FY 1994 BUDGET OVERVIEW - ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES, 04/28/1993, Question and Answer

Basis Date:: 19930805
Chairperson:: T. Bevill
Committee:: House Appropriations
Docfile Number:: Q93AK181
Hearing Date:: 19930428
DOE Lead Office:: DP, et al SUB
Committee:: Energy and Water Development
Hearing Subject:: FY 1994 BUDGET OVERVIEW - ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES
Witness Name:: E. Beckner, et al.
Hearing Text:

NUCLEAR WEAPONS REQUIREMENTS
Mr. Bevill. Dr. Beckner, with nuclear weapons requirements changing
so rapidly, can you assure this Committee that you are reviewing all
ongoing activities throughout the weapons complex to see if the work
being performed is still a valid requirement and that decisions are
being made quickly to prevent wasting funds?
Dr. Beckner. In the process of developing the FY 1994 and FY 1995
budget plans, Defense Programs (DP) conducted a complete validation of
all ongoing activities throughout the weapons complex. Additionally,
per my direction, responsible offices in Defense Programs are
continuously reviewing ongoing activities in the weapons complex to
ensure that work satisfies valid requirements that we make the most
effective use of available funding.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Mr. Bevill. Dr. Deutch, why do we need nuclear weapons when the
accuracy of conventional weapons has been significantly improved and
improvements are continuing?
Dr. Deutch. We need nuclear weapons for two reasons. The first is
to deter nuclear aggression by other nations. The second reason is that
there are many military targets that cannot be held at risk by even
the most accurate conventional weapons. [Deleted]
[Deleted)
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Mr. Bevill. Dr. Deutch, what type of nuclear weapons is DoD
looking at for future development? How far in the future do you see
the need to produce a nuclear weapon?
Dr. Deutch. The DoD has no requirement to develop a new nuclear
weapon. However, we need to maintain the ability to produce nuclear
weapons. Based on past experience, we can expect to find problems with
weapons in the enduring stockpile. If the problem seriously degrades
weapon performance, we may need to remanufacture or replace that weapon,
thus requiring new production. We cannot predict when such a need will
occur. But as long as nuclear deterrence remains a vital part of our
national security, we must maintain the capability to produce new
weapons.
ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES
Mr. Bevill. Please describe any programs in which the U.S. weapons
laboratories are cooperating with their counterparts in Russia.
Dr. Beckner. This is a rapidly evolving situation. For this
reason the attached lists of such activities for the DP weapons
laboratories may change.
Furthermore, those activities listed are funded with Department of
Energy (DOE) resources, not with Department of Defense (DoD) resources
derived for the Nunn-Lugar legislation. Those DoD sponsored activities
between the DOE weapons laboratories and Russian government agencies
and/or institutes can be provided by the Office of the Assistant to the
Secretary of Defense/Atomic Energy. The activities of the weapons
laboratories are grouped in the following seven areas.
Lasers and Laser Technology: The laboratories have purchased from
Russia reports on the physics of laser generation in crystals, on
technologies for the destruction of toxic chemicals and the treatment of
contaminated waste streams, and a report describing the ISKRA-5 high
power laser system. The laboratories have concluded an agreement to
acquire Russian data bases of interest to laser physics. The
laboratories have solicited proposals to support the release or exchange
of information relating to microshell technology and other issues of
laser-matter interaction and target performance.
Computation and Modeling: The laboratories are negotiating to
obtain reports on methods of equation-of-state construction, models of
material strength, methods of modeling hydrodynamic flow, and of
research into software applications for parallel computing.
Environmental Monitoring, Characterization, and Remediation: The
laboratories are working to develop isotope purity criteria for the
production of radioisotopes to be used in environmental and nuclear
science studies. The laboratories have proposed collaboration on the
Ground Based Earth Observing Network (GEONET), which involves extensive
data acquisition, regional and global modeling and prediction, and
world-wide dissemination of information obtained from the studies. The
laboratories have also proposed their Russian counterparts develop a
gamma ray spectrometer for field use to characterize soil samples. The
laboratories have also proposed funding Russian scientists to become
familiar with graphical information systems currently in use in this
country.
Nuclear Reactor Safety and Radioactive Material Processing: The
laboratories are exchanging information on criticality benchmark
experiments and calculations, criticality accidents, and burst reactors.
