Figure 6-1 Operational Concept for Global Engagement
GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT
In 2020, the US faces a wide array of national, transnational, and rogue actors who seek an advantage using highly lethal, low-cost weapons. Pro-liferating weapons of mass destruction (and related delivery systems) with increasing range, accuracy, and lethality, pose extreme danger to North America and areas of interest abroad. Joint Vision 2010 characterizes this environment as "challenging and uncertain," mandating that America and its coalition partners "fight as a joint team."
Looking to support Joint Vision 2010 and national security requirements in the next decade, USSPACECOM has developed the Global Engagement (GE) operational concept (Figure 6-1). It advocates integrated focused surveillance of space, air, and surface areas-designated by combatant commanders-a defensive umbrella against missile attack, and a force application capability for certain high-priority targets. To achieve this concept, we must integrate a robust ability to surveil from space with theater air and surface-based systems to support the Full Spectrum Dominance that Joint Vision 2010 demands.
Figure 6-1 Operational Concept for Global Engagement
GE will give theater commanders greater situational awareness and more reaction time by providing an effective forward presence in space as forward basing of forces decreases. Built on in-formation superiority, it takes advantage of leap-ahead technologies that bring unprecedented speed, flexibility, and perspective to an increasingly lethal battlespace. At present, the notion of weapons in space is not consistent with national policy. GE provides a plan that will provide alternatives to civilian leaders if a decision is made that this capability is in the national interest. In that event, we may need to encourage an environment of collective common security to generate the international and national political and fiscal support needed to update treaties and field systems for GE.
USCINCSPACE's vision seeks to revolutionize surface and air surveillance, missile defense, and Force Application from the ultimate "high ground." Its abilities will be even more dramatic than that of military aircraft decades ago. The past margin of safety for our homeland, allies, and vital interests-eroded by new, longer-range weapons-will expand again under GE.
For GE to succeed, we must integrate many systems for surveillance, warning, and command and control. Doing so will give us dominant battlespace awareness-information superiority. Combatant commanders will face adversaries who can threaten their theaters from far away, so USSPACECOM's planners envision a global defense information network-managed nationally-to integrate, process, and distribute staggering volumes of data. The data will move through battle managers that permit combatant commands to respond rapidly to threats with integrated land, sea, air, and space power.
GE faces significant challenges, including a worldwide, integrated system for command and control, surveillance of all environments day and night, the need to develop national and international space policies, and enough analysis to support critical tradeoffs of technology, systems, and architectures. Supporting Service components and DoD/National organizations will work together to meet these challenges. In the following sections, we first analyze GE's specified objectives: Integrated Focused Surveillance, Missile Defense, and Force Application. Then, we examine key tasks and capabilities, systems, CONOPS, organizations, partnerships, policies, and technologies. Finally, we assess our ability to achieve GE's goals and present directives and recommendations that will overcome shortfalls.
GE will provide worldwide situational awareness, a global defensive umbrella against missile strikes, and global deterrence against attack with potential offensive systems that possess decisive speed and precise lethality. It is seamlessly integrated with theater land, sea, and air systems through a global defense information network. The advanced systems that will provide these capabilities must develop through extensive national, civil, and commercial partnering.
Future space systems will give commanders greater situational awareness and more time to react by providing a forward presence to complement land, sea, and air systems in theater. Global situational awareness is critical for GE. To get it, we need global systems that can operate day and night in all environments-and in real time. These surface, air, and space capabilities will allow us to dominate all engagements. Whenever a theater's assets are limited, space capabilities will provide commanders with adequate situational awareness and force options until they can put theater assets in place.
In 2020, GE expands warning and assessment from space for missile defense, as well as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). It provides (1) worldwide situational awareness, (2) an integrated worldwide umbrella against missile attack, and (3) a limited ability to apply force from space against high-value, time-sensitive targets (see Figure 6-2).
Its most unique attribute is its availability-on-demand support for warning, surveillance, or targeting information, as well as missile defense or Force Application. All GE objectives will be executed through a USSPACECOM Battle Manager (see Figure 6-3).
Figure 6-2 Evolution to Global Engagement
Figure 6-3 Global Defense Information Network and the Battle Managers
GE is founded on three objectives-Integrated Focused Surveillance, Missile Defense and Force Application. Each objective contains key tasks that produce key capabilities and 2020 metrics. Systems and technologies, CONOPS, and organizations must be synchronized to achieve these capabilities. Also, national policies, domestic and international partnerships, and agreements and treaties will affect their development. Let's analyze these objectives in priority order, using the nine categories shown in Figure 6-4.
