Figure 7-9 The Global Defense Information Network is Central to Battle Management (BM)
FULL FORCE INTEGRATION
Establishing Global Standards
USSPACECOM must meet the DoD's standards in developing its battle managers to make sure they'll integrate with others. Further, all of USSPACECOM's information-producing assets must meet these standards so all battle managers can easily process information from all sources. The command will follow the DoD's standards (or commercial standards) whenever they're practical, establishing unique standards only when these standards are clearly inadequate.
Determining Common Types of Warfighter Information
To give warfighters information superiority, data from land, sea, air, and space must be fully integrated, easily understood, and accessible. Today, most warfighters think of information from space as part of USSPACECOM's Force Enhancement missions, (warning, navigation, meteorological and oceanographic (METOC), earth resource monitoring (ERM), and reconnaissance and surveillance). Warfighters extract what they can and combine it with information from sources on land, sea, and air. To be fully supportive, this integration must be automatic, so we propose two key steps:
Figure 7-9 The Global Defense Information Network is Central to Battle Management (BM)
In this section, we've focused on integrating information from space into all warfare mediums. Because Force Enhancement information is critical to warfighters, we must address USSPACECOM's capabilities, 2020 goals, and possible shortfalls for Navigation, METOC/ERM, Warning, and Reconnaissance and Surveillance.
Navigation
Space-based navigation systems provide three-dimensional position, data and a timing standard to military, civil, and commercial users worldwide. Precision navigation and timing are critical to coordinated and accurate force application by any platform in any medium providing, at a minimum, targeting and geolocation types of information. Space-based navigation into 2020 must be able to (1) cover the globe continuously in all environments; (2) cover space continuously; (3) improve positional accuracy; (4) improve timing accuracy; (5) operate in a navigation warfare environment; and (6) provide timely warning of failures.
Navigation systems now provide nearly worldwide coverage within the atmosphere at or above the earth's surface. With modest improvements already planned for the GPS constellation by 2020, this capability should reach 100% in all areas. But nothing on line or planned will support covert operations and some subsurface operations. We must explore technology to get coverage in all environments (e.g., through foliage and land structures). This technology must include the ability to adjust signals, power, and frequencies. For example, better technology for receivers, waveforms, and antennas could produce better penetration by the navigation signal for some applications.
Navigation positioning and timing are very important to space surveillance. It's now common for space vehicles to use navigation signals to determine orbits, calculate ephemeris data, and precisely time operations. By 2020, we'll need coverage in space out to geosynchronous orbits around Earth and beyond. Adding aft-facing antennas on GPS satellites will make this coverage possible by 2012.
Positional accuracy for systems using navigation and timing signals will improve spherical error probability (SEP) to less than one meter without relying on differential correction. Policy must address access to this precise locating data by non-military users. Before 2020, other technologies, such as Wide Area Augmentation System or Local-Area Augmentation Systems, could enable instrument landing systems that can land vehicles at zero ceiling and zero visibility.
The accuracy of a satellite's timing signal is expected to improve to one nanosecond by 2020. Precision timing already synchronizes systems such as secure communications, but increasingly complex communications networks will demand an improved timing signal. Some future timing improvements will come from cross-linking designed systems that allow satellites to compare and null faulty data in positioning and timing. Clock technology will improve timing by allowing integration of navigation packages onboard the US host satellites, thus providing a larger constellation for timing references.
The relatively new concept of Navigation Warfare assures access to precise navigation information in a challenged environment. It also selectively denies this information to adversaries while lessening the effect on neutral or friendly operations. As CONOPS develop, they must make sure US and allied systems can work together. We expect future capabilities to include a separate military frequency and variable power, which will assure some access in a hostile environment. We need better signal penetration and anti-jamming.
Whenever a platform must navigate precisely, such as for aviation and movement in space, systems must be able to warn us about degraded performance, failures, and the ensuing effects. Notice of individual failures among satellites and user equipment must be fully automatic to be reliable and efficient. This requirement will depend mostly on software that allows users to receive status reports continuously. Figure 7-10 depicts navigation goals for 2020.
