Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk on behalf of myself and the distinguished Senator from Connecticut [Mr. Lieberman] and 38 other cosponsors and ask for its immediate consideration and ask that the amendment be read in its entirety.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.
The bill clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Kansas [Mr. Dole], (for himself, Mr. Lieberman, Mr. Nickles, Mr. Cranston, Mr. Craig, Mr. Symms, Mr. D'Amato, Mr. McCain, Mr. Mack, Mr. Pressler, Mr. Warner, Mr. Wallop, Mr. Lugar, Mr. Stevens, Mr. Cochran, Mr. Kasten, Mr. Smith, Mr. Simpson, Mr. Gramm, Mr. Inouye, Mr. Reid, Mr. Bryan, Mr. Rudman, Mr. Helms, Mr. McConnell, Mr. Gore, Mr. Lott, Mr. Seymour, Mr. Brown, Mr. Burns, Mr. Chafee, Mr. Coats, Mr. Garn, Mr. Roth, Mr. Thurmond, Mr. Graham, Mr. Cohen, Mrs. Kassebaum, Mr. Glenn, and Mr. DeConcini) proposes an amendment numbered 1040.
At the appropriate place in the bill, insert the following:
The Congress finds:
American and coalition armed forces achieved great success in the Persian Gulf war in accomplishing the goals set forth by the United Nations Security Council.
Subsequent to the cessation of hostilities in the Persian Gulf, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 687, which has now been in effect for more than 100 days, and which required that Iraq submit within 15 days of its adoption a declaration of `the locations, amounts and types' of its weapons of mass destruction.
Resolution 687 further required that Iraq `shall unconditionally accept the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless, under international supervision,' of all of its `chemical and biological weapons,' and shall place all of its nuclear weapons-usable material under the `exclusive control, for custody and removal, of the International Atomic Energy Agency.'
Iraq has failed to meet any of these requirements of Resolution 687, and further:
(a) Refused to acknowledge the existence of its biological weapons program.
(b) Obstructed, including through the use of armed force, the efforts of the United Nations Special Commission established by the Resolution to inspect Iraq's nuclear facilities to carry out its mandate.
In a report issued on July 30, the Commission concluded that Iraq has undertaken a systematic effort to conceal its nuclear weapons development program, and has four times as many chemical weapons as previously estimated.
President Bush has stated his determination to accomplish the goals of Resolution 687.
It is the sense of Congress that:
1. Iraq's failure to meet the requirements of Resolution 687 constitutes a continuing and grave threat to vital American national security interests and to the peace, security and stability of the Persian Gulf region.
2. The Congress supports the use of all necessary means to achieve the goals of Resolution 687.
3. The President is urged to continue consulting closely with our partners in the Desert Storm Coalition, and with the United Nations Security Council, on efforts to achieve the goals of Resolution 687.
4. Should the use of force prove necessary, the President is urged to take all reasonable precautions to ensure that innocent civilian casualties are avoided or minimized.
Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on the amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
There is a sufficient second.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I yield myself 2 minutes, then I will yield to the distinguished Senator from Connecticut 5 minutes, and then the Senator from Tennessee 3 minutes and the Senator from Arizona 2 minutes, which will deplete our side, but I do have our leader time and I will be happy to yield some of that to other Members.
Mr. President, this is the 1-year anniversary of the Iraqi incursion and invasion of Kuwait. So I think it is very timely we are considering it today. I am pleased that so many Senators on both sides have joined in this resolution. It is a bipartisan effort.
Mr. President, I wanted the resolution to be read in its entirety because I believe its words speak for themselves.
Some people never seem to get the message. Sadly, Saddam Hussein is one of those people.
One year ago today, Saddam Hussein ordered his army into Kuwait. Through all the buildup to that invasion, Saddam did not get the message that the world would not tolerate his aggression--and the people of Kuwait and, indeed, of Iraq paid a terrible price.
Apparently, he has not yet gotten the message that the world will not tolerate his possession, or development of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. And unless he soon does get that message, Iraq may have to pay a heavy price again.
This amendment will put the Congress squarely behind the President in sending the message to Saddam in the loudest and clearest possible terms: You are out of wiggle room; you are out of bluffs; you are out of time.
Unless you, Saddam Hussein, act now, to acknowledge and eliminate your chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons programs--we, the United States, the President and the Congress, working together, will do the job for you.
Let me also add that the American people support this position, too. A Boston Globe poll published last week, for example, reports that 85 percent of the American people believe the United States should take action to stop dictators from aquiring
chemical, biological or nuclear weapons; and 79 percent would favor going to war to accomplish that goal, if diplomacy and economic sanctions do not work.
Mr. President, none of this means we want war, or further military action.
Back in January, just moments after the Senate passed the resolution authorizing the use of force to repel Saddam's invasion of Kuwait, I asked the then-Iraqi Ambassador, Mr. Al-Mashat, to come into my office. A number of Senators, including many of the cosponsors of this amendment, joined me at that meeting.
We told the Ambassador frankly that passage of the resolution was not an expression of any desire on our part to use force--but indeed, a last effort to avoid its use. We told the Ambassador to pass on the word to Saddam that we did not want war--but the only way left to avoid war was for Saddam to understand that we were united, and determined to do whatever was necessary to oust him from Kuwait.
Tragically, that message did not sink in.
So now we try again, through this amendment, to send a message to Saddam. A message not that we want to use force--but on the contrary, want to make one last effort to avoid it.
Mr. President, the United Nations has outlined its demands--its legitimate demands--in Resolution 687.
The President has laid out our demands--our legitimate demands--in the clearest possible terms.
By agreeing to this amendment, we will reinforce the President's declarations, and--hopefully--make Saddam understand, at long last, that all of us are united in our demands; and in our determination to do whatever we must to ensure that those demands are met.
Mr. President, on this day, the anniversary of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, I urge all Senators to vote for this amendment, in the interest of our national security, and in the interest of peace.
Mr. President, I reserve the remainder of my time, if I have any, and I yield to the distinguished cosponsor, Senator Lieberman.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is recognized.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Republican leader and I am proud to join with him and other cosponsors of this resolution in a unified and I believe unifying expression of support for the use of all necessary means to compel the Iraqi dictator to once and for all abide by the law.
One year ago today, the forces of Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, launching a brutal attack against that smaller, weaker neighbor. Too few people in the world believed that could ever occur. One year ago today, we stood really unknowingly at a crossroads of history. We did not appreciate what Saddam had in mind for Kuwait. In fact, for years we had tried to befriend him, turning a blind eye to his pattern of brutal behavior. So it was 1 year ago on August 2, 1990, with all those troops destroying a defenseless neighbor, that we could hardly believe our own eyes. At first, we could not clearly see the crossroads at which we stood. Saddam chose the path for us, a path that led ultimately to the war in the gulf and that great victory won by the coalition partners of Operation Desert Storm.
Now, on the anniversary of the invasion of Kuwait, we find ourselves at another crossroads. But this time we have been educated by our experience. Our eyes are open. We can see our choices clearly. And the path we choose today to take may well determine whether our hopes for peace will finally be realized in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf.
Yes, we have learned many lessons since August 2, 1990, and I think chief among them is that Saddam Hussein cannot be trusted.
Not now, and not ever. Even after suffering a humiliating defeat, he continues to flout international law, especially by his refusal to comply with the terms of U.N. Resolution 687, the cease-fire resolution.
And his violations are no mere technical violations or slight differences in interpretation of legal terminology. Saddam Hussein has clearly, consistently, and outrageously broken the terms of the cease-fire resolution, and he is doing so, we must conclude, to preserve his ability to create weapons of mass destruction.
According to the International Atomic Energy Agency Director Hans Blix, U.N. inspection teams that paid visits to Iraq discovered extensive Iraqi concealment and salvage efforts. And thanks to the reports of an Iraqi defector, we now know that the Iraqi dictator was much closer to actual possession of nuclear weapons than most of us believed possible. His effort was an indigenous effort, one that escaped the attention of all previous inspections, and one which might have resulted in the covert creation of dozens of atomic bombs, an arsenal capable of annihilating millions of people in a single, furious blow. And who--after this last year--among us can doubt that Saddam, were he to possess such weapons, would not hesitate to use them?
Mr. President, Saddam Hussein is fighting a single-minded rear-guard action to protect his weapons of mass destruction. For him, the U.N. cease-fire resolution is just that, a cease-fire, and not an end to the war. He may be pinning his hopes on our inability to sustain the pressure that we have applied to him.
He may be counting on us to lose our will, while he sustains his own.
We must prove him wrong. All the progress we have achieved throughout the course of these past 12 months--every bit of it--results only from the threat or actual use of force. Only when Saddam has been staring into the barrel of a gun that is cocked and ready to fire has he ever thought about giving in.
The resolution that Senator Dole and I and so many others have sponsored today provides us with an opportunity to send that signal to Saddam.
The resolution does not seek to move beyond the authority we have already provided to the President under previous action by Congress.
But it does express the clear intent of the Congress that the President can use any and all necessary means to carry out the terms of the U.N. Resolution 687, and particularly with regard to the development of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons of mass destruction.
Years before World War II, when President Roosevelt saw more clearly than most in this country how actions in faraway countries can threaten the survival of the civilized world, he said:
There can be no stability or peace either within nations or between nations except under laws and moral standards adhered to by all. International anarchy destroys every foundation for peace.
