INTRODUCTION
A - Overview
From the perspective of the 21st Century, how will the Gulf War be regarded? The use of
military space systems in this conflict may be seen as marking a major watershed in the
history of military technology and military tactics, ranking with the introduction of effective
armored tactics in World War II, the machine gun at the beginning of the century. And perhaps
in time it will rank with the introduction of gunpowder, the long-bow, chariots, and bronze
swords several millennia ago.
These judgments must await the verdict of history. Since the war has only been over for a few
weeks, it is premature to draw hard and fast lessons learned about the contribution of military
space systems to terrestrial operations in the theater.
A more fundamental problem in making this assessment is that it is much easier to identify
the technological inputs of military space systems in the Gulf Conflict, than it is to identify
the military outputs as a result of the application of these systems. It simple to point to the
number of reconnaissance satellites that were in orbit, the number of Global Positioning
System navigation receivers that were in use, or the variety of weather satellites and the
number of ground terminals that were receiving those weather satellite photos. Unfortunately
it is more difficult to say precisely what operational military difference was made by the input
of those capabilities, particularly given the fact that in most cases there were other non-space
systems that were also providing similar or complimentary types of inputs.
There was certainly an unprecedented range of military space systems in play in the Gulf
Conflict and an unprecedented number of ground receivers for the product from these
satellites. In addition, there were many unique opportunities for using these systems in the
Gulf; many more requirements for using these systems would have obtained in other theaters
or other conflicts. All of these factors have served to accentuate the extent to which the Gulf
Conflict may be regarded as the first space war. Certainly these factors support the proposition
that the main lessons learned from the Gulf War should be in the field of military space.
There are several questions that are posed in trying to draw lessons learned out of the Gulf
War for applications of military space systems to terrestrial conflicts.
First, what sort of military space systems were involved in the Gulf War?
Second, what ground control systems were used with these satellite systems?
Third, what range of ground segment equipment was available to support the
users of these systems?
Fourth, what specific applications of military space systems are can be
identified?
Fifth, what limitations, problems, drawbacks or difficulties were identified in the
application of these systems?
Sixth, what other non-space systems (terrestrial and airborne) were available
for use in this conflict and what was the synergy or complimentarily between
terrestrial or airborne systems on the one hand and space systems on the other
hand?
Seventh, what sort of systems, either space, airborne or ground-based provided
similar capabilities for the Iraqis.
And finally, what is the net assessment of what sort of contribution do these
military space systems made?
Preparations - Air Land Battle
The United States military did not approach the use of space systems in the Gulf War
unprepared. The American concept of operations in Desert Storm was derived from the Air/Land
Battle doctrine that had evolved during the 1980s in the context of the NATO theater. And
Air/Land Battle presumed significant space support. "Our current capabilities impinge upon our
ability to accomplish the difficult tasks of Airland Battle. Principle deficiencies identified are
response times, surveillance, target acquisition, and C3. These deficiencies can be significantly
reduced by space systems and related technologies. For example:....Space-based surveillance
and target acquisition systems also can provide real-time information on enemy forces. This
allows the commander to direct attacks and to coordinate fire power to gain and maintain the
momentum required to defeat the enemy....All of these systems are feasible within a ten year
time frame to support the Airland Battle Doctrine. For the future battlefield, space will be
another medium fully exploited to support ground operations and could well support the
strategic deployment of heavy and light forces without increasing force size. Force enhancing
capabilities of communications, reconnaissance, all-weather surveillance, navigation and target
acquisition systems will be integrated through a battle management computer to provide
coordinated attacks on any terrestrial target. Such a vision is, of course dependent on several
achievements -an expanded military satellite communications architecture, an expanded
reconnaissance and surveillance system and a battle management system which operates in
real time. The Army is committed to working these issues and will be doing then in
conjunction with our sister services."(1)
Operation Just Cause - Panama December 1989
The uses of military space systems Operation Desert Storm were also fore-shadowed by
Operation Just Cause in Panama in late December 1989. "A remote sensing satellite provided
US commanders with the big picture. GPS satellites made it possible, among other things, for
air-crews to zero in on air-evacuation points and airdrop and pickup zones. Soldiers toted GPS
terminals in backpacks. Navigation satellites and a weather satellite made it possible to provide
crews of all aircraft -- tankers, airlifters, gunships, fighters and reconnaissance, electronic
warfare and command and control platforms -- with optimum flight paths. Some air routes
were reordered as a result. One hilltop airstrip was shunned after icing conditions showed up
in images sent to Earth by a weather satellite on the watch for temperature gradations among
other things."(2) According to Col. Jackson Moss, Army XVIII Airborne Corps Deputy Chief of Staff,
UHF satellites linked commanders in theater with headquarters in the United States. To
maintain these links, the Joint Chiefs of Staff gave Just Cause forces first call on the UHF
satellites "for a number of hours. All these folks were talking to each other at the same time
on the same channels. Everyone who needed to communicate in that crucial 36 to 48 hours
had absolute top-quality communications."(3) Deployed forces "used a full 60 percent of total
Defense Department UHF satellite channels during the course of the Panamanian operation...
