News

"Achieving the Promise of Space – The Next Step"

Air Force Association Warfighting Symposium– Orlando, Florida

General Richard B. Myers – 4 February 1999

Good afternoon. Twice in the last six months, General Shaud has invited me to speak at a major Air Force Association event. Now when General Shaud extends that kind of invitation, you just have to accept. After all, think of the venues – Beverly Hills last November – Orlando today. Only the A.F.A. could take a symposium like this from "Rodeo Drive" to "Main Street USA"….from Hollywood chic to Mickey Mouse.….and still assemble such a distinguished group of intelligent, concerned, and visionary aerospace champions!

When you think about it, the different venues of L.A. and Orlando fit perfectly with my messages. At AFA-LA I hadn’t been in the saddle all that long, and folks were curious. So it was the perfect opportunity to give some high level, glossy thoughts on where space was going – sort of a "Rodeo Drive" vision. If you were there, you’ll remember some words on seizing a strategic opportunity where a fully integrated aerospace force achieves the full promise of space.

Those were the right words for that time, when people mostly asked, "Myers, where do you stand?" But now, eight months into my tenure, the questions have changed to "How do we get there, Myers?" Clearly, the answer calls for some down-to-earth ideas – sort of a "Main Street USA" action plan. So Orlando, as host city to Disney World, and its famous "Main Street USA," is perfect for what I want to say today about our space action plan.

The on-ramp for that main street discussion, though, takes us by some other pressing concerns I’m often asked about. They’re important issues, every one of them, and I want to make sure you all understand that back in Colorado Springs, they’re getting our fullest attention.

Experts can’t decide whether the first, less than a year away, is an impending apocalypse or a non-event. Of course, I’m speaking of the millenium rollover – the undisputed hot issue of 1999, and beyond for that matter. Since our three commands are as or more dependent on computers perhaps than any others, I’m asked often if we’re ready. We’re taking this issue very, very seriously.

Now, I know you’re all aware we’re working hard to ensure nothing happens come midnight on December 31st – though I take some comfort in knowing that in Colorado Springs, we’ll have two more hours to work the problem than they do in D.C. Still, make no mistake – we take this very seriously. For us, it’s a warfighting issue – and we know exactly when the enemy will strike. That’s why Secretary Cohen gave CINCs the responsibility for testing our Y2K system compliance. We’re already well ahead of the power curve. With a three-star action officer out at Peterson, and the personal involvement of all our commanders, backed up by a host of computer experts, Y2K has our undivided attention.

We’ve already put our plan to a significant test. And we’re not talking just a test of individual pieces of equipment, but a major systems test – an end-to-end capability test – designed to see if we can accomplish our warfighting mission. In this case, it was an opeval of NORAD’s strategic early warning mission. Independent observers called this complex, three-day collaborative effort with CINCSTRAT and the NMCC a benchmark for the rest of DoD. We have four more opevals – end-to-end tests – scheduled. Plus, we’ll be supporting a number of other CINCs in their opevals. I guarantee, we will be ready!

But best of all, we have the ultimate secret weapon, and that’s our people. Our people are the world’s best trained, most professional, and most dedicated. They are in the loop – and they are all 100% Y2K compliant. You’ll find them throughout our three commands. I’m proud of every one of them – and because of them, I’m confident….we will be ready!

One of the fringe benefits to come out of this whole Y2K thing is an acute awareness of our dependence on computers. We can’t imagine functioning without them – at work, at home, or at war. It took Y2K to remind us that every dependence creates a vulnerability; thus, Secretary Cohen’s call to arms. I submit that same dependence-vulnerability with computers is mirrored by a similar relationship with space – and we need the same call to arms. Think of it: just like the computer chip, we can’t imagine functioning without space – at work, at home, or at war. We know, for instance, that space is driving a new American way of making wealth.

Let me remind you of a few staggering facts:

We also know space is enabling a new American way of making war. Desert Fox – the mission to again force Iraqi compliance of U.N. resolutions – is typical:

Space is now so integral to our military operations that we will never again develop or execute any war plan without the benefit of some space-based capability. Let me also add that with all the focus lately on readiness, any evaluation of a hollow force now depends on the status and health of the space systems enabling that force. Simply put, U.S. military power is now directly reflected in U.S. space power.

