CONTROL OF SPACE

Prevention

Today's concept of Prevention relies on diplomacy and non-military actions to deny an adversary the benefit of space. Prevention links closely to Negation, a concept that applies military force against an aggressor's space systems. Traditionally, these operational concepts have been separate, but commercial uses of space, emerging technologies, and the increased importance of space to the United States and its allies will drive the consolidation of these concepts. Consortia-owned space capabilities will be widely available, and partners, competitors, and rivals will use the same space systems, blurring the traditional

distinction among friendly, hostile, and commercial systems. Emerging space and telecommunications technologies will continue to integrate space constellations with other nodes of the infrastructure for global information. As international, civil, governmental, and military systems mingle, we'll need to rely heavily on diplomacy to deny an adversary, but we'll use military actions when vital national interests are challenged and other options can't meet the challenge. In 2020, Prevention will include diplomatic, informational, economic, and military options to preserve freedom of action in space and check an adversary's power. As a result, nations will have to seek consensus on using space. The United States will lead other nations in developing this consensus and will seek coalition support for actions that limit or deny an adversary's use of space.

To understand how Prevention and Negation might combine, let's look at each separately, beginning with Prevention (see Figure 5-16).

Figure 5-16 Key Tasks for Prevention

Key Capabilities for Prevention

Based on the key tasks listed in Figure 5-16, Prevention in 2020 requires three key capabilities:

• Detecting unauthorized use or exploitation of all US or third-party space systems. Widely available space products and services are sophisticated enough to erode the US military advantage and threaten national interests.
• Assessing the mission impact with high confidence in near real time. Assessment is necessary for course of action development.
• Timely and flexible denial in near real time to curtail an adversary's advantage.

Figure 5-17 depicts desired warfighting capabilities, current abilities, and the goal for 2020.

Figure 5-18 is the Prevention Roadmap, which includes candidate systems, CONOPS, organization and possible partnerships relevant to achieving the 2020 goal.

Prevention-Systems Assessment

• Key capability-Detecting unauthorized space system use/exploitation (all systems with military utility). No systems exist or are planned to satisfy this capability. Sophisticated systems for ISR can detect use, but not in a responsive way. And commercial systems will be a greater challenge whenever we know little about them. Revised ISR capabilities and CONOPS may provide partial solutions. USSPACECOM's requirements of ISR must help drive future intelligence architectures (also important to Negation). Once the information is available, N/UWSS and the USSPACECOM Battle Managers can distribute it to everyone who needs it.
• Key capapbility-Assessing mission impact on US and third party systems (of national interest in minutes). No information systems exist, or are planned for this capability. Assessment must address the US' battlespace knowledge relative to potential adversaries so we can react correctly. Advanced models and simulations will serve as a basis for course of action development. N/UWSS and the USSPACECOM Battle Managers may address part of this capability, providing all-source information and connectivity.
• Key Capability-Timely flexible denial must be developed and executable (seconds). Planned and projected systems won't fully satisfy this capability. Development of flexible denial systems, short of negation, must include features such as selective denial of GPS, low probability of intercept, and encryption. Future space system designs, operations and spacefaring nations "prevention" agreements must incorporate these factors to preclude attempts to use and exploit US and third-party space systems.

Figure 5-17 Prevention Capabilities and Goals for 2020

Figure 5-18 Prevention Roadmap

Prevention-CONOPS, Organizations, Global Partnerships and Policies

Prevention without Negation places a premium on CONOPS, organizations, and partnerships instead of hardware. A consensus approach using coalitions and diplomacy is the key to Prevention and offers solutions that systems alone can't achieve.

A collection of common systems, standards, and protocols may prevent intrusion and exploitation, if backed by innovative supporting CONOPS and organizations. A dynamic space environment offers a potential adversary many paths, but coalitions can lessen or eliminate them. Coa-litions must clearly define agreements for quickly applying Prevention concepts during crises and share audits of all systems to detect and identify unauthorized use. Partnerships among the United States and other space providers, as well as between USCINCSPACE and the US intelligence community will drive progress toward rapid detection and identification of unauthorized use and exploitation. Existing organizations can support these partnerships, but new CONOPS for ISR will focus their abilities to support Prevention objectives.

In 2020, the NCA and combatant commanders will need a range of flexible options for Prevention-ranging from diplomatic, informational, and economic actions to more compelling military actions, if required.