Part of the reason so much ultra high frequency was used is that it allowed the troops to talk
to other troops quickly by using their own man-portable satellite communications dishes...
messages sent through the larger, super-high frequency dishes were slower, because they had
to pass through central exchanges."(4) SHF terminals were introduced into Panama several days
after the initial intervention.
B - Space Segment
The question is what sort of space systems were available to support the Gulf Conflict raises
a very interesting question of timing. If the war had taken place even three years ago, it is
unlikely that the contribution of military space systems would have been nearly so great. As
it was, the United States entered the conflict with an unprecedented array of operational space
systems in orbit. But press reports notwithstanding, none of the American launches during
Desert Shield and Desert Storm were in response to the crisis.(5) All of these flights had been
planned long in advance of the Iraqi invasion.
The imaging intelligence order of battle in space included an absolutely unprecedented number
of satellites, with one Lacrosse imaging radar satellite, and three of the older KH-11 Kennan digital
imaging satellites. This total of four imaging satellites is the largest number of imaging
satellites that the United States has ever had in space at one time, in
Figure 1 - Iraq
stark contrast with the single KH-11 in orbit as recently as five years ago, shortly after the
Challenger accident. During the late 1970's and early 1980's American imaging intelligence
would normally have consisted of two KH-11's in orbit all of the time, with single KH-9
Hexagon in orbit providing film return about six months out of the year.
In addition, the capabilities of each of these satellites were far greater than previous satellites.
The Lacrosse for the first time provided an all weather capability. This meant an average of a dozen useable passes over the theater of operations a day at average intervals of about two hours. In some cases there would be two satellites in the sky simultaneously, and at no point would there be more five hours without having a satellite over the theater of operations. With each of these satellites producing images at the rate of one every five seconds, there were literally hundreds of pictures a day of the theater of operations.
In addition the United States had very robust electronic and signals intelligence order of battle.
At least one geostationary Magnum signals intelligence satellite was available for intercepting
low strength broadcasts. Altogether there were perhaps 15 or 20 signals intelligence satellites that were also in
operation.
There were at least two Defense Meteorological Support Program weather satellites in operation
at the outset of Desert Shield, with a third launched in early January. There were somewhere
between 15 to 16 the Navstar global positioning system satellites in operation during the latter
stages of the conflict, as well as at least a pair of FLTSATCOM and at least a pair of DSCS III
communication satellites available for communication support in the theater. And the US
Military used images acquired from SPOT and LANDSAT for updating mapping products for the
forces in the theater.
Overall, the satellites were of higher quality and more numerous than has been the case at any
time in the past and more numerous and more capable than would have been the case even
five years ago.
C - Control Segment
With the possible exception of the Magnum geosynchronous signals intelligence satellite, all of
these satellites continued to support other military users around the world, in addition to the
forces deployed in South-West Asia. Thus the KH-11 that photographed Iraqi tanks in Kuwait
at 10 in the morning would be taking pictures of Soviet tanks in Moscow a few minutes later.
So it is not surprising that control of military space systems remained in the hands of
centralized facilities. Unity of command has long been a central tenet of air power doctrine,
and great significance has been attached to the fact the during Desert Storm the air forces
of eleven countries operated from a single Air Tasking Order (in contrast to the separate
operational planning of each of the services during the Vietnam War). Unity of command was
also a distinguishing element of space operations, given the unavoidably global coverage of
military space systems.