Well, in our time, we have learned that Saddam Hussein respects no laws and no moral standards, and as such, he represents a danger to the fabric of peace and security in the world. The fact that he possesses weapons of mass destruction, and still seeks to acquire more, makes that danger clear and present.
It would be wonderful if we could assume that U.N. resolutions and good wishes would convince Saddam to bare all, to come clean, to let us cart away all of his offensive capability. It would be wonderful, but it would be wrong. Therefore, we must be prepared to use force, if necessary, against Saddam again.
Recent events have shown that he has learned little in the year that has passed since August 2, 1990. But let us show by our vote today, on August 2, 1991, that we have learned a great deal.
Mr. President, I urge adoption of the amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. DOLE. I yield 3 minutes to the Senator from Arizona, and then 3 minutes to the Senator from Tennessee.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona is recognized.
Mr. McCAIN. Thank you, Mr. President.
I thank the distinguished Republican leader for proposing this amendment. It is a very important message to be sent at this time. And I would like to associate myself with the very eloquent remarks of the Senator from Connecticut, who I think describes the situation in very convincing fashion.
Mr. President, the only comment I would add to this very important discussion is, Saddam Hussein, being clearly in violation of the cease-fire agreement as regards weapons of mass destruction, makes a compelling case that we must act in order to prevent him from breaking this cease-fire agreement. Hopefully, he will do so without the use of force.
But, Mr. President, if we do not succeed here in this
clear-cut case of a tyrant who continues to attempt to build up and acquire weapons of mass destruction, we will never succeed in addressing the compelling issue of the nineties, and that is the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This will be viewed by the tinhorn dictators of the world, such as Assad, Qadhafi, and others, including North Korea, as a litmus test as to whether the world is serious, if we are going to address the issue of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
I would like to take just a moment relating to another matter, and that is the issue of the Presidential Commission on the Investigation of the MIA/POW's.
I have had extended discussions with Secretary Cheney, with National Security Adviser Scowcroft, and the Chief of Staff, Mr. Sununu. I am convinced they are moving rapidly toward the appointment of a Presidential Commission. I have urged General Scowcroft that the most credible members be appointed to that Commission, and I am considering Mr. President, a sense-of-the-Senate resolution to be put on this bill calling for the appointment of a Presidential Commission on POW-MIA issues. I am not sure that is necessary, but I am seriously considering it.
And, Mr. President, I am pleased that the administration is moving forward to the appointment of a Presidential Commission on this issue. I do not believe it harms the special committee that is being proposed by some of our Members.
But it is a very important issue, and it is very important we get this issue resolved.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield for just a moment, I wish to congratulate the Senator on his initiative, together with the Republican leader and others. This was a subject of some discussion in the Rules Committee this morning. At that time, I indicated to the membership present that I felt the administration was proceeding, and that it would in no way detract from such action the Senate may take with respect to its own committee.
Indeed, the subject deserves attention from the highest levels, both of the executive branch, the President, and the Commission, and indeed, the Senate, if that is the ultimate judgment of the Senate.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from Virginia for his views.
Again, I would like to express my appreciation to the minority leader. Twenty-two years ago, Senator Dole had a meeting with POW-MIA families in his office. He has been dedicated to the issue ever since. And it was his proposal and mine for deployment of a Presidential Commission starting last week. I appreciate his continued efforts and dedication on this issue.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I yield 10 minutes to the Senator from Minnesota.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Minnesota is recognized.
Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, I rise to oppose this amendment. I support the sponsors' intent to compel Iraqi compliance with the terms of the cease-fire agreed to by the Security Council. I share their concerns that the Iraqi Government is trying to evade these terms by concealing its nuclear weapons production facilities and chemical weapons capabilities. I believe that among the Members of this body, there is little question that Iraq must comply fully with U.N. Resolution 687.
But, Mr. President, as I read this language, `The Congress supports the use of all necessary means to achieve the goals,' I have to ask the question, what does `all necessary means' mean?
In this context, it has emerged as a code word for United States bombing of Iraqi facilities. But what else might it mean? Are we talking about ground assaults on Iraqi facilities by the United States or allied forces? Are we talking about other more catastrophic alternatives? We do not know.
We do not know. Given all the twists and turns of what has happened in the Persian Gulf, we will not know until the moment of decision comes closer.
Do we, in the wake of the war, hold congressional war-making authority in such disdain that we routinely attach vague, ambiguous, and gratuitous expressions of support--not a formal congressional authorization to use force--to any legislative vehicle which happens to move through this body?
In the face of all the allied opposition to unilateral use of force against these facilities now, why the rush? Why not continue to tighten the screws diplomatically and economically?
This is not really a debate. There will not be an equal division of opinion on this question. I have to tell you that my vote and my opposition will feel, and is, very lonely. I came here, and in my maiden speech on the floor of the U.S. Senate I had to speak about the war. I wanted to speak about health care and education and children and jobs and having our country do better economically. Now, the day before we go on recess, once again I speak out, and I know very few other Senators will be with me.
But I remember that when I was under attack for my vote--and it was discouraging because I want to do well for people and I want people to like me, and I do not like being alone--I called home and I talked to my youngest
son, Mark. He knew I was really down. And he said to me, `I know you are down. But, you know, you have to remember what you always told each of us. You have to stick with what you believe in. You have to say what you believe. You have to vote what you believe, Dad. You have to reach deep within.'
So, as much as I hate to oppose this, as much as I hate to be perhaps the lone voice in the Senate speaking out against this, I am going to continue to say what I believe. I am going to continue to vote what I believe. It is the only way. Other Senators disagree with me in good faith. But this is the only way I can go to sleep at night and be credible to myself and be a powerful voice for what I believe in.
I yield the remainder of my time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Akaka). Who yields time?
Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Tennessee and 4 minutes to the Senator from New York.
I ask unanimous consent that each side have 5 additional minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The Senator from Tennessee is recognized.
Mr. GORE. Mr. President, first I would like to thank the distinguished Republican leader for his courtesy and compliment him and Senator Lieberman for their leadership in introducing this amendment. I strongly support this amendment.
I might say I not only see this as a message to Saddam Hussein, I also see it as a message from the U.S. Senate, and I think from the American people through the U.S. Senate, to President Bush as well, because he is geting other messages on this question.
We have to respect and understand the situation the President is in. He is being urged by our allies in Saudi Arabia to leave the situation alone. Many of those coutnries that were part of the coalition during the war are now saying, do not upset the apple cart, do not do anything untoward. Let us just let things be.
Even in his meetings with the leader of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev, we are told that Mr. Gorbachev urged the President not to overthrow Saddam Hussein. Saddam Hussein himself is not the issue. The survival of that Bathist regime in Iraq is the issue, and whether or not they will be allowed to violate the terms of the cease-fire agreement. This is the 1-year anniversary of their invasion of Kuwait.
We have much to be proud of, much to reflect upon with pride. Our soldiers have performed admirably. The world community came together. The United States led the world community. The aggression was rolled back.
But am I missing something? After what we have been through, Saddam is still in power, still developing nuclear weapons, still developing chemical weapons. Hello? Have I missed something?
I do not think it is reasonable, after what we have been through, for him to continue the development of nuclear weapons in violation of the U.N. cease-fire agreement and for us to listen to the voices of the Saudi Arabians and others in the region who say, let us just keep calm about this and not do anything about it. I think that is an extremely serious mistake.
How is it that we can convince ourselves that the people of Iraq, whom we felt were perfectly capable of handling the sophisticated military weapons that our country was selling them for so long up until the invasion, and actually through an indirect route even during the occupation of Kuwait, how can we assume they can handle all that high technology, but then blithely assume they are incapable of handling democracy. Why is it we are unwilling to support the forces of democracy inside Iraq? It is because many of our allies there react against democracy as the worst thing they could possibly see in the region. They do not want democracy.
But in this situation we have to stand up for our interests, the larger interests of the world community, in not allowing Saddam Hussein and his regime to develop nuclear weapons. What this resolution says to Saddam Hussein and to President Bush is the American people believe that, if Saddam is not going to live up to the terms of this cease-fire agreement, we believe that is justification for using force, if necessary, to take out those nuclear and chemical facilities. I believe the Senate will go on record with a very strong and overwhelming vote to do that.
I think we should do more, may I say. I do not know why we do not have an investigation of war crimes going on right now, to lay down the indictment, to document the record, including the environmental atrocity that he has committed.
Mr. President, we are getting to the point where there is pressure to undo the sanctions. There is suffering on the part of the people of Iraq. We were told our war is not against the people of Iraq; it is against the government of Saddam Hussein. Well, the government of Saddam Hussein is still in power and the people of Iraq are the ones who are suffering.
I believe an international authority should be created to control the sale of Iraqi oil and to collect all of the revenue which comes from the sale of that oil and spend it only for humanitarian assistance--food and medicine--from an approved list, coming from Iraq, on condition it is not distributed by the government of Saddam Hussein. That should be a function of the world community as an additional measure to pressure the removal of Saddam Hussein.
But as a minimum item, we should overwhelmingly support this amendment. If necessary, use force against those nuclear sites--not ground forces; air strikes if necessary--to enforce the cease-fire agreement.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. DOLE. I yield 1 minute to the distinguished chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Pell, then 4 minutes to the Senator from New York and 2 minutes to the Senator from Nebraska.
Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I thank the Republican leader. I think his amendment is an excellent one and ask unanimous consent I be a cosponsor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. PELL. I intend to offer a further amendment for the protection of the Kurds. I hope it will receive the same overwhelming support. I yield back the remainder of my time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New York is recognized.
