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Program and Budget Structure

OVERVIEW

According to estimates published by the United States Government, the American military space budget is approximately $15 billion, slightly greater than the $14 billion spent by NASA. This suggests a rough balance between the military and civilian space programs. However, a closer analysis reveals that this government estimate significantly understates total American national security space spending, which is actually in the range of $25 billion.

There are at least three sources for this understatement.

First, the $15 billion only includes spending by the Department of Defense, explicitly excluding national-security spending by other government agencies. The most notable exclusion is the more than $2 billion that is the CIA's portion of the National Reconnaissance Office budget. Also excluded is national-security related spending by NASA, which in the past was over $1 billion annually in the form of a significant subsidy for military Space Shuttle flights, and continues in the discrepancy between the cost of running the TDRSS communications network (which supports the Lacrosse intelligence satellite) and the payments from the Defense Department.

Second, the US Government estimates largely focus on satellite producers and operators, and generally exclude satellite users. The $15 billion includes the budgets builders such as the Air Force Space and Missiles Systems Center, and of operators such as the Air Force Space Command. But it clearly excludes spending for military components which are largely devoted to the utilization of satellites, such as the Defense Mapping Agency, the Naval Telecommunications and Computer Command, or the Air Weather Service.

The exclusion of these users perpetuates an outmoded conceptualization of the military's use of space systems. In the early decades of the space age, military space systems were largely the provenance of national intelligence agencies and strategic combat components. But in the past decade, space systems have become increasingly useful to a much broader range of military formations. A similar definitional problem arises in other space arenas. Thus, in the realm of commercial communications satellites, to focus merely on satellites and launch vehicles would overlook the much larger investment in ground segment, and a view restricted to hardware would ignore the extensive activities of programmers and other communications companies. Similarly, annual spending on remote sensing satellites is small relative to the value-added image processing industry, which is also small relative to the broader Geographic Information Services industry.

There is, of course, some sense in which the entire military has been transformed into consumers of military space system services. But between space system producers and operators, and the Defense Department as a whole, there stands an intermediate cadre of users, which are largely devoted to processing satellite data or supporting satellite services, though they are not the final consumers of these products. The military support components in fields such as communications, meteorology and intelligence have no ultimate interest space services, but are intermediaries using space systems in support of other military components.

In the civil space science community, the Hubble Space Telescope Institute would be accounted part of the space program, as would other processing and archival facilities. Though much of the academic space science and astronomy communities are consumers of data from these entities, they are generally not counted as part of the space program. Thus, while it would be trivial to count the entire US military as part of the space program, intermediate users, such as the Defense Mapping Agency, which are analogous to the Hubble Space Telescope Institute, should properly be included.

A third source of understatement lies in the high degree of classification of intelligence-related space activities, which account for nearly 40% of the American national security space budget.

Those who argue against publicly releasing the aggregate amount for the entire intelligence budget (reportedly about $28 billion) contend that revealing this single number might reveal information on the budgets of individual agencies. The foolishness of this argument, as well as the irrelevance of the debate over releasing the aggregate total, is clear when it is understood that much more detailed budget data on America's most secret intelligence agencies is regularly revealed in the Pentagon budget. It is popularly believed that the intelligence budget is completely invisible -- in fact it is astonishingly thinly disguised, since it is hard to entirely hide tens of billions of dollars. Like the purloined letter, it is concealed in the open, for all to see if they but know where to look.

To paraphrase Einstein, the intelligence budget is subtle, but it is not perverse. Appreciation of this subtlety can provide surprising insight into the budgets of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), the National Security Agency (NSA), and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). With a few clear exceptions, the budgets of NRO, NSA and DIA are presented in the Defense Department's annual budget request and its unclassified supporting documents according to the same logic and rules as is used by other less highly classified programs. Simple arithmetic readily reveals the budgets of these agencies with a margin of error of perhaps 10%, to within a few hundred million dollars.

The continued pretense that the budgets of these agencies are "secret" only serves to protect them from accountability to the tax-paying public. The overall NRO budget nearly tripled during the decade of excess, increasing from about $3.5 billion (in constant FY94 dollars) in 1980, to nearly $9 billion in the mid-1980s, with the 1994 Clinton Administration request totalling about $7 billion. The reduction of more than $2.5 billion in the NRO budget over the past five years indicates that reductions in the intelligence budget are indeed possible. The fact that the 1994 Clinton Administration request for NRO is over twice the level of spending at the time of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan suggests that further savings are equally possible.