D - User Segment
The most visible attribute of the use of military space systems in the Gulf War was the
proliferation of user equipment to lower echelon forces. In the case of the Army the DSCS
(Defense Satellite Communications System) Ground Mobile Forces communication antennas are
used down to the brigade level for connectivity. Below that the MSE is used as a complimentary
communications capability of brigade and Division, and then SINCGARS and other radios for
below brigade. Both the Army and Marine Corps provide UHF voice connectivity using manpack
terminals much lower in the chain of command. But it remains unclear exactly how deep into
the American order of battle the satellite communications systems went. since a number of
the satellite terminals were commercial INMARSAT skyphones. It's not clear whether every
colonel was given one, and if not, what the basis was for distribution.
Prior to the 1980s, about the only place that could analyze overhead imagery as it came down
from the satellite would be the National Photographic Interpretation Center at the Navy Yard.
But over the last decade or so the TENCAP (Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities
Program) has greatly extended the dissemination of this product. Thus during the seven
months of the Gulf Crisis most of the Tactical Fighter Wings in the theater had a Constant
Source terminal to access the overhead product as soon as it was available. The Army Corps
commanders had terminals that were receiving imagery, Marine Corps commanders on a similar
echelon would also be looking at these pictures, and each of the aircraft carriers had FIST
(Fleet Imagery Support Terminal) that was used to look at pictures.
It remains unclear exactly what the architecture is for getting these picture from the satellite
to the Tactical Fighter Wing or the aircraft carrier. There is some suggestion that there's a
Direct Broadcast Antenna on the satellite that takes the pictures straight down to field
terminals. Others suggest that the picture goes from the photo satellite up to a Satellite Data
Systems satellite, down to a ground station, back up to a communication satellite, back down
to Ft. Belvoir in Virginia, over to NPIC for processing and tagging, then back up to a
communication satellite and back down to the theater. Even though that is an large number
nodes, the picture is going at the speed of light. So, even if it is transmitted six different
times, this is still a near real time capability where the person in the theater can be looking
at the picture within sort of high seconds to low minute after the time that the picture has
been taken.
It is clear, for instance, that pilots who were doing bombing runs over Iraq were looking at
pictures that had been taken minutes to hours before their mission, showing things such as
which end of the runway the antiaircraft was on, which end of the hanger had a bomb in it.
Based on the time lines on how quickly these pictures can get back to an aircraft carrier
versus how long it would take to fly back to the aircraft carrier, there could be cases where
the picture during the damage assessment was on the aircraft carrier before the pilots who
dropped the bombs got back to the aircraft carrier.
A second interesting feature of user segment is the widespread utilization of commercial
standard equipment. While the timing of the Gulf War was fortuitous in terms of the upgrades
in space segment, unfortunately the same cannot be said of the ground segment that was
utilizing these systems. In many cases the availability of ground segment has significantly
lagged behind the space segment expansion. The result was a surprisingly extensive reliance
on commercially developed and procured systems. Fortunately the US was able to very quickly
to go to outside commercial vendors and using civilian standard equipment make up for many
of these deficits.
For the Navstar Global Positioning System the overwhelming majority of receiver sets that were
being used in the theater were purchased from commercial vendors, and were operating
according to commercial standards after August 2nd. The introduction of the military standard
16 meter spherical error probable receiver sets has fallen behind the original schedule by
several years. So at the beginning of August, there were fewer than 2000 of these military
standard receivers available throughout the military. These were augmented by somewhere
between 3000 and 5000 single channel commercial receivers by early January. So the
overwhelming bulk of receivers, particularly the receivers that were being used by ground
forces were commercial receivers that were acquired after August 2nd. And complete list of
satellite terminals that were being used by ground forces, particularly by the Army, would
probably show that the bulk of those terminals would also not military standard terminals, but
rather $50,000 sky phones that use Inmarsat to talk to other users in the theater.
Similarly, much of the mapping data that was satellite imagery was derived from Landsat and
Spot, commercial companies, rather than from military mapping satellites. And in the case
of weather satellite support, there were two or three of the DMSP military weather satellites,
but much of the ground segment was commercially procured, rather than developed by the
military. And American forces were also relying on the two NOAA polar orbiting satellites as well
as the European civilian METEOSAT satellite for additional weather information.
