FAS | Space | Military | Doc/Ops | Ops | Desert Star |||| Index | Search | Join


ds_logo.gif - 8.5 K

APPENDIX

The Iraqi Target System

TARGETS IN IRAQ

In addition to monitoring the Iraqi military presence in and around Kuwait, American intelligence satellites covered a variety of targets in Iraq itself. These include the nuclear, chemical and missile development and production centers that are part of Iraq's advanced weapons complex, Iraqi military airfields, as well as other targets, such as Army bases, munitions plants, petroleum refineries and electrical power plants. "The earliest plan developed for Iraq had only about 80 targets for warplanes to attack, such as airfields, communications centers and chemical weapons plants, Air Force Officials say. Over the six months leading up to the air war, that target list swelled to more than 300."(1)

According to one intelligence official, "we get a lot more intelligence data than we have time to look at, and there are literally thousands of targets worth looking at."(2) "Many targets in Iraq were nominated for air strikes two months ago (ie in December 1990), even before the air campaign started... Weaponeering for a target -- the selection of aircraft and bombs to be used in a sortie, -- is usually decided five days in advance" of an air strike.(3)

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs Peter Williams noted that the air campaign and damage assessment process is "not like you get the overnight. You don't see the rushes from every day and then decide what you need to go out and do. It's not that quick... part of what is involved here in thinking about how this operation works, is expanding the time horizon a bit. It, unfortunately, does not work on the same 24 hour cycle as the news media does. It's something that goes out over several days. It's planned for several days in a row, and you work your way through it."(4)

Table 8 - The Iraqi Target System

Target ClassNumber
TOTAL328 - 363
Advanced Weapons42
Nuclear Facilities
9
Chemical & Biological Development
9
Chemical & Biological Delivery
13
Missile Development & Launch
11
Air Force220
Air Defenses
120
Airfields Main Operating Bases
8
Other Military Airfields
20
Dispersal Fields
25
Other Airfields
47
Command/Control24 - 47
Baghdad Bunkers
10 - 26
Air Defense Center
4 - 7
Army Headquarters
10
Terrorist Camps
4
Bridges42 - 54
Other Facilities25
Munitions Plants
7
Petrochemical Plants
11
Electrical Plants
7

The objectives of the American air campaign against Iraq were described by Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf in a briefing on 30 January 1991. "In our first phase, what we wanted to do was disrupt leadership command and control; destroy centralized air defense command and control; attack combat aircraft in the air and on the ground to achieve air superiority; damage nuclear, biological and chemical storage and production capability; and commence attack on the Republican Guards. Once we had done that, we planned to go into a second phase, which was to destroy the air defense radars and missiles in the Kuwait Theater of Operation to achieve undisputed control of the air -- some people call it air supremacy; and finally, to sever supply lines in the Kuwait Theater of Operations... Twenty six leadership targets were struck -- 60 percent of targets were struck -- 60 percent of those were severely damaged or destroyed... One-fourth of Iraq's electrical generating facilities are completely inoperative, and another 50 percent suffered degraded operations... Seventy-five percent of Iraq's command, control and communications facilities have been struck during our air campaign, and one-third of those are completely destroyed or inoperative...we've attacked air defense nerve centers, striking 29 targets... as a result, the Iraqis have abandoned centralized control of their air defense... We originally targeted 44 airfields -- 16 primary airfields, and another 28 dispersal airfields. We constantly are reevaluating this, based upon where they put their airplanes. To date, based upon where their airplanes have been, we've attacked 38 airfields... The 38 airfields have all been struck at least once, any many of them have been struck at least 4 times... We've targeted a total of 36 bridges. Of those 36 bridges, we have attacked 33 of them... nuclear, biological and chemical. We had 31 targeted locations, and we've attacked all 31... We have absolute confirmation we've destroyed over 11 chemical and biological storage areas..."(5)