Meteorological and Oceanographic/Earth Resource Monitoring (METOC/ERM)
The DoD requires worldwide and regional sensing of conditions in the atmosphere and oceans, on land, and in space to support military planning and employment across all conflicts. From precision-guided munitions to amphibious operations to space launch, this monitoring gathers information for targeting, determining threats, logistics, the battlefield environment, and situational awareness. All warfighters require some degree of worldwide surveillance (see chapter 5, Control of Space). To meet our 2020 goals for warfighting, we must improve characterizing the environment in three dimensions (3-D), coverage, refresh rates (expediency), accuracy, and physical description.
Figure 7-10 Navigation Capabilities and Goals for 2020
Characterizing in 3-D precisely locates environ-mental conditions using north/south and east/west coordinates, plus altitude, anywhere on the earth's surface and in the atmosphere. At present, characterizing takes hours for environmental conditions and days for land areas. Our 2020 goal is to characterize any area on the globe in 3-D within minutes or hours and to overlay this information on the common operating picture. Faster processing and more sophisticated models are necessary to tailor products that meet the warfighters' requirements in near real time. Space sensors have limited ocean penetrating capabilities but adequately provide for peacetime needs.
To exploit trends in battlespace environments, systems must revisit and observe certain regions on Earth with a particular frequency (refresh rate). Now, we can refresh worldwide data for meteorology in hours and earth resources in days. For 2020, we want the former to be at 10 minutes or less because this type of information is so perishable. Information on earth resources can refresh more slowly because it doesn't change as often. Dramatic increases in the number of space-based sensors will meet all future goals for this area.
We also need better spatial resolution from our sensors. That means better ability to detail a specified area's atmospheric and terrestrial attributes. We now have depictions for meteorology to within a kilometer and for earth resources to within 5-30 meters. To support global strikes from space, we need the former to be within hundreds of meters and the latter to be less than a meter. But space-based sensors or technologies for these accuracies aren't in the pipeline, so we'll need new development to achieve 2020 goals for spatial resolution. These goals also require much better modeling and processing to produce data that warfighters can use in 2020.
Sensors that monitor earth resources can determine an area's physical characteristics. By analyzing the data from different spectral bands, we can, for example, discern manufactured objects from natural ones, classify what an object is, and determine how that object may be changing through interaction with gases or other substances. The more bands of spectral data available, the better we can define physical characteristics. Sensors now provide tens of bands, but warfighting in 2020 will require thousands. To get there, we believe we'll need sensors providing ultra-spectral imagery which presently aren't funded or planned. But planning and funding are in place for several space-based technologies that will give us hyper-spectral imagery (hundreds of bands).
To meet overall 2020 goals for METOC/ERM, we must use the many sensors (DoD and commercial) we expect to appear in space. Figure 7-11 depicts METOC/ERM capabilities and goals for 2020.
Warning
USSPACECOM needs warning information from space assets to defend against threats from land, sea, air, and space. Now and in the future, we must (1) be able to detect, track, and identify ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and objects on land, sea, air, and space worldwide; (2) have survivable sensors; and (3) be able to generate and distribute warning information. Warning information supports warfighters requirements for worldwide surveillance, targeting, threat indication and geolocation. The ability to sense and distribute accurate, timely, and unambiguous warning information is critical to the full dimensional protection of our forces. See Figure 7-12 for a schematic of these capabilities.
The main warning goal in USSPACECOM's Vision for 2020 is to provide global coverage of threats to US interests. Because missiles and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are proliferating among nations and non-nation states, we must be able to detect, track, and identify cruise missiles and other objects in all mediums worldwide. Warning must also expand to include high-interest relocatable threats. Systems now can cover some of the current ballistic missile threats. Many future systems will strongly enhance warning coverage for some targets worldwide but no plan is yet in place to cover all of them.
