J.01. C/B Modeling. By FY96, develop, verify, validate, and document a hazard model for operational use. This same model will also be the basis for systems which support TBMD COEAs, BW detector studies, training, etc. By FY97, demonstrate the ability to evaluate the operational performance of representative Stand-Off C/B detector systems using the Distributed Interactive Simulation (DIS). By FY FY99 standardize a joint suite of models. This will include a high resolution, computational fluid dynamics (CFD) model for detailed analysis of ships, combat vehicles, shelters, etc. By FY02 complete algorithms for inclusion in the JCS JWARS model for joint tactical and strategic campaign analyses. These accomplishments will result in a standardized and documented DIS compliant joint capability for the full range of CBW hazard analyses for materiel development, combat development, training, test and evaluation, COEAs, and operational requirements.

Supports: Laser Stand-Off C/B detectors, lightweight stand-off chemical detector, NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle, Shipboard Advanced Liquid Agent Detector (SALAD), JSLIST, Armored Systems Modernization, LAM Exercises, Battlefield Distributed SimulationÐDevelopment (BDS-D) ATD, Combined Arms Tactical Trainer ATD, Integrated Bio ATD, JWARN, JWARS, JPO-BD Air Base/Port Bio Detection Network ACTD, Maneuver Control System (MCS), and the Tactical Environmental Support System (TESS).

J.02. Biological Early Warning ACTD (proposed). Maneuver forces and troops are particularly vulnerable to upwind releases of a biological warfare (BW) agent. Such a release can produce a widely-dispersed cloud with difficult-to-measure agent concentrations which can be lethal to humans. Early warning (stand-off and remote detection) of BW agents is thus essential to providing downwind personnel with as much warning time as possible to allow them to assume the appropriate protective posture or to avoid contamination completely. The objective of this proposed ACTD is to develop, demonstrate and field stand-off and remotely-employable point detection capabilities which can detect, identify, and characterize BW agents. These detection capabilities will include alarms which will be integrated into appropriate warning and reporting networks to promptly alert all personnel who may be exposed to BW contamination. This ACTD would develop and demonstrate the use of a helicopter-mounted eye-safe LIDAR which can detect particulate clouds (with respirable particles in the 1-10 micron range) at distances of 20 to 50 kilometers, depending on particle density. This LIDAR will not identify or characterize the particulate matter. To identify and characterize suspected BW agents, miniaturized and sensitive detectors (able to detect 1 to 10 agent containing particles per liter of air) are to be developed that can be remotely employed through air-drop, artillery, SOF emplacement, or mounted on unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). These miniaturized detectors may be selected from systems demonstrated under the Integrated Biodetection ATD or at Joint Biological Field Trials. Small, low-power air samplers must also be developed for remote deployments and may be integrated with biodetection systems. Present plans inlude (1) an FY96 demonstration of a miniaturized detector for SOF utilization, and (2) an ACTD that will demonstrate end-to-end stand-off and remote BW agent detection capabilities during FY98-99.

J.03. Airbase/Port Biological Detection ACTD. By FY98, develop and demonstrate a biological early warning capability and operational procedures to detect, alarm, warn, dewarn, identify, protect, and decontaminate large areas against a biological warfare (BW) attack on an air base or port facility. By FY96, initiate aerosol sampling in Korea and Saudi Arabia, model air base/port scenario excursions, and demonstrate in CONUS a small networked biological detection array with a generic detection (bio/not bio) capability. By FY97, demonstrate in CONUS a total system, to provide rapid detection (5 minutes versus 15 minutes), semi-automated versus manual warning and reporting of a BW attack using RF links, protection (collective protection and commercial oronasal masks), identification (20 versus 30 minutes) and sample handling of 8 high threat agents versus 4, and large area decontamination. This ACTD will demonstrate for the first time the capability to detect and protect high value fixed site assets against point and long line source BW attacks.