A. INFORMATION SUPERIORITY

1. Definition

Information Superiority combines the capabilities of intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR) and command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) to acquire and assimilate information needed to effectively employ our own forces to dominate and neutralize adversary forces. It includes the capability for near-real-time awareness of the location and activity of friendly, adversary, and neutral forces throughout the battlespace; and a seamless, robust C4I network linking all friendly forces that provides common awareness of the current situation. The JCS's vision of future warfighting demands both the development of Information Superiority (IS), and its pervasive and effective use. This section addresses, in addition to IS, the technologies and capabilities for effective employment identified for the Advanced Battlespace Information System (ABIS), and sensors for the acquisition of information leading to information superiority.

Information Superiority is essential to achieving virtually all other Joint Warfighting capabilities. Tactical sensor data and command and decision information derived from these and other capabilities enhances the development of information superiority. U.S. information superiority depends on the development and effective integration of Information Warfare capabilities to protect the information collection, processing, and dissemination capabilities of the U.S. and its coalition partners, and to degrade those of its adversaries.

2. Operational Capability Elements

Warfighters of the future must be able to respond rapidly and effectively, with little or no tactical warning, to a wide range of uncertain threats. These threats include conventional forces and weapons of mass destruction of increasing technological sophistication. There is a decreasing likelihood of forward-based U.S. forces in the theater. An effective response is likely to require interoperating and sharing resources with other coalition forces in the face of these threats. The JCS's vision calls for the rapid deployment of forces that are able to fight on arrival, and are able to sustain operations with a minimal logistics tail in the area of operations.

All this demands significant advances in our ability to develop superior knowledge of the battlespace in real-time, and to employ that knowledge effectively in planning and executing operations. The goal, as illustrated in Figure IV.A.1, is to enable the development of new concepts of operation that will assure operational dominance of the battlespace supported by Information Superiority. This is done by blending three broad capabilities -- battlespace awareness, effective force employment, and a grid of assured services -- into a system-of-systems.

Within these three broad capabilities, the Advanced Battlespace Information Systems (ABIS) study (Ref. 7) defined nine operational capabilities. These will provide future warfighters with an overall capability to: (1) control and shape the pace of the battle by providing the commander with a broader perspective and better intuitive feel of the battlespace, including the environmental conditions and operational situation; (2) plan and execute operations to achieve an overwhelming effect at precise places and times; (3) adapt rapidly to changing situations and environmental conditions to attack high priority targets throughout the battlespace. Information Superiority will empower lower echelon force elements by distributing the commander's intent and the information needed for timely and effective execution. Because three capabilities will inevitably degrade in the course of battle, a key objective of Information Superiority is to enable commanders to plan for this eventuality, to identify and protect essential capabilities and to reconfigure command and control structures to meet changing needs.

Effective Employment of Forces. With Information Superiority, commanders will be able to exploit their superior understanding of the battlespace to shape and control the conflict. They will be able to do this by dynamically directing and integrating tactical and supporting ISR resources for mission planning and rehearsal, targeting, and weapon assignment; and by battle damage assessments; and combat assessments to ensure optimum application of precision weapons and forces. Specific operational capability elements are:

1. Predictive planning and preemption. The ability to be proactive in the planning process to avoid direct confrontation (by employing alternative means); to be prepared to react and exploit opportunities when direct confrontation must occur, and to shape the expected actions to stay within an enemy's decision cycle and keep him out of ours.
   
   
2. Integrated force management. The capabilities to achieve the dynamic synchronization of missions and resources from, components, and coalition forces.
   
   
3. Execution of time-critical missions. The ability to provide processing language, interface characteristics and linkages which enable rapid target search and acquisition, battle coordination and target selection, hand-off, and engagement for the prosecution of time-critical targets.
   
   

Battlespace Awareness. Battlespace awareness includes the operational capability to acquire information about the position and movement of friendly, adversary, and neutral forces, and about the geospatial situation (e.g., terrain, weather, bathymetric conditions) in which they are deployed. It includes the capabilities to provide a common view and understanding of the situation across tactical and supporting forces, from joint force commanders to individual shooters. The effective integration of battlespace awareness within a system-of-systems will provide the warfighter with an extended view of the battlespace and of current and projected operational conditions, and an enhanced ability to identify and localize features of the battlespace in the face of degraded environmental conditions, and hostile countermeasures. This extended view will support and enhance the warfighters' intuitive feel for situations and command options.