Warning systems in 2020 should be able to locate targets within less than a meter. Improved warning capability will enable us to more accurately determine launch positions and predicted points of impact of ballistic missiles; discriminate between reentering warheads and decoys; and discriminate among fixed, relocatable, mobile, and moving targets. This information can also be used in targeting (e.g., retaliatory force application against launch sites, mobile or otherwise). Limited capability to precisely locate targets depends on the cumulative capabilities of planned systems which we expect to be in the field by 2006. A robust capability will require a Space-Based Radar. Similarly, we'll need ultra-spectral imagery to precisely identify objects. The cumulative capabilities of planned systems will give us only limited coverage.
Figure 7-11 METOC/ERM Rolled-Up Capabilities and Goals for 2020
Figure 7-12 Warning Capabilities and Goals for 2020
We have to detect and identify potential threats in near real time because theater missiles have short flight times, adversaries have better precision-strike weapons, and weapons of mass destruction are proliferating. We'll need object typing to help identify all objects of interest, including the type of warhead. Automatic cross-cueing, better pro-cessing and algorithms, and auto-recognition technologies are critical to timely detection. But no one is considering placing these technologies in warning systems, even though manual processing won't support the 2020 need.
Warning systems must also survive all levels of conflict and warfighting environments while quickly, reliably, comprehensively, and unambiguously warning about and characterizing all threats. Effective strategies for survivability and hardening also reduce life cycle costs by increasing a satellite's operability and endurance. Current space systems, as well as communications links to and from these space systems, meet survivability requirements. But ground-based segments fall short. According to analysis, near-term actions should keep warning systems survivable against most threats but will offer only limited protection against chemical and biological attacks.
By 2020, commanders will require warning information in near real time because of short flight time of theater missiles and improved capabilities of other weapons. To meet these requirements, warning messages must be generated nearly simultaneously with the warning indication and be continuously updated so they're always current and ready for release. Existing or planned command and control systems will distribute this warning information.
Reconnaissance and Surveillance
Reconnaissance and surveillance are essential to the warfighter. Worldwide surveillance is critical to developing situational awareness of the battle-space. Although we'll limit our discussion here because much information is classified, these abilities are vital to warning, threat indications, targeting, geolocation, and virtually every other type of warfighter information.
The US sensor capabilities are currently without peer. New and improved technologies including Hyper-Spectral Imagery (HSI), Ultra-Spectral Imagery (USI), Advanced Electro-Optical Warning Sensor (AEOWS), Space-Based Radar (SBR), and developing Low Observable (LO) and Moving Target Indicator (MTI) will come on line over the next few years to meet detection, coverage, target char-acterization and geolocation accuracy requirements envisioned for 2020. A shortfall exists, however, in the areas of tasking, cross-cueing, fusion, processing, and dissemination of intelligence data.
[Note: The roadmap for reconnaissance and surveillance is classified.]
Candidate Types
The categories and roadmaps we've described for space information are based on decades of experience in supporting warfighters' missions from space. USSPACECOM is confident this planning captures most future requirements for space derived information. But creating types of warfighter information-repackaging it into categories consistent with warfighters' needs-offers several advantages.
While "warfighter information types" that best support USSPACECOM's warfighter requirements are not decided, some likely candidates are:
Partnerships
Commercial technology already exceeds some of DoD's capabilities and will continue to outpace them. Thus, DoD should develop partnerships to exploit artificial intelligence for use in battle managers and the global defense information network, as well as to develop spectral imagery, increase data processing speed, fuse data, and observe the atmosphere and oceans. These partnerships will save money while maintaining the "leading edge" for our space forces.
Assessing Warfighter Information
By 2020, we can achieve the following:
GCCS and GCSS are operational precursors to USSPACECOM Battle Managers. The trend toward using global standards in the DoD is gaining strength, and most technologies for global defense information network are in place or under development. We anticipate that required technologies will get more attention because commercial groups also are interested in them. The real challenge is ensuring producers of space-derived information continually evaluate their contributions to the common information types, so warfighters will get the best possible support.