Mr. D'AMATO. Mr. President, first, let me commend my colleagues, Senator Dole and Senator Lieberman, for this amendment. It is long overdue.
We are not sending the kind of clear signal that Saddam Hussein must understand. Nor are we giving the right signal to the world community. I have to tell my colleagues that history, it would seem to me, has failed to wake us up, failed to let us know and give us the courage to act as we should. I look back to the days--it was not too long ago--when we can vividly recall the world community wringing their hands, condemning the State of Israel because she had the courage to do what many knew should be done, even her enemy, the Iranians. They condemned the State of Israel for knocking out the nuclear reactors 10 years ago. Incredible. And here we are now, after having scored a splendid victory, and when it comes time to see to it that the terms of the cease fire are adhered to, we kind of shilly-shally. We look the other way. We wonder.
It has taken us months and months to come to a point where we say he has nuclear capability far greater than anyone has suspected, he has the chemicals, biolgoical, and what do we do? We do not send a clear signal that says, listen, Saddam, you either comply with those resolutions or we will take the measures necessary to see to it that they are destroyed.
The only thing this amendment lacks is the fact that maybe it should include when we do make the strike, and if it is necessary to make the strike, that we see if we cannot have it coincide with one of Saddam's visits to one of those sites so that we can knock out two birds with one stone, or, might I say, one bird and one vulture.
When I hear this business about saying, oh, I have to go back to my constituents, you know, it is lonely--get in the real world. Understand what is happening; he is making a fool of us.
Let me tell you, my colleague from Tennessee was absolutely right when he said, you are going to lift the sanctions now? You really trust this son of a gun? You really think he is going to use these moneys for humanitarian aid? My gosh, what philosophical idiots have we turned into to believe that kind of drivel? That is drivel.
The Commission says, we want to make things nice, let us tuck them up and we will lift the sanctions. We should not lift those sanctions until that miserable person is out of there. Absolutely. If we lift those sanctions he is not going to help the Iraqi people. He is going to help his army; he is going to help the people who are with him.
So the Senator is absolutely right and this amendment, hopefully, will give to the administration the backbone necessary to stand and do what is right so that we can avoid more turmoil in the Middle East. God help us if this tyrant is permitted to develop the nuclear capability or chemical and biolgoical capability that he seeks. So I strongly support this amendment. It may, indeed, serve the purposes of world peace if we act now. I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. KERREY addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nebraska is recognized for 2 minutes.
Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, I also rise in strong support of the Dole-Lieberman amendment. The statements that have been previously made I think adequately cover the reasons for it. However, I do think it is important to observe that the presence of this amendment does beg a question, which is, Why is it needed? What is its purpose?
As I said, I believe the distinguished Senator from Kansas and the distinguished Senator from Connecticut and others have adequately addressed part of that, which is Saddam Hussein's performance, his violation of the U.N. Security Council Resolution No. 687; a clear violation of that resolution. I believe the United States should be prepared to use force, if necessary, to make certain that Saddam Hussein does comply with that resolution.
But in addition to that, Mr. President, I think the resolution itself provides an answer as to why we are taking this action today. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the U.N. Resolution 687 be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the resolution was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:
The Security Council,
Recalling its resolutions 660 (1990) of 2 August 1990, 661 (1990) of 6 August 1990, of 9 August 1990, 664 (1990) of 18 August 1990, 665 (1990) of 25 August 1990, 666 (1990) of 13 September 1990, 667 (1990) of 16 September 1990, 669 (1990) of 24 September 1990, 670 (1990) of 25 September 1990, 674 (1990) of 29 Octrober 1990, 677 (1990) of 28 November 1990, 678 (1990) of 29 November 1990 and 686 (1991) of 2 March 1991,
Welcoming the restoration to Kuwait of its sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity and the return of its legitimate Government,
Affirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Kuwait and Iraq, and noting the intention expressed by the Member States cooperating with Kuwait under paragraph 2 of resolution 678 (1990) to bring their military presence in Iraq to an end as soon as possible consistent with paragrpah 8 of resolution 686 (1991),
Reaffirming the need to be assured of Iraq's peaceful intentions in the light of its unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait,
Taking note of the letter sent by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq on 27 February 1991 1 and those sent pursuant to resolution 686 (1991), 2
Noting that Iraq and Kuwait, as independent sovereign States, signed at Baghdad on 4 October 1963 `Agreed Minutes Between the State of Kuwait and the Republic of Iraq Regarding the Restoration of Friendly Relations, Recognition and Related Matters', thereby recognizing formally the boundary between Iraq and Kuwait and the allocation of islands, which were registered with the United Nations in accordance with article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations and in which Iraq recognized the independence and complete sovereignty of the State of Kuwait within its borders as specified and accepted in the letter of the Prime Minister of Iraq dated 21 July 1932, and as accepted by the Ruler of Kuwait in his letter dated 10 August 1932,
Conscious of the need for demarcation of the said boundary,
Conscious also of the statements by Iraq threatening to use weapons in violation of its obligations under the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, 3 and of its prior use of chemical weapons and affirming that grave consequences would follow any further use by Iraq of such weapons,
Recalling that Iraq has subscribed to the Declaration adopted by all States participating in the Conference of States Parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and Other Interested States, held in Paris from 7 to 11 January 1989, establishing the objective of universal elimination of chemical and biological weapons.
Recalling also that Iraq has signed the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, of 10 April 1972, 4
Noting the importance of Iraq ratifying this Convention,
Noting moreover the importance of all States adhering to this Convention and encouraging its forthcoming Review Conference to reinforce the authority, efficiency and universal scope of the convention,
Stressing the importance of an early conclusion by the Conference on Disarmament of its work on a Convention on the Universal Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and of universal adherence thereto,
Aware of the use by Iraq of ballistic missiles in unprovoked attacks and therefore of the need to take specific measures in regard to such missiles located in Iraq,
Concerned by the reports in the hands of Member States that Iraq has attempted to acquire materials for a nuclear-weapons programme contrary to its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1 July 1968, 5
Recalling the objective of the establishment of a nuclear-weapons-free zone in the region of the Middle East,
Conscious of the threat that all weapons of mass destruction pose to peace and security in the area and of the need to work towards the establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of such weapons,
Conscious also of the objective of achieving balanced and comprehensive control of armaments in the region,
Conscious further of the importance of achieving the objectives noted above using all available means, including a dialogue among the States of the region,
Noting that resolution 686 (1991) marked the lifting of the measures imposed by resolution 661 (1990) in so far as they applied to Kuwait,
Noting that despite the progress being made in fulfilling the obligations of resolution 686 (1991), many Kuwaiti and third country nationals are still not accounted for and property remains unreturned,
Recalling the International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, 6 opened for signature at New York on 18 December 1979, which categorizes all acts of taking hostages as manifestations of international terrorism,
Deploring threats made by Iraq during the recent conflict to make use of terrorism against targets outside Iraq and the taking of hostages by Iraq,
Taking note with grave concern of the reports of the Secretary-General of 20 March 1991 7 and 28 March 1991, 8 and conscious of the necessity to meet urgently the humanitarian needs in Kuwait and Iraq,
Bearing in mind its objective of restoring international peace and security in the area as set out in recent resolutions of the Security Council,
Conscious of the need to take the following measures acting under Chapter VII of the Charter,
1. Affirms all thirteen resolutions noted above, except as expressly changed below to achieve the goals of this resolution, including a formal cease-fire;
2. Demands that Iraq and Kuwait respect the inviolability of the international boundary and the allocation of islands set out in the `Agreed Minutes Between the State of Kuwait and the Republic of Iraq Regarding the Restoration of Friendly Relations, Recognition and Related Matters', signed by them in the exercise of their sovereignty at Baghdad on 4 October 1963 and registered with the United Nations and published by the United Nations in document 7063, United Nations, Treaty Series, 1964;
3. Calls upon the Secretary-General to lend his assistance to make arrangements with Iraq and Kuwait to demarcate the boundary between Iraq and Kuwait, drawing on appropriate materials, including the map transmitted by Security Council document S/22412 and to report back to the Security Council within one month;
4. Decides to guarantee the inviolability of the above-mentioned international boundary and to take as appropriate all necessary measures to that end in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;
5. Requests the Secretary-General, after consulting with Iraq and Kuwait, to submit within three days to the Security Council for its approval a plan for the immediate deployment of a United Nations observer unit to monitor the Khor Abdullah and a demilitarized zone, which is hereby established, extending ten kilometres into Iraq and five kilometres into Kuwait from the boundary referred to in the `Agreed Minutes Between the State of Kuwait and the Republic of Iraq Regarding the Restoration of Friendly Relations, Recognition and Related Matters' of 4 October 1963; to defer violations of the boundary through its presence in and surveillance of the demilitarized zone; to observe any hostile or potentially hostile action mounted from the territory of one State to the other; and for the Secretary-General to report regularly to the Security Council on the operations of the unit, and immediately if there are serious violations of the zone or potential threats to peace;
6. Notes that as soon as the Secretary-General notifies the Security Council of the completion of the deployment of the United Nations observer unit, the conditions will be established for the Member States cooperating with Kuwait in accordance with resolution 678 (1990) to bring their military presence in Iraq to an end consistent with resolution 686 (1991);
7. Invites Iraq to reaffirm unconditionally its obligations under the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925,
and to ratify the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bateriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, of 10 April 1972;
8. Decides that Iraq shall unconditionally accept the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless, under international supervision, of:
(a) All chemical and biological weapons and all stocks of agents and all related subsystems and components and all research, development, support and manufacturing facilities;
(b) All ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometres and related major parts, and repair and production facilities;
9. Decides, for the implementation of paragraph 8 above, the following:
(a) Iraq shall submit to the Secretary-General, within fifteen days of the adoption of the present resolution, a declaration of the locations, amounts and types of all items specified in paragraph 8 and agree to urgent, on-site inspection as specified below;