Clearly, our commercial enterprises, our military prowess, even our daily lives, are inextricably tied to space. Indeed, as we approach the year 2000, our dependence on space has never been higher. That’s why those of us in uniform are working so hard to ensure the use of space on our terms, and to protect the assets in space that bring us such tremendous advantage in achieving the full promise of space.

Our concern really boils down to this – as big a year as 2000 is for our computer systems, it’s also a very important space year. A lot of events with significant potential to negatively affect our space assets will occur around the year 2000. Given our military and economic dependence on space, we might call this "the other Y2K," and it demands just as much of our attention as its more familiar cousin.

We’ve already had a taste of the first of these big events. You’ll recall our concern last November over the Leonids meteor shower. Fortunately, it turned out to be something of a non-event, but with peak storm activity expected this year and in 2000, we can’t be complacent.

The second big event is called "Solar Max" – a series of solar flares, which peak in intensity every 11 years. The next peak occurs in the Year 2000. The problem is similar in both cases: spacecraft exposure to charged particles resulting from the tremendous discharge of energy, either from a comet’s debris in the case of Leonids, or from flares in the case of Solar Max.

Finally, the Year 2000 puts us within a decade of when we’re supposed to be fully engaged in Joint Vision 2010, our new American way of fighting war. Of course, we’ve already taken the force cuts called for in JV2010 today. So, given acquisition timelines, we need to be well on our way in 2000 to getting those space and information systems that will enable JV2010, or we have to seriously consider building up our force again.

So we have Y2K and the other Y2K – makes you want to ask, "why me?" It also makes folks start to wonder if we’re really going to be able to pull all this off. Clearly, there’s a lot riding on space – for the Year 2000, for 2010, for our standard of living, and for our national survival. From this awareness grows a sense of urgency, a certain, natural impatience with the pace of progress in space. Unfortunately this also leads to questions over the stewardship of space. Some wonder if we’re stepping up to our responsibilities. Others leap to the conclusion that we need a separate space service. In my view, this mostly stems from the misperception of an inherent conflict between air and space where the air side always gets 51 percent of the vote.

As airmen, this implied criticism hits us in the gut. Never mind that no nation is better than the United States at exploiting space for national security and economic prosperity. No, it’s deeper than that. First, it’s in our genetic code to nurture a struggling new medium. From Kitty Hawk to Air Force independence, we’ve known neglect, inattention, and misunderstanding first hand. Airmen are not only culturally spring loaded, but also feel it’s a personal point of honor to avoid repeating the patterns set by the Army when airpower first emerged.

Second, we have historical experience on the dangers of stovepiping competing systems, mediums, or platforms. We learned our lesson of tactical versus strategic airpower; of fighters versus bombers. In short, airmen recognize that it’s not about the medium or the platform, it’s about the capability we bring to the fight – the effects we create on the battlefield. As a CINC, I couldn’t agree more. Our entire structure of jointness stresses teamwork and effects-based warfare.

So, as we contemplate the advancement of space power, I believe it’s helpful to recall the thoughts of Hap Arnold – a pioneer and champion of airpower. He said that divisiveness over stewardship and organization did not help the cause. Stewardship and organization weren’t the restricting factors. The real obstacles holding back airpower were resources and technology. Doesn’t that sound familiar today?

Ladies and gentlemen of the Air Force Association, I submit that it’s time we put the stewardship issue behind us and focus on the real enemies: funding, technology, and I would add policies that hold spacepower back. It’s time to continue with, as the Chief said, our superb stewardship of space. Now, given all that’s riding on space, it’s very fair to question our plans for future stewardship. I’ve made the case for how dependent we are on space, so it’s fair to ask what we’re doing to preserve, protect, and enhance the capabilities it brings us. I believe we sometimes invite criticism because our message isn’t as broad as our topic. Space touches on so many areas that it’s easy to leave someone or something out.

For example, we can outline our plans for space to enhance terrestrial operations and get questioned about our commitment to space as a warfighting medium in its own right. So, it’s up to us to better explain where we’re going, and how we expect to get there – or what I call our "Main Street" action plan for our "Rodeo Drive future."