Integrated Focused Surveillance
Integrated Focused Surveillance is the cornerstone of GE. Its systems provide on-demand, continual surveillance of high-interest targets-to support missile defense and force application for all commanders. High-interest targets, as defined by the NCA and combatant commanders, will probably include key fixed, moving, buried, and relocatable targets, as well as ballistic and cruise missiles. Observing these targets will require a sophisticated system of systems sensor network with diverse capabilities that can operate in all environments and in near real-time. The need for global surveillance (anytime, anywhere) leads to space-based solutions without political or geographic constraints. Over time, many surveillance capabilities that are currently delivered by surface and air-based platforms will migrate to space-based platforms. This will occur in phases as technologies mature and are incorporated into new systems. Challenges presented by missile and air surveillance are very different than those for surveillance of fixed and moving surface targets, and may require different solutions. This will lead to families of systems that provide different space-based capabilities: one similar to Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) for missile and air sur-veillance, and another similar to Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) for mobile and fixed surface targets. These systems will be fully integrated with comparable theater surface and air-based surveillance systems. Determining the most effective mix of surface, air, and space systems, and developing a phased plan that migrates surveillance capabilities to space will be essential to the success of Integrated Focused Surveillance. Figure 6-5 lists the key tasks, with their rationales, for Integrated Focused Surveillance.
From these tasks, we established five key capabilities for 2020:
Target set detection, surveillance. monitoring, and tracking of high interest objects in near real time is predicated on all source intelligence and is integral for both offensive and defensive time sensitive engagements. It must support all phases of targeting
Figure 6-4 Analyzing Global Engagement
Figure 6-5 Key Tasks for integrated Focused Surveillance
Figure 6-6 depicts current abilities as well as the goal for 2020.
Figure 6-7 is an Integrated Focused Surveillance roadmap based on candidate systems and technologies provided by the Components, Services, and other agencies. Current and planned classified systems were fully considered in the development of this roadmap and as part of the system assessment discussed below. An explanation of what they do and how they fit in to the roadmap is beyond the classification level of this document.
Integrated Focused Surveillance Systems Assessment
Figure 6-6 Integrated Focused Surveillance Capabilities and Goals for
2020
Figure 6-7 Integrated Focused Surveillance Roadmap
Integrated Focused Surveillance CONOPS, Organizations, Global Partnerships and Policies
To provide effective guidance and structure for crucial systems, CONOPS must lead away from stove-piped thinking and foster integrated land, sea, air and space operations. Requisite concepts include shared warning, USSPACECOM Battle Managers, and consolidated worldwide surveillance.
The Shared Early Warning CONOPS guides how to send data on missile warning from theaters to select allies. Because global defense information network will work at several security levels, this will expand to a Global Shared Warning CONOPS. Currently, we have strategic, theater, and shared warning that use separate systems and procedures. In the future, we'll have a common approach that uses the global defense information network to provide tailored warning information and standardized procedures to US and allied forces. The concept for USSPACECOM Battle Managers is also crucial and will bring together a variety of systems to create Integrated Focused Surveillance, so all commanders and decision makers can use the results. Finally, as advanced surveillance systems begin operating near 2020, a Consolidated Worldwide Surveillance CONOPS must be developed to integrate surface, air, and space systems from cradle to grave.
Organizations must keep pace with advanced systems and concepts, especially for the global defense information network. Divisions along traditional lines, such as centers for missile warning, space control, and air-defense operations, limit our flexibility and efficiency in completing a mission that must become more integrated.
Integrated Focused Surveillance could benefit strongly from three key partnerships that would (1) integrate commercial imagery, (2) develop dual-use technology with NASA's Mission to Planet Earth, and (3) develop a dual-use system for tracking aircraft with the FAA.
Emerging civil, military, and commercial space systems give us the chance to dramatically increase efficiency and decrease development and operational costs with dual-use systems. New space-based sensors are already being fielded. US and foreign companies will soon market imagery accurate to one meter. New generations of remote-sensing satellites will produce multi-spectral imagery at a much higher resolution than the current LANDSAT and SPOT systems, and Canada is already marketing its new radar-imaging satellite as a commercial project. Incorporating these products into Integrated Focused Surveillance by 2005 could save scarce resources to apply in other areas.