Table 9 - Desert Storm Air Sorties

DATE WEATHER TOTAL DAILY KTO KTO
CAS
GUARD SCUDS (SCUD)
(TELS)
Jan 17 1,000 1,000
18 * 2,107 1,100
19 4,700 2,600
20 7,000 2,300 1000 to date
21 * 8,100 1,100
22 * 10,000 1,900
23 12,000 2,000
24 15,000 2,000
25 17,500 2,707 --- mainly ---
26 * 20,000 1,000
27 23,000 2,000 (3)
28 25,000 2,500
29 27,500 2,600 300 (7 to date)
30 30,000 2,000 300 1,500 to date
31 32,000 2,600 ? 360 ?
Feb 1 35,000 2,500 ? 600 ?
2 37,000 2,600 ? 500 ? (3)
3 41,000 2,500 ? ? 1,500 to date
4 44,000 2,700 ? 250 ?
5 47,000 2,500 ? ? ? (6 to date)
6 49,000 2,500 650 ? ? (2)
7 52,000 2,600 ? ? 130
8 * 55,000 2,500 600 150 ?
9 * 57,000 2,800 ? 200 ? (2)
10 59,000 2,800 650 200 ?
11 62,000 2,900 750 200 ? (4)
12 65,000 2,600 675 225 ? (5)
13 68,000 2,800 700 240 170 (1)
14 70,000 2,800 800 200 190
15 73,000 2,600 800 100 150
16 76,000 2,600 700 170 150 (7)
17 78,000 2,600 800 100 150 (1)
18 * 80,000 2,400 870 100 130
19 83,000 2,800 870 100 130
20 86,000 2,900 900 100 100 (2)
21 * 88,000 2,400 800 100 100
22 91,000 2,700 1,000 100 100 (7)
23 94,000 2,900 1,200 100 300
24 ? ? ? ? ? ?
25 100,000 3,000 1,300 700 ? ?
26 103,000 3,000 1,400 700 ? 130
27 ? ? ? ? ? ?
28 110,000 ? ? ? ? ?

Nuclear Facilities

Al-Qaim - Phosphate fertilizer plant, with hydrogen fluoride production capability with reported potential to be used for Uranium yellow-cake production using uranium hexafluoride, and reputed Uranium enrichment facility.(6)

Al Qaqaa - Near Karbala, 50 kilometers south of Baghdad, reputed site of development and production of RDX and HMX explosives for nuclear weapons (reputed site of large explosion 17 August 1989).(7)

Baghdad Nuclear Lab - Facility on southeast edge of Baghdad for centrifuge testing and development.(8)

Gara Mountains - 64 kilometers south of the Turkish boarder, alleged site of uranium mine.(9)

Irbil (Erbil) - Reported underground nuclear weapons research facility, including possible centrifuge enrichment activity.(10)

Mosul - Reported unidentified nuclear facility, possibly including centrifuge uranium enrichment activity.

Factory 10 - Site northwest of Baghdad with artillery factory that includes lathes alleged for use in fabrication of centrifuges.

Qarachoq - south-east of Mosul, Soviet commercial Soyuz-Karta photos show an H-shaped building 100 meters long, which Kurdish rebels say is a nuclear weapons uranium processing facility, associated with an alleged uranium mine at Gara, 120 km away.(11)

Tawaitha-Osirak (Tuvait/Osiris) - Operational research nuclear reactor as well as inoperative reactor destroyed by Israel in 1981.(12)

Figure 41 - Iraqi Nuclear and Chemical Weapons Facilities

Chemical and Biological Warfare Facilities

DEVELOPMENT & PRODUCTION FACILITIES

Al Samawah - Petroleum refinery, possible chemical weapons production facility nearby.

Badush - Reputed development and production of chemical weapons.(13)

Baghdad - Reputed biological weapons research laboratory.(14)

Baji - Major center for production of chemicals, including some potentially used as chemical weapon precursors, such as Phosphoric Acid.(15)

Irbil (Erbil) - Reported chemical weapons production facility.(16)

Karbala - Chemical weapons production facility.

Project 9230 (Al-Fallujah) - Complex of three plants, main production facility for chemical weapon precursor chemicals, such as phosphorus compounds, originally built for pesticide production.(17)

Salman Pak - Chemical weapons development center, and reputed biological weapons research facility, with underground sheltered facilities.(18) The CIA estimates that this facility has the potential for production of biological warfare agents by early 1991.(19)

Samarra - Iraq's largest chemical weapon production facility, covering more than 26 square kilometers, with capacity to produce 720 of mustard agent and 48 tons of Tabun and Sarin nerve agent per year.(20)

CHEMICAL DELIVERY FACILITIES

Iraq reportedly has dispersed stockpiles of chemical agents deployed at "hundreds of secret caches" around the country.(21)

Al-Asad - military airfield

Al-Fallujah - military airfield

Al Iskandariyah - One of eight major operating bases

Az Subayr - Chemical weapons delivery facility at airfield.(22)

Basra - Chemical weapons delivery facility at airfield.(23)

H-3 - airfields.

Jalibah - airfield

Kirkuk - Air Force Main Operating Base

Radif al Khan - reserve airfield

Rutba - reserve airfield

Tallil - airfield

Tikrit - One of eight major operating bases

Ubaydah bin al Jarrah - airfield

Missile Facilities

In the first three weeks of the air campaign, more than 1,500 sorties were directed against Scuds.(24) This resulted in the destruction of about 30 fixed launchers.(25)

Al-Abbed - Fixed missile launch facility, west of Baghdad.(26)

Al-Anbar - Primary missile test launch facility west of Baghdad, includes operational launch facilities.(27)

As Salman - One of five new missile launch sites, near this location.(28)

Basra - Three missiles were test fired on 2 December.(29)

