J. CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL AGENT DETECTION

1. Definition

Contamination avoidance is the highest priority of the DoD chemical and biological (C/B) defense program, which also includes force protection (individual, collective, and medical) and decontamination. This taxonomy is defined briefly under the passive defense part of Counterproliferation described in Section IV-L of this report. Contamination avoidance includes the ability to detect, identify, characterize, and warn of a C/B agent attack. Capabilities in point and early warning detection of chemical and biological agents, combined with the ability to assess and disseminate threat and hazard information in a timely manner, are critical to determining the appropriate protective posture for fielded U.S. forces and allowing them to continue their missions in a C/B contaminated environment.

2. Operational Capability Elements

Figure IV.J.1 illustrates how chemical and biological agent detection, identification and warning (DIW) affect all aspects of the battlespace, particularly in supporting the national two major regional conflicts (MRC) global power projection strategy. Technologies for the detection, identification, characterization, and warning of an attack are the cornerstone of defense against C/B warfare. The key operational capability elements, as listed across the top of Figure IV.J.2, are:

• Early warning of a chemical attack;

• Early warning of a biological attack;

• Point detection (or local warning) of a chemical attack;

• Point detection (or local warning) of a biological attack; and

• Warning and reporting of chemical and biological attacks.

Operational capability elements for C/B detection are driven by the Defense Technology Objectives (DTOs) provided in the DTO Volume for the JWSTP and the DTAP. Technologies to support these objectives will be refined through Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTDs), Advanced Technology Demonstrations (ATDs), other technology demonstrations, and various technology thrusts.

Early Warning. Early warning of chemical and biological agents is critical to the effective avoidance of and protection against C/B contamination. Early warning of a biological attack is the highest CINC counterproliferation priority. Early warning, which complements point detection, is intended primarily as a means of detecting and tracking chemical and biological agent clouds and providing information to commanders downwind that a chemical or biological attack has begun. Intelligence capabilities provide information of an enemy's chemical or biological warfare capabilities (e.g., the size and nature of an enemy's stockpile). In contrast, early warning provides information as early in an attack as possible (from tens of seconds to tens of minutes before units are exposed to C/B contamination) so that commanders have increased options on operational responses, including which protective posture to assume.

Early warning may be implemented through standoff detection using a variety of laser detector technologies at ranges up to 100 km from the contamination, through point detectors deployed on remotely-controlled platforms (e.g., unmanned aerial vehicles, UAVs), or through the forward placement of point detectors (e.g., airdrops, special operations forces (SOF) emplacement). While a single technology (or technology suite) with combined multi-agent chemical and biological detection is a goal of these efforts, such a solution is not planned for transition out of tech base during the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP). Current technology thrusts for early warning focus on separate systems for chemical and biological detection.

The most likely near-term approach will continue to rely on complementary detection technologies using the following approach. Especially for biological agents, current and near-term technologies seek first to sense the presence of higher than normal concentrations of aerosols or particulate matter in the atmosphere. If it is present, data are examined to determine whether the aerosol or particulate formation is natural or man-made. Simultaneously, other sensors will seek to detect whether the aerosol or particulate contains biological material. As technologies mature, new systems will be able to detect, identify, and characterize an increasing number of toxic agents, more reliably, and from greater distances. Problems associated with developing these technologies include overcoming attenuation of laser energy by the atmosphere absorbents, and providing algorithms to discriminate between natural aerosols and man-made aerosols with biological warfare agents, miniaturizing and ruggedizing sensors, developing advanced sampling technologies, and integrating systems into warning and reporting networks.

One of the key early warning defense technology objectives-stand-off and remote biological warfare agent detection-recently has been transitioned out of the technology base and is being funded jointly by Joint Program Office for Biological Defense (JPO-BD) and the Counterproliferation Support Program. This program seeks to provide maneuver forces with an early capability against an upwind release of biological agents. Technologies being evaluated include laser stand-off detectors and sensors mounted on UAVs. Concepts of employment of these technologies will be evaluated in an ACTD proposed for an
FY 1997 start.

Point Detection. The overall goal of point detection (also referred to as local warning) is to develop point sensor technologies that can rapidly detect the presence of biological warfare agents, uniquely identify biological warfare agents, and to optimize the sensitivity, selectivity, reliability, and size of chemical warfare agent detectors. The program is divided into two parts, biological and chemical. Technologies under consideration in the near- and mid-term cannot address both of these threats using the same technology. However, there are efforts to develop a single suite of sensors to detect all potential C/B threats. Chemical and biological detectors would be incorporated as separate modules and upgraded as newer technologies emerge.

Point detection improves visualization of biological and chemical hazards in a local environment through the exploitation of emerging technologies such as immunoassays, deoxyribonucleic acid and gene probes, various forms of spectroscopy, and other physical and chemical characterization technologies. Technological challenges include (1) the development of sensor technology with sufficient sensitivity and discrimination to detect, identify, and quantify the presence of biological and chemical hazards without false alarm, and (2) the integration and development of C3I technologies to permit rapid, automatic collection, collation, dissemination and display of C/B hazard information to various command levels. Up to now, the primary S&T focus has been in sensor development, but it is evident that new technologies are required to integrate sensor information with other battlefield situation awareness information (e.g., geographical, meteorological) in order to properly design the software and hardware for the digital battlefield of the future.

