilities within a joint framework of doctrine and programs. This vision of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff builds upon the enduring foundation of high quality people and innovative leadership. The traditional concepts of maneuver, strike, protection, and logistics are leveraged with technological advances and information superiority to produce improvements which are potentially so powerful that they become, in effect, new operational concepts. As shown in Figure II.1, these leveraged concepts emerge as:

• Dominant Maneuver: The multi-dimensional application of information and maneuver capabilities to provide coherent operations of air, land, sea, and space forces throughout the breadth, depth, and height of the battlespace to seize the initiative and control the tempo of the operation to a decisive conclusion.
  
  
• Precision Engagement: The capability to accurately locate the enemy, command and control friendly forces, precisely attack key enemy forces or capabilities, and accurately assess the level of success.
  
  
• Full Dimensional Protection: The ability to protect our forces at all levels and obtain freedom of action while they deploy, maneuver, and engage an adversary.
  
  
• Focused Logistics: The capability to respond rapidly to crises, shift warfighting assets between geographic regions, monitor critical resources enroute, and directly deliver tailored logistics at the required level of operations.

These new operational concepts interact to create the powerful, synergistic effect of full spectrum dominance, the capability to dominate an adversary across the full range of military operations. Full spectrum dominance emerges as a key characteristic of U.S. Armed Forces for the 21st century.

Achieving Joint Vision 2010 will, in large measure, depend on the ability to achieve and exploit the twelve joint warfighting capability objectives described below. These twelve objectives, developed by the Joint Staff in collaboration with OSD and the Service science and technology executives, represent some of the most critical capabilities for maintaining the warfighting advantage of U.S. forces. Each is discussed in detail in Chapter IV. The twelve joint warfighting capability objectives defined below support the four leveraged elements of full spectrum dominance, as shown in Figure II.2.

• Information Superiority. Combines the capabilities of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) to acquire and assimilate information needed to dominate and neutralize adversary forces and effectively employ friendly forces. Includes the capability for near-real-time awareness of the location and activity of friendly, adversary, and neutral forces throughout the battlefield area. Also includes a seamless, robust C4 network linking all friendly forces to provide common awareness of the current situation throughout the battlefield area.
  
  
• Precision Force. Capability to destroy selected targets with precision while limiting collateral damage. Includes precision guided munitions, surveillance, targeting capabilities, and the "sensor-to-shooter" C4I capabilities necessary for responsive, timely force application.
  
  
• Combat Identification. Capability to differentiate potential targets as friend, foe, or neutral in sufficient time, with high confidence, and at the requisite range to support weapons release and engagement decisions.
  
  
• Joint Theater Missile Defense. Capability to use the assets of multiple Services and Agencies to detect, track, acquire, and destroy enemy theater ballistic missiles and cruise missiles. Includes the seamless flow of information on missile launches by specialized surveillance capabilities, through tracking by sensors from multiple Services and agencies, to missile negation or destruction.
  
  
• Military Operations in Urban Terrain. Capability to operate and conduct military operations in built-up areas and to achieve military objectives with minimum casualties and collateral damage. Includes precise weapons, surveillance, navigation, and communications effective in urban areas.
  
  
• Joint Readiness. Capability to enhance readiness for joint and combined operations, including capabilities for enhanced simulation for training.
  
  
• Joint Countermine. Capability for assured, rapid surveillance, reconnaissance, detection, and neutralization of mines to enable forced entry by expeditionary forces. Included is the capability to control the sea and to conduct amphibious and ground force operational maneuvers against hostile defensive forces employing sea, littoral, and land mines. For land forces, dominance means the ability to conduct instride tempo operations in the face of severe land mine threats.
  
  
• Electronic Warfare. Capability to disrupt or degrade an enemy's defenses throughout the area and time required to permit the deployment and employment of U.S. and allied combat systems. Includes capabilities to deceive, disrupt, and destroy the surveillance and command and control systems as well as the weapons of an enemy's integrated air defense network. Also includes capabilities for recognizing attempts by hostile systems to track or engage.
  
  
• Information Warfare. Capability to achieve information superiority by affecting adversary information, information-based processes, information systems, and computer-based networks while defending one's own information, information-based processes, information systems, and computer-based networks.
  
  
• Chemical/Biological Agent Detection. Capability for standoff detection of biological agents is our single most pressing need. Capabilities in both point and standoff detection of chemical and biological agents, combined with the ability to assess and disseminate threat information in a timely manner, are critical to protecting fielded forces.
  
  
• Real-Time Logistics Control. Capability for near-real-time visibility of people, units, equipment, and supplies which are in storage, in process, in transit, or in theater, and the ability to act on this information.
  