E - Operational Applications
Military space systems were involved in every major aspect of the war with Iraq. Thus for
example, virtually every component of the effort to deal with Iraqis Scud missile attacks,
involved use of one or more satellite systems. Imaging intelligence satellites were looking for
the transporter erector launchers before the missiles were launched, and Defense Support
Program early warning satellites were used to detect the missile plumes after they had been
launched. All of this information was relayed back to processing centers in the United States
using military communication satellites. The information was then relayed back to the theater
using military communication satellites. Weather satellites were used to try to determine in
advance when the Iraqis might be trying to take advantage of cloud cover to come out of
hiding and launch using mobile launchers. Signals intelligence satellites were used to pick up
on the meteorological radars the Iraqis were using to get weather information prior to their
launch.
An indicator of the use of imaging intelligence satellites is the number of separate, discrete
references in daily newspapers, trade press, and other publications to specific things that
photographic reconnaissance satellites have done -- specific targets that were photographed
with a specific piece of information resulting. There were more public references to such
incidents of using photo reconnaissance satellites in the seven months of the Gulf War than
in the previous 30 years. Several time each week some newspaper or trade press reporter
would report a new piece of information about the deployment of Iraqis forces, damage being
done to Iraqi military forces, or some similarly specific piece of information, that was linked
to the fact that photographic satellites had reported the information. Whereas, prior to the
Gulf War there would be press mentions of this sort at intervals of perhaps every month or six
weeks.
Clearly, one of the reasons for reliance on satellite connectivity was the absence of existing
infrastructure in the theater. In the case of forces that were already positioned in the NATO
theater or in Japan or Korean, there is a tremendous pre-existing land-line infrastructure
that can handle much of the day to day communication requirements. While there was some
reliance on the Saudi land-line infrastructure, one of the reasons the satellite communications
were so important in the Gulf War was that it was a "come as you are party." Forces that
didn't bring their own communications gear just weren't communicating. Satellite systems
proved the fastest means of established connectivity in the theater, although these links were
subsequently augmented by terrestrial links.
Another factor enhancing the utility of space systems was the fact that Saudi Arabia is a very
flat piece of terrain. As a result there was a tremendous problem with interference between
high frequency radio communications systems, and a lot of cross-talk and interference with
terrestrial systems. In order to avoid those types of self-jamming problems, there was a
greater reliance on satellites than might have otherwise expected.
F - Operational Limitations
Despite the generally positive contributions of satellites to terrestrial operations, military space
systems demonstrated a variety of failings and shortcomings during the war.
Clearly the photographic reconnaissance satellite systems were impeded by cloud cover. This
was a major problems in the first week of the air campaign, which began with several days of
rainy and cloudy weather which made it difficult to go after mobile scud launchers, and which
also made it extremely difficult to do bomb damage assessment. Cloud cover made the
difference between having a total of seven useable imaging satellites providing new pictures on
average of every two hours, and having to rely on a single imaging intelligence satellite, the
Lacrosse, which was providing new pictures every 12 hours. And the Lacrosse has a significantly
lower resolution than the optical satellites. Thus holes caused by bombs going through the roof
of bunker that would be immediately apparent to a 10 centimeter resolution photo satellite
would be totally invisible to the radar satellite with pictures of a resolution of about a meter
or so. Additionally, there would be some indicators for damage assessment such as burns and
scorch marks that would be immediately apparent in a photo satellite image that simply
wouldn't show up on the pictures from a radar satellite. Nonetheless, the fact that the radar
satellite was able to penetrate this cloud cover is something that's going to be getting a lot
of attention in determining the mix of radar satellites and photo satellites needed in orbit.
There are also some questions about the performance of the Defense Support Program early
warning satellites. There were initially concerns expressed on 2 December, when the Iraqis
launched several Scud missiles that the DSP alerting system did not provide adequate warning.
And it is also very unclear exactly what went wrong with the DSP and Patriot connection when
the system failed to intercept the Scud missile that hit the American barracks in Saudi Arabia.
Although navigation satellite systems generally worked well, and the combination of navigation
satellites and night vision goggles provided an unprecedented capability to operated under
cover of darkness. But anecdotal accounts suggest that even with these advanced technology
capabilities, forces continued to occasionally become disoriented in the dark, unable to make
the pre-planned rendezvous.
Previous comments notwithstanding, a lot of the communication satellite capability did not go
very far down into the chain of command. Although satellites might provide connectivity with
say the division artillery support elements and some independent armored regiments, for the
most part satellite communications did not go significantly below brigade. Thus for many
commanders who would have been interested in having satellite connectivity, it simply wasn't
available.
