Satellite Multiple Attack and Kill System

System Description. This system is similar to the Army's multiple launcher rocket system (MLRS), but instead of ground-to-ground capability the SMAKS employs a ground to space capability.⁵² The system has three models designed for attacking low, medium, and high earth orbiting satellites. Similar to the Army system it is highly mobile and carries an array of antisatellite rockets. Given the potentially large number of enemy satellites existing in 2025, enough SMAKS vehicles are needed to ensure an effective ground-based ASAT capability over the entire battlespace. The system can also be based on ships and submarines to provide the capability of destroying launch vehicles in the boost phase before they can deploy enemy satellite systems. SMAKS carries highly sophisticated command and control, targeting, and positioning systems, requires minimum manning, and is readily deployable.

Concept of Operations. SMAKS is sized to fit easily into the air mobility workhorse of 2025 and must be located at appropriate locations depending on the target set. The system is sea-deployable giving it added flexibility. Using the advanced global positioning system (GPS), SMAKS will take a minimal amount of time to accurately locate itself and prepare itself to conduct antisatellite operations. Upon proper direction, the SMAKS will process appropriate targeting data received from surveillance and reconnaissance assets, upload the targeting data into the appropriate number of missiles, and release the weapons. Surveillance assets will conduct battle damage assessment and feedback to the SMAKS.

Countermeasures. Potential countermeasures to this system would be electronic measures such as jamming and spoofing to confuse the required GPS information or other data links. Also while survivability is enhanced by using a mobile system, it is nevertheless vulnerable to attack from air or space while operating on the surface of the earth. Satellite maneuvering may be an effective countermeasure against a SMAKS type system that is heavily reliant on a target satellite's initial position and velocity for targeting.

Alpha Strikestar Transatmospheric Vehicle

System Description. The Alpha Strikestar is envisioned as a transatmospheric vehicle (TAV) able to take off and land horizontally and enter into low earth orbit.⁵³ It is able to transition between air and space environments repeatedly during the same mission, based on the threat and mission requirements. It carries multiple types of weapons to meet any threat. These include kinetic energy antisatellite missiles designed for total physical destruction and a high-powered laser cannon which is capable of disrupting, denying, degrading, or destroying unfriendly satellites. Another mission is the capture of an enemy satellite for return to earth or transfer to a useless orbit. The Alpha Strikestar is also air/space-to-ground capable using precision guided weapons to take out hard targets anywhere in the world on short notice. The vehicle is equipped with self-protective measures, as well as an imaging capability for battle damage assessment.

Concept of Operations. Alpha Strikestar can be scrambled to react to a crisis anywhere in the world on a moment's notice. Orbital insertion planning is preloaded into the weapons system computer to assist the pilot in proper positioning, target acquisition, and target engagement. For ground targets, mission planners will determine best application of weapons load (space or air delivered). The vehicle is flexible enough to enter low earth orbit en route to a ground target, reenter the atmosphere to deliver ordnance, then return to orbit to overfly the target and conduct battle damage assessment. If necessary the Alpha Strikestar can then reengage to complete the designated mission.

Countermeasures. This system will employ state-of-the art stealth technology, but if detected will be vulnerable to enemy ASAT attack, whether it be kinetic or directed energy. Since a TAV requires ground-based launch and processing facilities as well as runways, these are likely to be targeted as critical nodes by an enemy looking to ground a TAV fleet.

Directed Energy Weapons (DEW)

General Discussion. Counterspace missions in 2025 will require the ability to disrupt, deny, degrade, and destroy enemy space capabilities. The proliferation of space users will reach monumental proportions in 2025, making counterspace attacks on individual users (the ground component) nearly impossible. The critical linkage between the user and the information he or she desires is the space-based asset and the transmitted data. Add to this situation the large future role of the space system entrepreneur and now attacking these systems may not only bring legal action against the US but may degrade our own capability. Directed Energy Weapons (DEW) of 2025 will provide the most promise for disrupting, degrading, denying, and if necessary destroying enemy space capabilities.