I propose that our strategy for space falls in four areas: Integrate, Divest, Energize, and Assess. If you noticed, this makes for a handy acronym – I.D.E.A. – which is perfect for a simple soul like me that went to school in Manhattan – Kansas, that is. You can’t get much more main street than that!

It’s important to remember up front that these are not consecutive steps. Rather, all four areas are worked simultaneously. The first part of this process is to integrate. Here we mean the broader aspect of integrating new concepts, new technologies, new thought processes as we go along. It’s important that even as we pursue tomorrow’s revolution, we must bank the margin of today’s interim victories. Integration of space to enhance the effectiveness of air, land, and sea power is the imperative of this age. Anything less would be criminal.

A great historical example we have of this comes from the use of radar in the Battle of Britain. Here, the Luftwaffe had far superior numbers and assumed they could attack the R.A.F. in daylight operations. The thought was that they could pierce thin R.A.F. sector defenses with overwhelming force. What they didn’t anticipate was the use of a new-found capability – the early warning radar – which made British fighters effective in a way never before imagined.

Radar enabled the R.A.F. to see approaching German formations well enough in advance to pinpoint their response in mass. Rather than spread their resources across a zone defense as was necessary before radar, they were able to send mass to the point of attack. This compensated for their inferiority in numbers, and robbed the Germans of the advantage of surprise in timing and location of attack.

Now imagine if before the war, Britain’s leaders had decided not to integrate this new technology into their operations – had not had time to see how a warning system based on radar could revolutionize their war plans. What if they had said, "lets wait on this radar thing until it can achieve its fullest promise." Clearly, the Battle of Britain, already "a near thing," might have gone another way.

It’s imperative we apply this historical lesson to today’s circumstances, if for no other reason than that it fits perfectly with the concepts of JV 2010, where we expect more combat punch with fewer resources. Seems that more than 50 years ago Britains faced the same dilemma we do today. Let’s hope we are as wise in applying their lesson about integration.

Actually, I believe we are. Across all the services we’ve had tremendous success at integration. One example comes from our own EFX 98. Here the Air Force was able to deploy more teeth to the fight by leaving more tail at home. Space provided the reachback that linked the two parts and allowed us to pull off this new way of fighting today.

We’re also working hard on our newest space integration issue – that of information operations. With the tight linkage between space and information, any future battle for space superiority will really be a battle for information superiority. The Battle of Britain showed what happens when one side has better information.

So, we had best integrate what advantages we have today into our plans, even as we pursue those at the next level. We’ve had a good start. Intellectually, perhaps organizationally, we have a firm grasp on what’s necessary. Now we just need to commit the necessary resources to make it a reality.

So we can speak of huge integration efforts like information operations and new deployment concepts as we saw in EFX 98. Or we can highlight another kind of integration like our Colorado Springs refacilitization plan, which calls for a new Headquarters building for U.S. Space Command and NORAD, and right next door, a new building for Army Space Command. Either way, we’re talking about the full integration of space into military operations – today and every day.

Now another part of our larger plan for achieving the full promise of space includes a concerted effort at partnering. We’ve had great success in this area too, particularly with other agencies like NASA, the N.R.O., the N.S.A., and with industry. Partnering bridges the first two areas of our "IDEA" acronym – our space strategy. We use partnerships to better integrate our efforts because in a limited resource environment, no one can go it alone. And partnering helps identify ways to divest – the second part of our strategy to the future.

Divestiture is especially appropriate in the space business. Because of its substantial impact on both the military and the economy, and with the solid partnerships we’ve established between the two sectors, we often find the same players in the same room talking the same systems. Understandably, the conversation can easily alternate between warfare and market share. When that happens, those in uniform need to take a hard look at the issue and decide if it still fits into a military core competency. If not, it’s a prime candidate for divesting. The key indicator to study divesting is when the conversation tends mostly towards market share rather than warfare.

One obvious example of this process is the ranges. The Air Force owns our launch ranges, but perhaps it’s time to think about divestiture. In 1995, commercial launches just about matched DoD launches off the Eastern Range. Last year, commercial launches exceeded DoD launches on the East Coast. The trend in the outyears is similar.