It is quite unclear what the quality of information from weather satellites was, or at least how
useful that information was. A number of instances can be identified in which weather
conditions significantly impeded operations. The planned Marine amphibious landing Eminent
Thunder back in early November continued for a week before it was cancelled. The landing was
postponed on two occasions and finally abandoned when the air cushion vehicle landing vehicles
across the shore had high winds coming off the shore that were kicking up a fairly choppy sea
off shore. It is still unclear why with all of the weather satellite information available why the
weather people were not able to predict this in advance or to tell commanders that the
conditions were going to persist for a while.
In addition, more recently it was at least reported that one of the conditions that was
established for initiating full scale ground operations was at least three days of clement
weather so that forces wouldn't get bogged down in mud. But, in point of fact, after the
commencement of ground operations, within two days there were significant rainfalls in some
areas of operations and as a result the advance of some units were slowed down by as much
as a day. It's unclear whether this was a shortcoming in weather forecasting capability or
whether this was simply one criteria for initiating the ground operation that they decided to
wave in this case.
Of course, consumer expectations notwithstanding, meteorological satellites are useful for
predicting the weather, rather than controlling it. But in contrast to the number of instances
where bad weather that should have been foreseeable interfered with planned operations, there
are no accounts of episodes in which meteorological satellite data enhanced specific operations.
G - Alternative Systems
It is also important to recognize that in addition to all of the satellite systems, there were a
number of airborne and terrestrial systems that were providing similar or complimentary
capabilities. Indeed, perhaps the most significant problem in analyzing the relationship between
technological inputs and military outputs is the duplication of space and non-space
capabilities. There is an image of the war being entirely satellite driven, with all of 500,000
troops in the theater walking around with wrist radios connected to satellites in the sky, and
the entire operation being driven by satellites. Even though it would be fun to think that was
what was going on, in reality most of the soldiers in the theater were conducting operations
the old fashioned way.
Certainly some space systems, notable navigation and weather, provided services that were not
readily duplicated. Although even here, most aircraft used traditional inertial navigation
systems, in the absence of installed Navstar receivers.
But it is particularly difficult to assess the relative value of the intelligence collection
contributions that were provided by the aircraft platforms that were in the theater from those
of satellites. Imaging intelligence capabilities from satellites were supplemented by both the
J-Stars surveillance aircraft as well as the TR-1 high altitude, high resolution radar capability
provided by the A-Stars and UPD-X radars carried on those aircraft.
It is interesting to compare and contrast the capabilities of the satellite systems with those
of JSTARS and the TR-1. The TR-1, assuming that it would be standing back about 75
kilometers from the Saudi border, would be able to see about 150 kilometers deep into Iraq.
That would give coverage of the southern two-thirds of the western mobile Scud deployment
area, but not of the northern one-third of that area up around Syria. This underscores the
reason that the United States requested access Syrian air space to fly TR-1's to get complete
coverage of the Scud deployment area. Similarly, with TR-1 coverage in the east down around
Basra there are also portions of areas where the scuds were being deployed on mobile
launchers that were simply out of range of the TR-1 systems.
It is also interesting to note the two different maps that the defense department as published
of the Scud deployment areas. There was the initial map that was published a few days after
the air campaign began which showed sort of two kidney shaped deployment areas, one in the
west and one in the south. There was another map that was published approximately a week
later that showed that the scud deployment areas had expanded to fill sort of the western
third and the southern third of the country. In both cases it was clear that they were
beginning to find scuds being fired from areas that were well beyond the range of surveillance
from TR-1.
Even though JSTARS was successfully deployed to the theater, it was reported that the Air Force
only managed to get 44 sorties out of the two airplanes over a period of 41 days. So this
clearly did not have the sort of continuous around the clock synoptic
Figure 2 - Scud Deployment Areas
Figure 3 - Kuwait
Figure 4 - Iraqi Forces in Kuwait
Figure 5 - JSTARS Coverage of Kuwait
surveillance of the Kuwait theater of operations that would be desired from that aircraft. On
the other hand, there is a very pattern of coverage of the JSTARS Moving Target Indicator
radar. With a standoff back about 75 kilometers from the border, the radar permits
observation of an area something in excess of 150 kilometers deep into Kuwait and Iraq.