A directed energy weapon must be able to generate energy, direct it on the target, propagate it through air or space, to the target, and induce some lethal effect in the target. Charged particle beams are probably the best at generating, directing, and killing but are clearly the worst at propagating. Neutral particle beams can propagate and kill but cannot yet be generated with sufficient intensities. Lasers are very good at directing and propagating, since light reflects from mirrors, can be pointed like a spotlight, and after leaving the weapon propagates in straight lines.⁵⁴

Historically, the major drawback to DEW has been the necessity to operate in clear weather. If the DEW is placed in space to conduct space-on-space attacks, this deficiency is eliminated. If the DEW is on the ground conducting earth-to-space attacks or in space conducting space-to-earth attacks, 2025 technologies for boring access holes through clouds and other obstructions may eliminate this deficiency. Development of a high-powered microwave weapon which can operate in all weather conditions may eliminate the poor weather deficiency. The current airborne laser (ABL), being developed to counter theater ballistic missiles, will demonstrate the ability of lasers to operate in environmental turbulence of the earth's atmosphere. The recently completed New World Vistas Directed Energy Volume report by the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board indicates, "the ABL will probably be the first practical and effective directed energy weapon to be deployed."⁵⁵ This will be the springboard to operating lasers through the medium of air and space. By 2025, DEW systems will likely operate in space and from the ground. This will give us the ability to negate objects in the atmosphere and in space. Five directed energy concepts were explored in this study.

High Energy Laser Attack Station (HELAS)

System Description. Disrupting, denying, degrading, and destroying enemy space capability will be accomplished by a space-based high-powered, short wavelength, solid state laser platform. This constellation of orbiting platforms will provide continuous, 24-hour protection of friendly forces and negation of enemy capabilities.⁵⁶ This constellation of counterspace platforms will be placed in low earth orbit (LEO-150 NM), medium earth orbit (MEO -11,000 NM) and geosynchronous orbit (GEO-22,000 NM). The high energy laser attack station (HELAS) will consist of 16 orbiting platforms at LEO, eight platforms at MEO, and four platforms at GEO. This multilevel constellation will provide a layered interactive defense against all space-borne or space-transiting threats. The multilevel system will protect all US assets in various altitudes and inclinations. A diode pumped solid state laser (DPSSL) will be the heart of the laser weapon subsystem. The DPSSL is more efficient than flashlamp pumping, which is the traditional method of exciting solid state lasers, and it results in much less heating of the laser as well.⁵⁷ Current solid state, chemical, and free electron lasers can generate power in the kilowatts range. However, a credible HELAS must employ lasers in the megawatt ranges. There appears to be no major technological limitation for DPSSL to achieve the megawatt range, and continued advancements will reduce the cost to reasonable limits.⁵⁸

Concept of Operations. The HELAS will be the primary space attack/defense network for counterspace operations in 2025. The multilayer, multiinclination constellation will be operated by a single ground crew member (ops chief) with the assistance of artificial intelligence health and maintenance software systems.⁵⁹ Ground- based telemetry, tracking, and controlling will be conducted via satellite-to-satellite laser crosslinking. Another crew member will serve as the weapons manager who will track, target, and engage hostile targets. These two crew members can sit side by side in any size facility and in any location on the globe as long as they can communicate with at least one satellite. The crosslinking capabilities will provide the global command and control necessary to operate the constellation. Enemy ground launched or co-orbital ASAT can be detected, tracked, and engaged by HELAS. Although primarily a denial/destruction type weapon, the laser can be tuned to damage or degrade satellites by attacking subcomponents (i.e., solar array panels, reaction control thrusters, thermal heating of components to cause system shutdowns, etc.). Counterspace earth targets such as command and control (C²) facilities, earth station antennas, spacelift facilities, and spacelift vehicles can also be effectively engaged by HELAS. The four GEO platforms could also provide dual-use capabilities for planetary defense by orienting HELAS outward. This could be done in a global emergency noting the degradation of the space defense mission with the GEO platform oriented outward.

Countermeasures Special reflective or absorbent material could make the laser ineffective. Use of low-observable or stealth technology may defeat targeting and identification systems on the HELAS. The HELAS may be vulnerable to anti-satellite weapons or other laser stations. In addition, satellite hardening may be an effective countermeasure against low power laser pulses intended to degrade the target. This may force commanders to opt for the hard kill destruction of hardened satellites. A factor driving this decision will be the potential political impact of a turn in negative international opinion resulting from the total destruction of a satellite.

