CONTROL OF SPACE

Surveillance of Space

Near real-time space situational awareness, enabled by Surveillance of Space is the key contributor to the Control of Space and enabling freedom of operations within it. Future space surveillance capabilities will be the foundation for space superiority. Figure 5-8 depicts the Surveillance of Space key tasks.

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Figure 5-8 Key Tasks for Surveillance of Space

Key Capabilities for Surveillance of Space

Based on these key tasks, there are four key capabilities required for 2020:

Figure 5-9 depicts desired warfighting capabilities, current abilities, and goals for 2020.

Figure 5-10 is the roadmap for Surveillance of Space.

Surveillance of Space-System Assessment


Figure 5-9 Surveillance of Space Capabilities and Goals for 2020


Figure 5-10 Surveillance of Space Roadmap

Surveillance of Space-CONOPS, Organizations, Global Partnerships and Policies

The future CONOPS for surveillance systems will likely remain with the DoD, NASA, and related agencies such as the labs, or even the Russian Space Agency. We can also integrate some allied or foreign surveillance capabilities into an international operations center. However, centralized surveillance of space by USSPACECOM remains critical to optimal mission performance, standardization, responsiveness, and data integrity. Various distributed processing architectures will fuse data from all sources into the required space products and rapidly distribute them to forward users. These users will access the centralized database for space surveillance to get what they need. In 2020, several new or different organizations including an international space-surveillance net, may catalog space objects. USSPACECOM, AFSPACE (14 AF), and Naval Space Command will combine resources with allied, civil and industry partners-such as NASA, Canada, the European Space Agency, and the Russian Space Agency to establish and maintain a space catalog.

NASA, Canada, the European Space Agency, and the Russian Space Agency are prime candidates for forming partnerships to perform satellite self-identification and reporting. In addition, pre-launch inspections could ease the burden of characterizing satellites. Finally, an international policy on space debris could slow the growing number of objects that require tracking and cataloging.

Surveillance of Space-Overall Assessment

The overall assessment for Surveillance of Space is YELLOW because all key capabilities have short-falls. More sensors of higher quality, better orbit coverage and better observational data are needed to locate objects more precisely. We'll need improved or new technology to characterize objects more accurately in real time. Figure 5-11 shows this assessment.

Surveillance of Space-Technology Assessment

Migrating space surveillance from the ground to space will require some technological advancements.


Figure 5-11 Assessment for Surveillance of Space

Surveillance of Space-Overall Assessment

The overall assessment for Surveillance of Space is YELLOW because all key capabilities have short-falls. More sensors of higher quality, better orbit coverage and better observational data are needed to locate objects more precisely. We'll need improved or new technology to characterize objects more accurately in real time. Figure 5-11 shows this assessment.

Surveillance of Space-Technology Assessment

Migrating space surveillance from the ground to space will require some technological advancements. Many of the technologies supporting space-based surveillance are similar to those supporting Global Engagement's requirements for Integrated Focused Surveillance. This includes technology development for passive (e.g., electro-optical, bistatic, infrared) and active (e.g., radar, LIDAR/LADAR) sensors. As with other surveillance systems, a very good understanding of target signatures and backgrounds is critical to any surveillance system's success. Additionally, the data processing, algorithms, and data fusion for space surveillance is equally important to meet cataloging requirements. This may require onboard software for processing, hardware developments, and advancements in intelligent expert systems.

Space-based surveillance places a heavy requirement on developments in spacecraft-positioning systems; guidance, navigation, and control techniques; cryocoolers; batteries; structures; highly-efficient solar arrays; and vibration suppression. Additionally, satellite crosslinks will be required for cross-cueing, target tip-off, and highly accurate search and detection.

Finally, the ground segment (including command and control and data processing) also requires upgrades that have their own technical challenges. Some of the technologies required for robust command and control include handling information, processing data, developing algorithms, fusing data, intelligent systems, and human-machine interfaces.