One of NASA's core programs is the Mission to Planet Earth. This program coordinates an aggressive international effort in remote sensing. It will produce data so environmental scientists can better understand the complex interaction of our planet's land mass, hydrosphere, and atmosphere with space. The challenge of collecting, archiving, cross-referencing, and distributing information is similar for Integrated Focused Surveillance and Mission to Planet Earth. Large segments of the civil and commercial sector could benefit from generic capabilities such as automatic signature recognition, database archiving, and cross-referencing. Weather research and forecasting, banking and investment experts, agriculture, medicine, manufacturing, and education are just a few examples of how commercial applications can grow from government programs. Shared development of these capabilities during the first decade of the next century could strongly influence political and economic support for Integrated Focused Surveillance-a critical enabling concept for GE.
A potential key civil and military dual-use part-nership is a global space-based tracking system for domestic and international civil aviation traffic control. By 2020, this capability could replace ground-based radars, improve aviation safety, and increase international stability while reducing operational costs. There may be commercial applications as well. In the future, companies may see aircraft as part of a system that includes command and control (tracking) and use this capability to obtain marked improvements in safety as the number of airlines increases. Based on a Space-Based Radar with moving target indicator, this partnership could become as powerful and important as GPS is today. Partnerships in this area would build broad political support and a solid industrial and economic base for Integrated Focused Surveillance.
Integrated Focused Surveillance Overall Assessment
Capabilities under development for Integrated Focused Surveillance should support all missions by 2020, so we've rated this area GREEN. By 2020, technologies will emerge to provide day and night coverage in all environments within high-priority areas (see Figure 6-8).
Three pivotal items emerge from this analysis. We must have a global defense information network for Integrated Focused Surveillance to be effective. This network integrates space systems with surface and air systems, and resolves tasking, cueing, and distribution issues for the NCA and all commanders. Space-Based Radars will strongly improve coverage in all weather, day and night. Although other technologies like ultra-spectral sensors exist, we expect that Space-Based Radars will expand coverage in this critical area and move Integrated Focused Surveillance to a GREEN rating. It must be acknowledged, however, that stealth and advanced counter-surveillance technologies may degrade these abilities.
Figure 6-8 Assessment of Integrated Focused Surveillance
Integrated Focused Surveillance Technology Assessment
The systems needed to satisfy requirements for Integrated Focused Surveillance haven't been defined, but experts from the Components, Serv-ices, and other agencies believe certain technologies need to be explored, refined, and developed.
Space-based sensors for surveillance require new technology to rapidly and accurately detect, identify, characterize and track targets. Electro-optical, spectral, and synthetic aperture radar are just three types of sensors that could do these tasks. All need further development to produce a robust constellation that can detect and report targets in near real time under all conditions.
Electro-optical and spectral sensors must be lightweight and have high signal-to-noise ratio characteristics requiring advanced optics, dispersion elements, focal planes, and processing segments. For synthetic-aperture radar sensors, using high-power antennas, we need lighter transmit/receive modules and highly efficient amplifiers.
Advanced surveillance sensors demand much more of spacecraft: greater power, precision pointing, and lightweight rigid structures. Spacecraft may also need to process data onboard. This will require robust, reconfigurable, radiation-hardened processors, real-time capabilities, advancements in high-speed processors, models for using data, cross cueing techniques, and fusion technologies.
Work is already underway to develop a family of surveillance satellites that could provide some of the required capabilities, but the space segment is just one piece of the architecture needed for Integrated Focused Surveillance. The global defense information network, for example, must fuse and manage information from all sources.