The strategy for the biological detection technology effort is to develop a series of different technologies in parallel to ensure that a capability in biological detection is achieved. Several technologies currently being pursued are considered to be mature enough for transition to an Advanced Technology Demonstration in FY 1996. The large number of emerging technologies that are in various stages of development led to a decision by the JPO-BD to sponsor a yearly field trial and evaluation of available technologies. The evaluation will provide recommendations to advance the development of mature technologies, return immature technologies back to the laboratory for additional development, or to terminate the development of inadequate technologies.

The chemical detection strategy is similar to that for biological detection. Currently there are fewer technologies being considered - e.g., ion mobility spectroscopy (IMS) and surface acoustic wave (SAW) devices. In addition, mass spectrometry is being examined for its applicability to both the chemical and biological detection problem. An evaluation of the state of development of IMS and SAW technologies in FY 1997 will lead to selection of the most promising technology to pursue for future systems.

Warning and Reporting. Warning and reporting is the critical link between C/B detection and C/B protection. The goal of this effort is to provide sufficient, timely information to commanders at all levels from early and direct warning capabilities so that they may develop options on how to conduct their mission and decide the appropriate protective posture to assume, including dewarning for downgrading protective posture. Warning and reporting is a critical issue in contamination avoidance. The military Services have agreed to expedite the development of an early capability by integrating ongoing hardware and software into a Joint Warning and Reporting Network (JWARN) to be fielded in FY 1999. Technologies will be developed to provide increased management and control functions, as well as to integrate features of the emerging Global Command Control System (GCCS). The long term goal of JWARN is to decrease warning time by eliminating the manual and voice transmission of data, replacing it with digital transmissions, and by providing significantly improved modeling and simulation capabilities to identify and predict the location and nature of C/B hazards on the battlefield.

3. Functional Capabilities

Figure IV.J.2 shows the functional capabilities required to produce the operational capabilities comprising Chemical/Biological Agent Detection. Specific technology programs are listed under each functional capability.

4. Current Capabilities, Deficiencies, and Barriers

Figure IV.J.3 presents current limitations and the key technologies being pursued to overcome these limitations. Overcoming these technology limitations will lead to the

functional capabilities necessary to enable the chemical/biological agent detection operational capabilities. Following each operational capability is a summary of current limitations that must be overcome to accomplish the various DTOs.

For early warning, the technological issues are: (1) discrimination of biological warfare agents from each other and from naturally occurring biological materials in the atmosphere; (2) size, weight, and power of chemical and biological detection systems; (3) aerosol background - naturally occurring biological materials (e.g., pollen) may cause high false alarm rates for biodetection systems; (4) man/machine interface; (5) sensor integration on various platforms (e.g., UAVs); (6) on-the-move stand-off detection of chemical agents; and (7) sensitivity of stand-off detection systems. Meeting these constraints may require trade-offs in range and sensitivity.

For point detection, the technological issues are: (1) development of real-time detection of biological materials (current capabilities require 15 or more minutes to detect biological agents and longer to identify agents), (2) unique identification of biological materials (current efforts are focused on generic detection of aerosols and particulates and identification of a limited number of agents), (3) improved sampling and collection technologies for chemical and biological agents, (4) small lightweight chemical detector (current capabilities provide detection for units, but are not useful for use by an individual.), (5) decrease in false alarm rate, and (6) sampling and collection of suspect aerosols.

For warning and reporting, the technological issues are: (1) digitization of battlefield sensor information, (2) automation of detection and warning processes, (3) collation and display of relevant information at various command levels, (4) integration of other sensor information such as geolocation, and meteorology, and (5) integration of data into appropriate models for analysis and presentation.

5. Technology Plan

Technology demonstrations and joint field trials provide a means for the rapid field testing of technical options to solve operational needs. Figure IV.J.4 illustrates how these demonstrations support the CB detection joint warfighting capability objective. Figure IV.J.5 lists the DTOs which, when attained, will enable the operational capabilities as shown by Figure IV.J.6. Each JWSTP DTO is described in the DTO Volume for the JWSTP and the DTAP, and their relationships are plotted in the technology roadmap, Figure IV.J.7.

6. Summary

Science and technology efforts in C/B agent detection provide the basis for significant advances in protecting U.S. forces from the C/B threat and supports the number one priority of the CINC/JROC Counterproliferation JWCA. Warning and reporting is key to detection efforts because it integrates detection systems into the digital battlefield and provides commanders with information they need to accurately visualize the battlefield. Figure IV.J.8 provides an indication of how each DTO will contribute to the overall joint warfighting capability objective. Achieving these objectives will ensure that the future warfighter is equipped with state-of-the-art technologies and does not face the same C/B warfare deficiencies encountered during Operation Desert Storm.