H-2 - Oil pumping station that is base for six fixed launchers for modified Scud-B missile, one of five new locations.(30)

H-3 - Oil pumping station that is base for six fixed launchers for modified Scud-B missile, one of five new locations.(31)

Kuwait - Iraq has moved missile launchers, possibly including up to 36 Scud launchers, into Kuwait following the invasion.(32)

Mosul - One of five new missile launch sites, reportedly under construction.(33)

(Northwest of Baghdad) - One of five new missile launch sites, reportedly under construction, at an undetermined site northwest of Baghdad.(34)

Project 073 (Al-Fallujah) - Part of Project 395, Condor II and Tamouz rocket engineering workshops.(35)

Project 096 (Al-Mahmudiyah) - Part of Project 395, Condor II and Tamouz rocket propellant production facility.(36)

Project 124 (Al-Fallujah) - Development and production facility for al-Hussein long-range modified Scud missile.

Project 1157 (near Karbala west of Al Hillah) - Part of Project 395, rocket motor static test facility for Condor II and Tamouz (reported site of major explosion 17 August 1989).(37)

Saad 16 (near Mosul) - Primary Condor II missile development center,(38) with research on chemical and nuclear weapons. Missile research facilities include launch range, high-speed wind tunnels, missile test facilities, and chemical and electronics laboratories.(39) Aircraft production facility is planned nearby.

Figure 42 - Iraqi Air Defenses

Air Defenses

Iraq deployed anti-aircraft weapons at more than 120 sites.(40) These facilities used "several Soviet designed radars units, including the Spoon Rest mobile early warning radar, Flat Face early warning and target acquisition radar, and Squat Eye search and target acquisition radar."(41)

Airfields

Iraq has a total of about 100 airfields, of which six are major bases for Iraqi air forces.(42) In addition, there are "several large stretches of highway clearly designed to double as aircraft runways -- wide and long enough to accommodate even Iraq's Soviet-built Ilyushin 76 transport planes."(43) These airfield included over 200 hardened shelters to protect combat aircraft from aerial attack. The initial campaign for air superiority focused on these facilities, since coalition planners anticipated that the Iraqi Air Force would destroy as many as 200 coalition aircraft in the initial days of the war. However, few Iraqi aircraft rose to challenge the coalition air forces, and nearly 150 first-line units fled to airfields in Iran. By the second week of the air campaign, 65 percent of the Iraqi airfields remained operational, but according to Navy Capt. David Herrington, the "percentage is not really important. It varies from day to day. We've seen an airfield be operational one day, and then they won't use it again for three or four days. Some of our ordnance that's used against those airfields is effective for a period of time, but no matter what the damage on these linear targets, over time they can be repaired."(44)

Figure 43 - Iraqi Air Fields

According to Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Tony McPeak, "about day seven we decided to attack Iraqi aircraft in their aircraft shelters... they had about 600 shelters. We attacked the majority of them."(45)

MAIN OPERATING BASES

Al Iskandariyah - One of eight major operating bases

Ash Shuaybah - One of six major bases for Iraqi air forces.(46)

Basra - One of six major bases for Iraqi air forces.(47)

H-3 (Haj Sen) - Oil pumping station used as air base, east of Rutba near Shib al Wolj, one of six major bases for Iraqi air forces.(48).

Kirkuk - One of six major bases for Iraqi air forces.(49)

Mosul - One of six major bases for Iraqi air forces.(50)

Rashid - One of six major bases for Iraqi air forces.(51)

Tikrit(52) - Home town of Saddam Hussein.

MILITARY AIRFIELDS

Al-Amarah(53)

Al-Asad(54)

Al-Fallujah(55)

Al-Habbaniyah(56) - near Baghdad

Al Jaber - One of three airfields in Kuwait

Al Salem - One of three airfields in Kuwait

Az Zubyar / Rumaila(57)

Baghdad (Downtown)(58)

Baghdad International Airport(59)

Balad(60)

H-2 - near pumping station.

Hadhar

Irbil (Erbil)(61) - Reported underground nuclear weapons research facility.

Jalibah(62)

Kuwait City - One of three airfields in Kuwait

Qayyarah(63)

Shaik Mazhur(64)

Tallil(65)

Tal Afar(66)

Ubaydah bin al Jarrah(67)

BACK-UP DISPERSAL AIRFIELDS

Al Muhammadi

Al Qaim

Ar Rutba

As Salman

Basra West

Ghalaysan

H-1 - near pumping station.

H-3 Highway Strip - One of three backup airfields east H-3.

H-3 Northwest(68) - One of three backup airfields east H-3.

H-3 Southwest(69) - One of three backup airfields east H-3.

Hawr

Kut Al Hayy

Nejef

Numaniyah

Qalat Salih

Qalat Sikar

Qasr Amij

Qurna

Radif al Khan

Rumashid - backup airfield east of H-3 (inside Jordon?)