USSPACECOM should stay involved in ongoing studies of surveillance within DoD. The requirements documents derived from these studies will play a key role in achieving our 2020 goals. Trends in surveillance technologies suggest we could get what we need if we have:
Integrated Focused Surveillance Recommendations and Directives
We must achieve Integrated Focused Surveillance before completing Missile Defense and Precision Strike. To realize 2020 goals for this area, USCINCSPACE must:
(Directive/Recommendation) Advocate operational requirements and priorities, emphasizing sensors that work day and night in all environments. (SPJ5)
(Directive/Recommendation) Advocate wide-area, global coverage. (SPJ5)
(Recommendation) Support development of technology for automatically recognizing and characterizing targets. (N-SPJ2, SPJ3/5)
(Directive/Recommendation) Coordinate with other CINCs, Components, and Services on concepts for a global defense information network to make sure it's compatible with similar systems that support Joint Warfare. (SPJ3, N-SPJ6)
(Recommendation) Support development of multi-level security capabilities. (N-SPJ6)
(Recommendation) Support development of dual-use technologies and systems. (N-SP/AN, SPJ3/5, N-SP/J6)
(Directive) Establish a dialogue with NASA, the NRO, and other stakeholders to develop a phased migration of surveillance capabilities to space platforms for air and missile surveillance, as well as surface surveillance, and to determine the mix of surface, air, and space platforms that provides the most effective capability for the end users. (N-SPJ2, SPJ3/J5)
Missile Defense protects against ballistic and cruise missiles threatening forces and vital interests of the US and our allies. This task becomes more difficult as systems are able to deliver weapons of mass destruction with increased range and lethality. Countering the worldwide threat of cruise missiles at low altitudes will be particularly challenging. But if we can field effective systems and use them in concert with theater capabilities, we'll also be able to counter other high-value airborne targets, such as aircraft and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. As with Integrated Focused Surveillance, Missile Defense must integrate seamlessly with theater systems for all commanders and decision makers. Figure 6-9 lists the key tasks for Missile Defense.
Based on the tasks in Figure 6-9, we've identified four key capabilities for Missile Defense in 2020:
Figure 6-10 shows how we do these four things now, as well as the goal for 2020
Figure 6-9 Key Tasks for Missile Defense
Figure 6-10 Missile Defense Capabilities and Goals for 2020
Figure 6-11 Missile Defense Roadmap
Missile Defense-Systems Assessment
Figure 6-11 shows a missile defense roadmap based on candidate systems and technologies the Components, Services, and other agencies provided.
The Space-Based Platform and Space Operations Vehicle will enable weapons that will engage ballistic missiles in their boost, midcourse, and final phases, as well as cruise missiles at most altitudes. Space-Based Lasers will do better. The USSPACECOM Battle Managers and global defense information network must allow commanders with forces at risk to select and use the proper weapons and, if the threat isn't neutralized, continue the engagement. They will also update all commanders and decision makers on system readiness and replenishment.
Combat Assessment (2020 goal: 100%, real time). Programmed and planned systems will reach 2020 goals. Most missile-defense systems can assess battle damage after an engagement with limits similar to those for full-spectrum engagement. Current systems, such as PAC-3 and Aegis, have limited coverage and capability to determine battle damage. Advanced theater systems will expand coverage and better define target damage. Early "strategic" systems, such as Ground-Based Lasers and Interceptors, will start us in the right direction. The Space-Based Platform, Space Operations Vehicle and Space-Based Laser will add to these capabilities. USSPACECOM Battle Managers and global defense information network will provide vital combat assessments for commanders and automated cross cueing for sensors and defense systems.
Missile Defense-CONOPS, Organizations, Global Partnerships and Policies
A key CONOPS for Missile Defense is USSPACECOM Battle Managers which parallels the concept for Integrated Focused Surveillance. As the global defense information network develops, it must integrate the capabilities, planning requirements, and execution needs of all surface, air, and space-based missile defense systems. It must support all commanders and decision makers. The US supports shared-warning systems for some allies, but we must have a global warning system to support the missile defense partnership described below.
The USSPACECOM Battle Managers and global defense information network must work across traditional boundaries in more flexible, integrated organizations.
Today, policy for military space systems resembles that of aviation at the beginning of the 20th Century. In 1899, before airplanes were invented, the Hague Peace Conference banned them from combat; but countries ignored this restriction during World War I. In 2020, regional instability, terrorism, and the proliferation of accurate, long-range weapons, capable of mass destruction, may present as great a challenge to the world community as strategic nuclear weapons did during the Cold War. National policy and commitments to treaties on antiballistic missiles permit us to deploy only limited systems to counter large strategic threats but allow deploying robust systems to counter theater threats. To counter these threats worldwide, especially when theater systems are absent, we need space-based capabilities. We must investigate candidate technologies so options will be available when called for. Treaties that maintain stability and strategic balance during the Cold War may need to change if we are to maintain world security in 2020.
