1. Definition
A wide array of political, economic, technological, and military capabilities are necessary to effectively counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). The DoD's counterproliferation (CP) capabilities are associated with seven functional areas: (i) prevent proliferation by denying attempts of would-be proliferaters to acquire or expand WMD capabilities-proliferation prevention; (ii) obtain actionable strategic and tactical intelligence on existing or emerging proliferant states or groups-strategic and tactical intelligence; (iii) watch the battlefield to detect, identify, and characterize WMD forces-battlefield surveillance; (iv) target, interdict, and/or destroy hostile nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) forces and supporting infrastructure with minimal collateral effects-counterforce; (v) actively defend U.S. forces, other friendly forces, and non-combatants by intercepting ballistic and cruise missiles with NBC warheads-active defense; (vi) passively defend U.S. forces, other friendly forces, and non-combatants through NBC agent detection, individual and collective protection, medical treatment, and decontamination--passive defense; and (vii) find and safely dispose of WMDs that paramilitary groups or terrorists attempt to covertly employ in the U.S. or in a theater of U.S. military operations-counter terrorism.
The DoD technology base supports each of the above seven CP functional areas. However, in the context of this JWSTP, counterproliferation is the capability for (1) detecting and evaluating the existence of manufacturing capability for weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and (2) battlefield identification and assessment of the damage capability of alert and launched WMDs to permit the proper level of counterforce to be exerted promptly, and (3) passive defense of individuals and forces. It includes improved counterforce against hardened WMD storage and production facilities. It also includes planning tools incorporating collateral damage prediction, specialized surveillance capabilities, advanced weapons, and enhanced battle damage assessment capabilities. This JWSTP focuses on passive defense and counterforce.
In the context of Counterproliferation, passive defense is the capability to avoid or survive a nuclear, biological, or chemical attack and to continue missions in a contaminated environment. Contamination avoidance is the cornerstone of the C/B passive defense program and is detailed in section IV-J of this report. In addition to contamination avoidance, the defense program includes force protection (individual, collective, and medical) and decontamination, as described in this section.
b. Counterforce
Counterproliferation counterforce is the capability to destroy, neutralize, or deny access to above-ground, slightly buried (bermed bunkers and cut-and-cover), and deeply buried targets (including tunnels) containing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and related facilities and systems, while minimizing collateral effects from the hazardous materials contained in the WMD facility. The potential for catastrophic casualties among both combatants and non-combatants resulting from the release of hazardous WMD materials may require new operational tactics, techniques, and procedures in addition to new technologies. Some time urgent WMD launch systems are mobile; requirements for detection, tracking and defeat of such targets are discussed in section IV.B, Precision Force. Active defense against WMD-carrying theater ballistic missiles is addressed in Section IV.D, Joint Theater Missile Defense.
2. Operational Capability Elements
Figure IV.L.1 illustrates the concept of counterproliferation on the battlefield.
a. Passive Defense
The key operational capability elements in the passive defense area are: (1) detection, identification and warning of C/B attacks (described in Chapter IV-J of this report); (2) individual (non-medical) protection; (3) collective protection; (4) decontamination; and (5) medical protection (including both vaccines and post-exposure therapies).
Operational concepts for passive defense are driven by the Defense Technology Objectives (DTOs) included in the DTO Volume for the JWSTP and the DTAP. Technologies to support these objectives will be refined through ACTDs, ATDs, other technology demonstrations, and various technology development programs.
Individual Protection. The goals of individual protection technology efforts are to (1) improve protection against current threats and add protection against future threats, (2) minimize mission degradation by reducing the impact of the use of individual protection on the soldier's performance, and (3) reduce the logistics burden. The key components of individual protection are ocular and respiratory protection and percutaneous protection. Both components support general soldier requirements such as the Army's 21st Century Land Warrior Concept and specialized applications for the Navy and Air Force. Advanced filtration technologies and selectively agent-impermeable membranes will reduce individual performance degradation. Because of the high interest in providing protection against biological agents for both U.S. forces and their supporting civilian infrastructure in global force projection, initiatives will examine the feasibility of using lightweight, disposable biological masks against such hazards. The key to effective individual protection relies on accurate detection, identification, and warning so forces know when to assume the appropriate protective posture.