Shaik Jasim

Shaklawa

Subaku

Uum Qasr

Wadi al Khirr

Command and Control Facilities

Leadership facilities attacked in Baghdad include "the presidential palace, the Ba'ath Party regional headquarters in Alawiehella; the Defense Ministry and military command in Maydan; the communications center in Karkh, on the west bank of the Tigris, and intelligence headquarters in Mansour..."(70)

Human intelligence sources suggested the existence of as many as 26 bunkers around Baghdad, of which 10 were located using imaging intelligence systems.(71) "seven allegedly nuclear-proof shelters beneath Hussein's various residences and offices in Baghdad."(72) Other command targets in Baghdad included four central communications facilities, of which one was reportedly located in the Rashid Hotel, which was used by Western journalists.(73) "The other three centers -- the Telecommunications Building, The Ministry of Defense, and the Baathist Party Headquarters -- were destroyed or badly damaged in the first three days of the war..."(74)

Brig. Gen. Richard Neal noted that "we have tried to eliminate his ability to communicate to the public and to his commanders in the field."(75) As a result, "hardly a single suburban postal and telegraph office has been spared in civilian areas in and around Baghdad. Similarly, as the Pentagon views Saddam Hussein's Iraq, the Ministry of Local Government is a 'valid military target' because it controls police forces in the countryside."(76)

AIR DEFENSE CONTROL CENTERS

Sources agree that Iraqi air defenses divided into four sectors, each of which were controlled from a central facility, although Mosul is the only location generally agreed to.

Baghdad - Main sector operations control center.(77)

Kirkuk - an Air Force Main Operating Base.(78)

Kut Al Hayy - a reserve dispersal airfield.(79)

Mosul - Main sector operations control center at an Air Force Main Operating Base.(80)

Nasiriya - Main sector operations control center.(81)

Rashid - an Air Force Main Operating Base.(82)

Rutba - Main sector operations control center.(83)

ARMY HEADQUARTERS

Al-Amarah - Headquarters for II Corps.(84)

As Sulaymaniyah - Headquarters for I Corps.

Baghdad(85)

Habaniya - Headquarters for II Guard Corps.

Irbil - 5th Army Corp headquarters.(86)

Kirkuk - 1st Army Corp headquarters.(87)

Mosul - Headquarters for VII Corps.

Samarra - Headquarters for X Reserve Corps.(88)

Shatt-al-Arab(89)

Tikrit - barracks for Army division(90)

Terrorist Training Camps

At least four terrorist training camps in Iraq.(91)

Western Iraq, near Jordan - a camp for training Abu Nidal Organization members in weapons and explosives.

Near Baghdad - a camp for training members of the Arab Organization May 15, headed by noted bomb-maker Abu Ibrahim.

Near Baghdad - another training camp of undetermined affiliation.

(Undetermined Location in Iraq) - a training camp for Palestine Liberation Organization.

Figure 44 - Other Iraqi Facilities

Figure 45 - Iraqi Bridges

Bridges

"It took allied bombers more than three weeks to knock out just 17 major bridges, particularly because in the first week relatively few smart munitions were diverted from strategic targets. Many Navy 'dumb' bombs dropped by F/A-18 and A-6 bombers flying from the Persian Gulf to the Basra area missed their targets... and as a result supplies continued to pour into Kuwait until early" in February.(92) In early February, Maj. Gen. Robert Johnson noted that "our interdiction effort to try and isolate the KTO (Kuwait Theater of Operations) continues. We are attacking, consistently, some 42 major bridges that lead into the KTO. The last 24 hours we attacked nine. Of some interest is the fact that we periodically retarget bridges. In some cases where pontoons have been put in place to substitute for a river bridge, and in a couple of occasions either we have destroyed two spans of a double span bridge, we've seen efforts by the Iraqis to put a ramp across between the two and still find the bridge usable."(93)

And by mid-February, it was reported that "more than 27 of 31 main bridges on the principal supply road from Baghdad to Kuwait have been knocked out, reducing by more than 90 percent Iraq's ability to replenish its 545,000 forces in Kuwait and southern Iraq."(94) "One by one, the bridges of Baghdad fell this week, sliced by missile and laser-guided bombs... In all, there are 10 main bridges across the half-mile-wide Tigris in an around Baghdad, all built of reinforced concrete and capable of supporting tanks, artillery and other heavy military traffic -- as well as an endless stream of civilian traffic. To the south, there is just one more major bridge connecting Iraq's only two roadways between Baghdad and the strategic city of Basra... That bridge, located near the Iraqi town of Shanawa, 50 miles north of Basra, was destroyed nearly three weeks ago..."(95)