Peaceful nations must prudently guard against the threats described above but unilateral action may appear aggressive and hostile. Strong coalitions and collective security arrangements should address re-gional instability, terrorist actions, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and sophisticated, long-range delivery systems. Such arrangements will provide strong political and economic support for a new generation of agreements and treaties that normalize space operations.
Missile Defense-Overall Assessment
Developing capabilities should meet all requirements for Missile Defense by 2020. Theater systems will cover some geographic areas, and space-based systems will provide global coverage. Analysis reveals that we need several pivotal systems and should address two critical issues concerning policy and partnerships.
Ground-Based Interceptors, Space Operations Vehicles, Space-Based Platforms and Lasers, and High Power Microwaves are crucial. If we add the Ground-Based Interceptor to theater defense systems, we can marginally satisfy this mission in 2003 (rated YELLOW).
If we add Space Operations Vehicles and Space-Based Platforms to the mix, we can move to a GREEN rating by 2008 to 2012. These systems will use similar, possibly identical payloads, so they're basically different platforms for the same weapon. Since scarce resources may not permit funding of both, this may result in a decision point between the two planned concepts.
The Space-Based Laser and High Power Microwave will use directed energy to strike nearly all potential targets. Because both are large and expensive, we may need to choose one. Fortunately, they're just beginning to develop and won't deploy before 2018 or 2020. By 2005, we should have enough information to analyze tradeoffs and decide between them, if necessary.
Eventually, leaders may need to review national policy on space-based weapons, particularly related to the ABM Treaty. Politics after the Cold War make this difficult, but emphasizing the benefits of coalition action and collective security should gradually build support for it.
Figure 6-12 Assessment of Missile Defense
Missile Defense-Technology Assessment
Assets for Integrated Focused Surveillance also support Missile Defense. Today, we're emphasizing defense against theater ballistic missiles. National Missile Defense considers defense against large ICBMs and SLBMs. We'll have to include cruise missiles in the future but the space segment won't have to do it all. Instead, it will be part of a worldwide, integrated system for Missile Defense based on the ground, in the air, and in space. Defenses will operate in tiers to serve all commanders and will engage missiles in all phases of flight.
To defend against missiles, we must find a way to detect threats quickly in land, sea, air, and space environments, as well as during all kinds of weather. New sensor and imaging technologies are described in the previous section on Integrated Focused Surveillance.
Engagement options range from conventional to kinetic and directed energy weapons based in all mediums. Technical challenges for space-based systems include weight constraints, adaptive optics, and beam control. Laser weapons similar to those described in the chapter on Control of Space may apply to Missile Defense, but they must get much better at tracking and intercepting targets. Kinetic weapons also face technical challenges: developing and integrating miniaturized guidance, continuous control, actuation technology, applying advanced composites to high-performance propulsion systems, controlling fires, improving their penetrating power, and improving propulsion.
Integrating missile defense technologies may be the greatest challenge and requires a global defense information network and a USSPACECOM Battle Managers as part of this system.
Commercial solutions are advancing quickly, especially in telecommunication and computing, so the US military should be able to leverage them at relatively low cost. We should have an infrastructure for limited Missile Defense by 2020 if we follow current development paths and partner with organizations outside the DoD.
Missile Defense-Recommendations and Directives
Missile Defense restores the margin of safety for our homeland, allies, and vital interests. USCINCSPACE must address key issues on resources, requirements, and policies to achieve 2020 goals:
(Recommendation) Establish a dialogue with appropriate government organizations on space policy. (SPJ5)
(Directive/Recommendation) Develop a "nodal analysis" of the technologies contained in this Long Range Plan. (N-SP/AN, All Components)
(Directive) Define and help in cross-fertilizing the Components' technology efforts. (N-SP/AN, SP/3/5)
(Directive/Recommendation) Work with Components and other CINCs to develop, test, refine, and exercise rules of engagement across theaters and to fully integrate space systems into theater and JTF operations. (N-SP/AN, SPJ3/5)
(Directive) Update IPL to establish clear priority for candidate systems that provide key capabilities. (SPJ5)
"Department of Defense shall maintain a capability to execute the
mission areas of space support, force enhancement, space control and force application." |
USCINCSPACE responsibilities include:
|
From its inception in 1985, USSPACECOM has been directed by the Unified Command Plan (UCP) to plan for and develop requirements in support of engaging ballistic missile attacks on the United States. There are potential space-based solutions to this very difficult national missile defense challenge. If our country were to pursue research and development of these space-based options, they would also offer attributes for the engagement of time-critical, very high value targets (besides BMD) anywhere in the world. Force Application could hold a finite number of targets at risk anywhere, anytime. In support of direction by the National Space Policy and Unified Command Plan, this Long Range Plan examines the possibility of force application in some detail.