Surveillance of Space-Recommendations and Directives

(Directive) Develop modeling and simulation to analyze the performance of proposed systems and sensors. These analysis tools will be instrumental to studies, analyses, trades, and future operational concepts for space surveillance. (N-SP/AN)

(Recommendation) Examine new and enhanced sensor technology. (Labs)

(Recommendation) Review and update space surveillance policy on distributing data; including all military and national systems, as well as envisioned partnership systems. (SPJ5)

Protection

Protecting the US interests in space is critical to our economic, informational, and military welfare. Although the notion of space as a sanctuary appears seductive to many, our increasing reliance on space systems, and information derived from space, creates a center of gravity potential adversaries clearly understand. From a military perspective, Protection takes on a new dimension as non-DoD systems (commercial and third-party) become even more integrated into plans for using joint forces. Protection includes active and passive defensive measures to minimize threats (natural and man-made) to space systems, (space, links, and ground segments) as shown in Figure 5-12.

Key Capabilities for Protection

Based on the key tasks in Figure 5-12, Protection requires five key capabilities for 2020:

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Figure 5-12 Key Tasks for Protection

Figure 5-13 depicts the desired warfighting capabilities for Protection, the current ability, and the goal for 2020.

Figure 5-14 is the Protection roadmap.

Protection-Systems Assessment


Figure 5-13 Protection Capabilities and Goals for 2020


Figure 5-14 Protection Roadmap

Protection-CONOPS, Organizations, Global Partnerships and Policies

Today, Protection operations depend on post event analysis because systems can't detect and identify sources in near real time. By 2020, the United States must have protection systems and CONOPS that can detect an event and predict its effect on mission operations. Defensive operations, in near real time, require a robust battle manager to provide situational awareness.

The same organizational changes proposed for Space Surveillance and Assured Access will con-tribute significantly to this objective. In addition, laser-clearinghouse and collision-avoidance programs, out of the Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center, will prevent inadvertent illumination and ensure collision avoidance for high-value payloads. They will expand to assume a role in traffic control for space forces. In addition, a Joint Space Force Component Commander-like position will help determine how to protect forces. We don't intend to prescribe how a regional CINC should organize their space forces; we're merely stating the need to organize for space. Eventually an organization could emerge to handle global traffic control as the FAA and ICAO do now for air travel. Our increasing reliance on civil, commercial, and international space systems makes partnerships, laws, and agreements to protect these assets a key to preserving them. To do so, we must jointly develop onboard protection for all parties. As the DoD secures more space services from commercial sources, they'll need agreements that require the sources to protect their assets, so systems will be available through all levels of conflict. The combination of growing manufactured threats (orbital debris and antisatellite systems); the harsh space environment (Solar Max in 2007); and the need to ensure space services are available to a demanding consumer, will lead industry to incorporate some measures of protection on their own. Any future treaties must be carefully worded to ensure we can protect space systems of national interest while still denying an adversary the hostile use of space.

Protection-Overall Assessment

The overall assessment for PROTECTION in 2020 is low YELLOW because all capabilities have shortfalls (see Figure 5-15).

Protection-Technology Assessment

Achieving a GREEN rating depends on very immature technology, which requires immediate attention. Although many of the technologies (related to the information stream) are similar to those for Prevention, some threats will require unique technology. For example, the emergence of energy weapons demand entirely new technologies, such as shielding, onboard maneuvering, and hardening, for satellites to protect themselves. Advancement in artificial intelligence, on-board processing, miniature packages and attack sensors will contribute a lot to Protection. Technologies discussed under Surveillance of Space may satisfy some requirements for identifying, locating, and classifying objects in space. These are but a few of the technology challenges we must overcome to protect satellites. We're also looking forward to the results of the threat warning and assessment reporting demonstration (scheduled for 2000).

Technology requirements for satellite communications and control will affect satellite protection. They include exception reporting, onboard diag-nostics and repair, and satellites that can work on their own.


Figure 5-15 Assessment of Protection

Protection-Recommendations and Directives

(Directive/Recommendation) Pursue an automated capability to detect, identify, and report in near real time on threats or attacks to US and allied space systems (SPJ3/Labs).

(Directive/Recommendation) Pursue policy and possible alliances of space-system owners and operators to process anomalies and analyze trends. (SPJ5).

(Directive) Develop advanced models and simulation capabilities to help analyze nodes, identify effects and determine which capabilities we must rapidly reconstitute. (N-SP/AN).

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