According to Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Tony McPeak, "we tracked 54 major bridges... Once we had destroyed the major bridges, the Iraqis threw across pontoon bridges, and we went after them also.... We had about 40 out of the 50-odd that we were tracking that were in the water at the end of the time. They didn't get them all. It only lasted 33 days, and we really didn't start on bridges until about day seven to ten."(96)

As a result of these attacks on Main Supply Routes, Brig. Gen. Richard Neal stated that "one of the things we have noticed is that the convoys have been broken up and we now see probably vehicles in groups of tens of twenties where in fact we used to see hundreds of vehicles, and in some cases we've seen thousands of vehicles. Those trends, obviously, have changed as a direct result of two things -- our bombing campaign against the bridges and roads and railways, and then, of course, our interdiction campaign against those convoys themselves."(97)

The difficulty in attacking these targets, as well as the need for continued intelligence coverage, was suggested in mid-February by Gen. Kelly, who recalled that "we said in the past that linear things are difficult to interdict, so if you cut a road or a railroad or a pipeline or things of that nature, they can be repaired relatively easily.... Whereas, if you can take out a bridge, you have created a much more serious interdiction problem. The theater of operations are dominated by the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers. Therefore, the Iraqis have to cross those rivers in order to provide war materiel to their forces at the front. What we would like to do is see those forces at the front atrophy. We would like to see them starve in terms of supplies so that their combat power is reduced, so that our relative power over them is enhanced. That's the reason that we're taking out the bridges. The railroad bridges, once you take them out, deny the enemy the opportunity to move very heavy tonnages, and on land, rail is the cheapest way to move heavy things like tanks... If you take the highway bridges out over the river, it prevents all other classes of supply, really all classes of supply from moving forward, and has the bonus effect of causing traffic backups at the bridges. When those traffic backups are military in nature, they make lucrative targets for our aircraft to attack, so in being able to do that you reduce their capability to resupply their troops. We say we feel that reduction is somewhere in the 90 percent regime..."(98)

However, the significance of these attacks on Main Supply Routes was mitigated by Iraqi supplies pre-positioned in the KTO. "'We know he has three to six months of supplies dispersed in little piles all over the place,' said one official. 'We have been watching him do that for five months. We've been getting spectacular effects in the depot,' he said of the bombings, 'but when you look at his ability to sustain his force, that's a very different measurement and it doesn't relate to the number of bombs dropped,"(99)

Munitions Plants

Al-Iskandriyah - Major artillery shell assembly plant, includes facility for filling chemical weapon artillery shells, as well as "super-gun" development site.(100)

Al-Kindi - Conventional weapons production facility.(101)

Mansur - Transistors, integrated circuits and other electronics production.(102)

Nasr - Ordnance factory at Mahawiel includes production of large free-fall aircraft bombs.(103)

Saad 16 (Al-Dour) - Defense electronics center producing communications and radar equipment since 1985.(104)

Saladin - military production complex near Tikrit.(105)

Taji - Production plant for 105mm and 203mm artillery, including those developed by Gerald Bull.(106)

Petroleum Facilities

Al Samawah - Petroleum refinery with capacity of 18,000 barrels per day.

Al Qayyarah - Petroleum refinery with capacity of 4,000 barrels per day.

Bayji - Two large petroleum refinery complexes, with capacities of 150,000 and 70,000 barrels per day. Major center for production of chemicals, including some potentially used as chemical weapon precursors, such as Phosphoric Acid.(107)

Basra (Al Basrah) - Petroleum refinery with 70,000 barrels per day capacity.(108)

Daura (Ad Dawrah) - Leading petroleum refinery with capacity of 80,000 barrels per day, which along with Baji accounts for 65% of Iraq's domestic refinery capacity.(109)

Hadithah - Petroleum refinery with capacity of 6,500 barrels per day.

Khanaqin - Petroleum refinery with capacity of 10,500 barrels per day.

Kirkuk - Petroleum refinery with capacity of 30,000 barrels per day.(110)

Mosul (Al-Mawsil) - Oil facility(111)

Muftiyah - Petroleum refinery with capacity of 4,000 barrels per day.

Musayyib (Petrochemical Complex #2) - Production of chemicals such as ethylene, potentially used as chemical weapon precursor (ethylene oxide to thiodiglycol to mustard gas),(112) or as a fuel-air explosive (FAE).(113)

Electrical Plants

One account noted that the "allies would cut off Baghdad's electricity. The military was sure to crank up emergency generators, leaving everyone else in the dark. But the idea was to make Iraqi civilians feel the seriousness of the war without making them an outright target."(114)

Az Zubayr(115)

Baghdad(116)

Basra(117)

Darbandikan(118)

Kirkuk(119)

Little Zab(120)

Nasiriyah(121)

Nejef(122)

1. Schmitt, Eric, and Gordon, Michael, "Unforeseen Problems in Air War Forced Allies to Improvise Tactics," The New York Times, 10 March 1991, page 1, 16.

