Figure 5-1. Advances in Fielded C3 Systems
The effectiveness of the spacenet 2025 system is best examined by "grading" it against measures of merit relevant to the alternate futures of 2025. The spacenet 2025 system is highly effective, according to the measures of merit. Next, the paths to achieve the key technologies of the system are outlined. These require an evolution of space systems and related technologies with some technological revolutions as springboards to evolution at the system level. The spacenet system is achievable within 30 years.
Examination of measures of merit for the spacenet 2025 system proves its military value in the alternate future worlds. Starting with the three tenets of Air and Space Superiority-awareness, reach, and power-the AFIT operational analysis team and the 2025 white paper teams derived over 100 force qualities and associated measures of merit to evaluate the 2025 white paper concepts. When the spacenet 2025 system was analyzed against all force qualities, the results showed 29 measures of merit from nine categories as valid measurements for this system
First, the ground survival category measures performance of the ground portion of the spacenet 2025 system-specifically the small, portable C3 devices used to operate the satellites.
Detection. Spacenet 2025 will use small, mobile communications devices in the field to communicate through spacenet for C2 of spacenet satellites. The mobile terminals should be as small as today's handheld cellular phones. Focused beam EHF signals minimize the probability of signal intercept. Large frequency ranges available in the EHF band allow spread spectrum communications to make signals blend in with everyday radio-frequency background noise. Packaged switched technology enables burst communications-minimizing the time of radio transmissions, reducing the probability of detection.
Countermeasures. EHF communications can use very small antennas, possibly only inches in diameter. Miniaturization of electronics should yield handheld space communication devices by 2025. These communications devices allow instant mobility, minimizing the probability that the user will be hit by an adversary if detected.
System of Systems. Spacenet accommodates many simultaneous users, giving "spatial distribution" so it is impossible to hit all system users. The war fighter in the field has multiple paths to transmit or receive information, since transceivers can be distributed anywhere in theater or the world. Loss of as many as 10 percent of the satellite C2 nodes should not impact the spacenet system since multiple nodes can be spatially distributed anywhere on the earth. Further, the small, portable communication devices are relatively inexpensive and easily replaced. If some field devices are neutralized, replacements are easily deployed.
The identify category measures spacenet's ability to accurately recognize situations of interest to the war fighters, including possible natural or man-made threats against spacenet.
Tempo. Spacenet 2025 provides global coverage for the war fighter. With "eyes and ears" and efficient data processing in space, war fighters receive critical information from spacenet on demand. Spacenet 2025 provides the earliest possible sensing, detection, and data delivery to maximize war fighters' operations tempo. Indications and warnings delivered by the spacenet system allow the war fighter to anticipate some enemy actions in advance. Further, spacenet can detect, identify and engage hostile ASAT systems before they can attack.
Traceability. Spacenet uses package-switched digital technology to transfer information between satellites and users. Package-switched technology provides an address of both the intended recipient and the original sender with each package that flows through the spacenet system. These addresses give users the ability to trace all information through the spacenet system.
Accuracy. Spacenet systems will be highly accurate. Increased multispectral sensing capabilities and onboard computing power will enable spacenet to correlate data with great certainty. This correlated data could be force enhancement data for war fighters or information about hostile threats to the spacenet system itself. Spacenet will use onboard databases and intelligent software to compare real-time data with stored threat information to maximize accuracy of processed information.
Resolution. Technological advances in multispectral sensing will improve resolution to levels not possible today. Miniaturized, distributed spacenet systems in low earth orbit can collect multiple data sets and synthetically combine them to improve resolution and fidelity. An example is multiple missile warning systems detecting an event, exchanging information through cross-links, and computing the solution for improved geolocation. These same sensor and computing advances will also provide enhanced resolution in identifying counterspace threats.
Next, the integrate category measures spacenet's ability to integrate data into a coherent picture to support the war fighter and help negate threats against the spacenet.
Battle Space View. Co-orbiting spacenet systems will provide excellent overview of any battlespace area on or near the earth. Large numbers of microsatellites in LEO can provide continuous coverage of an AOR. When proximity to the AOR is not critical, a few satellites in geosynchronous orbit can "see" the entire earth and space theater out to 22,000 miles. Spacenet is designed to be modular, and is easily expanded to cover different AORs as priorities change.
Tempo. Spacenet 2025 provides global coverage for the war fighter. With significant data processing using intelligent onboard software, spacenet will rapidly integrate data in the least possible time and transmit it to the users on demand. With unparalleled coverage of the earth from space, the spacenet system integrates and provides critical data to war fighters in advance of hostile enemy actions, maximizing the operations tempo.