Placing this template coverage map over the Kuwait theater of operations it becomes clear that
a single JSTARS standing back 75 kilometers from the border was able to complete survey the
entire battle space on a continuous basis and see everything from where XVII corps and VII
corps were moving in from the west, all the way over to Basra and up to the Euphrates river
where the Republican Guard was operating. During the period of the ground operations, literally
the entire battle field was under continuous surveillance and essentially every vehicle that was
moving anywhere in the entire battle space was going to be under continuous observation by
JSTARS.
That is not the sort of capability that can be provided by the imaging intelligence satellites.
Quite to the contrary, it has been said quite aptly that these satellites are like looking at the
world through a soda straw. Depending on whether the satellite is flying directly overhead or
looking 1000 kilometers off to the east or west, normally the images from the satellites are
only going to be on the order of 5 or 10 kilometers on a side. With the 30,000 plus square
kilometers of just Kuwait and immediate surrounding vicinity, this requires having to take
something in the vicinity of 1000 or 1500 separate images in order to completely map the
immediate theater of operations. Even assuming good weather for that continuous period of
time, this probably requires a total of 2 to 3 days to be able to pick up the images needed to
completely map the theater of operations. Whereas JSTARS can refresh the moving target
picture of the battle field about every minute or so. Of course the problem is that the J-Stars
moving target indicator is only picking up
Figure 6 - Imaging Satellite Coverage of Kuwait
targets that are moving and is not able to do the sort of damage assessment needed to figure
out whether air strikes have hit all the tanks or bunkers that were intended.
Another problem that emerged in the bomb damage assessment was the discrepancy between
the counts of tanks, vehicles, bunkers and other targets destroyed. Those made by DIA and CIA
in Washington primarily on the basis of reconnaissance satellite imagery. The damage
assessment that was being done by CENTCOM J2 in theater was using not only the overhead
assets but was also using pilot reports. During the week or 10 days during which these
discrepancies were being ironed out there was a period in which the CENTCOM J2 numbers were
running at about twice the number of the numbers that were being assessed here in
Washington. This was in part simply because of the different accounting methodologies.
Unavoidably pilot reports are going to turn out to be a little optimistic. And it is unavoidable
that the analysis of overhead product which requires looking at a tank day after day after day
and watch it continue not moving before being able to decide that in fact it has been
successfully destroyed, is inherently a more conservative technique.
In the case of Scud missile attack warnings, the Defense Support Program early warning
satellites were supplemented by the AWACS air defense aircraft which were also being used
track the Scud missile launches. Certainly the space signals intelligence, which was being used
against the Scuds as well as against other emitting targets, was also being augmented by the
capabilities of the RC-135 RIVET JOINT aircraft as well as the U-2R and TR-1 platforms.
For the Army ground mobile forces DSCS receivers are only used down to approximately the
brigade level. For connectivity at brigade and below the Army relied on basically land based
cellular systems such as MSE and SINCGARS, and their less capable predecessors. And even in
those cases where satellites were used, other terrestrial links were generally available to
provide assured connectivity. Thus it would be very difficult to identify unique contributions
made by satellites.
H - Iraqi Capabilities
There was a fairly grotesque disparity between American intelligence collection capabilities and
those of Iraq. So certainly in terms of this major contrasting capabilities, basically the US was
looking at the chess board, clearly illuminated, whereas Iraq was sitting there with a blindfold
trying to figure out whether the game being played was chess or checkers. For imaging
intelligence the US had all of the satellites, as well as J-Stars, U-2R, TR-1, all of which were
providing us standoff imaging capability as well as RF-4C's, TARPS Pods on Navy aircraft which
were giving an in-country imaging capability. In contrast, as near as one can tell, about the
only long range reconnaissance that Saddam Hussein has was MiG-25R reconnaissance aircraft
and there doesn't seem to be any indication that these were effectively utilized.
At the same time it is important to understand that there were very different requirements.
One of the synergisms or enabling capabilities that American reconnaissance satellites provided
was the ability to do very precise targeting and to plan in advance the exact targets of
precision guided munitions. In the first evening of the air campaign the Air Force dropped a
bomb down the elevator shaft at the Air Defense headquarters. In this case, over a period of
time satellites were used to decide that was the intended target and that the elevator shaft
would be a good way to get a bomb down into the building for maximum destruction. So when
the pilot went out there he knew what the building looked like, knew that there was an
elevator shaft in the middle of it, and knew to put his laser designator over the little cab on
the elevator shaft. All of these precision bombs were greatly aided by the fact that there was
this precision intelligence collection capability to let you know exactly where the target was.
