The defense of the Earth-Moon system requires a global outlook, in spite of limitations in international cooperation. Leadership of a planetary defense program is a critical issue which must be established both nationally and globally. However some nations may possess the capability to unilaterally defend the planet, their own territory, or the territory of selected allies. This paper suggests a possible leadership framework. This section presents a command and control system based on that proposed framework. Command and control of a system of systems to detect and mitigate ECO threats poses many challenges-especially command relationships among international organizations.

Unilateral US Command Elements

By 2025 the United States could certainly possess the capability to defend the planet either through an expedient, ad hoc effort or through a deliberately planned, funded, and coordinated program. With either possibility the US could take the lead by default or by its own initiative. The proposed command structure will allow the United States to unilaterally lead and execute the effective detection and mitigation of an ECO threat (fig. 3-3).

The National Command Authority (NCA) would oversee the efforts of the primary players in the PDS and coordinate their activities. This coordination would take place through a new entity, the Planetary Defense Coordination Council (PDCC). The PDCC would in turn work with the European Space Agency and the Council of International Cooperation in the Study and Utilization of Outer Space-European Agencies with similar interests and capabilities. Although American private industry and academia are not subject to the strict command relationships of federal bureaucracies, during a time of global crisis they would likely adhere to the direction of the NCA-much in the same way they did during World War II--by banding together to combat a threat to all Americans and possibly to all other humanity.

International Command Elements

The alternate futures developed for the 2025 study pose varying degrees of global leadership; that is, the role of the United Nations varies greatly with the alternate future. This section assumes that the UN has no strict governmental authority-only its mandate over its member nations. This situation is similar to what exists in 1996. In that light, no nation has subjugated its sovereignty to the UN. So with respect to the world powers, the UN acts with little higher authority. There is no hierarchical structure. But regional organizations such as the European Union will have increased clout as some European nations will have banded together for increased influence. Other possibilities include regional alliances in other areas of the world, including Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. Countries in these areas may form coalitions to increase their political, economic, and military power.

Command Responsibilities-US Unilateral Action

With respect to planetary defense in 2025, there will be no official global government power to unilaterally organize, develop, deploy, and operate a planetary defense system. The planet will be forced to rely on voluntary cooperation of countries for defense against ECO impacts. But under the threat of such a catastrophe, the cooperation among nations to the decisions of the United Nations probably would run akin to the cooperation of American academia and private industry to decisions of the National Command Authority. An ECO could bring together and coalesce the nations of the world under one authority for the common good.

C⁴I for Detection Subsystems

Three entities would hold primary responsibility for detection of ECOs: international observatories (generally managed by academia in coordination with government), the US Air Force, and NASA. During normal times, these entities would conduct operations without requiring significant outside direction. Should an emergency posture be required due to a possible ECO impact, sites would coordinate their efforts under the direction of the US National Command Authority or UN as appropriate.

C⁴I for Mitigation Subsystems

Two US governmental departments would be responsible for mitigating an ECO threat: the Departments of Defense and Energy. Depending on the mitigation strategy, the NCA would direct either or both of these organizations to engage the ECO as described in the mitigation sections.

Research and Development

Research and development would fall into various realms. Specifically, the DOD and DOE would perform their own organic research but also contract out to academia and private industry for inputs. In addition, technological advances developed independent of the planetary defense initiative would be incorporated into the effort.

Exploration

Responsibility for physical exploration of space has fallen primarily into the lap of NASA and its association with academia. Manned occupation of space has been a responsibility primarily of NASA. Unmanned occupation of space has spread from NASA to the Department of Defense (and the National Reconnaissance Office) and rapidly to private industry (commercial satellites). There will be a growing trend towards the civilianization and privatization of space. But for the US unilateral defense of the planet, the federal government will continue to carry the lead for space exploration.

Exploitation

Private industry will retain its role as the primary exploiter of space. But governmental development of exploitation technologies will be critical. Moon-based manufacturing and mining for federally sponsored space occupation will fuel a growing trend of the private exploitation of space. Private industry will find uses for space resources or unoccupied expanses for its own use. These technologies will be directly applicable to the exploitation of ECOs. With the development of such technologies, ECOs will become attractive sources for minerals and other valuable resources.

Command Relationships/Connectivity

Command relationships and connectivity among units within the PDS subsystems have unique requirements to consider. The detection systems operated by USAF, academia (observatories), and NASA will all be tied into Space Command headquarters rapidly providing information on ECOs. These detection systems then cross check each other to determine the accuracy of the observation and its resulting prediction.

Detection groups share information on asteroids in a centralized database, storing asteroid orbit, composition, and proximity data. Private industry would then be able to determine which bodies to seek and potentially exploit.

For the mitigation systems, connectivity is not as complicated as for the detection systems. Commander in Chief, US Space Command, would posses the responsibility to engage ECOs under direction from the NCA. From a military planning standpoint, commander-in-chief, United States Space Command would periodically perform a deliberate planning process to establish a plan to engage a ECO. The CINC's cosmic area of responsibility possesses few threats other than ECOs, and prudence dictates establishment of an operations plan to defend against potential ECO impacts. This plan would include the mitigation options described later.

Communications

Communication among the players who study the potential threat that ECOs pose is growing. In 1996 the detection system is loosely and informally integrated through the Internet. The earth's sentries scan small portions of the skies at a time and deposit their data on the Internet for other sentries to verify. Their techniques are rather basic and heavily dependent on computing power. An appropriate analogy here is the air defense network employed by the British during the Battle of Britain. Many observers deployed along the coast of the English Channel scanned the skies for formations of German planes and, once detecting them, identified their size and composition. These forward observers relayed their information to the centralized command centers where their information would be integrated into the big picture with radar and other observations.⁷³ So those who scan space for ECOs would benefit greatly from an improved communication network.