US Governement Estimates

Beginning in 1963, each year the Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E) would release annual aggregates for military space spending. This practice was discontinued in 1989, as a result of the realignment of the responsibilities of this position. Subsequently however, the National Space Council did release graphs disclosing the total military space budget in current and constant year dollars. But it was not until 1993 that a new official Defense Department estimate was released. The Defense Department aggregates the military space budget into eleven broad categories:(7)

Manned Space Flight consisted primarily of funding for the X-20 Dyna Soar and the KH-10 Manned Orbiting Laboratory, as well as military support to NASA. No funding was displayed in this category after 1970.

Communications consists of communications satellites and related equipment, including AFSATCOM, DSCS, FLTSATCOM, UHF Followon, and MILSTAR. It also includes aircraft modification programs like PACCS/WWABNCP EC-135 and NECAP Class V mods.

Navigation consists mainly of the Navstar GPS and Transit user equipment and space and ground segments.

Mapping, Charting and Geodesy includes efforts to obtain more accurate data for maps and charts and provide geophysical information to strategic and tactical weapons systems, such as knowledge of the size, shape and gravity field of the Earth for supporting ballistic missile forces.

Meteorology and Oceanography consists mainly of the DMSP and other environmental programs that supply timely weather information to help DoD effectively employ forces.

Space Defense included such anti-satellite weapon projects as SAINT, Program 437 and Program 505. With the termination of these projects, no funding was displayed in this category after 1974.

Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment / Early Warning consists of various satellite and ground programs, such as DSP, NORAD Cheyenne Mountain Complex, BMEWS, and NDS that together provide attack warning information.

Launch Vehicle Acquisition and Development consists of programs for space launch vehicles and space launch and Shuttle support, including the Advanced Launch System, Shuttle operations, and the Vandenberg Shuttle launch complex.

Ground Support consists mainly of operations and maintenance funding neccessary to support range support, instrumentation and launch facilities (the Eastern and Western Test Ranges), satellite control (such as CSOC and SCF), Spacetrack satellite detection and tracking networks. It also includes funding for Air Force Space Command Headquarters.(8)

Supporting Research and Development consists mainly of support for basic and applied research, development in areas such as rocket propulsion, aerospace technology, advanced spacecraft technology test and evaluation projects, including the development and testing of launch systems, the Space Test Program, LIGHTSAT/SPINSAT, SDI and NASP programs.

General Support and Intelligence(9) covers various functions such as technical and mission support for space related activities and classified Air Force and Navy programs.(10) This category also includes such programs as MIT Lincoln Laboratory, NORAD Cheyenne Mountain Space Defense Systems, Professional Military Education, Development Planning, TENCAP, FOREST GREEN, General Defense Intelligence Program, and Special Activities.(11) Also included are laboratory and research center in-house programs, development and support organizations, general operational support, and space-related military construction not otherwise charged to specific space projects.(12)

These definitions disclose a number of ambiguities and inconsistencies. The Launch Vehicle category includes development of new launch vehicles such as the Shuttle and ALS, while development of other new launch vehicles, including NASP, is included in the Research and Development category. Similarly, launch facilities for the Shuttle are encompassed under Launch Vehicles, while launch support facilities for expendable launch vehicles are included in the Ground Support category. Missile warning functions at Cheyenne Mountain are placed under the Tactical Warning area, while anti-satellite actitities at Cheyenne Mountain are placed under General Support, and other satellite tracking functions are included under Ground Support. Similarly, non-mission specific research and technology activities are included both in Supporting Research and Development and in General Support.

It must be noted that apart from these definitional shortcomings, there are additional problematic aspects to these US Government estimates. The aggregate categories are clearly not consistent time series, but rather represent year-to-year appraisals of what should or should not be included as "space." Thus NORAD headquarters funding was excluded in the early 1980s, though the same activity was included upon the formation of the US Space Command. Particular inconsistency is notable in the treatment of the Strategic Defense Initiative. In 1985 it appears that the entire program was included, whereas more recently only space-based systems have been included.