Correlation. Using onboard databases and knowledge modeling, spacenet satellites and their accompanying defensive satellites will have access to historical information about missions, targets, and threats. Spacenet will make maximum use of historical data to correlate and process "raw" or real-time data and communicate the conclusions to the war fighters that need the data. The onboard computers "know" who needs particular data, and they filter information to avoid overload.
The monitor category measures the ability of the spacenet system "owners" to track and control spacenet resources.
Resources. The spacenet is a self-monitoring system. Spacenet communication nodes keep track of other nodes and terrestrial users to route communications traffic via the most efficient means, routing traffic around degraded or destroyed nodes. Further, the spacenet system can provide health and status data of any satellite in the system to the appropriate ground controllers worldwide. The spacenet system ensures the theater commander and individual ground controllers know the status of all theater space resources. The spacenet system does its own battle damage assessment. If a spacenet satellite or ground terminal is "alive," the users will know it; appropriate operators are immediately notified if an asset is "killed."
Forces. Spacenet can track satellite controllers on the ground by locating controllers when they contact the spacenet. Protocols can "poll" the spacenet to ensure that in-theater controllers "check in" at selected times. Thus, we know that they are still alive and controlling their space assets. If a controller has not checked in, a replacement controller deploys immediately.
Next, the plan category measures how spacenet prepares for upcoming situations.
Effective. The goal of spacenet is to provide timely, global, and secure communication of force enhancement data to war fighters on the earth, in the air, or in space. War fighters identify the targets and use the spacenet system to get the information needed about the targets. Spacenet system priorities will be set at the appropriate levels. Theater commanders set priorities for spacenet assets they "own" (like the tactical, disposable microsats). National authorities establish priorities between theaters for shared spacenet systems. The "internet in space" feature of the spacenet system ensures instant connectivity and maximum flexibility to change goals, targets, or priorities.
Efficient. The spacenet system is efficient in many aspects, ensuring reduced operations costs and minimum logistics support. Common spacecraft components ensure maximum connectivity at the lowest cost. People, aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles, or other satellites can use small lightweight communications devices for standardized communication with the spacenet and other systems that communicate with the spacenet. Nuclear systems, laser power beaming, or electrodynamic tether systems may provide cost-effective, efficient power for spacenet satellites. Nuclear or electric propulsion systems provide a nearly unexpendable energy source to maneuver spacenet satellites. Inexpensive, disposable microsats may provide optimum support for short, tactical missions.
The decide category measures spacenet's capability to use information to make a decision and the overall quality of the decision made.
Decision Basis. The spacenet system uses optical devices to store the information needed by onboard computer systems for decisions. Optical systems will store orders of magnitude more data than today's electronic systems, providing a solid foundation for the decision-making software. Optical storage could come in the form of holographic data storage. Knowledge for decisions could be represented in advanced formal data models such as "Z."
Quality. To avoid information overload, it is important for the spacenet to make high-quality decisions about traffic routing, data delivery to users, spacenet defense, and autonomous operations. Artificial intelligence will help ensure high-quality decisions. Genetic algorithms can adapt themselves to changing situations to improve their actions. Neural networks perform pattern-matching to choose optimal courses of action for a given situation. Highly capable computers onboard spacenet satellites enable complex calculations to ensure the highest quality decisions.
The communicate category measures spacenet's communication abilities.
Capacity. Spacenet is partly a communications system. Spacenet provides communication capacity to terrestrial, aerial, and space-based users. Those users could be people, autonomous sensors, or unmanned vehicles. System capacity depends on the communications medium in 2025, and on data compression improvements. Spacenet will transfer data at 400 gigabits per second for a single visible light laser (expected not later than 2010). If technology moves beyond visible light lasers by 2025, data transfer rates could exceed 15 terabits per second for ultraviolet lasers, or 1,000 terabits per second for soft X-ray lasers. Each of these data throughput rates may improve from 20 to 50 times, through use of advanced data compression schemes such as fractal compression.
Connectivity and Interoperability. The spacenet digital communications scheme will connect to many standard systems. Spacenet must connect to many systems since it will use both civilian and military space-based communication nodes. Spacenet also provides connectivity to users without direct spacenet transceivers through terrestrial internet compatibility.