(b) The Secretary-General, in consultation with the appropriate Governments and, where appropriate, with the Director-General of the World Health Organization, within forty-five days of the passage of the present resolution, shall develop, and submit to the Council for approval, a plan calling for the completion of the following acts within forty-five days of such approval:
(i) The forming of a Special Commission, which shall carry out immediate on-site inspection of Iraq's biological, chemical and missile capabilities, based on Iraq's declarations and the designation of any additional locations by the Special Commission itself;
(ii) The yielding by Iraq of possession to the Special Commission for destruction, removal or rendering harmless, taking into account the requirements of public safety, of all items specified under paragraph 8(a) above, including items at the additional locations designated by the Special Commission under paragraph 9(b)(i) above and the destruction by Iraq, under the supervision of the Special Commission, of all its missile capabilities, including launchers, as specified under paragraph 8(b) above;
(iii) The provision by the Special Commission of the assistance and cooperation to the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency required in paragraphs 12 and 13 below;
10. Decides that Iraq shall unconditionally undertake not to use, develop, construct or acquire any of the items specified in paragraphs 8 and 9 above and requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Special Commission, to develop a plan for the future ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with this paragraph, to be submitted to the Security Council for approval within one hundred and twenty days of the passage of this resolution;
11. Invites Iraq to reaffirm unconditionally its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1 July 1968;
12. Decides that Iraq shall unconditionally agree not to acquire or develop nuclear weapons or nuclear-weapons-usable material or any subsystems or components or any research, development, support or manufacturing facilities related to the above; to submit to the Secretary-General and the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency within fifteen days of the adoption of the present resolution a declaration of the locations, amounts, and types of all items specified above; to place all of its nuclear-weapons-usable materials under the exclusive control, for custody and removal, of the International Atomic Energy Agency, with the assistance and cooperation of the Special Commission as provided for in the plan of the Secretary-General discussed in paragraph 9(b) above; to accept, in accordance with the arrangements provided for in paragraph 13 below, urgent on-site inspection and the destruction, removal or rendering harmless as appropriate of all items specified above; and to accept the plan discussed in paragraph 13 below for the future ongoing monitoring and verification of its compliance with these undertakings;
13. Requests the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, through the Secretary-General, with the assistance and cooperation of the Special Commission as provided for in the plan of the Secretary-General in paragraph 9(b) above, to carry out immediate on-site inspection of Iraq's nuclear capabilities based on Iraq's declarations and the designation of any additional locations by the Special Commission; to develop a plan for submission to the Security Council within forty-five days calling for the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless as appropriate of all items listed in paragraph 12 above; to carry out the plan within forty-five days following approval by the Security Council; and to develop a plan, taking into account the rights and obligations of Iraq under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1 July 1968, for the future ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with paragraph 12 above, including an inventory of all nuclear material in Iraq subject to the Agency's verification and inspections to confirm that Agency safeguards cover all relevant nuclear activities in Iraq, to be submitted to the Security Council for approval within one hundred and twenty days of the passage of the present resolution;
14. Takes note that the actions to be taken by Iraq 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 of the present resolution represent steps towards the goal of establishing in the Middle East a zone free from weapons of mass destruction and all missiles for their delivery and the objective of a global ban on chemical weapons;
15. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the steps taken to facilitate the return of all Kuwaiti property seized by Iraq, including list of any property that Kuwait claims has not been returned or which has not been returned intact;
16. Reaffirms that Iraq, without prejudice to the debts and obligations of Iraq arising prior to 2 August 1990, which will be addressed through the normal mechanisms, is liable under international law for any direct loss, damage, including environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources, or injury to foreign Governments, nationals and corporations, as a result of Iraq's unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait;
17. Decides that all Iraqi statements made since 2 August 1990 repudiating its foreign debt are null and void, and demands that Iraq adhere scrupulously to all of its obligations concerning servicing and repayment of its foreign debt;
18. Decides also to create a fund to pay compensation for claims that fall within paragraph 16 above and to establish a Commission that will administer the fund;
19. Directs the Secretary-General to develop and present to the Security Council for decision, no later than thirty days following the adoption of the present resolution, recommendations for the fund to meet the requirement for the payment of claims established in accordance with paragraph 18 above and for a programme to implement the decisions in paragraphs 16, 17 and 18 above, including: administration of the fund; mechanisms for determining the appropriate level of Iraq's contribution to the fund based on a percentage of the value of the exports of petroleum and petroleum products from Iraq not to exceed a figure to be suggested to the Council by the Secretary-General, taking into account the requirements of the people of Iraq, Iraq's payment capacity as assessed in conjunction with the international financial institutions taking into consideration external debt service, and the needs of the Iraqi economy; arrangements for ensuring that payments are made to the fund; the process by which funds will be allocated and claims paid; appropriate procedures for evaluating losses, listing claims and verifying their validity and resolving disputed claims in respect of Iraq's liability as specified in paragraph 16 above; and the composition of the Commission designated above;
20. Decides effective immediately, that the prohibitions against the sale or supply to Iraq of commodities or products, other than medicine and health supplies, and prohibitions against financial transactions related thereto contained in resolution 661 (1990) shall not apply to foodstuffs notified to the Security Council Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) concerning the situation between Iraq and Kuwait or, with the approval of the Committee, under the simplified and accelerated `no-objection' procedure, to materials and supplies for essential civilian needs as identified in the report of the Secretary-General dated 20 March 1991, 9 and in any further findings of humanitarian need by the Committee;
21. Decides that the Security Council shall review the provisions of paragraph 20 above every sixty days in the light of the policies and practices of the Government of Iraq, including the implementation of all relevant resolutions of the Security Council, for the purposes of determining whether to reduce or lift the prohibitions referred to therein:
22. Decides that upon the approval by the Security Council of the programme called for in paragraph 19 above and upon Council agreement that Iraq has completed all actions contemplated in paragraphs 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 above, the prohibitions against the import of commodities and products originating in Iraq and the prohibitions against financial transactions related thereto contained in resolution 661 (1990) shall have no further force or effect;
23. Decides that, pending action by the Security Council under paragraph 22 above, the Security Council Committee established by resolution 661, (1990) shall be empowered to approve, when required to assure adequate financial resources on the part of Iraq to carry out the activities under paragraph 20 above, exceptions to the prohibition against the import of commodities and products originating in Iraq;
24. Decides that, in accordance with resolution 661 (1990) and subsequent related resolutions and until a further decision is taken by the Security Council, all States shall continue to prevent the sale or supply, or the promotion or facilitation of such sale or supply, to Iraq by their nationals, or from their territories or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of:
(a) Arms and related materiel of all types, specifically including the sale or transfer through other means of all forms of conventional military equipment, including for paramilitary forces, and spare parts and components and their means of production, for such equipment;
(b) Items specified and defined in paragraphs 8 and 12 above not otherwise covered above;
(c) Technology under licensing or other transfer arrangements used in the production, utilization or stockpiling of items specified in subparagraphs (a) and (b) above;
(d) Personnel or materials for training or technical support services relating to the design, development, manufacture, use, maintenance or support of items specified in subparagraphs (a) and (b) above;
25. Calls upon all States and international organizations to act strictly in accordance with paragraph 24 above, notwithstanding the existence of any contracts, agreements, licensees or any other arrangements;
26. Requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with appropriate Governments, to develop within sixty days for the approval of the Security Council, guidelines to facilitate full international implementation of paragraphs 24 and 25 above and paragraph 27 below, and to make them available to all States and to establish a procedure for updating these guidelines periodically;
27. Calls upon all States to maintain such national controls and procedures and to take such other actions consistent with the guidelines to be established by the Security Council under paragraph 26 above as may be necessary to ensure compliance with the terms of paragraph 24 above, and calls upon international organizations to take all appropriate steps to assist in ensuring such full compliance;
28. Agrees to review its decisions in paragraphs 22, 23, 24 and 25 above, except for the items specified and defined in paragraphs 8 and 12 above, on a regular basis and in any case one hundred and twenty days following passage of the present resolution, taking into account Iraq's compliance with the resolution and general progress towards the control of armaments in the region;
29. Decides that all States, including Iraq, shall take the necessary measures to ensure that no claim shall lie at the instance of the Government of Iraq, or of any person or body in Iraq, or of any person claiming through or for the benefit of any such person or body, in connection with any contract or other transaction where its performance was affected by reason of the measures taken by the Security Council in resolution 661 (1990) and related resolutions;
30. Decides that, in furtherance of its commitment to facilitate the repatriation of all Kuwaiti and third country nationals, Iraq shall extend all necessary cooperation to the International Committee of the Red Cross, providing lists of such persons, facilitating the access of the International Committee of the Red Cross to all such persons wherever located or detained and facilitating the search by the International Committee of the Red Cross for those Kuwaiti and third country nationals still unaccounted for;
31. Invites the International Committee of the Red Cross to keep the Secretary-General appraised as appropriate of all activities undertaken in connection with facilitating the repatriation or return of all Kuwaiti and third country nationals or their remains present in Iraq on or after 2 August 1990;
32. Requires Iraq to inform the Security Council that it will not commit or support any act of international terrorism or allow any organization directed towards commission of such acts to operate within its territory and to condemn unequivocally and renounce all acts, methods and practices of terrorism;
33. Declares that, upon official notification by Iraq to the Secretary-General and to the Security Council of its acceptance of the provisions above, a formal cease-fire is effective between Iraq and Kuwait and the Member States cooperating with Kuwait in accordance with resolution 678 (1990);
34. Decides to remain seized of the matter and to take such further steps as may be required for the implementation of the present resolution and to secure peace and security in the area.