  
• Counterproliferation. Capability to 1) detect and evaluate the existence of a manufacturing capability for weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and
  2) identify and assess the weapon capability of alert and launched WMDs on the battlefield to permit the proper level of counterforce to be exerted promptly. Includes counterforce against hardened WMD storage and production facilities.
  
  

The Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment (JWCA) process, supported by the Unified Commanders-in-Chief, Services, and Defense Agencies, identifies opportunities for improving warfighting effectiveness. This continuous process provides insights into issues involving joint warfighting requirements, readiness, plans for recapitalization, and support for joint requirements and resource recommendations. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), comprised of the Vice Chiefs of Staff of the four Services and chaired by the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, oversees the JWCA process.

The relationship between the Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment areas and the twelve Joint Warfighting Capability Objectives is depicted in Figure II.3.

D. Defense Science and Technology Strategic Planning and Assessment

The Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DDRE) has strengthened the strategic planning and assessment processes critical to improving the Science and Technology (S&T) community's responsiveness to their warfighting and acquisition customers. This has been a team effort involving the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Joint Staff, Military Services and Defense Agencies. The following is a brief summary of these innovations.

The DDRE has established the Defense S&T Advisory Group (DSTAG) to advise her on the strategic planning, programming, budgeting, review and assessment of the DoD S&T program spanning research, technology development, demonstration and transition. Chaired by the DDRE and meeting bi-weekly, the DSTAG members include the Service S&T Executives, J8, DUSD(AT), Service requirements general/flag officers and the

Directors of DARPA, DNA and BMDO (see Figure II.4). This participative approach to overseeing the DoD S&T program will greatly improve the focus, quality, timeliness and customer satisfaction of the $7 billion/year DoD S&T investment. Two major tasks of the DSTAG are to guide the development of the annual Defense S&T strategic plans and review the results of the annual Technology Area Review and Assessments (TARA).

In addition to building upon the individual S&T strategic plans of the Services and Defense Agencies, this year the Defense S&T Strategy is revised to be responsive to the White House National Security S&T Strategy (see Figure II.5) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's Joint Vision 2010.

Achieving Joint Vision 2010 concepts will, in large measure, depend on our ability to achieve and exploit the twelve Joint Warfighting Capability Objectives of Section B above. These objectives, developed by the Joint Staff in collaboration with OSD and the Service S&T executives, represent some of the most critical capabilities for maintaining our warfighting advantage. They do not include all of the future Joint Warfighter's needs derived from the Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment.

The Defense S&T Strategy therefore addresses the S&T needs of the future warfighting CINCs and Military Services, while leveraging the S&T efforts of other Federal and private sector S&T as highlighted in the National Security S&T Strategy.

As shown in Figure II.6, the JWSTP, DTAP and BRP are published by March in time to be cited in the Defense Planning Guidance to guide Defense Agency and Service preparation of their S&T budget and Program Objective Memorandum (POM). These plans build upon and do not duplicate the Service/Agency S&T plans. They also consider recent technology forecasts such as the Office of the Secretary of Defense's Revolution in Military Affairs, the Air Force's New Vistas, the Army's Force XXI, and the Marine's Sea Dragon efforts.

These plans ensure that the near-, mid-, and far-term needs of the joint warfighter are properly balanced and supported in the S&T planning, programming, budgeting, and assessment activities of the DoD. Advanced concepts and technology identified as enhancing high priority joint warfighting capabilities, along with prerequisite research, will receive funding priority in the President's Budget and accompanying Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP). These plans are made available to the United States Government, Defense contractors, and our allies with the goal of better focusing our collective efforts on superior joint warfare capabilities and improving interoperability between the United States and our allies.

In May, Technology Area Review and Assessments are held for each of the 10 DTAP technology areas and basic research. Each of the 11 Panels have at least 2/3 of the members from outside DoD. Most of the TARA members are national leaders from the
National Academy of Sciences, National Academy of Engineering, Institute of Medicine, Defense Science Board or from the Services' Scientific Advisory Boards. The TARA Panel is co-chaired by a senior executive from the Office of the DDRE. The appropriate representative from the Defense S&T Reliance Executive Committee (see Figure II.7) briefs the DoD program as compared to the planning guidance. Special S&T issues identified by the DDRE are also reviewed.

Following each one week TARA, the DoD co-chair of the TARA briefs the findings and recommendations to the DDRE chaired DSTAG. Included in this brief is the co-chair's program recommendations for termination, adjustment and enhancement to better align the S&T program to comply with guidance. Following the DSTAG briefings, issues are briefed by the DDRE to the Program Review Group and Program Decision Memoranda are issued as needed. Following the POM cycle, revision of the Defense S&T Strategy and three supporting plans begins again in time to be published as guidance for the next budget cycle.