Security. Spacenet will ensure that unauthorized users cannot tamper with its internal configuration. Improved data encryption units and authorization codes will protect vital information. This security also prevents tampering with onboard packet routing information, prioritization, and defensive tracking and targeting information. Spacenet must also protect "friendly" communications and data from unauthorized users. Small encryption units on authorized military spacenet transceivers provide this security. Cryptographic key codes will change regularly to deny enemy use of "captured" spacenet transceivers. Encryption protects satellite cross-links, uplinks, and downlinks. Laser cross-links take advantage of laser pinpoint accuracy to minimize probability of signal intercept. EHF uplinks and downlinks provide narrow footprints on the earth, making it more difficult to intercept signals. Spread-spectrum, short-burst transmissions also make spacenet uplinks and downlinks difficult for unauthorized receivers to detect and record.
Data Accuracy. The communications channel provided by spacenet should follow commercial standards for data accuracy. Advanced error correction encoding or error detection and retransmission technology ensures data accuracy.
User Friendliness and Human Interaction. The Spacenet 2025 system will use 3D computer displays to ease the human-computer interaction.
The space survival category measures spacenet's survivability in the harsh space environment.
System of Systems. Spacenet consists of many different orbiting communications, mission, and defensive satellites. The distributed design of the system ensures that the spacenet will still be able to accomplish the mission and route communications traffic to other nodes if some of the satellites fail. Ultimately, the user will nearly always get the data desired.
Countermeasures. The satellite security section defines active and passive countermeasures available in spacenet to counter threats to individual satellites and the system as a whole. The system is able to counter both natural and manmade kinetic and radiation threats.
Detectable. The satellite security section defines three possible low-detectability technologies incorporated into military spacenet satellites: energy diffusion surfaces, energy-absorbent materials, and energy-refracting or -reflecting materials. Each technology defeats a specific detection medium. To keep costs low, civilian spacenet satellites will not use low-detectable materials.
Vulnerability. Spacenet is primarily many small, distributed microsatellites, each providing an independent mission, communications, or defensive function. A weapon or a natural object impact could destroy these satellites because they are small. The relatively low cost and easy replacement of spacenet microsatellites offsets this vulnerability.
Finally, maintenance in space measures the maintenance aspects of the spacenet system.
Maintenance Footprint. Spacenet has no need for separate system maintenance in space. Spacecraft are self-maintained by well-designed systems. These systems use intelligent materials and some microminiature machines for small-scale subsystem repair. If an entire satellite fails, the spacenet system knows to bypass it until a replacement satellite arrives. When they break, the relatively inexpensive microsatellites are "thrown away" and replaced. "Unexpendable" propulsion sources minimize any refueling or space "tug" requirements. The spacenet 2025 maintenance footprint should approach zero.
Reliability. Spacenet satellites will have a high mission capability rate from simplicity and the ongoing self-maintenance scheme of each subsystem provided by microminiature machines and intelligent materials. Onboard computers and autonomy ensure maximum mission availability. Satellite designs in 2025 minimize satellite failures caused by the harsh space environment.
Security. To avoid tampering with the internal system functions of spacenet, security measures and procedures protect each spacenet satellite from the time it leaves the factory until launch. Once on orbit, active and passive security systems ensure continuous protection against enemy threats-both physical and signal-intercept threats.
Storage Volume. Spacenet microsatellites are small and made of common parts. The common parts make the satellites quick to assemble. This avoids the need to have a large number of spacenet satellites built and awaiting launch. Should a spacenet satellite fail, a replacement will be assembled in a few hours from the common parts and launched into orbit the same day. Since the satellites are small, they will not take up much room if stored, nor will they occupy significant space in the launch vehicle payload fairing.
Future timelines described in this section were developed using the Horizon mission methodology. The Horizon mission methodology starts with a given end-state, then describes those changes that must occur to achieve the end state. The methodology works back from the future to the present, until it describes the current generation of technologies.
Improved war fighter support begins with today's initiatives, like Technical Exploitation of National Capabilities (TENCAP), to connect the "sensor to the shooter." Evolution of these systems, combined with some revolutionary improvements in information processing and storage and intelligent software for use on earth and in space, will lead to a highly efficient user-pulled system in 2025. The key to success is to ensure a continuous partnership between the users and the war fighters in the development process from requirement identification to demonstration, validation, and production.
Improved C3 for the spacenet 2025 system also requires a stepped approach. First is today's initiative to minimize on-site personnel at satellite remote tracking stations, resulting in unmanned, global, fixed satellite command and control. The next step requires miniaturization of electronics and computing power to enable these same systems to become portable. High-rate, robust earth-to-space and space-to-space data transfer must evolve in parallel. Laser cross-links and other technologies co-developed by the commercial and military communities will make the spacenet a reality by 2025.