Directives and Recommendations on Information
This LRP directs three key actions for USSPACECOM:
This plan recommends that USSPACECOM:
The Department of Defense (DoD) has successfully developed the military's abilities in space through diverse organizations with strong skills in specialized areas. Although technically proficient, these organizations focus on their own expertise and don't interact much. No organization is the focal point or coordinator for this community. A fragmented space community hinders the warfighters' best use of space capabilities.
To remedy this situation, the military, intelligence, and civil space communities must reevaluate the way they task and operate, must close the gap between black and white space operations; and, must build partnerships to better support war-fighters. Recognizing this need, the Unified Command Plan designates USSPACECOM as the single point of contact for military operational matters in space including communications. But we can't achieve a cohesive space community merely by naming a single point of contact. Instead, we need a comprehensive approach in three areas: (1) how warfighters request space-derived information and the way we task space resources; (2) the structure necessary to support all warfighters' space needs and to command, control, and carry out space missions; and (3) the partnerships needed to encourage cooperation throughout the community.
Figure 7-13 provides an overview of how processes, structures, and partnerships evolve toward a global defense information network enabling war-fighters to directly request, task, and access resources from the military, intelligence, and civil space communities. Meanwhile, USSPACECOM must lead the effort to meet warfighters' requirements.
Organizational Process
A variety of space and non-space systems are available to collect information. The processes to request and task space resources are too complex, time consuming, and cumbersome. Today, most information providers require users to follow their unique "request for information" procedures. Even agencies and other military organizations that operate in the same area don't combine or standardize their processes. Request formats, priorities, and product formats all vary. Furthermore, tasking often requires someone to determine priorities. Requesting and tasking must be streamlined to give warfighters simpler, faster access to space-derived information.
To improve requesting and tasking, the Joint Staff, space, communication, and intelligence commu-nities must join forces to standardize the way they plan, set priorities, task, carryout warfighters' requests, and report on the status of space systems. Standard processes don't mean the information providers lose control of their products or resources, nor do they prevent warfighters from working directly with their information providers. Normal decision making to resolve apportionment issues won't change. The goal is to provide war-fighters standardized request formats, priorities, and product formats that are simple to use no matter who provides the information.
Figure 7-13 Overview of Processes, Structures and Partnerships
The first step is to ensure functional areas (i.e., MILSATCOM and intelligence) have standardized procedures through which warfighters can readily request space support. As an example, two war-fighters requiring different MILSATCOM support-say, ultra-high frequency and the Defense Satellite Communications System-will follow the same procedures for both.
Once functional areas have standard processes, we can integrate them across the space community. Then, automating these procedures will give the warfighter one uniform process for information requests.
At the same time, we must examine how tasking occurs and improve it, possibly using USSPACECOM's concept of operations for Command and Control of space forces. This concept would standardize space tasking and give warfighters a single point of contact, so they can integrate planning and synchronize assigned space forces.
We imagine the military, intelligence and civil space communitites, as well as the warfighting CINCs, will incorporate these automated processes into their battle management and information systems to facillitate real time information and battlespace characterization.
A good model is the planned tasking for the Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS). It shows the flexibility we need in future systems. Situations and priorities drive its automated processing from customer to sensor in real time. Priorities across different mission areas (missile warning and defense, technical intelligence, and battlespace information) will go into a database that will automatically order support requests without the delays in current processes that have people in the loop. The result will be more responsive and direct support to regional CINCs.
Figure 7-14 USSPACECOM's Structure for Command and Control
Organizational Structures
USSPACECOM's evolving missions and organizations require a clear understanding of how space forces will interact among themselves and with the customers they support. Integration with associated command and control must be grounded in joint doctrine, just as land, sea, and air forces are.