Solar Energy Optical Weapon (SEOW)

System Description The SEOW will use the evolutionary concept of large orbiting structures to focus solar rays on earth and space targets to disrupt, deny, degrade, and destroy enemy capabilities.⁶⁰ This concept constructs a 10 kilometer magnifying glass or focusing element in space to illuminate targets on the ground or in space. This illumination can turn night to day on the ground, scorch facilities, or overheat satellite components. The solar energy provided to the focusing element on the weapon also provides a perpetual power source for the orbiting platform. Instead of using an orbiting magnifying glass to focus energy, another alternative is to use stored solar energy to power a directed energy weapon. A leap in battery technology leading to the capability to store immense quantities of power can be expected by 2025.

Large lightweight structures (kilometers) are feasible for 2025 and will provide the necessary stable platform to house the focusing or magnifying glass element. Advancements in space membrane structures and adaptive optics may provide the necessary capabilities to produce an energy frugal space-based weapon. Each SEOW will orbit at geosynchronous altitude and consist of an Attitude Control System, Guidance, Navigation, and Control System, Reaction Control System, Targeting and Identification System, and the Laser Communications System.

Concept of Operations. The orbiting SOEW will be assembled in low earth orbit and boosted into geosynchronous orbit after the completion of the 10-kilometer optical focus assembly. The weapon can be maneuvered over the area of interest to provide space-to-earth capabilities as well. The solar energy can be spotted over a particular area of interest turning night into day. In addition, the beam could be focused on a power generation facility on the ground to provide a continuous high- energy source or the station could focus its beam on a lower orbiting satellite to provide it solar power when it would normally be in the earth's shadow. The beam could also be focused on an enemy orbiting threat to raise the internal temperature beyond functional limits. This may not destroy the satellite but, because of low sensitivity to heat, will force the automated shutdown of the satellite. Enemy controllers will only be able to detect the out-of-limit condition but will be unable to detect the source. For imaging and electronic surveillance satellites which pose a great threat to our forces (i.e., removes element of surprise), the SEOW will illuminate the target prior to its entry into the area of responsibility forcing an automated shutdown of the satellite or blinding of its sensors, thus preventing collection over our assets. Once the target has departed the protected area, illumination is discontinued until the next threat enters the area. Although this will completely deny use of the imaging/reconnaissance platform to all users for that period of time, US surveillance capabilities will be provided by other US government-controlled assets.

Countermeasures. As a large fragile target, the optic or space membrane could be easily disrupted or destroyed by KEWs or objects. Enemy forces could attempt to ram the weapon with a kamikaze satellite in hopes of rupturing the adaptive optic system. As a result, an active defense system will be needed to counter this potential threat. An alternative is to use a large number of small membranes coupled with adaptive optics to form a synthetic aperture type focusing element. This will make the array less vulnerable by dispersing the elements which makeup the optics system.

Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) and High Power Microwave (HPM) Pills

System Description.⁶¹ EMP radiation can be viewed as variations or created disturbances in the electromagnetic field which can cause disruption of electronic devices by arcing, overloading, and discharging. These EMP charges can be generated by numerous sources and can cause limited to extensive damage to electronic components. High power microwaves (HPM) can penetrate external protective surfaces and disable or damage critical components of a satellite or other spacecraft. The HPM weapon might be focused on specific circuits and subcomponents within the target in order to disrupt or degrade mission functions.⁶² Focusing and tuning the HPM to a specific wavelength or frequency might allow certain components to be isolated and affected. The EMP or HPM pills will be microsatellites which maneuver within close proximity of an enemy satellite and emit short-range pulses to interfere with the normal operation of the satellite.⁶³ These pills are intended for short duration operations in order to minimize the potential for collision with friendly satellites. These microsatellites will be launched into space by aircraft, transatmospheric vehicles (TAVs), small launch vehicles, or small fighter aircraft using high impulse air-to-space missiles. After 30 to 60 days, the pills will be directed to move to a collection orbit to be recaptured by TAV. The EMP/HPM pill will consist of small, lightweight satellites with an EMP gun or HPM generator attached. This compact, short-range weapon will provide an adequate offensive counterspace capability which will be undetected by the enemy. Because of the longer wavelengths and wider beams generated by EMP type weapons, pointing accuracy will not be as critical as those needed for laser type weapons. Although some EMP/HPM weapons exist today, the challenge for 2025 require miniaturization of the spacecraft and the applicable weapon.