At present, the notion of weapons in space is not consistent with us national policy. Planning for this possibility is the purpose of this plan should our civilian leadership later decide that the application of force from space is in out national interest |
Many of the systems and concepts for Missile Defense may have applicability to Force Application. This concept envisions holding a finite number of targets at risk anywhere, anytime with nearly instantaneous attack from space-based assets. This concept will add options for deterrence and flexibility for the NCA. It will offer reduced risk, increased speed, and short cycle times to counter some high-value targets that may threaten US and allied forces and interests. Thus, the NCA may need at its disposal a means of engagement, in the form of Force Application from space, to neutralize threats without widespread destruction. The ability to apply force from space may employ orbital systems or ground-based systems. Force Application may be optimal when time is absolutely critical, risk associated with other options are too high or when no other courses of action are available. National and possibly coalition support for this concept will likely precede any research on capabilities deployment. Policies, doctrine, treaties, CONOPS, and command and control issues for Force Application may be more restrictive than those previously discussed for Missile Defense.
Seven military tasks are envisioned to be essential for the future employment of Force Application. One of these, cueing, is also a key task for Integrated Focused Surveillance. Five others-identifying targets, mission planning, executing, reconstituting, and assessing and reporting-are identical to the similarly named key tasks for Missile Defense. The remaining task is weaponeering (see Figure 6-13).
Figure 6-13 Key Tasks for force Application
Based on the projected tasks in Figure 6-13, there are five proposed key capabilities for 2020:
Figure 6-14 depicts the proposed 2020 key capabilities and metrics for Force Application.
Figure 6-14 Force Application Capabilities and Goals for 2020
Force Application-Assessing Possible Systems-Concepts
Figure 6-15 is a roadmap for research, and when appropriate, development of Force Application that, with NCA approval, could be deployed. It is primarily based on Missile Defense candidate systems and technologies which the Components, Services, and other agencies provided.
Figure 6-15 Force Application Roadmap
Force Application-CONOPS, Organizations, Global Partnerships and Policies
Concepts for Force Application are centered on global defense information network and USSPACECOM Battle Managers and are identical to those for Missile Defense.
Key organizations for Force Application relate to global defense information network and are the same as those discussed for Integrated Focused Surveillance and Missile Defense. Development and approval of the appropriate policies for Force Application, are the key issues for this capability. We recognize that the NCA has the lead to define national policy in this area, and no capability can be implemented until the NCA directs this to occur. Our objective is to plan for the future, conduct appropriate research, and propose possible pathways to achieve this capability. Key policy and partnership issues for Force Application are part of those for Missile Defense, where we addressed the need to reevaluate space policy in light of a new world situation. We advocate building coalition support for space-based defensive systems and 21st Century treaties. If successful, this construct will allow us to deploy potent defensive systems, but the source of the threat will remain. The next step is deploying systems for force ap-plication that add to collective security by strongly deterring rogue states.
Force Application-Overall Assessment
Many of the technologies, systems and CONOPS developed for a robust Missile Defense provide a significant springboard for Force Application capabilities. In the event that the NCA chooses to accomplish Force Application, the ongoing Missile Defense efforts and the research and development initiatives outlined in the plan would meet all mission requirements by 2020; so its rating is GREEN (Figure 6-16).
Space Operations Vehicles and Space-Based Platforms will support Force Application by offering increased responsiveness and versatility that will result in better coverage of potential targets. Thus, by 2008-2012, we should be able to meet part of the mission and achieve an overall rating of YELLOW. As with Missile Defense, Space Operations Vehicles and Space-Based Interceptors will use similar, if not identical payloads.
The Ballistic Missile Replacement, Space-Based Lasers and High Power Microwaves, will meet all mission requirements and turn the rating to GREEN in 2018 to 2020. The Ballistic Missile Replacement is essentially an improved replacement for the Conventional Ballistic Missile and will be compatible with whatever follows our fleet of intercontinental ballistic missiles. Lasers and High Power Microwaves offer nearly the same kind of support, and may fulfill potential Force Application missions.