1 S/22275, annex.
2 S/22273, S/22276, S/22320, S/22321 and S/22330.
91-11221, 33152 (E)
3 League of Nations, `Treaty Series,' vol. XCIV (1929). No. 2138.
4 General Assembly resolution 2826 (XXVI), annex.
5 General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII).
6 General Assembly resolution 34/146.
Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, the resolution is a rather weak one, in my judgment. It is hardly an unconditional surrender. It deals essentially with the border-to-border dispute between Iran and Iraq. It provides a mechanism to ensure there are no biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons still in Iraq. It directs Iraq to do a number of things; it requests Iraq to do a number of things. It talks about this being a first step toward a regional zone where nuclear and other mass destruction weapons will not be present.
I urge my colleagues to look at the U.N. Security Council Resolution No. 687. It is part of the reason that we are revisiting this issue. It is decidedly weak. It is hardly a document that indicates Iraq itself unconditionally surrendered as a consequence of their defeat.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yield time?
Mr. DOLE. The Senator from Ohio [Mr. Metzenbaum], desired 2 minutes. He has been called away to the telephone. Is the Senator from Minnesota going to take additional time?
Mr. WELLSTONE. No.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I find myself controlling the time in opposition, but I support the Dole amendment. So I am prepared to yield to people who are in opposition. I would like to save most of the time because I think I have that duty. I ask the Senator from Minnesota, does he have a desire for more time?
Mr. WELLSTONE. I say to the Senator from Georgia that I have basically spoken my piece. I have laid out my concerns. There may be another Senator who wants to speak against this.
Mr. NUNN. Does the Senator from Delaware desire to speak?
Mr. BIDEN. I would like to speak. I am not sure I am in opposition or favor. I raise two questions.
Mr. NUNN. How much time do I have, Mr. President?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 14 minutes.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I yield the Senator from Delaware 7 minutes.
Mr. DOLE. Is the Senator from Ohio to be recognized next?
Mr. BIDEN. The Senator from Ohio can go next.
Mr. President, the Senator from Ohio is very gracious in suggesting I go forward. I am going to be brief out of necessity, because I have only minutes, but also because there is no need to spend a lot of time with the issue I want to raise.
This resolution does not fail in terms of its objective, which I think most are willing to support. That is a policy that we have already now declared, a policy that we voted on and gave authorization for one that was the congressional equivalent of a declaration of war. Once that was done, most of us who opposed it, opposed it on the basis of timing. We already crossed the Rubicon on that.
Now the question is getting the job finished. I am prepared to support `getting that job finished,' particularly as it relates to nuclear capability. What concerns me is not a grammatical point or substantive point, but a constitutional point.
This resolution, I am concerned, may fail in a fundamental way in that it may not be clear what exactly it is about. Is this a mere expression of encouragement to the President to be energetic in pursuing the ends of resolution 687, or is it an authorization to use force which would be clearly constitutional, which I strongly support, and which I believe should be explicitly stated, if that is what is meant. Or, is it an exhortation to the President to exercise an allegedly inherent authority we believe he still retains? If it is, I am prepared to support that as well, but it does not say that in the resolution.
Regardless of what we think about the outcome of the vote we had last year or some months ago on this issue, in January, it was historic, it was proper, it was precise and it was necessary, and we did it. We cast a vote and we did it in a way we have not done in a long time, not willy-nilly. We stepped up, we concluded under constitutional responsibility what we were willing to give the President authority to do what he did.
I, quite frankly, think it is important that the resolution contain as I say, certain provisions: First either a direct authorization to use force, or a paragraph where it says `it is the sense of the Congress that;' second, there be a paragraph 3(a) short of the last paragraph that says something to the effect that the U.S. Congress exhort to the President the use of authority that he retains from the authority granted to him in January by the Congress.
So I would strongly urge, if it is able to be done under our rules, the sponsors of this legislation to be explicit. But all I see is that the President is urged to continue consulting closely with our partners in the Desert Storm coalition and with the U.N. Security Council in efforts to achieve the goals of Resolution 687. That is not an explicit authority, and I believe under our Constitution it is a dangerous precedent to suggest that that is a base upon which the President has the authority to go to war.
I predict that we will have on this floor very shortly other resolutions about the unfinished business, because no one here argues we finished the business of the Persian Gulf war. Saddam Hussein is still wandering around with a sidearm strapped to his side. He is consolidating power. The Kurds are struggling for power. The Shiites are striving for power, and so on. So I would urge my colleagues, if they would be willing, to accept some modification along the lines of either explicitly stating that this is a continuation of authority already granted or an authorization granting authority. I would strongly urge their consideration. I think it is the best way for us to cleanly proceed and say what we mean.
If I have any time left, I ask either one of the sponsors whether or not they would consider that or respond as to why what I have suggested might not be necessary constitutionally.
Mr. DOLE. Mr. President if I could respond--is there any time remaining?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware has 2 minutes.
Mr. BIDEN. If they can answer on maybe their time. Is that possible?
Mr. DOLE. I think I have already overextended my time.
Mr. BIDEN. Answer on my time. This is extremely important.
Mr. DOLE. This is a legitimate question, one that the Senator from Delaware raised with me a couple of days ago. This amendment does not and is not intended to authorize the use of force by the President.
We purposely structured this amendment to avoid any extended debate on the question of authorization of the use of force or the war powers. My personal view, and I should add the President's view, is that in circumstances such as those we face in Iraq the President requires no specific authorization from Congress. He already has the authority under the Constitution as Commander in Chief to undertake military action short of war to defend our vital interests.
Others, including I, believe the coauthor of this amendment, the distinguished Senator from Connecticut [Mr. Lieberman], believe that the President does not, indeed, need such congressional authorization, but they also believe that the authority given in January--in other words this is an extension of the authority given in January.
I yield to the Senator from Connecticut, who just made a very valid point in discussing with me about the second authorization for the same conflict. I yield to my colleague.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. I thank the distinguished Republican leader.
In responding to the very pertinent question raised by the Senator from Delaware, this Persian Gulf war was perhaps the most legal war we have ever fought leading through the U.N. resolutions of last fall. Our own resolution (S.J. Res. 2) enacted on January 12, authorizes the President to use U.S. Armed Forces to carry out Resolution 678, and the intention here is not to have a further authorization but to make clear that we support the use of force as the President deems necessary to further carry out the authorization we gave him in January.
Mr. President, if I may put it this way, we have sent troops abroad almost 215 times in our history. Prior to the Persian Gulf war, there were only five declarations or war, this being the sixth. To use the term authorize here would be the equivalent of saying that we needed two declarations of war in Operation Desert Storm, one to start it and one to finish it. That makes no sense. We have given clear authority in Senate Joint Resolution 2 and this merely expresses our support for the President and sends a message to Saddam Hussein and our allies that we intend not to allow him to flout the U.N. cease-fire resolution.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President on the Senator's time, since we just all used up my time, may I respond for 60 seconds? Is that possible? Thirty seconds.
Mr. DOLE. I ask unanimous consent I may be given 1 minute.
Mr. BIDEN. I thank the chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. BIDEN. Would the Senator be willing to say explicitly that the argument is inherent based on the President's authority versus his not having inherent authority. If the Senator will use any language that says this is an explicit recognition of the continuation of the authority that was granted, then there is no problem here. I do not think the President has any reason to worry.
One Senator said this is the most legal war. Look at it. It was the most clean legal war, the one with the most support of the American people. There are benefits to being clearly legal. Would the Senator be willing to insert a phrase saying that this is a continuation of authority already granted to the President. We acknowledge that this is a continuation; he can act under that. The President believes he does not need it anyway. We will not prejudice the President's position, but we will satisfy the congressional position if that is all that we really mean.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's 1 minute has expired.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, if I may have an additional moment from the Senate Republican leader to respond.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent if I might for 2 additional minutes to respond to the Senator from Delaware.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I would yield ultimately to the cosponsor, the distinguished Republican leader, for his response, but may I say that I think we have established a clear record of intent here with the statements that have been made: that there is not another authorization necessary; that was done in January, and it is not the intention of the sponsors to support the use of all necessary means pursuant to the authorization that was given in January.
I think we have established a very clear record. The real message is not just the legal one, although that is important. The real message is to the gentleman in Baghdad.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield to me?
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Yes.
Mr. DOLE. I prefer not to try to start amending the resolution at this point. I think we have made the history. The Record will reflect precisely what the Senator from Delaware said.
But I think this amendment assumes one way or another that the President has the authority he needs, and this amendment expresses the support of Congress for his exercise of that authority, and that is for the use of force should that be necessary. That is all we are suggesting we are doing.
I am afraid if you start amending this resolution, then it creates problems on this side of the aisle, and I think we have made the record. I think we have in effect tried to address the concerns, the very real concerns raised by the Senator from Delaware.