2. Smith, Jeffrey, "Building Was Targeted Months Ago as Shelter for Leaders," The Washington Post, 14 February 1991, page A25, A32.

3. Fisk, Robert, "Air Officers in Dispute over Baghdad Raids," The Independent, 15 February 1991, page 1.

4. DoD News Briefing, 22 January 1991, page 8.

5. CENTCOM Briefing, 30 January 1991, page 1-3.

6. Browne, Malcolm, "Iraqi Chemical Arms: Difficult Target," The New York Times, 5 September 1990, page 15.

7. Safire, William, "Object: Survival," The New York Times, 5 November 1990.

8. Albright, David, et al, ""Iraq and the Bomb: Were They Even Close?" The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March 1991, page 16-25.

9. Roberts, Gwynne, "Satellite Reveals Uranium Mine," Jane's Defense Weekly, 3 November 1990, page 879.

10. Gertz, Bill, "Missile Strike against Iraq mulled on Hill," The Washington Times, 10 September 1990, page A6.

11. Roberts, Gwynne, "Satellite Pinpoints Nuclear Site," Jane's Defense Weekly, 9 January 1991, page 70.

12. Gertz, Bill, "Missile Strike against Iraq mulled on Hill," The Washington Times, 10 September 1990, page A6.

13. Gertz, Bill, "Missile Strike against Iraq mulled on Hill," The Washington Times, 10 September 1990, page A6.

14. Gertz, Bill, "Missile Strike against Iraq mulled on Hill," The Washington Times, 10 September 1990, page A6.

15. Gertz, Bill, "Missile Strike against Iraq mulled on Hill," The Washington Times, 10 September 1990, page A6.

16. "Iraq: Targets for U.S." The New York Times, 18 November 1990, page 1.

17. Gertz, Bill, "Missile Strike against Iraq mulled on Hill," The Washington Times, 10 September 1990, page A6.

18. Ottaway, David, "Official Denies Iraq Has Germ Warfare Plant," The Washington Post, 19 January 1989, page A36.

19. Gordon, Michael, "CIA Foresees Iraq Biological-Weapon Capability in Early '91," The New York Times, 29 September 1990.

20. Gertz, Bill, "Missile Strike against Iraq mulled on Hill," The Washington Times, 10 September 1990, page A6.

21. Browne, Malcolm, "Iraqi Chemical Arms: Difficult Target," The New York Times, 5 September 1990, page 15.

22. Scarborough, Rowan, "Shields won't Deter Attack," The Washington Times, 2 November 1990, page A11.

23. Scarborough, Rowan, "Shields won't Deter Attack," The Washington Times, 2 November 1990, page A11.

24. Church, George, "Combat in the Sand," Time, 11 February 1991, page 26.

25. CENTCOM Briefing, 8 February 1991, page 3.

26. Fulghum, David, "U.S. Lays Groundwork for Possible Offensive," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 27 August 1990, page 17.

27. Fulghum, David, "U.S. Lays Groundwork for Possible Offensive," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 27 August 1990, page 17.

28. Fulghum, David, "U.S. Lays Groundwork for Possible Offensive," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 27 August 1990, page 17.

29. Gertz, Bill, "US Detects Iraqi Missiles at Last Minute," The Washington Times, 10 December 1990, page A8.

30. Fulghum, David, "U.S. Lays Groundwork for Possible Offensive," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 27 August 1990, page 17.

31. Fulghum, David, "U.S. Lays Groundwork for Possible Offensive," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 27 August 1990, page 17.

32. Murphy, Kim, "Iraqi Missiles in Kuwait Raise Chemical Fears," Los Angeles Times, 22 August 1990, page 1.

33. Fulghum, David, "U.S. Lays Groundwork for Possible Offensive," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 27 August 1990, page 17.

34. Fulghum, David, "U.S. Lays Groundwork for Possible Offensive," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 27 August 1990, page 17.

35. Eisenstadt, Mike, The Sword of the Arabs: Iraq's Strategic Weapons, (Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Paper #21, 1990) page 22.

36. Eisenstadt, Mike, The Sword of the Arabs: Iraq's Strategic Weapons, (Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Paper #21, 1990) page 22.

37. Eisenstadt, Mike, The Sword of the Arabs: Iraq's Strategic Weapons, (Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Paper #21, 1990) page 22.

38. George, Alan, "Western Computers aid Iraqi missiles," Flight International, 18-25 September 1990, page 7.

39. Eisenstadt, Mike, The Sword of the Arabs: Iraq's Strategic Weapons, (Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Paper #21, 1990) page 22.

40. Pasztor, Andy, "Iraqi Air Arm Seen Surviving Initial Attacks," The Wall Street Journal, 15 January 1991, page A3.

41. "Apaches Cleared Storm Path," Jane's Defense Weekly, 2 March 1991, page 286.