Lastly, we believe Prevention will be enabled if space is designated an area of responsibility and if a position like a Joint Force Space Component Commander is established. We don't mean to prescribe how a regional CINC should organize space forces-only to say we must organize for space to establish Prevention leadership and responsibility and to spur progress in developing flexible options, techniques, tactics, and procedures for deterrence in space.

Prevention-Overall Assessment

We consider Prevention to be low YELLOW based on shortfalls in detecting, identifying, and reacting to unauthorized use of space systems. The growing number of, and reliance on, commercial and third-party systems pose significant challenges to preventing an adversary's use of space. But the assessment could become GREEN if major space providers cooperate on diplomatic, informational, and economic solutions (see Figure 5-19).

Prevention-Technology Assessment

Emerging technologies to address Prevention shortfalls, include an onboard ability to detect intrusion and an ability to characterize the intrusion. Encryption can help a lot, using electronic fences or keys with identification techniques common to the financial industry. Technologies that make systems tougher to intercept and can make detection and identification in near real time less critical will enhance Prevention goals.

Prevention-Recommendations and Directives

(Recommendation) Form an international alliance to detect and respond to unauthorized use of US and allied space systems (Department of State/ Industry/SPJ5).

(Directive/Recommendation) Advocate technologies, such as controlled access, encryption, and low probability of intercept, to support international Prevention (Components/Labs).

(Directive) Evolve doctrine so Prevention includes the range of options-non military and military-to limit an adversary's unauthorized use of space (SPJ3/J5).

(Directive) Develop advanced models and simulations to support analysis of Prevention nodes for operational planning and execution (N-SP/AN).

Figure 5-19 Assessment of Prevention

Negation

Negation is the ability to deny, disrupt, deceive, degrade, or destroy an adversary's space systems and services. It involves military actions to target ground-support sites and infrastructure, ground-to-space links, or spacecraft. Figure 5-20 shows key tasks for Negation.

Figure 5-20 Key Tasks for Negation

Key Capabilities for Negation

Based on the key tasks in Figure 5-20, negation requires four key capabilities in 2020.

• Flexible effects are required because friends and foes may use space systems at the same time. Flexible effects will achieve the range of reversible and permanent objectives for Negation-deny, disrupt, deceive, degrade, and destroy. The NCA and combatant commanders will need this flexibility to negate an enemy's systems while preserving space services for the United States and its allies.
• Precision attack minimizes or eliminates fratricide so we don't harm or destroy space serv-ices for United States and allies on the targeted system or near the target. As space services and products intertwine with other elements of national power, this precision becomes vital.
• Employment on-demand is critical because friendly forces must respond in minutes to operate faster than the adversary. To protect forces and support military operations, combatant commanders must be able to negate space systems immediately.
• Combat assessment allows combatant commanders to know whether negation efforts were successful. If it isn't, commanders must decide wether to strike a target again. Assessing results are very difficult whenever we're trying to negate satellites or information processing Figure 5-21 shows the desired warfighting capabilities, the current adilities, and the goal for 2020. Figure 5-22 is the roadmap for Negation, showing candidate systems and their enabling technologies.