In 2025 the communication links among observatories will be well-meshed to cross feed and up-channel ECO data. Speed of data transfer is not a critical technology, and current capabilities are adequate to perform this function. But the integration of this information is what is lacking in 1996. Currently no person or agency officially possesses the chartered job to collect, analyze, and disseminate all ECO data. In 2025 a system to collect and analyze the data provided by the observatories will be essential. This becomes less of a technology issue than a functional, command and control issue. In 2025 that responsibility could fall on CINCUSSPACECOM.

Communications between command facilities and space vehicles may greatly benefit from technological advances. The concept describing faster-than-light communications (currently thought to be beyond current understanding of physics) is one which would benefit, though is not necessary for, mitigation systems that must physically intercept the ECO.⁷⁴ Instantaneous communications between the earth and the space vehicle would facilitate endgame decision making-where and how to engage the ECO, for example. Not having to enlarge the space vehicle with computer hardware containing preprogrammed or automated engagement phase capabilities will allow larger payloads, faster engagement speeds, and farther engagement distances. The faster-than-light communications concept hinges on a concept of the conservation of quantum properties. If the sender alters the quantum properties of his transmitter, the receiver instantaneously is altered to compensate for the change in quantum properties.

Additionally, very high rate (gigabyte per second) communications for data relay would greatly benefit deep space control of intercept vehicles. Combined, these two concepts of high-speed and high-rate communications could have far-reaching effects.

Computers

Probably the biggest area in which great strides can be made is in the computer processing of observation data. The degree volume of space scanned is limited by scan resolution and processing capability. Faster computers coupled to more capable telescopic devices allow larger sky volumes to be searched for ECOs. Comparing new scans with archive scans at resolutions required for early detection of ECOs requires rapid database management tools and sophisticated analysis programs. In 1996 the shift from photographic to digitized techniques is almost complete. By 2025 the expansion of archive data and advances towards finer scan resolutions will make detection of ECOs far more complete and accurate.

Improved computing capabilities is also important in the astrometry realm. Astrometry currently relies upon optical and radar for the follow-up tracking that permits refinement of the orbit necessary to identify an ECO. With better orbit-calculating models that account for orbit perturbations induced by planetary gravity (e.g., by Jupiter) and with better computing power (e.g., more significant digits), orbits can be predicted more accurately and farther into the future than with current systems. The orbital chaos contributed by Jupiter's gravitational pull to the mechanical calculations can be minimized by better modeling and greater computational power. Also, in 2025 we anticipate a combination of ground- and space-based remote sensing devices for astrometric calculations. On the ground there likely would be optical (telescope) and radar devices; in the air there would likely be optical (Hubble-like) telescopes, radar, radio array, infrared, LIDAR, and LADAR sensors.

Finally, as the database of main belt asteroids grows, data management becomes critical. Keeping track of hundreds of thousands of asteroids and comets calls for improved computing power, faster processing, and larger memory. Fortunately, this power appears to be achievable in time.

As chip technology improves, memory capacity surpasses the 1 gigabyte threshold, providing an enormous capacity to store huge amounts of data. But along with these advances, the chips and their ability to perform becomes more susceptible to space radiation. Space vehicles using these advanced chips will require hardening from cosmic radiation.⁷⁵

Intelligence

Much intelligence is required regarding NEOs, but relatively little is presently known. This intelligence becomes vitally important to decide which mitigation system(s) can best be used against them and to predict the probability of mitigation success.

Specific intelligence necessary for all NEOs includes, but is not limited to, individual physical shape, size, mass, structure, surface and interior material compositions, brittleness, terrain, velocity, and inherent motion (e.g. spinning or wobbling). Specific intelligence necessary for targeted ECOs includes the aforementioned properties and particular weak points and maybe landing sites.

Several satellites have been used to perform NEO flybys, either as primary or secondary missions. Much data has been obtained; however, there is much more to be gained. The recently launched Near Earth Asteroid Rendezvous (NEAR) satellite will rendezvous with an asteroid to characterize its physical and geological properties (elemental and mineralogical composition, density, shape, spin state, interior structure, and surface morphology).⁷⁶ Other planned satellite missions include Clementine II; a comet rendezvous mission by ROSETTA--a European Space Agency program; Imaging of Near Earth Objects (INEO)--an NEO flyby mission by the German Center of Applied Space Technology and Microgravity; and a yet-to-be-named near-earth asteroid rendezvous mission by the Japanese Institute of Space and Astronomical Science (ISAS).

Clementine II is a congressionally directed technology demonstration satellite designed to test state-of-the-art sensors, components, and subsystems in the deep-space environment. Presently, the directed baseline mission is to fly by three near-earth asteroids (NEA) in quick succession. Several hours prior to the NEA flyby, a small (less than 20 kilograms) probe will be released from the mothership and directed to intercept the asteroid using onboard autonomous navigation techniques.⁷⁷

The planned ISAS satellite will map the surface and hover within one foot of an asteroid.⁷⁸ These and other missions are of critical importance if our mitigation systems are to be designed to work effectively. Other missions are suggested by various authors.⁷⁹

C⁴I Summary

Table 5 summarizes the technical hurdles that must be overcome to implement the ideas outlined in this section effectively. Overall, there are few showstoppers that prevent the implementation of a workable C⁴I planetary defense subsystem. Cost of the C⁴I subsystem is relatively low. Current systems and capabilities are nearly sufficient to perform the mission.

^* ECO Scenarios 1-4 are described in Table 3.

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