The road to microsat constellations in 2025 begins with today's miniaturization initiatives by DOD, commercial entities, and NASA's New Millennium program. There is probably one generation of "medium sized" 500-700-pound satellites between now and the 20-to-30-pound microsats of 2025. Revolutionary leaps in spacecraft power, propulsion, and computing power are required, along with evolutionary growth in autonomy capabilities, to implement the spacenet 2025 system. Leadership by the commercial space world and integration of capabilities into military uses is also vital.
The world of 2025 may include several "space-capable" nation-states. To ensure that the US maintains space dominance, countermeasures must minimize the perceived natural and hostile threats to US space assets. A defensive strategy could include passive and active defensive measures and fast, cost-effective satellite replenishment.
The general progression to spacenet 2025 starts with today's "demonstration systems" like Clementine and TAOS, that are proving the concepts of autonomy, miniaturization, and simplicity. The US should aggressively lead a forum to share "lessons learned" between military, civil (NASA), and commercial space programs. Once proven, the "medium-sized" satellites will replace today's large, multimission platforms. These "medium" systems open the door for the spacenet 2025 system of microsats that ensures US control of space throughout the 21st century.
The true measure of spacenet is its ability to get critical information
to and from the war fighter in near real time. This information may come
in human-readable form, or machine-readable form for controlling devices
such as unmanned aerial vehicles or sensor systems. This real-time information
capability will require the development, refinement, and integration of
numerous systems with the spacenet (fig. 5-1).
Figure 5-1. Advances in Fielded C3 Systems
Although portable satellite communications systems exist now, they will continue to become more transportable while providing more throughput. Connectivity will increase as more systems adopt standard protocols for data transmission. This will occur as space communications become more commercialized. Finally, as the information explosion grows, consumers will demand improved methods to avoid drowning in a sea of data. Data-fusion technologies will grow, dependent upon increases in artificial intelligence.
Communication Systems Development
In 2025, high-speed cross-links between satellites will be used to interconnect
mobile and remote forces (fig. 5-2). The move towards satellite cross-links,
already started in 1996, needs to continue for satellites to provide communications
capabilities needed in 2025. Moving towards higher frequencies will come
naturally as the commercial satellite market provides more throughput.
Figure 5-2. Technological Advances in Satellite Cross-linking
Space Qualified Computer Development
Several systems outlined earlier require advances in computer processing
and storage. Commercial computer and satellite markets will push these
advances. As the commercial satellite market grows, more-capable space-qualified
computers will emerge (fig. 5-3). As communications technologies increase
in speed, space-qualified systems will become faster, driving towards optical
computing technology.
Figure 5-3. Advances in Satellite Computer Technology
In 2025, satellites will use common subsystems, making them less expensive
than those of 1996 (fig. 5-4). Common systems are just starting in the
commercial space industry, with the Hughes standard satellite bus "series
600." Given a standardized bus, standardized subsystems such as power,
propulsion, and attitude control are the next step. The final step is to
make components from different manufacturers standardized in much the same
manner as interchangeable personal computer components today.
Figure 5-4. Timeline for System Standardization
Active and passive satellite defenses will increase the survivability
of a satellite system in 2025 (fig. 5-5). As more and more civilian satellites
are launched, civilians will protect their investments by making their
satellites more survivable in the natural space environment. The military
will need to pursue defenses against man-made attacks.
Figure 5-5. Advances in Satellite Defensive Systems
Government and the commercial sector must leap forward harmoniously to maximize synergy and continue on course to achieve the common long-term goals: US economic prosperity and continued US space dominance throughout the next century.
Three categories of recommendations are worth consideration. First, the commercial sector should lead advancement in some technologies. These will be evolutionary and natural progressions, and they should directly enhance growth and profitability in the commercial sector.
Second, the Air Force/US Government should provide incentives in some technology areas that are not necessarily in the commercial evolutionary path or that may involve high risks and DOD-unique requirements. The Air Force should fund technology programs in this category to reduce risk, and they should provide incentives to the commercial sector to "take over."
Finally, technologies that the Air Force/US Government should lead are very broad-based activities requiring overarching leadership-at least to get started. The US Government should lead the spacenet C3 system architecture development just as it did in the early days of the internet. Other technologies in the final category are most clearly DOD-unique requirements or high-risk, and expensive development programs.
Technologies the Air Force should expect the commercial sector to lead:
Technologies the Air Force/US Government should provide incentives for:
Technologies the Air Force/US Government should lead:
The spacenet system meets or exceeds the applicable measures of merit relevant to the alternate futures of 2025. The paths are feasible to achieve the key technologies of the spacenet 2025 system. These paths require an evolution of some technologies and some technological revolutions as catalysts to lead the system evolution. Three categories of recommendations suggest ideas that the Air Force should consider to stay on track to achieve the spacenet system by 2025.