Collective Protection. The collective protection technology base efforts seek to maintain protection against current threats and add protection against future threats. At the same time, collective protection technology efforts seek to reduce logistical burdens through the development of improved filter materials with longer useable lifetimes. Collective protection efforts focus on: (1) improvements to current reactive-adsorptive materials, (2) advanced non-reactive filtration processes, (3) advanced reactive filtration, (4) regenerable filtration processes for NBC protection of military vehicles, aircraft, ships, shelters, and buildings, and (5) a reduced logistics burden.
Decontamination. Decontamination is defined as the process of removing or neutralizing from a surface the hazard resulting from a chemical or biological agent attack. The objective of decontamination technology efforts is to develop methods which are effective, environmentally safe, react with chemical agents or disinfect biological agents, and do not affect the operational effectiveness of the surface or equipment being decontaminated. Current decontamination materials are caustic and rely heavily on water, and methods for decontamination cannot currently be used to decontaminate large critical areas such as sea or air ports of debarkation or the interiors of sea or air transport vehicles. An effective decontaminant for electronic components is a critical shortfall. Critical studies are needed to define the decontamination technology issues which must be addressed as part of the national global force projection and our ability to deploy to two potentially contaminated MRCs simultaneously.
Medical Protection. Medical protection consists of three primary functions: (1) pre-exposure preventative measures, (2) post-exposure treatment, and (3) diagnostic capabilities. These functions are applied to defense against chemical and against biological threats. Technology efforts will provide a number of medical products for preventing illness or soldier degradation when percutaneous or aerosol chemical agents or biological agents are used on the battlefield. For soldiers exposed to these agents, a number of initiatives will seek to reduce the lethality/incapacitation effects of BW agents and reduce the time requirement to return to duty. Current technologies only provide partial protection against a number of percutaneous or inhaled chemical agents, and only a limited number of vaccines are available against biological agents. In addition, there are some treatments for exposure to a limited number of biological agents.
b. Counterforce
Execution of successful counterforce missions against WMD and WMD-related facilities while minimizing the potential for collateral effects requires improvements in: (1) the identification and characterization of targets, (2) attack planning and execution, including the development of automated planning tools and procedures and all weather attack capability, (3) probability of kill and battle damage assessment (BDA), and (4) assessment and minimization of collateral damage/hazards. While these operational capability elements are not unique to the counterforce mission, their application to WMD-related targets requires specific functional capabilities and the application of specialized technologies.
Figure IV.L.2 shows the functional capabilities required to produce the passive defense and counterforce operational capability elements.
4. Current Capabilities, Deficiencies, and Barriers
Figure IV.L.3 presents the key technologies that are needed to overcome limitations and to enable achievement of the requisite functional and operational capability elements in the realm of counterproliferation.
a. Passive Defense
For (non-medical) individual protection, the technological issues are: (1) the development of materials and environmental systems which provide reduced heat and other stress burdens on the soldier, and are more selective in precluding transport of agents across the ensemble barrier, but at the same time pass heat and perspiration, (2) providing clear criteria for dexterity and mobility requirements, and (3) providing masks which can be adapted to a number of specialized aircrew applications.
For collective protection, the technological issues are: (1) the development of longer lifetime filters/filter materials for collective protection shelters, and (2) the development of regenerative filter processes and materials.
For decontamination, the technological issues are: (1) the development of a less corrosive, non-aqueous based decontamination material, (2) the development of technologies for dissemination of decontaminants over large surface areas such as sea and airports, (3) providing technologies for decontamination for sensitive closed areas (such as cargo holds or ship compartments) and sensitive equipment (such as electronics and avionics), and (4) developing reactive materials for self-decontamination.
For medical protection, the technological issues are: (1) the development of vaccines against remaining threat list biological warfare agents, (2) the development of FDA-acceptable testing protocols for vaccines to determine vaccine efficacy using non-human subjects, (3) the development of improved topical skin decontamination material, and (4) the development of prophylaxes against nerve and blood agents.
b. Counterforce
The current counterproliferation counterforce capabilities are limited to above-ground and slightly buried (relatively soft) WMD facilities with little capability to minimize collateral effects other than through attempting functional denial while avoiding direct attack against any WMD material. This functional denial capability is very dependent on full characterization of the WMD target complex, which for underground structures is almost impossible unless there are very detailed and highly reliable human intelligence sources. When WMD material is attacked, the resulting collateral effects prediction capabilities are useable with existing hazard prediction codes only under moderate weather conditions and only with a small set of WMD material types and storage conditions.