Near-Term Structures
In the near term, we have two challenges. First, USSPACECOM must build a structure for command and control and an operations center (see Figure 7-14) that provides a single, multi-faceted point of contact to better serve the warfighters' space requirements (including those of USCINCSPACE). Second, USSPACECOM must continue to provide space expertise and capabilities to other warfighters until space experience is organic to all unified commands.
The first challenge is building a clear chain of command for tasking between USCINCSPACE and Component commanders, and constructing a single point of contact for warfighters. The heart of the concept is centralized planning of all space forces and decentralized execution through the Components. USCINCSPACE, through his J3, will task Components using mission-type orders.
The Space Operations Center (SPOC) will be the command center from which USCINCSPACE establishes a single point of contact for military space operations, coordinates and directs operations worldwide, commands and controls space forces, and resolves conflicts with agencies, allies, and industry. During crisis or contingency operations, USSPACECOM's battle staff and battle management cell (BMC) working through the SPOC, will tailor support to CINCs. USSPACECOM will integrate and synchronize space forces to support joint and combined operations, emphasizing a joint perspective by integrating at the beginning of joint planning.
Official tasking for execution must pass from CINC to CINC unless another command relationship is established (see Figure 7-15). The normal relationship between USSPACECOM's Components and Components of other CINCs is direct liaison authority, which allows "reachback" for education, information, and initial planning. Whenever necessary, however, USCINCSPACE may expand this relationship to (1) support; (2) transfer tactical control; or (3) after consulting with the supported CINC, ask the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) to approve transferring operational control of a specific unit.
USSPACECOM's intent is to transfer forces whenever practical so the supported CINC will have as much direct control as possible. If transferring operational control is not appropriate, we will establish the necessary command relationships.
Figure 7-15 Joint Relationships
When deciding on the appropriate relationship, the Command must consider employment effects-do they stay in the region or go beyond it?-and operating location-is the system located or deployed inside the regional CINC's operating area?
Two examples, using the Joint Tactical Ground Station (JTAGS), which warns against theater missiles, will clarify this concept.
Example 1: JTAGS is permanently located in Germany, but it supports USEUCOM and USCENTCOM, and it provides shared early warning to several allied countries in both areas of responsibility. Even though it operates within one CINC's operating location, its effects are "global." Thus, USSPACECOM wouldn't transfer force or place the Component in a support relationship with the regional CINC. Rather, ARSPACE would retain operational control and have direct liaison authority with the supported CINC.
Example 2: JTAGS has deployed for a crisis in Southwest Asia. The data affects a single region. Therefore, USSPACECOM would transfer the force or place the Component in a support relationship after consulting with the regional CINC. The transfer of forces would be consistent with joint doctrine and authorized by the SECDEF.
USSPACECOM must also consider the recipient's ability to command and control the resource. If they can't, USSPACECOM may have to deploy some type of command and control element or not transfer the force. Furthermore, if the command is supporting multiple operations at the same time, we may retain direct control of the force.
Regional CINCs must resolve how to command and control space forces the SECDEF transfers to them. Joint doctrine provides the following examples (see Figure 7-16): (1) organize the space forces under a Space Component Commander; (2) integrate the space capabilities into respective service or functional components; (3) place all space forces under one of the existing Components; (4) centralize the space forces at the CINC Staff level.
The second challenge USSPACECOM faces is ensuring space expertise and capabilities are available to the other warfighting CINCs until they have enough experience to exercise command and control of space forces. USSPACECOM's Joint Space Support Teams and space liaison officers, who now augment theater CINCs, are supposed to be transition "bridges," not to remain in theaters indefinitely. USSPACECOM will give the regional CINCs enough time to grow "space-smart" people; gain confidence in their ability to request, task, and access space-derived information through their own battle managers; and establish a structure for commanding and controlling space forces before withdrawing liaison officers or support teams.