Figure 5-21 Negation Capabilities and Goals for 2020

Figure 5-22 Negation Roadmap

Negation-Systems Assessment

• Key Capability-Flexible effects-Desired mix of permanent (40%) and temporary (60%) effects. Programmed and planned systems will meet the requirement for flexible effects. The US' evolving ability to launch a conventional attack on ground stations and supporting infrastructure, as well as the Ground-Based Interceptor for National Missile Defense, satisfy requirements for permanent effects. Planned systems, including relocatable radio-frequency and laser jammers, Ground-Based Lasers, Space-Based Jammers, and the Space Operations Vehicle cover temporary or non-lethal actions. The Space-Based Jammers and Space-Based Lasers appear to be the most versatile in providing options for temporary effects on anticipated targets. Information operations, though not addressed, may do this more efficiently. Planned systems and information operations rely heavily on high volumes of precise information from sensors to shooters, who must have it in near real time. If they don't get precise information quickly, lasers or information operations could destroy systems.
• Key Capability-Precision attack against an adversary's space system (limited target set, 100% of the time, all nodes). Programmed and planned systems will attack precisely. Present systems include conventional attack against ground sites and supporting infrastructure, but planned systems will greatly improve this ability by 2020. Radio frequency and laser systems-fixed and mobile-will attack precisely against targets near Earth. Emerging space and telecommunications trends that tailor services to specific regions or users will complicate engagements for Negation forces because information flows seamlessly across a global infrastructure. We must solve this problem with better equipment and procedures. Questions emerge: Should we "fix" systems or make them mobile? Do we have enough systems with access to targets? Can we solve support issues, such as basing rights or deployment logistics? The Space-Based Jammer and Laser don't have these problems. Just as information operations can cause flexible effects, they can also attack precisely. But, in all cases, sensors will need to provide shooters with a lot of precise technical and operational intelligence.
• Key Capability-Employment On-Demand against all nodes of an adversary's space system (limited target set), whenever required (minutes). Planned systems will satisfy requirements for employment on demand. Today, conventional forces can't respond quickly enough because of problems with support in far-flung operating locations. Likewise, applications using National Missile Defense Ground-Based Interceptor depend on line-of-sight. Some planned systems, such as the Ground-Based Laser and relocatable platforms using radio frequencies or lasers, have the same shortfalls. Abilities envisioned for the Radar Imaging Deep Space Network, as well as Space-Based Radars, Lasers, and Platforms, will meet goals for on-demand employment. Constellations must be robust enough to place "eyes" completely on the targets.
• Key Capability-Combat assessment against limited target set (near real time). Planned and programmed systems do not fully address demanding requirements for assessing results of flexible effects and precision attack. Today, Ground-Based Lasers, optics, and radars can see only the gross physical characteristics of lethal attacks. Information operations and ISR assets permit fairly comprehensive combat assessment. But, these systems support a range of national and theater customers who would likely preempt them for other missions. For that reason, planned negation systems must either include their own equipment to assess results or get the information from other intelligence-gathering systems. The Space-Based Electro-Optical Network, Radar, and Laser offer high resolution imagery without atmospheric distortions that affect ground-based systems. Though not addressed, information operations-such as attacks on computers-can also assess results when an action doesn't cause observable damage. Infrared sensors, especially space-based ones, can assess results when physical damage is limited. Planned systems must address new approaches to ISR, employing active collection approaches associated with information operations.

Negation-CONOPS, Organizations, Global Partnerships and Policies

Integrating complex, overlapping Negation operations with the regional CINC's campaign plan will require CONOPS for space superiority (single operational focus); force protection (counter anti-satellite); and Prevention and Negation. Designating space as an area of responsibility will enable USCINCSPACE to develop, plan, coordinate, and execute combat operations in space.

A Joint Force Space Component Commander-like position will integrate space operations with theater planning to coordinate Negation requirements. Also, the USSPACECOM Battle Managers will support this organization by managing information and tasking in near real time.

As on-orbit systems and space debris increase, many more objects reenter the Earth's atmosphere. In fact, because spacecraft use composite materials, they will often reenter intact. We'll need to partner with other players in space to reduce the dangers of these reentries.

The United States will need to develop national policies supporting space warfare, weapons de-velopment and employment, and rules of engagement. Key allies, theater commanders, and agencies will have to coordinate on these policies.

Negation-Overall Assessment

Our overall assessment for Negation is YELLOW because planned and programmed systems satisfy all Negation capabilities except combat assessment (see Figure 5-23).

Negation-Technology Assessment

Today, we have conventional abilities that produce mostly permanent effects against satellite ground stations. In the future, we need land, sea, air and space-based systems. These flexible, negation systems must strike precisely to produce reversible and permanent effects against all nodes of a potential adversary's space systems. They must act in near real time and not harm systems belonging to allies or neutral players.

Laser and radio frequency technologies offer promise to provide improved permanent effects without fratricide to friendly and neutral systems. We need to develop devices using chemical oxygen-iodine lasers (COIL), free-electron lasers, nonlinear optics, passive and active high-resolution imaging, beam control, optical sensing technologies, and high-power optical components, and ways of establishing the vulnerability of a target.

High-Power Microwaves may be able to disrupt, degrade, and destroy electronics in communication and information systems. They would use bandwidths at high peak power to damage electronic information processing and communications or bandwidths at high average power to disrupt them. Efforts are underway on radio-frequency sources and effects, antennas, and pulsed-power systems. Digital radio-frequency memory can accurately store, replicate, and manipulate coherent signals for retransmission, thus degrading a threatening sensor's ability. Microwave power modules also are much smaller and more efficient than typical transmitters using vacuum tubes or transistors.