Mr. NUNN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia is recognized.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I agree with the last comment made by the minority leader. I believe that the January 12, 1991 congressional authorization to use force is of sufficient authority for the President to use force to enforce the U.N. cease-fire terms. The U.N. cease-fire grew out of the basic conflict that was authorized clearly by the Congress on January 12.
My logic is as follows: The Security Council Resolution 678 authorized the use of force to free Kuwait, and quoting that resolution, `To restore international peace and security in the area.' House Joint Resolution 77 specifically noted that Iraq's nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction `pose a grave threat to world peace,' and authorized the use of force pursuant to Resolution 678.
Then we came along and had Resolution 687 of the United Nations requiring Iraq to identify the locations, amounts, and types of all nuclear and nuclear-related weapons and systems and subsystems, and to place such under the exclusive custody for control and removal of such items as a condition of the normal cease-fire, which was a cease-fire relating to Resolution 678 and certainly relating to the House joint resolution we passed on January 12. Accordingly, noncompliance by Iraq to the terms of the cease-fire resolution amounts to a continuing threat to peace and security in the area. And I think that that means the cease-fire could be vitiated if this state of basic noncompliance were to continue, and that would enable the coalition to resume hostilities to ensure compliance with Resolutions 678 and 687 and that ties right back into the resolution.
As I read the Dole-Lieberman resolution, it makes it clear that what we are doing is supporting the use of all necessary means to achieve the goals of Resolution 687. So, I think there is a flow of logic here. I do not think this is granting new authority. I understand that is what the authors have said. I see it as a congressional affirmation of the authority the President already has. Is that a fair summary?
Mr. DOLE. That is a fair summary.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I do not believe we ought to amend this. I think the record is clear right now, abundantly clear by both the words and by the congressional debate and legislative record.
Mr. METZENBAUM addressed the Chair.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I yield back.
Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, could I yield 20 seconds to myself?
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, who controls time? I am a little confused here.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia and the Republican leader control time.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I yield the Senator--How much?
Mr. WELLSTONE. I will try to do this in 20 seconds.
Mr. NUNN. I will yield the Senator 1 minute.
Mr. WELLSTONE. I appreciate that.
I thank the Senator from Delaware for his analysis. I want to make it clear one more time that there is absolutely no disagreement about the need for Iraqi compliance. There is absolutely no disagreement about what we are faced with. I just wish that what I thought was a very helpful suggestion by the Senator from Delaware would have been adopted. I think the language is broad and vague. I think it is confused with whether or not it is an authorization. I do not think we should be making these kinds of decisions in this manner,
a sense of the Senate attached on to a vehicle without the kind of discussion that we are supposed to have on such a serious question. I think the Senator from Delaware made a very helpful suggestion. I wish it really had been part of the amendment. If it had been, it would have made it a very different vote for myself, I think.
Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I yield 2 minutes of my leader time to the Senator from Ohio.
Mr. METZENBAUM. I thank the minority leader.
Mr. President, I rise to support the resolution. I am frank to say that I had some reluctance early on. I was not sure whether this was the right thing for us to be doing. As I have read it, studied it, and heard the arguments, however, I have become more and more convinced that it is time that the Congress assert itself in unequivocal language to indicate that we support the use of all necessary means to achieve the goals of Resolution 687.
I do not believe that, in the history of this country, there have been many adversaries or enemies of this country that have been more evil, more lying or more deceptive than has Saddam Hussein. I am one who did not vote originally for the use of force. I had believed that sanctions might work. Once we got into the war, it was my feeling we would win it, and we did win it. My concern was and feeling was that the only mistake, if any, that was made was we did not go far and finish it.
I think this resolution says it is time to finish it. I think Saddam Hussein has been attempting to fool the American people, and to fool the world. He has lied publicly. He lied to the distinguished minority leader--and I was there and others were with us at that time--deliberate, unequivocal lies. He has been lying in every instance. He has been deceptive, unwilling to let the U.N. committee examine the availability of nuclear weapons, to actually learn the facts. I believe if there ever was a case where this country has to indicate it is totally united and supportive of using whatever necessary force has to be used in order to achieve the objectives, I think this is exactly one of those cases.
I yield the floor.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I yield the Senator from Nebraska 1 minute.
Mr. EXON. I thank the Chair. I thank the leader.
I intend to support the resolution because, obviously, whatever form it is staking, I think we want to send a clear signal to the President, if he thinks it is necessary and has to do some more with regard to the Iraq's nuclear capacity, that Hussein has or does not have, and chemical capacity.
My concern is--and I would ask a quick question from my friend who is the cosponsor--does this go far enough? The Senator reference the U.N. resolution, and what we did before.
Unfortunately, I think this resolution does nothing to say to the President to go even further to eliminate Saddam Hussein as a ruler of that country in some fashion. This really does not address that at all. Is that correct?
Mr. LIEBERMAN. The Senator from Nebraska is correct. I think it is fair to say that I certainly share his desire, as I would guess most Members of the Senate do, that the business of the war be finished and ultimately there will not be real peace and security called for in the U.N. resolution until Saddam Hussein is gone and out of power.
Mr. EXON. This does not do that?
Mr. LIEBERMAN. This does not. This only deals with the enforcement of Resolution 687, which is the cease-fire resolution of the United Nations.
Mr. EXON. I support it. I do not think it goes far enough.
Mr. NUNN. I yield such time as I have remaining to the Senator from Tennessee.
Mr. GORE. Mr. President, I would like to try to clear up the conditions about the degree to which the Congress is authorizing the President to use force. This issue is complicated by the fact that in January when we authorized the use of force, the President and many of his supporters on the other side of the aisle took the position that the congressional authorization was not really needed because the President had the inherent authority.
We decided to bypass that debate and vote on whether or not we were going to authorize the use of force. In my opinion, the President implicitly acknowledged, to my satisfaction at least, that he needed the authorization from the Congress to do what he later did. We had an up-or-down vote. We authorized that force.
Clearly, in authorizing him to use force in the enforcement of the U.N. resolution this is a continuation of the authorization already granted. The fact that the distinguished Republican leader takes the position that he may have the inherent authority anyway should not prevent those of us who believe there is a continuation of the authority we previously granted from voting for this expression of support.
We are once again bypassing that debate and saving it for another day. The narrow question is whether or not we express support for the use of force in the event it becomes necessary to enforce the cease-fire sanctions as a continuation of the authority already granted by the Congress.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I was tempted at the outset to vote against this resolution, not because I disagree with the policy it reflects but because I disagree with the way it is formulated. My concern is not a grammatical point, but a constitutional one. The text of this resolution fails to be clear about what exactly it is:
Is it a mere expression of encouragement for the President to be energetic in pursuing the ends of U.N. Resolution 687? If so, we should be more specific.
Is it an authorization to use force? If so, let us say that.
Is it an exhortation to the President to exercise an allegedly inherent authority to use force? If so, I disagree that the President possesses such authority.
Is it an exhortation to use an authority we believe the President retains as a consequence of the explicit use-of-force authorization enacted by Congress in January? If so, since that is not a completely self-evident proposition, let us make it clear.
I am sorry that we are not able, through amendment, to clarify the text because amendments have been deemed out of order and we are therefore left with the alternative of voting the resolution up or down.
Thus, those of us who wish to vote in favor of the policy reflected in the resolution, but who worry about the lack of clarity in the text itself, must rely on the fact that the legislative history--the very strong statements made on the floor here today by the bill's manager, Senator Nunn, by Senator Gore, and the amendment's sponsor, Senator Lieberman--will, along with this statement, serve to establish a clear intent.
The legislative intent underlying this resolution is, as I understand it, to affirm two propositions:
First, that actions taken by the President, including the use of force, in seeking the implementation of U.N. Resolution 687 may be taken under the authority enacted by Congress in January; and
Second, that Congress encourages the President to act vigorously to seek the implementation of U.N. Resolution 687.
As to the first of these propositions, I have expressed my preference for a more explicit text because, although it may be perfectly reasonable to do so, it is not unequivocally obvious that the Presidential authority enacted before the war should be interpreted to extend into the implementation of U.N. Resolution 687, which was passed after the fighting stopped. In matters of such gravity, I think clarity is our solemn responsibility, and offers a considerable degree of insurance against later divisiveness and recrimination.
However, with the strong statements on the floor today to which I have referred, I believe a strong foundation of legislative intent has been laid. And the intent expressed is an intent with which I can agree.
As to the second proposition--not whether the President has authority to use force, but whether he should use it if necessary--I think it is particularly important to be clear about the relationship of this vote and the congressional vote in January. It is both consistent and sound, I believe, to have voted no then and to vote yes now.
The question at issue in January was not whether we should use force, if necessary, against Saddam Hussein. It was a question of timing. All concerned knew that if authorization were granted, the President would use force immediately; he had made that unmistakably clear. Thus, the issue then was whether to give sanctions a chance--an option, as is now well known, then favored by many of our own military commanders.
The vote of the Congress in January was controversial, as well it should have been. But we should have no doubt--indeed, we and the American people should have nothing other than pride--about the value of our having focused directly and voted democratically on that most solemn of issues: Should Congress authorize the President to use force?
It was a fine and remarkable moment in the history of the American Constitution. And we made the kind of clear decision--clear in legal terms, clear in policy--that I am confident the framers intended when they allocated to Congress the decision on war. I voted to give sanctions time. But the majority voted otherwise--in effect to go to war. And we remain in that conditiion today.
That decision having been reached in January, I believe it logically consistent--and sound policy--to urge the President today to proceed as necessary to carry through to success the policy we embarked upon in January. That is why I support the resolution before us now.