A close examination of these estimates discloses a several other puzzling features. Although throughout the Cold War it was deemed possible to release numbers for the General Support category (which includes headquarters functions as well as the Air Force and Navy portions of the NRO budget), with the demise of the Soviet adversary this category was deemed too sensitive for public disclosure, as was the surveillance category which includes missile warning satellites.

With the various adjustments previously discussed, it is possible to recreate through the aggregation of individual line-items the overall top-line US Government estimates with reasonable accuracy. In fact, this bottom-up line item aggregation is in better agreement with the Defense Department estimate than is the National Space Council current year dollar estimate. And the National Space Council inflation-adjusted constant dollar estimate is clearly (though inexplicably) inconsistent with all other estimates.

A bottom-up line item aggregation also reproduces the Defense Department's estimates for broad mission areas with an error of less than +-10% in almost every year in the 1980s. However, there are several puzzling anomolies in specific programs which resist easy explanation. The four programs with the clearest and most consistent definitions are Communications, Navigation, Mapping and Meteorology.

A bottom-up line-item aggregation in the Meteorology program area successfully reproduces with negligible divergence the DoD estimates from 1980 through 1986, and from 1991 through 1994. However, there is a gross discrepancy from 1987 through 1990, during which the DoD estimate is nearly twice the total that can be derived through line-item aggregation. There is no apparent explanation for this, as a close examination of budget documents reveals no meteorology or oceanography related programs not included in the line-item estimates.

One possible explanation for this anomoly may lie in the fate of the Naval Remote Ocean Sensing Satellite/System (N-ROSS). N-ROSS was intended to be a lower-cost version of the Naval Ocean Surveillance Satellite (NOSS), to gather oceanographic data in support of anti-submarine warfare operations. NOSS was cancelled in the early 1980s when its estimated total cost had risen to $782 million.(13) But N-ROSS, with a planned September 1990 launch on a Titan 2, fell victim to a significant cost overrun, with total projected costs increasing from $270 million to $420 million, amid charges of Navy mismanagement.(14) However, in early 1987, Navy Secretary John Lehman attempted to revive the N-ROSS effort,(15) with a launch anticipated in late 1991 or early 1992.(16) Under the revived program, Lockheed and GE Astro-Space would compete for the contract to build the satellite.(17) However, the program was apparently terminated in 1988.(18)

It may be that the failure to gain broad political support for this program led to a decision in late 1987 to abandon the overt acknowledged N-ROSS program, while proceeding with a similar covert unacknowledged program. The timing and level of the anomolous funding in the Meteorology mission area is consistent with this intepretation. If this is the case, it is less than apparent precisely where this covert funding was located in the Navy budget. Although the Navy's RDT&E budget is littered with special axcess program line items with exotic names such as LINK PLUMERIA, CHALK WEED, and LINK EVERGREEN, there are no line items with funding profiles that precisely match that of the meteorology funding anomoly. But at least two line items appear in proximity to other budget items for space systems and anti-submarine warfare, so they are certainly in the right neighborhood. The closest fit is LINK LAUREL, the funding for which rises and falls with that of the anomoly. But it would be neccessary to include 1989 through 1991 funding from the RETRACT MAPLE line item to roughly match the required amount, while excluding this line item for prior and subsequent years. Though this could be accomodated by assuming that LINK LAUREL funded part of the program, and that a project under RETRACT MAPLE funded another part for a three year interval. Although this budget analysis does not exclude the existence of a covert N-ROSS program, neither does it come close to establishing its existence. However, there is no other apparent explanation for the discrepancy in meteorological funding.

Even more puzzuling are the discrepancies in navigation and communications. For the early 1980s the DoD summary figure for navigation and the line-item aggregation are in very close agreement, with the glaring exception of 1982, when the DoD summary figure is some $185 greater than the line item total. That this is a one-time anomoly is indicated by the very close agreement between the two estimates in the years immediately preceeding and following. But a minute examination of DoD budget documents fails to disclose any indication of an explanation of this peculiarity. The divergence in the late 1980s and early 1990s might be explained by the costs of modifying in-service aircraft to accomodate GPS user equipment, but there is no indication of such expenditures in published budget documents.

Similar eccentricities are to be noted in the realm of communications. The 1986 DoD estimate is over $200 lower than the line-item total, while the next year the situation reverses, with the DoD estimate over $200 higher than the line-item estimate. Another wild gyration is also observed in the early 1990s, when the DoD summary is $200 million in excess of the line-item aggregate in 1991, and falls to more than $300 million lower by 1993. Although differences in accounting for MILSTAR might account for the excursion in the 1980s, there is no apparent explanation for the more recent excursion. But this later anomoly is part of a larger pattern of a substantial, growing and inexplicable divergence in the most recent Defense Department estimates, with a substantial deficit in communications and a major surplus in General Support.

Given the vague and shifting definitions of the other summary categories, no attempt has been made to reconcile the DoD and line-item aggregate totals.

One final observation further confirms the limited utility of the DoD budget analysis. The most recent Defense Department estimates included for the first time a breakdown of the budget into functional categories. There is a fair degree of correspondence between the bottom-up line item aggregation and the Defense Department's estimates for military personnel, operations and maintenance, and military construction. However, there is a major discrepancy in RDT&E and Procurement, with the Defense estimate of Procurement standing over $2 billion higher, and the RDT&E account a similar amount lower, that would be anticipated on the basis of line item aggregation. Unless the Defense estimate is simply in error, there must be a substantial misrepresentation of budget categories at the line time level. The simplest explanation it that the Air Force Special Activities RDT&E line item, which covers NRO launch vehicles and spacecraft, is treated as procurement in this aggregation, though why this would be remains obscure.

In light of the limitations of the US Government budget categories, a more consistent and illuminating classification system is needed.

Communications consisting of communications satellites and related equipment, including AFSATCOM, DSCS, FLTSATCOM, UHF Followon, and MILSTAR. It also includes aircraft modification programs like PACCS/WWABNCP EC-135 and NECAP Class V mods.

Navigation consisting of the Navstar GPS and Transit user equipment and space and ground segments.

Mapping, Charting and Geodesy including efforts to obtain more accurate data for maps and charts and provide geophysical information to strategic and tactical weapons systems, such as knowledge of the size, shape and gravity field of the Earth for supporting ballistic missile forces.

Meteorology and Oceanography consists mainly of the DMSP and other environmental and oceanographic programs that supply timely weather information to help DoD effectively employ forces.

Surveillance consisting of various broad-area surveillance satellite programs for detecting and tracking targets such as nuclear explosions, ballistic missiles, aircraft and surface vessels, using infrared and radar sensors, including systems such as DSP and NDS, as well as such MASINT programs as FOREST GREEN, but excluding high resolution imaging and signals intelligence systems.

Intelligence consisting of all signals intelligence programs, as well as high resolution radar and optical imaging intelligence space systems. This includes space related activities and classified Air Force and Navy programs, TENCAP, General Defense Intelligence Program, and Special Activities.

Space Defense including anti-satellite weapon projects and other programs, such as deception and evasion, to negate adversary space systems, as well as satellite survivability measures.

Ballistic Missile Defense consisting of space-based and ground-based exo-atmospheric interceptors, sensors, and related research and technology programs, notably those of the SDI program.

Space Surveillance including items such as NORAD Cheyenne Mountain Complex, NORAD Cheyenne Mountain Space Defense Systems, BMEWS, that provide missile attack warning information, as well as Spacetrack satellite detection and tracking networks.

Launch Vehicle Acquisition and Development consisting of programs for space launch vehicles and space launch and Shuttle support, including the Advanced Launch System, Shuttle operations, and the Vandenberg Shuttle launch complex, as well as including the development and testing of launch systems such as the NASP program, along with range support, instrumentation and launch facilities (the Eastern and Western Test Ranges),

Ground Support consists mainly of operations and maintenance funding neccessary to support satellite control (such as CSOC and SCF).

General Support covers various functions such as technical and mission support for basic and applied research, development in areas such as rocket propulsion, aerospace technology, advanced spacecraft technology test and evaluation projects, the Space Test Program, LIGHTSAT/SPINSAT. This category also includes such programs as MIT Lincoln Laboratory, Professional Military Education, Development Planning, Also included are laboratory and research center in-house programs, development and support organizations, general operational support, and space-related military construction not otherwise charged to specific space projects. It also includes funding for unified and service Space Command headquarters.