With space education and training fully in place by 2005, staffs of theater CINCs will have the required space education. At that time, command and control of space forces will be established, so regional CINCs will have a foundation for their own structures. By 2012, if not sooner, a global defense information network of sophisticated battle managers, coupled with "space-smart" staffs will replace support teams and liaison officers.
Figure 7-16 Integration Options
Far-term Structures
As USCINCSPACE becomes a supported CINC and begins combat operations in or from space (2008), organizational structures will evolve to support these mission changes.
Organizations within USSPACECOM (at the CINC's staff and the Components) will emerge to command, control, and carry out these new combat operations. USSPACECOM's Components will develop the necessary units (operations centers, units, squadrons, or wings) to execute Control of Space (CoS) and Global Engagement (GE) missions. The SPOC will expand its space battle manager to incorporate the oversight, commanding, and controlling needed to task the Components. The SPOC will also be the focal point for integrating operational partnerships as the space community merges black and white operations, masses operations with similar purposes, and collaborates on future missions. USSPACECOM's staff structure must fully support combatant requirements.
External to USSPACECOM, regional CINCs will have established their organizational structures for command and control of the space forces transferred to them.
A "traffic control" organization with worldwide coverage will need to ensure vehicles transiting to and from space are safely integrated with air traffic. This includes avoiding collisions during launch, on-orbit, and during reentry. We expect this organization to be military, civil, commercial or international. It may be a mix of all four, possibly evolving from USSPACECOM's Space Control Center and the FAA's approach to controlling air traffic. This organization for global traffic control-or global air traffic control-must be able to deconflict and protect systems and be in place no later than 2020. We'd prefer it to start operating by 2008 to meet the demand envisioned for the CoS and GE missions.
In the long run, USSPACECOM's concept for commanding and controlling space forces enhances the command's flexibility and responsiveness to support operations by the other warfighting CINCs. It provides the foundation for space to be integrated at the same level as land, sea, and air forces are today-as an integral part of the campaign, not an afterthought buried in an annex.
Organizational Partnerships
Partnering-by establishing agreements, memoranda of understanding, and procedures-is essential to critical community-wide cooperation on space issues. It will also ensure warfighters can depend on a single point of contact for military space. The military, intelligence, and civil communities for space must embrace a new paradigm in partnerships-begin with the best space support to warfighters in mind. To do so, they must integrate "black and white" space, standardize space tasking and requests, organize to better service warfighters (through the single point of contact), and design and acquire future systems that work together, support modeling and simulation, and allow rapid prototyping. Partnerships developed now will drive the success of these steps. In the next 15 years, the space community must establish agreements, memoranda of understanding, and procedures to fully support warfighters on all space operations issues. The efforts of the Ballistic Missile Defense Office and the NRO to develop agreements are great models.
Organizational Assessment
We can attain the processes, structures, and partnerships needed to improve space support to the warfighters. If communities cooperate, they can standardize and improve tasking and reporting. USSPACECOM's concept of operations for commanding and controlling space forces is laying the groundwork now for developing an expanded SPOC and for structuring components. The command's liaison officers and support teams are already in place extending support to regional CINCs until they are confident in their own space expertise. The operational relationship between USSPACECOM and the NRO is on track, and USCINCSPACE is recognized as the operational lead for integrating space forces. Continued strengthening of partnerships is integral to changing the way we operate as a space community; partnering is possible and critical to making space operational for warfighters.
Organizational Directives and Recommendations
USSPACECOM will:
USSPACECOM should:
We consider all four objectives-policy and doctrine, education of people, information, and organization-achievable |
Full Force Integration Critical Thrusts
Integrating space forces and space-derived information with land, sea, and air forces and their information is critical if our nation is to remain the world's preeminent fighting force. Warfighters today face formidable tasks from peacekeeping operations to full-scale conflict. Budget and staff reductions make these challenges even more daunting, but we can meet them if we integrate all mediums to give warfighters every possible advantage. Space is a key player in this integration which faces seven critical issues:
