News

Subject:      Team B on ASATs (the view from 1976)
From:         thomsona@netcom.com (Allen Thomson)
Date:         1995/10/19
Message-Id:   <thomsonaDGoADL.Dv8@netcom.com>
Newsgroups:   sci.space.policy,alt.war,alt.politics.org.cia

   I was recently rereading the famous "Team B" alternative 
National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) of 1976 while preparing a 
posting for a.p.o.cia and came across the following section on 
Soviet ASAT.  It's interesting from several points of view, so
I've reproduced the entire available text here (there are many 
redactions, unfortunately).  I've made some comments in places 
where there is information relevant to present-day problems of 
satellite vulnerability and other things which interest me. 


++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

   Estimating History [i.e., previous NIE assessments]
   
   [One or two paragraphs redacted]
   
      In 1968, the Soviets initiated actual non-nuclear ASAT 
   testing, a fact which was reflected in the 1969 NIE. By 1971 
   (Feb), NIE 11-3 noted that a non-nuclear ASAT capability had 
   been demonstrated, but that "a fully operational system would 
   require greater flexibility than was displayed in the Soviet 
   tests." [NIE 11-3-71, p.79, paragraph 207]  It was believed hat 
   the same constraints on ASAT use discussed in earlier years 
   would continue to prevail, and would, in fact, be reinforced by 
   the increasing dependence of the Soviets upon their own 
   satellite systems as well as the effects of the SAL [Strategic 
   Arms Limitations] negotiations. 

It will be very interesting to obtain those 1960s - early 1970s 
NIEs to see what the "constraints on ASAT use" were believed to 
be, as those probably influenced the way future U.S. systems
like the KH-11 (IOC Jan 1976) were designed. 

As far as increasing Soviet dependence on satellites goes, it's 
my impression that, at least in a qualitative sense, they never
got to the degree of dependency the U.S. did.
   
      In an August 1971 supplement, the NIE noted that the Soviets 
   were in a period of frequent ASAT testing, and questioned why 
   they did not employ a non-nuclear ASAT variant of the Galosh 
   ABM, which would be capable of direct ascent intercepts and 
   therefore highly effective against US reconnaissance satellites. 

Quite a relevant comment in the present-day context: non-nuclear 
direct ascent ASATs, the kind easiest to build, were recognized 
as "highly effective against US reconnaissance satellites." 

   This reasoning let to the view that the ASAT system was a long 
   range program ultimately directed against the full range of US 
   space systems which could have originated in response to 
   hypothetical systems (e.g., orbital bombardment) widely 
   discussed in the early 1960's, but not introduced. 

An interesting notion, but I'd want to see the evidence before
accepting it.   

      The hiatus in ASAT testing from 1971 to 1976 has led to the 
   publication of essentially unchanged estimates concerning the 
   Soviet ASAT system, although Soviet laser capabilities have been 
   given increasing emphasis as they have advanced.  In addition, 
   in 1974 the NIE noted that the Soviets demonstrated a capability 
   to place satellites in geostationary orbit, thus potentially 
   extending their ASAT capabilities to that altitude. 
   
The second sentence contains a point worth bearing in mind as we 
sail off into the future: GEO (or even GTO, for crossing shots) 
launch capability implies some degree of GEO ASAT capability. 


   The Evidence
   
   [entire text, approximately two to four paragraphs, redacted]

Darn.


   Analysis/Estimate [by Team "B"] 
   
      As it currently exists, the Soviet ASAT system has several 
   operational limitations which must be considered in assessing 
   its potential utility to the USSR. 
   
   (1) Altitude Limitation.  This was noted above, and is primarily 
   a function of the launch vehicle [SL-11].  It could be 
   alleviated by use of a larger launch vehicle such as the SL-12, 
   although Soviet views regarding the necessity of testing at 
   higher altitudes prior to operational use remain unknown.
   
   [ section 2 redacted ]
   
   (3.) Target Capacity. As noted, each target satellite requires a 
   separate ASAT launch. Although US reconnaissance systems 
                                  ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
   maintain only a small number of satellites, which cannot be 
   ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
   rapidly replaced, on orbit 
   ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

Aigh!  This is *still true today, and is getting worse* as the
"recapitalization/reinvestment" program rolls along.  Lots of 
people know it now, lots of people knew it then.  So what the 
hell has been going on in the NRO these past twenty years?

   a militarily effective attack upon planned systems (such as 
   GPS) would seem to require development of an ASAT vehicle 
   with a multiple engagement capability. [One or two paragraphs 
   redacted] 
   
      While Soviet intentions for the current system cannot be 
   determined, consideration of its characteristics and limitations 
   does permit attribution of several potential applications: 
   
   (1) Political Use. Demonstration of intent, political "shock" 
   effects, etc.

True today as well.
   
   (2) Crisis Management.  One time denial of information during a 
   high intensity crisis situation.

Hm. I'd tend to think that the availability of UAVs makes this 
less valid in today's world.   

   (3) Extended Conventional War. Denial of tactical information 
   over an extended period of time, possibly preceded by or 
   coupled with lower level antisatellite operations, such as laser 
   blinding, ECM, etc. 

Well, given the small numbers of spysats and long replacement 
times, this is probably still important.  UAVs might take up 
much of the slack locally, but loss of global reconnaissance 
would be a serious indirect consequence of satellite destruction 
in a regional conflict.  It would be interesting to find out 
what kinds of industrial lasers could be used for blinding 
satellites these days. 

   Physical satellite destruction may be more 
   likely as the nuclear threshold is approached. [about four lines
   redacted] This would be fully in consonance with Soviet 
   employment of other space systems, such as their radar ocean 
   surveillance satellite, in tactical operations.

IMO, "the nuclear threshold" is totally irrelevant today in 
talking about ASAT.  We'll nuke'm if they use nukes (or just 
maybe biological weapons -- not chemicals) on U.S. territory or 
troops and not otherwise.
   
   (4) Strategic Research and Development.  Provide test and 
   operational data for use in development of more capable ASAT 
   systems.
   
      It is worth noting that the second series of Soviet ASAT 
   tests began about a year after the ABM treaty, which had 
   significantly constrained the number of ABM launchers that the 
   Soviets could possess.  Since the ASAT system is totally 
   ineffective in an ABM role, its development may reflect a Soviet 
   desire to avoid diverting any of their ABM system to an anti-
   satellite role, while at the same time acquiring an ASAT system 
   that could in no way be construed as a violation of the ABM 
   treaty. 
   
Another interesting dissertation topic: to what extent were 
early ABM (and perhaps high-performance SAM??) systems on either 
side designed to be usable as LEO ASATs?

   
   Soviet Strategic Objectives: An Alternative View
   Report of Team "B"
   Intelligence Community Experiment in Competitive Analysis
   December 1976
   
   Note:
   This document is one part of an experiment in competitive 
   analysis undertaken by the DCI [Director of Central 
   Intelligence] on behalf of the President's Foreign Intelligence 
   Advisory Board.  The views expressed are those of the authors 
   and do not represent either coordinated National Intelligence or 
   the views of the Director of Central Intelligence.
   
   Introductory Remarks:
   The mandate of Team "B" was to take an independent look at the 
   data that go into the preparation of NIE 11-3/8 [on Soviet 
   strategic forces], and on that basis determine whether a good 
   case could be made that Soviet strategic objectives are, in 
   fact, more ambitious and therefore more threatening to U.S. 
   security than they appear to the authors of the NIEs...
   
   Team Leader      : Professor Richard Pipes
   Associates       : Professor William Van Cleave
                    : Lt. Gen. Daniel Graham, USA (Ret.)
                    : Dr. Thomas Wolfe, RAND Corporation
                    : General John Vogt, USAF, (Ret.)
   Advisory Panel   : Ambassador Foy Kohler
                    : The Honorable Paul Nitze
                    : Ambassador Seymour Weiss
                    : Maj. General Jasper Welch, USAF
                    : Dr. Paul Wolfowitz, Arms Control and 
                      Disarmament Agency



Newsgroups: sci.space.policy
From: "Allen Thomson"  
Date: 18 Sep 2005 12:05:07 -0700
Subject: 1977 DCI view of tactical use of spysats, vulnerability
 

A while back I posted some vulnerability-related excerpts from the
famous (or infamous, as you choose to see it) Team B pseudo-NIE: 
"Team B on ASATs (the view from 1976)" 
http://tinyurl.com/b57uy also
http://www.fas.org/spp/military/program/asat/at_951019.htm 

The document the following was taken from was published soon after the
Team B report and probably was at least somewhat influenced by it. 