Force Application-Technology Assessment
Pending NCA guidance, each of the systems proposed to support Force Application concepts require attention in many technology areas. Space-Based Lasers must be lightweight, consume little power, be very accurate and develop high energy. They'll also need to overcome atmospheric distortion. High Power Microwaves must use lightweight sources of highly efficiency radio-frequency energy. Both systems will need new spacecraft technologies to provide more power and extremely accurate pointing and tracking. Other areas that need technology improvements are advanced systems for guidance and navigation, high-speed processors, and techniques for stabilizing spacecraft. Geolocation accuracy is also critical. To hit a terrestrial target requires precise knowledge of the spacecraft's state vector (attitude, velocity, and acceleration). The systems we use now don't provide a precise enough state vector for Space-Based Lasers or High Power Microwaves. GPS receivers, star trackers, data processing, and data fusion are just some of the technologies that must improve to support these weapons.
Data processing, including precise algorithms, is critical for detecting, identifying, and tracking targets, as well as suppressing backgrounds. Concepts for Force Application systems will depend strongly on accurate sensors to detect targets, but we'll have this technology if we develop capabilities for Integrated Focused Surveillance.
To cover the world, Common Aero Vehicles must reenter at very large cross ranges and, therefore, be able to withstand very high thermal and aero-dynamic loads. We'll need low-cost, durable, lightweight thermal materials, as well as advanced materials and structures, to meet this capability.
We'll also need innovative techniques to deploy the weapons these vehicles will carry.
Figure 6-16 Assessment of Force Application
Force Application-Recommendations and Directives
USCINCSPACE should address key issues on resources, requirements, and policies to explore Force Application concepts:
(Directive) Develop concepts for carrying out the Force Application mission. (SPJ5/AFSPC)
(Directive) Pursue research and development programs for Force Application as approved and consistent with national policy. (SPAN/AFSPC)
(Directive) Examine the Force Application mission through Title X and other wargame opportunities.
(Directive/Recommendation) Help develop Force Application system models and simulations to support tradespace analyses and policy implications. (N-SP/AN, SPJ3/5, Components)
(Recommendation) Establish a dialogue with appropriate government organizations on Force Application space policy. (SPJ5)
The GREEN rating for Global Engagement depends on ratings of GREEN for Integrated Focused Sur-veillance, Missile Defense, and Force Application.
Integrated Focused Surveillance becomes GREEN in 2018, when we'll have robust sensors that can operate day and night in all weather, plus a fully capable global defense information network. Good coverage is available for theaters and other high-interest areas. We'll need to harness technology for Integrated Focused Surveillance to provide enough global coverage under tight budgets.
Missile Defense goes from RED to YELLOW in 2003, YELLOW to GREEN in 2008-2012, and reaches full capability in 2018-2020. Ground-Based Interceptors and theater defense systems marginally meet this mission and achieve a YELLOW rating. Space Operations Vehicles and Space-Based Platforms fully cover the mission, resulting in a GREEN rating. We project no shortfalls, but stealth technology could seriously impact Missile Defense capabilities. Policies must be reviewed, and in some cases modified, to achieve full capability.
The potential for adequate Force Application from space becomes YELLOW in 2008-2012 with the advent of Space Operations Vehicles and Space-Based Platforms and GREEN in 2018-2020 because we expect Space-Based Lasers and High Power Microwaves to be operational. We expect no shortfalls, but advanced techniques for countering surveillance could create problems by degrading accurate targeting information. Policy issues are very similar to those for Missile Defense.
Prioritized Capabilities
In this section we've ranked critical capabilities for Global Engagement. Listing the most important key capabilities will help focus the actions of USSPACECOM, Components and other organizations.
Critical Capabilities
| Real Time Target Identification and Characterization (Integrated Focused Surveillance)
Ballistic and Cruise Missile Warning (Integrated Focused Surveillance) Battle Management (All) On Demand Missile Defense (Missile Defense) |
Key Capabilities
Missile Defense Combat Assessment (Missile Defense)
Target Set Detection/Surveillance/Monitoring/Tracking (Integrated Focused Surveillance)
On Demand Force Application (Force Application)
Locating Ballistic Missile Launch Point and Impact Point Prediction (Integrated Focused
Surveillance)
Flexible Force Application (Force Application)
Force Application Combat Assessment (Force Application)
Flexible Effects (Force Application)