In addition to ground-, air-, and space-based lasers, radio-frequency transmitters, and microwave technologies, the military Space Operations Vehicle and space-based weapons would give the United States enough flexibility to meet future Negation requirements. The military Space Operations Vehicle and Space-Based Lasers are inherently flexible because they offer options for reversible and non-lethal effects. But the Space Operations Vehicle will require lightweight, durable thermal protection and revolutionary propulsion systems, as well as other technologies outlined under Assured Access.

The military Space Operations Vehicle and space-based weapons can perform temporary and permanent jamming, strike satellites, and blind space sensors. Ground-Based Lasers are being developed and demonstrated to support antisatellite systems. A central part of the effort is the Air Force's demonstration of integrated beam control with parallel development for the COIL device, high-power optical components, and assessments of a satellite's vulnerability. Jamming will require laser sources to provide the precisely directed, highly intense beams of coherent, mid-infrared, jamming energy. Semi-conductor laser diodes are very efficient, bright, lightweight, and compact. Technologies for information operations may also be able to temporarily deny, disrupt, and degrade enemy systems.

By 2020, when USCINCSPACE becomes a supported commander, battle-management technologies must mature to create a seamless net serving USCINCSPACE, other combatant CINCs, and combat-support agencies for execution in hours or even minutes. Battle management must include assessing the success of Negation missions. This assessment will be toughest for temporary effects.

Figure 5-23 Assessment for Negation

Negation-Recommendations and Directives

(Directive) Advocate programs for flexible, precision attack via land, air, sea, and space (SPJ3).

(Directive) Advocate the ability to assess Negation results onboard, as a complement to national or theater systems (SPJ3).

(Recommendation) Advocate national policy and legislation to support Negation (SPJ5).

(Directive) Evolve doctrine to consolidate Negation with Prevention (SPJ5).

SUMMARY ASSESSMENT

The overall assessment is YELLOW based on combining the ratings of the five specified objectives:

• Assured Access is GREEN in 2020, if required systems, CONOPS partnerships, and policies are available.
• Surveillance of Space is YELLOW in 2020 if we can credibly analyze the space surveillance system's performance. A GREEN rating requires strong advances in quickly characterizing space objects, as well as improvements in locating and sizing orbits.
• Protection in 2020 is low YELLOW. To achieve a YELLOW rating, we must develop and incorporate emerging technologies for affordable, lightweight, and effective systems that detect threats.
• Prevention in 2020 is rated a low YELLOW, with large shortfalls. Systems, CONOPS, and organizations must be planned and developed to address the deficiencies. But partnering efforts could increase the rating to GREEN.
• Negation is YELLOW, despite the range of negation equipment projected for 2020, because it won't have systems to assess its success.

Prioritized Capabilities

We developed critical capabilities by focusing on those which (1) support multiple objectives, (2) address a near-term threat, and (3) enable other capabilities by providing resources or because they must exist before we can carry out the others. For example, characterizing high-interest objects in real time is a primary surveillance capability that supports the ability to protect our space systems and negate an adversary's. In addition, the growing number of satellite services being developed and deployed by organizations outside the United States means characterizing these objects is a near-term threat. Finally, characterizing high interest objects logically precedes the ability to target, attack, and assess effects.

As you read the following lists, keep in mind that we consider all key capabilities important but must identify critical ones due to constrained resources.

Critical capabilities are essential to gain freedom of operations in space and denying that freedom to others. So we gave priority to capabilities that preserve our space advantage and improve our situational understanding of space, including knowledge about US and allied systems, potential threats, and unauthorized use. It's also essential to be able to change the space force structure, so we can counter or gain an advantage over an adversary.

Critical Capabilities

Key Capabilities

Assess Mission Impact (Protection/Prevention)
Combat Assessment (Negation)
Timely Surveillance of High Interest Objects (Surveillance of Space)
On-Demand Satellite Deployment (Assured Access)
Launch to Sustain Required Constellations for Peacetime (Assured Access)
Precision Attack (Negation)
Employment on Demand (Negation)
Detect/Track Precise Size & Location (Surveillance of Space)
ID/Locate/Classify Source (Surveillance of Space)
Timely Flexible Denial (Prevention)
Withstand & Defend (Protection)
Catalog/Monitoring (Protection)
Reconstitute & Repair (Protection)
On-Demand SATOPS Execution (Assured Access)
Integrated SATOPS Mission Planning (Assured Access)