U.N. Resolution 687, which outlines the terms of the cease-fire in the gulf war, requires that Iraq `shall unconditionally accept the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless, under international supervision' of all its chemical and biological weapons. U.N. Resolution 687 also mandates the placement of all of Iraq's nuclear weapons-usable materials under the `exclusive control, for custody and removal, of the International Atomic Energy Agency.'
Because Iraq has failed to meet this demand, and bcause there is a very real danger that Saddam Hussein may seek to develop weapons of mass destruction, the security interests of the international community may very well require concerted action to alleviate that threat.
If a further use of force becomes necessary, pursuant to relevant U.N. resolutions and to the authority enacted by Congress in January, I will support it--as I have always been prepared to support the necessary use of force against Saddam Hussein. This resolution today, though not as explicit in its design as I would have wished for constitutional reasons, expresses that policy. Thus, I will vote in its favor.
Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished Senator from Pennsylvania, the last request for time, and then I will close with the remaining minute.
Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Republican leader for yielding time.
I ask unanimous consent that I may be listed as a cosponsor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I suggest that this is a very important resolution on a very important day marking the 1 year anniversary of the invasion of Iraq against Kuwait. This body had very extended debates on January 10, 11, and 12 and voted to support the use of force against Iraq. We have had flagrant violations by Iraq on their commitments to make appropriate disclosures of their weaponry--nuclear, chemcial, bacteriological.
There is an explicit statement in this resolution which I think is plain beyond any doubt; that is, that there are vital U.S. national interests involved here. We cannot stand by and permit Iraq to develop these forms of weaponry given their treachery and their willingness to use this kind of force on
unarmed cities, civilian populations, as illustrated by 39 Scud attacks against Israel. There is a forceful statement. This strengthens the hand of the President, of the United States.
I hope it is overwhelmingly adopted. I thank the Chair.
I yield the floor.
Mr. CHAFEE. Mr. President, it is a sad fact, but true, that Saddam Hussein rules by force and will only yield to the threat of force. Even a cursory examination of his background makes that fact clear.
In 1980, he invaded Iran at a period when he thought the Iranian revolution had made that country vulnerable. The ensuing war cost hundreds of thousands of lives and ended in stalemate. Millions fought and suffered needlessly because of the ambitions and miscalculations of the Iraqi tyrant. One also cannot help but recall that it was during the course of this long war that Saddam Hussein used chemical weapons against both his Iranian adversaries and rebellious Iraqi Kurds.
It was only a few years after the end of the futile Iran-Iraq war, and exactly 1 year ago today, that Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait. As we all know, his troops vandalized that country and committed numerous acts of abuse, torture, and kidnaping. Yet, even after his actions were condemned by virtually the entire world, and an embargo was imposed, and the forces of the U.N. coalition assembled against him, he refused to comply with the mandatory U.N. Security Council resolutions calling for his army to withdraw.
After the air campaign began, he remained intransigent, despite the enormous hardship this imposed on his people and most especially the Iraqi army. He did not respond by seeking negotiations but by firing missiles at civilian targets; setting fire to Kuwait's oil fields; and dumping millions of gallons of crude oil into the Persian Gulf. He seems contemptuous not only of law but of life itself.
In the aftermath of the war, he turned his loyal Republican Guard forces against his own people. The Shiites were brutally suppressed in the south and the Kurds were driven across international boundaries in the north--creating an enormous humanitarian disaster. It was only after coalition forces were sent to Turkey and northern Iraq, intimidating Saddam Hussein, that it proved possible to restore order.
Most recently, we find the U.N. deadline for Iraq, to disclose its weapons of mass destruction, has elapsed and Iraq is not in compliance. U.N. inspectors have encountered repeated obstructions and evasions and have even had guns fired over their heads. I think there can be little doubt that Iraq is trying to conceal nuclear and possibly chemical and biological weapons-related materials. A recent Washington Post article on this subject states:
UN-IAEA inspections in May, June and July * * * revealed extensive Iraqi salvage or concealment efforts, including complete removal of equipment and reinforced, concrete floors from several building. While IAEA officials estimate that at least 6.6 pounds of weapons-grade unanium were made covertly, Iraq has admitted making only one pound. U.S. intelligence officials estimate that Iraq possesses 15-25 pounds, and want Iraq to surrender all of its hidden fissile materials, bomb designs, triggers, and any other vital weapons components.
Saddam Hussein has fomented and survived coup attempts in the violent world of Iraqi Baathist politics. I believe that he subscribes to the ancient view, expressed in Thucydide's `History of the Peloponnesian War,' that `Right as the world goes is only in question between equals in power, while the strong do what they can, and the weak suffer what they must.'
Mr. President, if we seriously hope to obtain Saddam Hussein's compliance with U.N. resolutions calling for the destruction of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, we must retain at least the plausible threat to use force. The President is not eager to use force, and I believe he has shown considerable restraint. He brought the ground war to an end after only 100 hours although he might easily have allowed it to continue to inflict even greater damage on Iraqi forces. Later, he might have used force in northern Iraq. But again he exercised restraint.
I believe the President will continue to exercise restraint but I also believe that it would be naive to rule out the possibility of using force at a time when Iraq is clearly not in compliance with important U.N. resolutions. Saddam Hussein was taught a severe lesson in Iraq, and I therefore believe that our threats are sufficiently credible in his mind to obtain the cooperation we need, if we remain firm in the weeks and months ahead. If the threat of force is removed, however, I think it is vitually certain that Saddam Hussein will flagrantly disregard relevant U.N. resolutions.
Mr. President, Saddam Hussein has used chemical weapons in the past and might well use nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons in the future, if he had the opportunity. Should this amendment be defeated, essential leverage will be lost, and the benefits of our victory in the gulf will be unnecessarily compromised.
As I noted at the outset, force seems to be the only thing that Saddam Hussein has any respect for. We should make clear to Saddam Hussein that that option remains available to the President of the United States. I am pleased to be a cosponsor of this amendment and I urge its adoption.
Mr. DURENBERGER. Mr. President, I will support this resolution by my colleagues from Kansas and Connecticut, although I have some concerns about it. My support is for the President of the United States and for the United Nations and for the goals of the international community's entry into Iraq.
My concern is for the meaning of `all necessary means.' What does it mean? Does it imply a new authority for the President? Is it an extension of the authority granted in January, which I strongly supported? That was an important and signal precedent. That was an important decision that his body arrived at after long and careful deliberation. It had a very specific set of goals. Have they not been achieved? If not, in what respect?
Yes, it is necessary that the international community ensure that Iraq complies with the U.N. resolutions pertaining to the cease-fire. This is an extremely significant objective, especially as it pertains to Iraq's nuclear capabilities.
I will support the resolution, but with some concerns about what is intended by it. Thank you, Mr. President, I yield the floor.
Mr. ADAMS. Mr. President, I strongly support the need to resolve immediately the extreme danger posed to world peace by Iraq's nuclear weapons program. I do not believe, however, that the United States should employ military force at this time without having exhausted all peaceful alternatives, such as multilateral action through the United Nations, the IAEA, or other similar groups.
We are again in a situation where the President is laying down a military ultimatum--similar to the January 15 deadline, which triggered the war in the gulf. And I feel I must repeat again that, under the Constitution of the United States, only the Congress has the right to introduce U.S. force into hostile situations. Not the President alone. Not the United Nations.
The President has not asked for that authority, nor has Congress debated whether or not such action would be advisable, given Saddam Hussein's refusal to comply with the terms of U.N. Resolution 687. If we adopt the Dole-Lieberman amendment, we run the risk of sending the message that whenever the President wants to use force against Iraq, it is fine with the U.S. Congress. It is a blank check and a total abdication of congressional responsibility.
I agree with my colleagues that strong action should be taken to eliminate Iraq's chemical, biological, and nuclear capabilities. But I do not believe the United States should take unilateral military action to accomplish this objective, because it sets a dangerous precedent. If such action is acceptable against Iraq's nuclear capability, why not against India's or Pakistan's or another nation's unsafeguarded nuclear facilities?
I believe the President should work vigorously through the U.N. and its affiliates, as well as through other multilateral groups, to achieve resolution 687's goals. The President should be pressing for permanent IAEA monitoring in Iraq, for Iraq to abide by the guidelines of the Australia Group on chemical and biological weapons proliferation and the Missile Technology Control Regime.
I expect the President to report regularly to Congress on progress toward achieving Iraqi compliance with the U.N. resolution.
I believe that such an approach would pressure Saddam Hussein without yielding on the vital issue of authorizing unilateral military force.
Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, I rise in support of the amendment of the distinguished Republican leader, which I am proud to cosponsor.
It is so very important for us to send this very clear, continuing message to Saddam Hussein: That his deceit and trickery will not be tolerated in a civilized world. We must do all that we can to ensure his compliance with the U.N. Resolution 687 including this authorization for the President to use all necessary means, including force, to accomplish the elimination of Iraq's nuclear capability. We are simply telling Saddam directly and succinctly to comply with the mandate of the international community or face up to the consequences--again. He would be a bigger boob if he ignored this one.
Senators Dole, Metzenbaum, Murkowski, McClure, and I personally met with Saddam Hussein in April 1990. At that time, we told the Iraqi dictator of our concerns regarding his nuclear capabilities, his threat to use chemical weapons against Israel, and of our desire for Iraq to join the civilized family of nations. We also told him to reconsider his pursuit of dangerous chemcial and nuclear programs and to cease his provocative cruelty if, according to his representations to us, he really wanted peace and cooperation with the United States.