42. Metz, Helen, (editor), Iraq: A Country Study, (Library of Congress Federal Research Division, US Government Printing Office, Washington DC, 1990), page 219.

43. Dye, Lee, "Decade of Digging Aids Iraq," Los Angeles Times, 26 January 1991, page A1, A6.

44. DoD News Briefing, 28 January 1991, page 3.

45. DoD News Briefing, 15 March 1991, page 5.

46. Metz, Helen, (editor), Iraq: A Country Study, (Library of Congress Federal Research Division, US Government Printing Office, Washington DC, 1990), page 219.

47. Metz, Helen, (editor), Iraq: A Country Study, (Library of Congress Federal Research Division, US Government Printing Office, Washington DC, 1990), page 219.

48. Metz, Helen, (editor), Iraq: A Country Study, (Library of Congress Federal Research Division, US Government Printing Office, Washington DC, 1990), page 219.

49. Metz, Helen, (editor), Iraq: A Country Study, (Library of Congress Federal Research Division, US Government Printing Office, Washington DC, 1990), page 219.

50. Metz, Helen, (editor), Iraq: A Country Study, (Library of Congress Federal Research Division, US Government Printing Office, Washington DC, 1990), page 219.

51. Metz, Helen, (editor), Iraq: A Country Study, (Library of Congress Federal Research Division, US Government Printing Office, Washington DC, 1990), page 219.

52. "Iraq: Targets for U.S." The New York Times, 18 November 1990, page 1.

53. "Iraq: Targets for U.S." The New York Times, 18 November 1990, page 1.

54. "Iraq: Targets for U.S." The New York Times, 18 November 1990, page 1.

55. "Iraq: Targets for U.S." The New York Times, 18 November 1990, page 1.

56. U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, "Iraq" (map 79-692209), 1979.

57. "Iraq: Targets for U.S." The New York Times, 18 November 1990, page 1.

58. U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, "Iraq" (map 79-692209), 1979.

59. U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, "Iraq" (map 79-692209), 1979.

60. "Iraq: Targets for U.S." The New York Times, 18 November 1990, page 1.

61. Scarborough, Rowan, "Shields won't Deter Attack," The Washington Times, 2 November 1990, page A11.

62. "Iraq: Targets for U.S." The New York Times, 18 November 1990, page 1.

63. "Iraq: Targets for U.S." The New York Times, 18 November 1990, page 1.

64. "Iraq: Targets for U.S." The New York Times, 18 November 1990, page 1.

65. "Iraq: Targets for U.S." The New York Times, 18 November 1990, page 1.

66. "Iraq: Targets for U.S." The New York Times, 18 November 1990, page 1.

67. "Iraq: Targets for U.S." The New York Times, 18 November 1990, page 1.

68. U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, "Iraq" (map 79-692209), 1979.

69. U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, "Iraq" (map 79-692209), 1979.

70. Frankel, Glenn, "Iraqi Rebels Say Air Raids Hit Iraqi Industry Hard," The Washington Post, 22 January 1991, page A17.

71. Scarborough, Rowan, "Iraq Builds its Defenses, Makes More Poison Gas," The Washington Times, 3 December 1990, page A4.

72. "The Right Stuff," US News & World Report, 4 February 1991, page 24-30.

73. Sciolino, Elaine, "Is It the Luxury Hotel's Basement, Or an Iraqi Military Nerve Center?" The New York Times, 15 February 1991, page A13.

74. Schmitt, Eric, "Iraq Said to Hide Key War Center In a Baghdad Hotel for Foreigners," The New York Times, 14 February 1991, page 1.

75. CENTCOM Briefing, 14 February 1991, page 5.

76. Healy, Mellisa, "US Forced to Defend Its Basic Targeting Goals," The Los Angeles Times, 14 February 1991, page 1.

77. Gaines, Mike, "Paper Tigers," Flight International, 9 January 1991, page 20-22.

78. Barry, John, "A Second Look at an Air War," Newsweek, 7 January 1991, page 18.

79. Barry, John, "A Second Look at an Air War," Newsweek, 7 January 1991, page 18.

80. Barry, John, "A Second Look at an Air War," Newsweek, 7 January 1991, page 18.

81. Gaines, Mike, "Paper Tigers," Flight International, 9 January 1991, page 20-22.

82. Barry, John, "A Second Look at an Air War," Newsweek, 7 January 1991, page 18.

83. Gaines, Mike, "Paper Tigers," Flight International, 9 January 1991, page 20-22.

84. Scarborough, Rowan, "Shields won't Deter Attack," The Washington Times, 2 November 1990, page A11.

85. Scarborough, Rowan, "Shields won't Deter Attack," The Washington Times, 2 November 1990, page A11.

86. Frankel, Glenn, "Iraqi Rebels Say Air Raids Hit Iraqi Industry Hard," The Washington Post, 22 January 1991, page A17.