A NOTE ON BUDGET TERMS AND CONCEPTS(6)

Spending the Money

The Defense Budget goes through several phases before the money is actually spent. Once the budget has been authorized and money appropriated by the Congress, the Defense Department obligates the funds to individual contractors. When the money is subsequently transferred to the contractor, this results in an actual outlay of funds. In some cases there can be a delay of several years between the time of Congressional action and actual outlays.

The Future Years Defense Program

The heart of the Defense Budget is the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), pronounced "fidip"). Formerly known as the Five Year Defense Program, failures to systematically update this document during the Bush Administration led to the change to a more generic nomenclature. The FYDP was initiated by Secretary of Defense McNamarra, and brought a modicum of rationality to what had previously been a chaotic process. Beginning with the Fiscal Year (FY) 1963 budget, the FYDP projected the Defense Budget five years into the future, as a basis for evaluating the current year's budget request. Each year the FYDP is advanced into the future by one year, and accumulates another prior year of data. In addition, the Extended Planning Annex to the FYDP projects general funding requirements to ten years into the future from the date of the budget submission.

Budget Categories

The defense budget is divided into five broad categories of activity. Funding for Program Elements are reported to the Congress and the public through such documents as the R-1 which lists Research, Development, Test and Evaluation programs, the P-1 which lists Procurement Programs, and the C-1 which lists Construction projects (unfortunately, there is no "O-1" for Operations and Maintenance, or "M-1" for Military Personnel). The R-1 displays the level of spending for each Program Element, and the format of the P-1 roughly parallels the program element structure, though program element numbers are not listed for budget line items. These documents are the basis for debate on defense programs. Program Element Descriptive Summary and Justification of Estimates budget documents provide narrative descriptions at the Program Element level indicate such important information as contract activity and the overall mission of the program.

Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E)

The defense budget divides the research and development process into five stages. A program's stage of development is generally indicated by the first two digits of its Program Element Number, although the decision as to which category a Program belongs in is somewhat arbitrary. The five stages are:

6.1 Basic Research: efforts directed toward the expansion of specific knowledge of natural phenomena, but not tied to a specific program.

6.2 Exploratory Development: efforts directed toward the expansion of technological knowledge and the development of materials and components with potential application to new military weapons and equipment. Emphasis on exploring the feasibility of various approaches to military problems up to the point of breadboard and prototype fabrication.

6.3A Advanced Development: efforts directed toward the development of experimental hardware for technical or operational testing of its suitability for military use.

6.3 Advanced Development: efforts directed toward the development of experimental hardware for technical or operational testing of its suitability for military use.

6.4 Engineering Development: efforts directed toward the development of a particular system engineered for service use, but which has not yet been approved for production and deployment.

6.5 Test Ranges and Support: test, development, evaluation and design facilities for research programs, as well as projects which have already entered (or have been approved for) the production-deployment stage.

Procurement

Major weapon system acquisition costs are directly associated with the appropriate program element or elements in accordance with the mission or missions assigned to the weapon system. Unit related items are associated with the program elements according to the unit's identity, relative wartime deployment priorities, the equipment authorizations for each unit, and world-wide asset position for equipment items. Some resources, such as light vehicles, are allocated to base operations program elements. In some cases, particularly in the Navy, summary program elements are used to accumulate procurement resources to avoid an arbitrary allocation.

Military Construction (MILCON)

When a construction project is identified, the dominant user is determined, and a specific program element is assigned on this basis.

Operations and Maintenance (O&M)

Several methodologies are used to identify operation and maintenance costs. Force-related resources are applied according to workload requirements, such as flying or steaming hours or overhaul schedules of force units. Costs associated with General Schedule (GS) civilian government employees are covered in this account.

Military Personnel (MILPERS)

Military personnel costs are applied to program elements by a computation of average salaries times the number of personnel for each program.

Defense Programs

A program is an aggregation of program elements that reflects a force mission or a support mission of the Department of Defense and contains the resources needed to achieve an objective or plan. The major programs of the FYDP may overlap areas of management and functional responsibility within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the programs are not considered to be the exclusive responsibility of the Office of Primary Responsibility.