The specific capabilities necessary to achieve battlespace awareness are:

1. Information acquisition. The sufficient, timely, high-quality surveillance, reporting, target designation, and assessment information on enemy, friendly, and U.S. units, events, activities, status, capabilities, plans and intentions to ensure that Joint or Coalition Commanders have dominant battlespace knowledge.
   
   
2. Precision information direction. The capability to dynamically direct and integrate both tactical and supporting C4 and ISR resources for targeting, weaponeering, mission preview, battle damage assessment and combat assessment to maintain the ability for the on-scene commander to exploit and shape the battle space.
   
   
3. Consistent battlespace understanding. The capabilities to elevate the level and speed of cognitive understanding of enemy, friendly, and geospatial situations, and maintain consistency in that view across tactical and supporting forces.

The Grid. The grid will support global connectivity with flexible, rapidly configurable network services, automated assistance to facilitate universal user access to information, and assured services in stressful environments. These services will also provide flexible command structures and support for time-critical, short duration mission tasks such as "sensor-to-shooter" integration and support. The services of the grid are separate from command structures, disseminating battlespace awareness to users when they need it and in the form that they need it to facilitate the collaborative planning and execution of joint and coalition operations. The connectivity and flexibility will also allow the creation of "virtual staffs" that expand and augment the capabilities of in-theater forces with collaborative services, reach-back capabilities, and reduced local footprint.

The critical operational capabilities of the grid are:

1. Universal transaction services. The capability to provide warfighters and their systems the ability to exchange and understand information, unimpeded by differences in connectivity.
   
   
2. Distributed environment support. The mechanisms and services required to allow the warfighters to craft their C4I information environments from the full set of assets connected through the grid, including the ability to establish distributed virtual staffs and task teams.
   
   
3. Assurance of services. High-quality services that warfighters must have when needed, to meet dynamically changing demands, and defended against physical and information warfare threats.

Achieving the Information Superiority operational capability elements described will require significant advances in the functional capabilities to manage the acquisition, simultaneous processing, and parallel dissemination of information in an assured and secure manner, and to effectively integrate mission planning functions. Figure IV.A.2 shows important functional capabilities as they relate to the nine operational capability elements for Information Superiority.

4. Current Capabilities, Deficiencies, and Barriers

Currently fielded information systems do not support the kind of robust, assured, and timely flow of accurate and relevant information needed to meet future joint warfighting needs. Operational practices limit flexibility and effective employment. The structure for C4I remains divided along organizational and functional lines and is strongly tied to the hierarchical command structure, due in large part to inadequate capabilities for the automation of multi-level security. Users must know the secure network addresses all of the nodes with which they want to communicate, a daunting requirement in the heat of battle. Even when information can be provided, it may be in a form that has been tailored and optimized for some other mission. These divisions, tied to a rigid framework of battlefield geometry, limit the commander's ability to assign sensors to priority targets and to dynamically retask high value assets across missions and services in response to changing situations and opportunities. Furthermore, communications bandwidths and connectivity are inadequate to support the flow of data under conditions of peak demand.

"Stovepiping" -- the operational fragmentation and end-to-end segregation of information flow by type, command structure, and mission -- makes it difficult to acquire, process, and disseminate essential information across joint forces, and makes it virtually impossible to develop a common picture of the battlespace. There currently is only a limited ability to detect and monitor targets and events concealed in foliage, in structures, underground, or in adverse weather or countermeasure environments. Rigid ISR, and lack of visibility of independent tactical sensor tasking and coverage, further limit abilities to manage and coordinate sensor assets for real-time operations.

There are a number of technological, organizational, operational, and programmatic barriers to overcoming these current limitations. While commercial information systems technology will continue to advance rapidly, it must be modified to meet military needs and demonstrated under realistic operational conditions. Some of the problems to be overcome in terms of security and battle damage survivability are uniquely military, as are the specific advances required in sensors to support the acquisition of battlespace awareness. Traditional concepts of operation and rigid C4I structures will need to change if the warfighter is to realize the benefits of advancing technology. Battlespace awareness transcends individual Service and organizational divisions, and will require the effective integration of, and sustained commitment to, individual Services and joint programs.

Figure IV.A.3 provides a summary of the nine Information Superiority operational capability elements, functional capabilities limitations, and technology advances needed. Note that the functional capabilities listed include, in addition to those items corresponding directly to the abbreviated titles shown in Figure IV.A.2, essential capabilities shared with other joint warfighting areas. (Note that entries with only a number are defined earlier in the chart.)