Now I’m not talking complete divestiture of launch operations – that may not be wise. But some version of shared management under a national spaceport concept, perhaps, where we retain the necessary level of military equity seems appropriate today. Lieutenant General (retired) Dick Henry’s range I.P.T. with industry reached similar conclusions, so we’re giving his recommendations a serious, hard look, both at Air Force Space Command, and at the Air Staff.

Earlier I suggested that the four parts of our "IDEA" strategy constitute a simultaneous process. This concept couldn’t be clearer than with the third part of the strategy. We can’t successfully integrate or divest without efforts to energize. As I see it, and as Hap Arnold suggested, there are three major factors holding us back from achieving the full promise of space: funding, policies, and technology. We must concentrate hard on energizing each of these.

It’s unfortunate the Air Force has so many bills to pay, but we can see the fallout from today’s operational, and tomorrow’s modernization and sustainment imperatives. We’re forced to make difficult choices like slipping the Space-Based Infrared System, our #1 space acquisition priority, for two years.

Likewise, we’re growing increasingly concerned about prospects for our GPS operational control system and our Minuteman ICBM modernization. And we must find resources to support our people and their families. At Space Command, we have similar retention issues as other commands, as our space operators are in demand in commercial industry. As I see it, shortfalls with space have a way of trickling down across our economy and throughout our Armed Forces. Therefore, we must energize space funding at a national level. It’s more than we can do in the Air Force.

The same holds true for space policies. Just as we can’t expect to successfully fight the next war with the equipment of the last war, we surely won’t see victory in the next war using the policies of the last war. To best prepare for the future, we have to energize our thinking too. We need that national debate on the existing policies and open questions affecting future military capabilities and possibilities in space. And we need resolution of that debate sooner rather than later.

Without it, we can’t fully exploit the promise of emerging technologies – the third area we need to energize. Many call for an acceleration of space-based capabilities, and they do so with the best of intentions. But we can do only what’s doable; we can go only as far as mature technology allows us to. In order to facilitate innovation, we have to energize basic research and development, science and technology. This is vital, even in a limited resource environment. This too, requires a national level effort.

By concentrating on the first three parts of our process – integrate, divest, energize – I’m certain we can achieve the full promise of space. To complete the "IDEA," though, we have to make sure along the way that we’re on the right track – we have to assess our progress.

We talked before about one method of assessment – the opevals we’re using to verify our success on Y2K. We have many others, like exercises. I mentioned EFX 98 earlier. We also have a number of demonstrations like the Joint Warfare Interoperability Demonstration, or JWID 99. And we have Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations, such as the one planned for Space-Based Laser.

All are intended to show us if we’re on the right track. And all will help us determine if our efforts to integrate, divest, and energize have paid off. Of course in U.S. Space Command, we have the added advantage of bumping all this up against our Long Range Plan – the perfect tool for providing unity of effort in achieving the full promise of space.

USSPACECOM’s priorities and future requirements are all based in the Long Range Plan. Using it, we’ve begun to synchronize our strategic planning process with those of our components. That falls right in line with the larger strategy to integrate, divest, and energize. We’ll close the loop with assessment, and gauge our progress against what’s outlined in the Long Range Plan. We need to hit all four cylinders – to integrate, divest, energize, and assess in order to achieve the full promise of space. All this adds up to our action plan.

Now the pressure is on. If we continue to work those issues I mentioned earlier, and do so in the context of our four-phased "IDEA," we’ll fly right up Main Street and reach that Rodeo Drive plateau. Our future in space depends on it. Our future military success depends on it. And the well being of our entire nation depends on it.

I’m optimistic about our prospects for that future – just as Dr. Edward Teller advised three decades ago when he said, "I think it is my duty and your duty to be optimistic………because only with optimism can we create out of all the uncertainty the kind of future in which it will be worthwhile to live." I’m confident our optimistic plan will make that future worthwhile.

So that’s it. That’s my pitch to you this afternoon. I hope I’ve shown how engaged we are in taking our efforts in space to the next level. To General Shaud, and the Central Florida Chapter of the A.F.A., many thanks again for yet another wonderful opportunity, and God bless.