Program 1 - Strategic Purpose Forces

Offices of Primary Responsibility (OPR) Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USDP), Under-Secretary of Defense for Research & Engineering (USDR&E), Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation (DPAE). Strategic forces are those organizations and associated weapons systems whose force missions encompass intercontinental or transoceanic inter-theater responsibilities. Program 1 is further divided into strategic offensive and strategic defensive forces, including operational management headquarters, logistics, and support organizations identifiable and associated with these major subdivisions.

Program 2 - General Purpose Forces

Offices of Primary Responsibility (OPR): USDR&E; USD(P)

General purpose forces are those organizations and associated weapons systems whose force mission responsibilities are, at a given point in time, limited to one theater of operation. Program 2 consists of force-oriented program elements, including the command organizations associated with these forces, the logistic organizations organic to these forces, and the related support units that are deployed or deployable as constituent parts of military forces and field organizations. Also included are other programs, such as the Joint Tactical Communications Program (TRI-TAC), JCS-directed and coordinated exercises, Coast Guard ship support program, war reserve materiel ammunition and equipment, and stockfunded war reserve materiel.

Program 3 - Intelligence and Communications

Offices of Primary Responsibility (OPR): USDR&E; USD(P). Consists of intelligence, security, and communications program elements, including resources related primarily to centrally-directed DoD support mission functions, such as mapping, charting, and geodesy activities, weather service, oceanography, special activities, nuclear weapons operations, space boosters, satellite control and aerial targets. Intelligence and communications functions that are specifically identifiable to a mission in the other major programs shall be included within the appropriate program.

Program 4 - Airlift and Sealift Forces

Offices of Primary Responsibility (OPR): USDR&E; DPAE. Consists of program elements for airlift, sealift, traffic management, and water terminal activities, both industrially-funded and non-industrially-funded, including command, logistics, and support units organic to these organizations.

Program 5 - Guard and Reserve Forces

Offices of Primary Responsibility (OPR): Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs (ASD(RA)), DPAE. The majority of Program 5 resources consist of Guard and Reserve training units in support of strategic offensive and defensive forces and general purpose forces. In addition, there are units in support of intelligence and communication; airlift and sealift; research and development; central supply and maintenance; training, medical, general personnel activities; administration; and support of other nations.

Program 6 - Research and Development

Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) USDR&E. Consists of all research and development programs and activities that have not yet been approved for operational use, and includes basic and applied research tasks and projects of potential military application in the physical, mathematical, environmental, engineering, biomedical, and behavioral sciences. It also includes development, test and evaluation of new weapons systems equipment and related programs.

Program 7 - Central Supply and Maintenance

Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) Assistant Secretary of Defense for Military Installations and Logistics ASD (MI&L). Consists of resources related to supply, maintenance, and service activities, both industrially funded and non-industrially-funded, and other activities, such as first and second destination transportation, overseas port units, industrial preparedness, commissaries, and logistics and maintenance support. These functions, which are usually centrally managed, provide benefits and support necessary for the fulfillment of DoD programs.

Program 8 - Training, Medical and Other General Personnel Activities

Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs ASD (HA) and ASD (MI&L). Consists of resources relate to training and education, personnel procurement services, health care, permanent change of station travel, transients, family housing, and other support activities associated with personnel. Excluded from this program is training specifically related to and identified with another major program. Housing subsistence, health care, recreation, and similar costs and resources that are organic to a program element, such as base operations in other major programs, are also excluded from this program. Program 8 functions and activities, which are mainly centrally managed, provide benefits and support necessary for the fulfillment of DoD programs.

Program 9 - Administration and Associated Activities

Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) ASD (C). Consists of resources for the administrative support of departmental and major administrative headquarters, field command, and administration and associated activities not accounted for elsewhere. Included are activities such as construction planning and design, public affairs, contingencies, claims, and criminal investigations.

Program 10 - Support of Other Nations

Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs ASD (ISA). Consists of resources in support of international activities, including support to the Military Assistance Program (MAP), foreign military sales, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Infrastructure.