We also delivered to him a letter outlining that message, which I ask to be printed in the Record at the conclusion of these remarks. Read that letter. The world saw his actions. The five of us who went on that trip can tell you all the you need to know about this man. He is a base deceiver, a liar.
We must again restate the message which Saddam Hussein failed to hear prior to our successful military victory. He should have learned well from that lesson. Until today, Iraq has failed to meet any of the requirements of Resolution 687. Further, Iraq has refused to acknowledge the existence of biological weapons. Iraq has obstructed the efforts of the U.N. Special Commission established by the resolutoin to inspect Iraq's nuclear facilities to carry out its mandate.
President Bush has stated his dogged determination to accomplish the goals of Resolution 687. To Saddam Hussein, we say, do not make the same mistake twice. Do not doubt our resolve to enforce the cease-fire provisions. We have the full support of the United Nations. We have worked with the United Nations so very successfully in the last year and we will continue to do that. Do not continue to second guess the world and the President of the United States. Comply with the mandate immediately. The U.S. Senate is sending you the real message today.
There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:
President Saddam Hussein: Welcome.
Senator Robert Dole: At 11 o'clock yesterday evening we contacted President Bush by telephone and each of us spoke with him. He was pleased that we were going to visit Baghdad.
Mr. President, we would like to present to you a letter signed by the five of us. We have provided the translator with a copy, and perhaps it would be easier for us to have a discussion with you after the letter has been read. It's very short.
U.S. Senate Delegation,
April 12, 1990.
His Excellency Saddam Hussein,
President of the Republic of Iraq,
Dear Mr. President: We appreciate your willingness to receive us during your holy month of Ramadan, particularly on such short notice.
We come to Baghdad, as a bipartisan delegation of the United States Senate, because of our belief that Iraq plays a key role in the Middle East. we would also like to see improved bilateral relations between our nations.
It is clear to us that we can never resolve the serious differences between our nations if we ignore them, or fail to take advantage of opportunities to communicate with each other clearly and candidly. For that reason, we believe it is important that you hear our very deep concerns about certain policies and activities of your Government, which stand as a major barrier to improved relations.
Your nation has just emerged from a long and costly war, which has generated concerns about your own security. But we cannot stress too firmly our conviction that your efforts to develop a nuclear, chemical and biological capability seriously jeopardize--rather than enhance--your security, potentially threaten other nations of the region, and provoke dangerous tensions throughout the Middle East. Your recent statements threatening to use chemical weapons against Israel have created anxiety among nations throughout the world. In your own interest and in the interest of peace in the Middle East, we urge you to reconsider pursuit of these dangerous programs and provocative assertions.
We must also express our profound distress at the alleged activities which led to the expulsion of an official of your diplomatic mission in the United States on charges that he was involved in a conspiracy to murder. We repeat: if our two nations are to have better relations, such activities as those alleged to have occurred must never happen again.
Finally, we urge you to become actively and constructively engaged in the peace process now underway involving Egypt, Israel, representatives of the Palestinian people, and the United States.
Mr. President, we thank you again for receiving us. We look forward to our exchange of views.
James A. McClure, Howard M. Metzenbaum, Bob Dole, Alan K. Simpson, Frank H. Murkowski.
Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I will just close in 30 seconds.
This is an anniversary present to Saddam Hussein. The President says we want you to stop lying to the Iraqi people, stop lying to the people in the Mideast, stop lying to the United Nations, stop lying to the people in the United States of America. Come clean on your nuclear weapons, your chemical weapons, and maybe even your biological weapons, and tell us where they are. If you do not, then your presidency is going to self-destruct, because we are going to say today in the U.S. Senate and, hopefully, in the House at a later date, that we support the use of force as we did in January. This is an indication of that, as the Senator from Tennessee pointed out. We want you to get the message this time. You are a very slow learner, Saddam Hussein. You find it very difficult to get the message. Did you not get the message in January of this year?
I hope there is an overwhelming vote of support for this resolution--for peace. We do not want to use force and never have wanted to. He has to understand that, in the final analysis, there may not be any recourse.
I yield the remainder of my time.
Mr. NUNN. I yield the remainder of my time.
Have the yeas and nays been ordered?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Yes, the yeas and nays have been ordered.
Mr. NUNN. Thank you, Mr. President.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Kansas.
The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk called the roll.
Mr. FORD. I announce that the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. Pryor] is absent because of illness.
The result was announced--yeas 97, nays 2, as follows:
So, the amendment (No. 1040) was agreed to.
Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the amendment was agreed to.
Mr. NUNN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the pending Metzenbaum amendment be set aside for 1 minute so that I may offer an amendment relating to the protection of the Kurds. This amendment has been cleared on both sides.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Wellstone). Is there objection? Without objection, it is so orderd.
Mr. PELL. I will not ask for a rollcall vote. I ask for its immediate consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. Pell], for himself, Mr. Helms, Mr. Dole, Mr. Gore, Mr. D'Amato, Mr. Lieberman, Mr. Wofford, and Mr. Exon, proposes an amendment numbered 1041.
Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with.
Mr. WARNER. I object. Mr. President, I do not have the amendment. Could we hear it read or at least be handed the amendment? I will withdraw my objection if the Senator is able to provide the Senator from Virginia with the amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the clerk will read the amendment.
The legislative clerk continued to read as follows:
SEC. . PROTECTION OF THE KURDS.
(a) The Congress finds that--
(1) the continuation of Saddam Hussein's Ba'ath party regime poses an enduring and serious threat to the fundamental human rights and physical survival of many of the Iraqi people including Iraq's long-oppressed Kurdish minority and its Shi'a majority;
(2) United States military intervention in northern Iraq helped spare a part of the Kurdish people from Iraqi military attack and from disease and hunger; and
(3) the presence of United States and coalition forces in southern Turkey with a clear mandate to protect Iraq's Kurdish minority, through military intervention if necessary, is essential to the survival of Iraq's Kurdish minority.
(b) The Congress supports the use of all necessary means to protect Iraq's Kurdish minority, consistent with the relevant United Nations Resolution and the authorities contained in Public Law 102-1.
Mr. PELL. Mr. President, when U.N. Resolution 687 was negotiated in March it had a glaring omission. While it included language demanding that Iraq declare and destroy its missiles, its chemical weapons, its nuclear facilities, and its biological weapons facilities, it included no provision requiring Iraq to stop killing its own people. During the month of March the most appalling catastrophe overtook Iraq's Kurdish minority and Shi'a majority. Cities were shelled, religious shrines became slaughter houses, whole neighborhoods were razed, tens of thousands were executed. The terror unleashed by Saddam's forces drove almost the entire population of Iraqi Kurdistan to the borders with Iran and Turkey. For far too long the victorious coalition ignored the desperate human suffering on Iraq's northern and eastern borders. As is typical in these situations, the victims were primarily the very young and the very old. Kurdish children and their grandparents were dying at a rate of 600 to 1,000 each day in early April.
Thanks to television the world finally had to react. The United States and its coalition partners launched one of the most successful humanitarian relief operations in history. Our troops created a safe haven in northern Iraq free of the murderous Iraqi Army and secret police, provided food and medicine to needy people, and then restored basic services to the cities in the safe haven.
Unfortunately, our deployment was, in my view, too short. Instead of simply withdrawing, I believe we should have turned our military position over to a U.N. force. After all, the threat to the Kurds is long-term and will continue for as long as Saddam Hussein is in power.
But, we did not stay and now the Kurds are protected only by an over-the-horizon force in Turkey. We have told the Iraqis that if they launch an attack against the Kurds we will again intervene. This threat will be more credible if it is backed up by the Congress. My amendment is intended to enhance the credibility of the United States mission to protect the Kurds. By supporting the use of force if necessary, my hope is to make such use less likely.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask to be added as a cosponsor. I commend the Senator from Rhode Island. There certainly is no objection on this side. The amendment notes that it is cosponsored by Mr. Helms, Mr. Dole, and others on this side.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the Senator from Virginia will be added as a cosponsor.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I commend the Senator from Rhode Island for his leadership in this area. We are all very concerned about the Kurdish minority in Iraq and the cruelties that have been imposed on them over the years.
I think it is important in this amendment to note that in the final paragraph of the amendment the Senator has added the words which I suggested and which I think improve and make clear in the amendment that `The Congress supports the use of all necessary means to protect Iraq's Kurdish minority.' That was in the original amendment. Senator Pell agreed to add, `consistent with the relevant U.N. resolutions and the authorities contained in Public Law 102-1,' which I think makes it clear we are tying this to the war, the aftermath, the cease-fire, and the flow of events that came out of that war, which have been in some cases, from a Kurdish point of view, certainly catastrophic.
So I think it is important that this be tied and not be deemed a perpetual grant of authority to the President, that it does not flow from the United Nations nor flow Public Law 102-1, which is a resolution passed last year.
So it is clear this authority, to the extent it is authority--but it really is, I believe, more an expression of support than a grant of authority. The word authority is not used; the word support is used.
Mr. PELL. That is correct. We intentionally did not use the word authorized we used the word support.
Mr. NUNN. It is clear that the support ties to the authority from the United Nations and from the public law that has been passed. So I think it is a very good amendment, and I support it.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate? If not, the question is on agreeing to the amendment.
The amendment (No. 1041) was agreed to.
Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the amendment was agreed to.
Mr. NUNN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.