  1977
  Director of Central Intelligence
  Report on
  The Intelligence Community
  DCI/IC 77-4657 

  SECRET
  Approved for Release 2002/05/07: 
  CIA-RDP83M00171R002100110007-6 

  -Page 1- 

  INTRODUCTION 

  A. Purpose of the Report 

  This is the first comprehensive report(*) on the Intelligence
  Community presented to the President and the Congress by the
  Director of Central Intelligence.  It is designed to provide an
  over-view of the context, significant trends and major
  challenges confronting the United States national foreign
  intelligence effort from the DCI's perspective on the
  Intelligence Community as a whole(**). (U) 

  (*) The original report, published in January 1977, was
  classified Top Secret. This version is being published at the
  Secret level to make the report available to a wider readership. 

  (**) The term "intelligence," whenever used in this report,
  should be taken to mean foreign intelligence unless otherwise
  specified. [remainder of footnote omitted]. (U) 

  -Page 20- 

    National/Tactical Intelligence Interface. 

  Considerable attention has recently been devoted to problems
  related to the conflicting demands of national and tactical
  needs for intelligence derived from national systems,
  particularly over-head reconnaissance systems. In reality the
  problem is three-tiered, involving the needs of national,
  departmental and field consumers. Each element has needs and
  missions which are unique, and which differ in important
  respects from those of the others. The nature of some of these
  differing needs is such that certain collection systems cannot
  be optimized for one consumer without serious degradation of
  their utility to others. Tradeoffs are required, and must be
  made from a national perspective. (S) 

  The current mission of most national intelligence collection
  resources is the timely and continuing support of national-
  level decision makers involved in policy formulation,
  international negotiations, and crisis, control. These systems
  are designed to operate in an essentially benign environment. If
  we were to redesign our national intelligence capabilities to
  operate effectively in both benign and conflict environments, we
  would have to make a major investment in system survivability
  and the tactical communication and dissemination links and
  subsystems. We would also have to consider the impacts of such a
  step in terms of effects on aspects of our foreign policy (such
  as the Open Skies Agreement. SALT verification, etc.) and on the
  overall intelligence budget, including national, departmental,
  and intelligence-related* programs. (S) 

  In effect, we are faced with the dilemma of trading off our
  capabilities to support war avoidance and crisis control and our
  capabilities to provide tactical intelligence from hardened
  national systems at such time as our military forces may be
  committed. In reality, the viability of national intelligence
  systems as wartime assets remains to be proven. It needs to be
  tested in more joint exercises and war games. Such evaluations
  would demonstrate the relative capabilities of national and
  tactical intelligence assets for support of combat operations,
  as well us of the National Command Authority. We must ascertain
  what can be accomplished effectively with the systems now in
  being, both national and tactical, before we venture into a
  massive redesign which would be expensive in terms of money,
  time and capabilities. (S) 

  (*) Intelligence-related programs are those programs which,
  while not art of the National Foreign Intelligence Program, are
  closely related to it; included are such things as tactical
  warning, airborne reconnaissance, ocean surveillance, and
  certain training. (C) 

  -Page 20- 

  The recent recommendation for a national-level study to provide
  the basis for a Presidential decision is the first step. 
  Planning for more joint exercises involving national systems is
  underway and should establish what we can effectively do now. 
  Simultaneously, the capability of tactical systems to provide
  information to the National Command Authority will be tested. On
  the basis of what we learn from these initiatives, we can make
  informed judgments as to how to proceed in resolving the
  interface problem. (S) 

  As intelligence-related assets become more expensive, complex,
  and interrelated with national intelligence assets, it becomes
  even more crucial that central control be exercised to prevent
  overlap and unnecessary duplication. The Congress has stressed
  this point and E.O. 11905 has emphasized the same theme. There
  must be the necessary concept, doctrine, policy, and strategy to
  assure that we are moving in the right direction. (U)