CINC counterproliferation priorities can be directly linked to enhancements in the four counterproliferation counterforce operational capabilities as listed in this Joint Warfighting S&T Plan. The technology barriers to each counterproliferation counterforce operational capability element, their associated goal(s), functional capability, limitations, and needed technologies are addressed in Figure IV.L.3 and discussed below.
Timely target identification and characterization. WMD development can be masked by commercial chemical and pharmaceutical processes, medical and biological research, and nuclear power generation. In addition, WMD activities can be hidden in underground structures that include hardened facilities. Specialized proliferation path prediction tools, sensors, and sensor data fusion techniques are required to identify and characterize WMD targets sufficiently to allow the selection of appropriate counterforce options.
Prompt attack planning and execution. The efficient planning and execution of attacks against WMD targets requires specialized target planning tools to best address the warfighter's damage criteria while minimizing the associated collateral effects. Accurate estimation of potential collateral effects against both combatants and non-combatants resulting from attacks against WMD targets plays a unique role in the warfighter's decision process of when and how to attack these targets. In addition, the high priority of WMD related targets requires all-weather guidance to meet the warfighter's need to attack whenever he/she chooses.
Reliable kill and BDA. The reliable kill of underground and hardened WMD facilities while minimizing collateral effects requires enhanced penetrating munitions with warheads that have enhanced lethality and agent defeat/neutralization characteristics. Penetrating munitions also require a smart, programmable, hard target fuzing capability to ensure detonation at precise depths, and precision guidance to provide detonation-point accuracy. In addition, physical attacks on underground structures require special BDA sensors that provide confidence in functional damage assessments.
Minimize collateral effects. The minimization of collateral
effects and the understanding of the hazards associated with the
WMD materials released requires specialized tools that can reliably
predict appropriate weather (mainly winds) over actual terrain
and accurately predict the transport of WMD materials due to the
weather conditions. It also involves the understanding of lethality
aspects of the numerous chemical, biological and nuclear hazards.
CAPABILITIES | |||
| EFFECTIVE EMPLOYMENT | |||
| Protect force from C/B contamination and ensure ability to sustain operations and accomplish mission in a C/B contaminated environment | 1. Common individual protection equipment (IPE) design and
material
for Services' applications with modular adaptation for ground,
sea, and air. (Same system- different packages.)
2. Reduced performance degradation. 3. Assure integration and compatibility with future equipment |
1. Significant improvements in respiratory protection not likely
in near future without a material (filter) break-through or using
a powered system
2. Ability to satisfy final performance goals may require multiple systems and/or power as in case of thermal degradation 3. Full definition of the 21st Century Land Warrior is needed to satisfy future compatiblity requirements 4. Attempting to use one mask for all joint service missions may result in performance reductions for some missions 5. Mission requirements for weight, protection, and launderability force trade-offs. No single material fulfills all requirements currently 6. Requirements for protection and tactility for gloves force trade-offs 7. Promising materials for percutaneous protection do not meet affordability requirements. Unsuitable for mass production |
1.New concepts in respiratory protection: enhanced protection studies.
Material and composite technologies
2. Protective system integration and analysis: quantify mission performance; performance testing; performance models for predicting current and future equipment 3. Protective material and test technologies: improve test methodology for protection assessment. Improve aerosol stability. Investigate effects of different aerosol sizes on protection 4. New/improved filtration systems: develop engineered adsorbent - superactivated adsorbents and polymeric adsorbents. New catalytic systems will be developed. Improved particulate filtration technologies 5. Focus on the unique operational aspects of the marine environment, such as firefighting/damage control, flight deck operations, and high-intensity SPECWARS operations 6. Selectively-permeable materials for percutaneous protection 7. Various reactive and non-reactive lightweight materials and membranes for protection against all identified C/B hazards 8. Novel elastomers for overboot protection |
| Ensure ability to sustain operations and accomplish mission in a C/B contaminated environment |
4. Regenerable (catalytic) filtration
to reduce logistics burden while increasing protection factor
5. Reduce weight, cube, and power requirements |
8. Limited basic
research funding to understand link between physical and adsorptive
properties of various materials in order to predict and optimize
filtration performance
9. No adequate means to measure filter life in the field 10. No clearly defined requirements for collective protection |
9. Reactive-adsorptive materials
10. Advanced non-reactive filtration processes 11. Advanced reactive filtration processes for NBC protection of military vehicles, aircraft, ships, shelters, and buildings 12. Regenerative filtration processes (pressure- and temperature-swing adsorption, PSA/TSA) 13. Embedded monitors 14. Plasma technologies 15. Catalytic Oxidation (CATOX) |
CAPABILITIES | |||
| Ensure ability to sustain operations and accomplish mission in a C/B contaminated environment |
6. All-agent, non-corrosive less labor-intensive decon capability
7. Decontaminant suitable for aircraft, ship, and vehicle interiors, and sensitive items 8. Determine requirements for large area decon |
11. Current decontaminant (DS2) is effective in chemical decontamination,
yet has a surface corrosive effect
12. Limited assessments have been made to determine scope of problems associated with large area decontamination (LAD). Consequently, there are no formal requirements for LAD 13. Environmental and safety requirements limit choice of decontaminants 14. Assessment of methods and technologies to decon compartment interiors needed |
16. Non-corrosive, non-aqueous decontaminant
for field/equipment 17. Environmentally safe decon of electronic and sensitive equipment 18. Sorbent decon 19. Large area decontaminant dissemination techniques and technologies 20. Surface Raman Spectrometer to monitor decon 21. Quaternary Ammonium Complexes 22. Enzymatic decontaminants |
| Maintain technological capability to meet present requirements and counter future threats. Provide individual-level prevention and protection to preserve fighting strength. Provide medical management of chemical casualties to enhance survival and expedite and maximize return to duty |
9. Nerve agent pretreatment and therapy
10. Antiseizure therapy 11. Advanced development of topical skin protection 12. Advanced development of nerve agent field diagnosis 13. Advanced development of cyanide prophylaxis |
15. Need expansion of chemical/biological medical training program
16. Advanced product development and FDA approval process for fielding of chemical products 17. Current downsizing and monetary restrictions 18. Integration of DoD/Triservice needs (better joint coordination and representation |
23. Vesicant and respiratory agent therapy 24. Advanced anticonvulsant 25. Multichamber autoinjector 26. Reactive topical skin protectant 27. Topical optical treatment 28. Catalytic scavenger treatment for chemical agents 29. Rapid field diagnostics |
|
Sustain effectiveness of U.S. Armed forces operating in a BW environment
To prevent casualties by use of medical countermeasures
To diagnose disease with forward deployable kits and confirmation
assays, and
To threat casualties to prevent lethality, and to maximize return to duty |
14. Aerosol immunization against biological threat
agents
15. Multivalent vaccine against biological threat agents 16. Pretreatment against biological threat agents 17. Rapid diagnosis kits |
19. FDA approval of Bio Agent vaccines using non-human models
20. Rapid stockpiling of vaccines identified by threat priority |
30. Anthrax immunization prophylaxis
31. Botulinum toxin immunization 32. Smallpox immunization 33. Use of other commercially available vaccines if necessary, e.g., chlorea, plague, tularemia, Q-fever, encephalitis verus, etc. 34. Field-Deployable Diagnostic kits |
|
Find and characterize WMD production, storage or related facilities
that are on or below the ground (at shallow or moderate depth)
--Find mobile missile launchers in hiding places or in transport --Find and characterize very hard or deeply buried underground WMD facilities to include tunnels |
18. ID and characterization
sensors
19. WMD mission planning tools 20. Sensor Data Fusion |
21. Few sensor capabilities for finding either mobile missile launchers or buried WMD targets
22. Little exploitation of all source information to identify and describe WMD targets 23. Minimal real-time intelligence and targeting information for warfighters 35. Advanced SAR/radar imaging |
36. Unattended Ground Sensors (UGS) with seismic, acoustic, electromagnetic, and NBC
capabilities
37. Multi-sensor imaging 38. Remote BW/CW sensors 39. Low-cost & man-portable sensors 40. Microsensors 41. Real-time data fusion/integration 42. ATR and automated handling of massive data streams 43. Automated proliferation path analysis for critical node identification |
CAPABILITIES | |||
| Develop operationally suitable, integrated, computerized force application recommendations with confidence bounds and collateral effects predictions/minimization for WMD targets |
18.
19. 20. 21. WMD Prolif. path prediction 22. Real-time weather data & forecast 23. Collateral effects prediction |
24. No decision aid to determine
where in WMD development, production, and employment process counterforce
attacks have highest probability of success and minimum collateral
effects
25. No attack planning tools for WMD targets that select aimpoints, fuzing, and weapon types for a broad range of soft and hardened targets and that predict both structural response and collateral effects 26. No attack planning tools that permit optimization to minimize collateral effects for a broad range of WMD targets |
44. Targeting calculation capabilities that include the following:
|
| Acquire means to defeat WMD targets at times and under circumstances chosen by the U.S. |
24. Enhanced penetrating munitions
25. Enhanced lethality warheads 26. Agent defeat warheads 27. Hard-target smart fuzing 28. All-weather guidance 29. BDA sensors |
27. No available earth penetrator that can destroy
deeply-buried or very hard WMD targets
28. No earth penetrator with payloads for BW/CW agent defeat or neutralization 29. Limited, highly accurate all weather delivery capability 30. No sub-surface BDA 31. No real-time all-source data fusion |
45. Advanced penetrating weapons
46. Void-sensing, depth-sensing fuze 47. Highly accurate, all-weather guidance/delivery 48. Weapon-borne sensor to provide penetration/detonation history. 49. High temperature incendiary and BW/CW agent defeat payloads 50. Real-time all-source sensor data fusion |
|
--Develop an operationally suitable, integrated all-weather WMD
source/transport/ effects prediction capability for effects on military forces and civilian populations resulting from 1)accidental release from WMD facility, 2)enemy use of WMD weapon, or 3)US attack on WMD weapon or facility. --Develop means to minimize collateral effects resulting from US attack on WMD facility or weapon |
19.
20. 21. 22. 23. 26. 27. 28. 29 |
32. No integrated, automated and validated NBC hazard prediction
tools for wide-ranging WMD targets and U.S. weapons
33. No sensors and tools able to provide detailed equipment, enemy WMD weapons, and WMD facility characterization 34. No special weapons that achieve functional kill while minimizing NBC release |
51. Accurate models for expulsion of NBC materials
52. High-resolution in-theater real-time weather data and forecasts 53. Accurate models for terrain effects on transport of NBC models 54. Lethality assessment of dispersed NBC materials 55. Targeting methods and advanced weapons to minimize expulsion of NBC materials 56. Sensors and tools for WMD facility, equipment, and enemy WMD weapon characterization 57. Real-time all-source sensor data fusion |
Technology demonstrations and joint field trials provide a means for the rapid field testing of technical options to solve operational needs. Figure IV.L.4 illustrates how these demonstrations support the passive defense and counterforce joint warfighting capability. Figure IV.L.5 shows the Defense Technology Objectives (DTOs) which, when attained, will enable the operational capability elements. Figure IV.L.6 shows the demonstration support of operational capability elements. Each DTO is described in Appendix B and their relationships are plotted in the technology roadmap, Figure IV.L.7.
Figure IV.L.8 notionally shows the progress over time as each DTO is achieved.
a. Passive Defense
Science and technology efforts in passive defense provide the basis for significant advances in protecting U.S. forces from C/B threat and support the #1, #6, #7, and #8 priorities of the CINC/JROC Counterproliferation JWCA. Passive defense must integrate all the operational capability elements (C/B detection, force protection, and decontamination) to provide an effective warfighting capability in a contaminated environment. Figure IV.L.8. provides a notional path showing how each DTO will contribute toward the overall joint warfighting capability. Achieving these objectives will ensure that the warfighter is equipped with state-of-the-art technologies and does not face the same deficiencies encountered during Operation Desert Storm when threatened by future adversaries.
b. Counterforce
The Counterproliferation I and II ACTDs are being conducted in multiple phases. This allows planning, execution, and assessment to be accomplished with current capabilities against defeatable WMD targets now and to expand capabilities and potential target sets to finally address all WMD facilities with minimal and predictable collateral damage.
The Counterproliferation I ACTD (DTO L03) consists of the first two phases. Phases III through V are included in the Counterproliferation II ACTD (proposed). These last three phases involve advanced weapons and employment capabilities to minimize collateral effects by avoiding the release of, or neutralizing chemical and biological agents.
| Passive Defense | |
| Medical Biological Defense | |
| Medical Chemical Defense | |
| Advanced Lightweight Chemical Protection | |
| Advanced Agent Filtration | |
| Decontamination for Global Reach | |
| Counterforce | |
| Counterproliferation I ACTD (Technologies to defeat shallow-buried biological and chemical weapon storage and production facilities) Decontamination for Global Reach | |
| Counterproliferation II ACTD (Technologies to defeat an expanded WMD target set including surface, mobile, and deeply buried targets) | |
| Nuclear Technology Development | |
| Planning Systems for Contingencies Involving Proliferants | |
| Hard Target Defeat | |
| Prediction and Mitigation of Collateral Hazards | |
| Advanced Unitary Penetrator (AUP) | |