Concept of Operations. During prehostilities and during crises/war, EMP/HPM pills will be launched into orbit. These microsatellites will be positioned next to high- value enemy satellite systems and space systems operated by neutral countries or multinational corporations which may supply information to the enemy. The EMP/HPM pills will fly in formation with the enemy satellites until directed to engage. The explosive generator (or applicable weapon) will fire a fine tuned graduated pulse at the target. The goal is to deny the space capability through disruption and not destruction. This is especially true in the case of multinational corporation satellite systems. The pill can fire several rounds over a 60-day period at key times during the enemy satellite's orbit when it is collecting information on US forces or downlinking data to the ground. When the EMP/HPM pill has completed its mission or is no longer necessary, it can be deorbited and allowed to decay in the earth's atmosphere. The EMP/HPM pills can provide local neutralization of enemy satellite systems over the battlefield as well as global with a large number of cheap weapons.

Countermeasures. System shielding and electrical ground may reduce the effectiveness of the EMP/HPM pill. If detected, the enemy could maneuver out of harms way or fire a kinetic or directed energy weapon to degrade or destroy the EMP/HPM pill. Dispersion (spreading the mission over a larger number of smaller satellites) is another countermeasure. The resulting increase in numbers will force a corresponding increase in the number of EMP/HPM pills and will make degradation of the system more difficult. Our forces could counter by making EMP/HPM pills cheaper and easier to operate than the target satellite system.

Ground-Based Laser (GBL)

System Description. The GBL provides the capability to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy enemy space capabilities and potentially protect friendly space assets.⁶⁴ Several ground-based laser concepts have been explored over the past 25 years. Ground- based lasers offer unique advantages over space-based laser systems. Supportability and operability are major advantages to the ground-based laser. Deployment and supportability is functionally easier on a ground-based system than on an orbiting space system. There are two major drawbacks to ground-laser systems: line-of-sight limitations and atmospheric perturbation.

This concept will develop the laser station on the earth, fire the laser at relay optics in space, and use those relay mirrors to engage targets either in space or on the earth. This places the most technically challenging component on the ground and deploys a very simple relay network system in orbit. Three to five laser generation sites will be placed in various locations across the continental United States (CONUS). These sites will have access to relay mirrors orbiting above, which can transfer the laser beam to other orbiting relay stations to attack targets on the other side of the globe. Dispersion of the laser stations and relay mirrors will help defeat the poor weather deficiency which has plagued the capability of ground lasers to fire through cloud cover into space. The Laser Guidestar program developed technology for atmospheric compensation which allows a ground telescope site to view a scene or irradiate a target anywhere around the globe while a relay mirror is in position to provide the view.⁶⁵ This technology will greatly contribute to our future ability to bounce lasers off orbiting mirrors to attack targets.

Concept of Operations. The five laser generation stations will be placed in those geographical locations best suited for laser operations and favorable weather conditions. Wide dispersion of these sites will increase the probability of having at least one site in clear weather for optimum operation. The laser generation site will be an unattended nuclear-powered facility which will provide the necessary megawattage required for the high-powered solid-state laser. Control of the five stations and the orbiting mirrors will be centralized in a primary facility with a mobile backup facility. Redundant satellite communications between the laser generation sites will increase survivability of the ground-based laser system. The orbiting mirrors will be laser crosslinked to reduce the ground support network for telemetry, tracking, and control (TT&C). The same reflecting mechanism used to attack a target can be used to identify and track the object before engagement. This information will be processed by ground computers at the central control facility and attack commands will be issued to the laser ground sites. Recycle times can be reduced to instantaneous rapid fire by using multiple laser generating sites to engage multiple targets. Different relay paths can be used to add redundancy to the system and also mitigate the problem of limited number of discharges by a single laser site.

Countermeasures. Ground-based laser generation facilities are susceptible to conventional attack or sabotage. The orbiting mirrors will be susceptible to ASAT attack however, a large constellation of cheap orbiting mirrors is a natural counter to these measures. Excessively poor weather conditions across the entire CONUS will degrade the network capability. This may require overseas or outside the continental United States (OCONUS) basing (i.e., Hawaii, Alaska, Guam, Puerto Rico, etc.). The ability to actively modify weather conditions could be used to defeat a ground-based laser system by planting clouds over the laser site. On the other hand, the ability to remove cloud cover through weather modification may be an effective counter to the effect of poor weather on ground-based lasers.

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