5. Technology Plan

Achieving Information Superiority and its seamless integration into warfighting operations will require both advances in technology and the development of new operational concepts to exploit them. Figure IV.A.4. maps selected ACTD's and ATD's for Information Superiority against operational capability elements. The complete list of DTO's shown in Figure IV.A.5 represent a mix of ongoing and funded ACTD's and approved candidates for FY97, and ABIS-proposed ACTDs and long-term DTOs for which specific ATD's and ACTD's are still being defined. Figure IV.A.6 shows how these ACTDs, ATDs and related DTOs support operational capabilities. The volume on Defense Technology Objectives provides further information on demonstrations and DTOs. Figure IV.A.7 provides an integrated roadmap of selected key demonstrations and JWSTP DTOs. Again, because of the pervasive nature of information superiority, not all critical efforts listed in Figures IV.A.5 and IV.A.6 can be displayed.

The near-term program (through FY 2000) includes the ABIS-proposed ACTDs. It should provide the basis for immediate improvements in battlespace awareness and in the integration of improved knowledge into mission planning and execution. These demonstrations will support new concepts of C4I operation and improvements in the warfighter's ability to use ISR assets. This will demonstrate the value of Information Superiority to the operational forces and provide a strong foundation upon which to build an effective long-term program to achieve the JCS's future warfighting vision. New C4I capabilities and concepts will begin immediately to affect capabilities and concepts of operation in all other warfighting areas.

Near-term demonstrations will provide a basis for further improving tactical integration, real-time management of ISR, and dynamic retasking of forces, and for the better integration of concurrent planning and execution in the 2000-2005 time frame. The prototype grid capabilities demonstrated in the near-term should begin to evolve into the type of massive, distributed, and responsive environment envisioned in the long-term ABIS objectives.

Further advances and demonstrations will be required within the 2000-2005 timeframe and beyond to assure the availability of Information Superiority and the secure, and effective services that the warfighters will need in future conflicts. Figure IV.A.7 includes a number of long-term DTOs that will demonstrate Information Superiority capabilities in support of new operational concepts to achieve overwhelming effect across the full spectrum of dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full-dimension protection, and focused logistics capabilities envisioned by the ABIS study.

6. Summary

The planned and funded technology and advanced concept programs will demonstrate and evaluate a wide range of potential Information Superiority improvements in three to five years. Realizing the incremental improvements that lead to the JCS's revolutionary vision of overwhelming dominance in the battlespace (as illustrated in Figure IV.A.8) will require a continuing long-term commitment. These efforts, coupled with the projected continued doubling, every two years, of the performance of the underlying information system hardware, should result in significant incremental improvements in the warfighters' visibility and command of the battlespace, as well as in the availability of accurate, detailed sensor-to-shooter information.

Between now and the year 2000, improvements in force employment will largely be based on better target recognition and timely attack; improved C2 early in the campaign; the beginnings of a defensive IW capability; and an improved information environment for collaborative work. Battlespace Awareness is to be improved by providing a consistent situational picture and an ability for the integrated tasking of SIGINT and IMINT capabilities. Improved awareness will support tactical needs and provide real-time sensor information directly to shooters. Grid capabilities will be improved to support the rapid configuration of tactical networks (including nodes for mobile users) with enhanced abilities to integrate and distribute information securely in a broadly heterogeneous environment.

In the longer term (2000-2010), the continued evolution of operational concepts and the availability of new technologies will provide a basis the for full development of ABIS concepts. Further improvements in force employment will be possible through the wider dissemination of each commander's intent. Improved automated tools for local decision-making, coupled with better status information and an ability to forecast likely future options and contingencies would enhance the ability of commanders at all levels to reason from ambiguous information, and to tailor force and mission packages to meet the needs of an on-going conflict. Battlespace Awareness will be enhanced by continuously projecting friendly and enemy moves and their likely outcomes, by adaptively supporting cognitive functions of diverse users, and by providing tailored information for mission execution when and where it is needed. Grid capabilities will be made more robust by advances in IW, and by providing end-users with an ability to tailor and adapt their information environment and access to information.

Even with the continued advance of commercial information systems, it will be a great challenge to meet the demand for greater bandwidth, processing throughput, and faster response time. There will be unique technology required only by the military. Integration of commercial advances will also be used to meet essential military needs. Out year ACTD's will be needed to demonstrate and validate these advances. The emphasis in the out-year program is on development and demonstration of essential intelligent, adaptable capabilities to ensure availability and security of services at all echelons and to support dominance in all types of conflict.