Program 11 - Special Operations Forces

Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) Assistant Secretary of Defense for Low Intensity Conflict ASD (LIC). Consists of resources in support of special operations forces, particularly the Special Operations Command, a unified command.

Program Elements

The Defense Department budget is structured like a cake with three layers. The top layer consists of what are called Program Elements (PE), which is the basic component of the FYDP. These are the large aggregations of activities, such as the B-1B bomber or the MX missile.

The next level of detail is provided by Projects which are constituent components of some Program Elements. Project-level budget data is not displayed in the R-1 and P-1 documents, though information is provided about individual Projects in the Program Element Descriptive Summary documents.

The lowest layer of the budget cake are Tasks. This is the working level of the Program, where actual activities are described. In some programs, Tasks are sometimes referred to as Work Packages. But budget documents normally provide no detailed information concerning Task-level program activity.

The first digit of the Program Element number identifies the defense Program. The second and third digits provide additional programmatic characterization, which varies from Program to Program (Figure 1-1).

The fourth and fifth digits uniquely identify the Program Element. There are four sets of program elements that are located throughout the FYDP structure and are identified by a common code in these positions.

xxx90x Audiovisual Activities

xxx94x Real Property Maintenance

xxx96x Base Operations

xxx98x Management Headquarters

The last position, which is alphabetic, identifies the DoD component to which the element is assigned (Figure 1-2).

Figure 1 - 1

Program Element Number Structure

First Digit Second Digit Third Digit


1 Strategic Forces

0 Strategic Offense/Defense 1 Aircraft

1 Strategic Offense 2 Missiles

2 Strategic Defense 3 C3 Systems 4 Surveillance & Warning

5 Safeguard

6 Ballistic Missile Defense

7

8 Other


2 General Purpose Forces

1 Unified Commands

... ........................... ... ...........................

2 Forces - Army 1 Alaska

2

3 Europe

4 Pacific

5 South

6 FORCECOM

7 8 Other CONUS

3 Ops Sys Development - Army

... ........................... ... ...........................

4 Forces - Navy 1 Sea Control / Projection

2 Sea Control Forces

3 Mine Warfare

4 Sea Projection

5 Space/Electronic Warfare

6 Support - Shore Based

5 Ops Sys Development - Navy

... ........................... ... ...........................

6 Forces - Marine Corps 1 Division/Wing Teams

2 Divisions

3 Combat Support

4 Other Support

5

6 Ops Sys Development - USMC

Figure 1 - 1 (continued)

Program Element Number Structure

First Digit Second Digit Third Digit


2 General Purpose Forces (continued)

... ........................... ... ...........................

7 Forces - Air Force 1 Combat Aircraft Units

2 Combat Support Aircraft Units

3 Missile Units

4 Units - Other

5 Other Support

... ........................... ... ...........................

8 Other


3 Intelligence/Communications

1 General Intelligence & Cryptological Activity

2 National Military Command System

3 Communications

4 Special Activities

5 Activities (Other)


4 Airlift & Sealift

1 Airlift 1 Industrially funded

2 Non-Industrially funded

3 Tactical Airlift

4

5

6

7

8 Other

... ........................... ... ...........................

2 Sealift 1 Industrially funded

... ........................... ... ...........................

3 Traffic Management

4 Special Operations

5

6

7

8 Other


Figure 1 - 1 (continued)

Program Element Number Structure

First Digit Second Digit Third Digit


5 Guard & Reserve Forces

0 Support of Other Nations

... ........................... ... ...........................

1 Strategic Forces 1 Strategic Defense

2 Strategic Defense

3 Strategic Defense Warning

4 Strategic Offense

... ........................... ... ...........................

2 General Purpose Forces 0 Management Headquarters

1 Management Headquarters

2 Management Headquarters

3 Naval Reserve

4 Navy Headquarters

5 Marine Corps Reserve

6 Air National Guard

7 Air Force Reserve

8 Army National Guard

89 Naval Reserve

9 Army Reserve

99 Naval Reserve

... ........................... ... ...........................

3 Intelligence/Communications 11 Air National Guard

12 Air Force Reserve

13 Naval Reserve

14 Naval Reserve

15 Naval Reserve

16

17 Naval Reserve

18

19 Naval Reserve

29 Naval Reserve

30 Other

... ........................... ... ...........................