In contrast, the Iraqis could get about all the long range intelligence targeting information they
required from a good road map. The only long range attack capability that they possessed
were Scuds with a circular error probable of about a kilometer -- this was basically lobbing
them in the general direction of the right city. So the Iraqis didn't require the same type of
precise targeting capability as the United States.
Undoubtedly the Iraqis did have some of the commercial standard GPS receivers that were the
same as the US was using. Undoubtedly Iraq benefitted from the fact that the Air Force had
turned off the selective availability by not encrypting the course acquisition code on the
satellites. As a result, even with a commercial receiver would provide 20 meter accuracy, as
opposed to the 100 meter accuracy that you would normally be getting when the things are
encrypted. On the other had the US had a requirement to move lots of vehicles around at
night, to move lots of people over very long distances. The Iraqis, on the other hand, for the
most part just had to sit there in their fox holes and hope that a bomb didn't land on them
and shoot at the Americans or surrender when they show up. Certainly there is no evidence
of Iraqi use of GPS. So again, the United States had much greater capability in this area, but
this was matched by a much greater requirement.
In the case of weather, it is clear that the Iraqis were getting satellite photos off of the
American and European weather satellites, the same way that everybody else in the theater
was. There was a strong correlation between cloud cover in Western and Souther Iraq with the
launching of Scud missiles.
The final example was during the ground campaign, when the Iraqis didn't know which direction
the coalition was attacking from. If the Iraqis had either the sort of intelligence satellites that
the US had that would have given them updates sort of every couple of hours on the
disposition of our forces, or if they had a JSTARS sitting over Basra as the United States had
a JSTARS just inside Saudi air space, looking at literally the entire battle space, it would have
been abundantly clear to the Iraqis which direction the coalition was attacking from, and which
direction was simply a feint whereas. The United States could see where all the Iraqi troops
were and where all of their troops were moving, and this was clearly a major element or
component in the ability to mount the feints.
I - Net Assessment
Even accounting for those areas where the Iraqis were able to get some sort of satellite
support, or the areas where they could get sort of the same thing without using satellites, it
is clear that, even though the US did have a range of support requirements that the Iraqis
didn't have, the availability particularly of standoff targeting and intelligence collection
capability was of major significance to the outcome of the conflict.
According to Lt. Gen. Thomas Moorman, commander of Air Force Space Command, "Desert
Storm will be an extraordinary learning experience for us. We are learning things that may
never have been clear to us without this example. Not only is it a watershed, but it is a
glimpse into the future. Things may not all be like 'Desert Storm' in terms of size of the
theater or number of troops employed, but there are some basic truths that are becoming
apparent... Desert Storm is a watershed event for space. For the first time, we have space
beginning to become fully integrated into the prosecution of hostilities, to a much greater
extent than in Operation 'Just Cause' (Panama), both in terms of services as well as
understanding and dependency...."(6)
Martin Faga, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space, notes that Desert Shield provided
a "markedly increasing appreciation by the military customers for the value of space systems.
I've had the experience of a range of officials, mostly senior officers, indicating to me their
pleasure with how much support space systems were able to give them, the flexibility of the
systems, the ability to apply them to the problems quickly and effectively. That kind of
military support is reflected in the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which translates to support on the
Hill... Its more and more people who know more and more individual units who are served...
in that fairly large scale operation in an environment without a huge infrastructure like you'd
find setting up in Europe or something, more need, and the more the need's being met."(7)
1. Graves, Howard, "Army Directions in Space," EASCON 85,
October 1985, pp 346-347.
2. Canan, James, "Space Gets Down to Earth," Air Force, August
1990, page 30-34.
3. Kiernan, Vincent, "Satellites Crucial In Countering Iraq," Space
News, 13 August 1990, page 1, 20.
4. Gibson, Susan, "Tactical Transceivers: Transportable in the
Military," Satellite Communications, September 1990, page 10-11.
5. Furnis, Tim, "Satellites Launched for Desert Shield," Flight
International, 21 November 1990, page 11.
6. "The JDW Interview," Jane's Defense Weekly, 9 February 1991,
page 200.
7. Faga, Martin, (Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space),
Interview, 20 September 1990.
http://www.fas.org/spp/military/docops/operate/ds/lessons.htm
Implemented by Sara D. Berman
Maintained by Robert Sherman
Originally created by John Pike
Updated Monday, April 07, 1997