87. Frankel, Glenn, "Iraqi Rebels Say Air Raids Hit Iraqi Industry Hard," The Washington Post, 22 January 1991, page A17.

88. Scarborough, Rowan, "Shields won't Deter Attack," The Washington Times, 2 November 1990, page A11.

89. Scarborough, Rowan, "Shields won't Deter Attack," The Washington Times, 2 November 1990, page A11.

90. Sciolino, Elaine, "Iraq Says US Hits Hussein's Home Town," The New York Times, 6 February 1991, page A8.

91. Gertz, Bill, "Terrorist Camps Deserted in Iraq," The Washington Times, 4 February 1991, page A9.

92. Atkinson, Rick, "Iraqis Called Vulnerable to Land Attack," The Washington Post, 15 February 1991, page 1.

93. CENTCOM Briefing, 8 February 1991, page 3.

94. Schmitt, Eric, "Iraq Said to Hide Key War Center In a Baghdad Hotel for Foreigners," The New York Times, 14 February 1991, page 1.

95. Healy, Mellisa, "US Forced to Defend Its Basic Targeting Goals," The Los Angeles Times, 14 February 1991, page 1.

96. DoD News Briefing, 15 March 1991, page 5.

97. CENTCOM Briefing, 10 February 1991, page 3.

98. DoD News Briefing, 12 February 1991, page 3-4.

99. Gordon, Michael, "Iraqi Republican Guard Units Are Described as Substantially Intact," The New York Times, 6 February 1991, page A1, A8.

100. Gertz, Bill, "Missile Strike against Iraq mulled on Hill," The Washington Times, 10 September 1990, page A6.

101. "Iraq: Targets for U.S." The New York Times, 18 November 1990, page 1.

102. Gertz, Bill, "Missile Strike against Iraq mulled on Hill," The Washington Times, 10 September 1990, page A6.

103. Eisenstadt, Mike, The Sword of the Arabs: Iraq's Strategic Weapons, (Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Paper #21, 1990) page 25.

104. Gertz, Bill, "Missile Strike against Iraq mulled on Hill," The Washington Times, 10 September 1990, page A6.

105. Frankel, Glenn, "Iraqi Rebels Say Air Raids Hit Iraqi Industry Hard," The Washington Post, 22 January 1991, page A17.

106. Gertz, Bill, "Missile Strike against Iraq mulled on Hill," The Washington Times, 10 September 1990, page A6.

107. Gertz, Bill, "Missile Strike against Iraq mulled on Hill," The Washington Times, 10 September 1990, page A6.

108. "Iraq: Targets for U.S." The New York Times, 18 November 1990, page 1.

109. Eisenstadt, Mike, The Sword of the Arabs: Iraq's Strategic Weapons, (Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Paper #21, 1990) page 56.

110. Scarborough, Rowan, "Shields won't Deter Attack," The Washington Times, 2 November 1990, page A11.

111. Scarborough, Rowan, "Shields won't Deter Attack," The Washington Times, 2 November 1990, page A11.

112. Gertz, Bill, "Missile Strike against Iraq mulled on Hill," The Washington Times, 10 September 1990, page A6.

113. "U.S. Says Iraq has devastating fuel-air explosive," Baltimore Sun, 5 October 1990, page 1.

114. Mathews, Tom, et al,"The Secret History of the War," Newsweek, 18 March 1991, page 28-39

115. Metz, Helen, (editor), Iraq: A Country Study, (Library of Congress Federal Research Division, US Government Printing Office, Washington DC, 1990), page 151.

116. Metz, Helen, (editor), Iraq: A Country Study, (Library of Congress Federal Research Division, US Government Printing Office, Washington DC, 1990), page 151.

117. Metz, Helen, (editor), Iraq: A Country Study, (Library of Congress Federal Research Division, US Government Printing Office, Washington DC, 1990), page 151.

118. Scarborough, Rowan, "Shields won't Deter Attack," The Washington Times, 2 November 1990, page A11.

119. Metz, Helen, (editor), Iraq: A Country Study, (Library of Congress Federal Research Division, US Government Printing Office, Washington DC, 1990), page 151.

120. Metz, Helen, (editor), Iraq: A Country Study, (Library of Congress Federal Research Division, US Government Printing Office, Washington DC, 1990), page 151.

121. Scarborough, Rowan, "Shields won't Deter Attack," The Washington Times, 2 November 1990, page A11.

122. Scarborough, Rowan, "Shields won't Deter Attack," The Washington Times, 2 November 1990, page A11.


FAS | Space | Military | Doc/Ops | Ops | Desert Star |||| Index | Search | Join


http://www.fas.org/spp/military/docops/operate/ds/appendix.htm
Implemented by Sara D. Berman
Maintained by Robert Sherman
Originally created by John Pike
Updated Monday, April 07, 1997