4 Airlift & Sealift 1 Airlift

2 Airlift

31 Sealift

33 Tactical Airlift

39 Other

Figure 1 - 1 (continued)

Program Element Number Structure

First Digit Second Digit Third Digit


5 Guard & Reserve Forces (continued)

... ........................... ... ...........................

5 Base Operations

6 Research & Development

7 Central Supply & Maintenance

8 Training, Medical & Personnel

9 Administration

10 Support of Other Nations

11 Special Operations Forces


6 Research & Development

1 Research 0 R&D Support

2 Exploratory Development 1 Research / Military Science

3 Advanced Development 2 Aircraft

4 Engineering Development 3 Missiles

5 Management & Support 4 Astronautics

6 Test & Evaluation 5 Ships & Small Craft

7 Operational System Dev 6 Ordnance & Combat Vehicles

7 Other Equipment

8 Management & Support


7 Central Supply & Maintenance

1 Supply

2 Maintenance & Service 0 Industrial Funded

1 Headquarters

2 Non-Industrial Funded

3

4

5

6

7

8 Other


Figure 1 - 1 (continued)

Program Element Number Structure

First Digit Second Digit Third Digit


8 Training, Medical & Personnel

1 Personnel Procurement

2

3

4 Individual Training & Education

5 Base Operations

6 Individual Training - Health Care

7 Health Care Delivery

8 Personnel Activities

71 Armed Forces Info Service

72 Holding

73 Travel

74 Defense Family Housing

75 Other

9 Other


9 Administration

1 General Support 1 General Support

2

3

4

5 Other Support Activities

... ........................... ... ...........................

2 Headquarters

3 Security & Legal

4 Undistributed


10 Support of Other Nations


11 Special Operations Forces


Figure 1 - 1 (continued)

Program Element Number Structure

Component Identifier Codes

A Army

B Defense Mapping Agency

C Strategic Defense Initiative Organization

D Office of the Secretary of Defense

E Advanced Research Projects Agency

F Air Force

G National Security Agency

H Defense Nuclear Agency

I Defense Reconnaissance Support Program

J Joint Chiefs of Staff

K Defense Information Systems Agency

L Defense Intelligence Agency

M Marine Corps

N Navy

O

P

Q

R Defense Contract Audit Agency

S Defense Logistics Agency

T

U [Undistributed Resources]

V Defense Investigative Service

W Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences

X Inspector General

Y Defense Audiovisual Agency

Z

6. 6 Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), The Five Year Defense Program; Book 1 FYDP Program Structure, DoD 7045.7-H, August 1984, chapter 2, is the primary source for this section.

7. Sources for these descriptions include:

Stares, Paul, The Militarization of Space - US Policy, 1945-1984, (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York), page 257.

United States Senate Appropriations Committee Defense Subcommittee, Department of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1988, 100th Congress, 1st Session, part 3, 23 April 1987, pages 472-473.

General Accounting Office, Military Space Programs, GAO/NSIAD-90-154FS, June 1990, page 86.

8. Space Command Headquarters was specified in the 1987 Senate enumeration but not in the 1990 GAO list.

9. Although most enumerations characterize this category simply as "General Support," the 1987 Senate list calls this category "Support and Intelligence."

10. According to the 1990 GAO list.

11. According to the 1987 Senate list.

12. According to Stares.

13. Cushman, Jack, "Satellite Failures Derail Navy's N-ROSS Project," Defense Week, 27 August 1984, page 13-14.

14. Eisestadt, Steven, "Navy Scraps Space Plan's Cornerstone," Defense News, 22 December 1986, page 1, 12.

15. Eisestadt, Steven, "Lehman Does an About Face, Resucitates N-ROSS Program," Defense News, 6 April 1987, page 8.

16. Palca, Joseph, "US Navy Oceanography Satellite Heading for a Comeback," Nature, 6 August 1987, page 468.

17. Starr, Barbara, "Navy May Renew Controversial N-ROSS Competition," Defense News, 19 October 1987, page 4.

18. "Navy Pushes to Kill N-ROSS Satellite Program in FY89 Budget Process," Inside the Pentagon, 5 February 1988, pages 4-5.


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