National Security, Nonproliferation and-Counter-Terrorism: The
laboratories are continuing to support ongoing activities involving the
NonProliferation Treaty (NPT), the Joint Verification Experiment (JVE),
the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT), and the Bilateral Consultative
Commission (BCC).
Accelerator Based Conversion (ABC) and Accelerator Transmutation of
Waste (ATW): The laboratories are proposing an initiative to jump start
ABC/ATW research in Russia.
High Energy Density Science and Technology: The laboratories are
proposing an extensive collaboration, including technology exchange, in
the field of megagauss technology for pulsed power applications.
PIT REUSE
Mr. Bevill. Please describe the status of the "Pit reuse"
alternative.
Dr. Beckner. With the termination of the plutonium production
capability at Rocky Flats, the only source of pits to satisfy any
future production requirements are those returned from dismantled
warheads. The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory is currently
developing the equipment which will allow us to do so. When
development work is complete, we plan to install the equipment at the
Pantex Plant. The schedule currently calls for completing the
installation by the end of FY 1995.
STOCKPILE MEMORANDUM
Mr. Bevill. What is the status of the latest Nuclear Weapons
Stockpile Memorandum?
Dr. Beckner. The FY 1993-FY 1998 Nuclear Weapons Stockpile
Memorandum (NWSM) was approved by former President Bush on January
19, 1993. Current scheduling calls for submission of a new NWSM
covering the period FY 1994-FY 1999 to President Clinton in the fall
of 1993.
NUCLEAR TESTING PROGRAM
Mr. Bevill. Please describe the status of the Department's nuclear
testing program.
Dr. Beckner. On February 12, 1993, President Clinton notified the
Congress of his intent to submit a report concerning nuclear testing
pursuant to section 507 of Public Law 102-377. Currently, the Department
of Energy is working with the Administration in a review of questions
concerning negotiations for a comprehensive test ban and the related
question of resuming a limited program of U.S. nuclear testing after
July 1, 1993, as provided for under this legislation. A report to the
Congress should be ready later this spring.
As the Agency responsible for the nuclear testing activity in the
U.S., the Department has taken steps to maintain our core nuclear
testing capability so we will be able to respond to whatever options
are determined most appropriate on the basis of this review. These
options require the expenditure of funds in the following broad areas:
(1) Activities to prepare to conduct specific nuclear tests in
the near-term consistent with section 507, Public Law 102-377,
including maintenance of the infrastructure to conduct nuclear
and nonnuclear tests for the U.S. and the United Kingdom; and
(2) Activities to prepare for the cessation of nuclear testing
after FY 1996.
STATUS OF RUSSIA'S NUCLEAR TESTING PROGRAM
Mr. Bevill. What is the status of Russia's nuclear testing program?
Dr. Alessi. With the breakup of the Soviet Union and Moscow's loss
of administrative control over the Semipalatinsk Test Site in
Kazahkstan, Russia, has only one nuclear test site: Novaya Zemlya, two
islands located about 300 km north of the Arctic Circle.
Russia declared a moratorium through the end of 1992 and later
extended it to coincide with the U.S. moratorium (the last Soviet test
was October 1990 at Novaya Zemlya).
[Deleted]
TEST BAN
Mr. Bevill. Please describe the impact of a comprehensive test ban
on the United States. What programmatic and funding changes would be
required?
Dr. Beckner. If an indefinite and complete ban on nuclear testing
were adopted by the U.S., DOE would still be responsible to maintain and
certify the continued safety and reliability of the Nation's enduring
stockpile. Confidence in the stockpile, as well as our capability to
respond to new nuclear-related threats, is based on the unique technical
expertise of the DOE laboratory scientists and engineers.
Past U.S. experience with the nuclear test moratorium of 1958-61
and the suspension of nuclear testing by the United Kingdom between 1966
and 1973 indicate that there would likely be a loss of scientific
personnel at the weapon design laboratories. Without the ability to
prove or disprove theories and models in nuclear experiments, many
scientists will choose to move on to other fields. Under a
comprehensive test ban, the loss of testing capabilities will likely
be rapid and the equipment and engineering skills of nuclear testing
soon atrophy. Furthermore, it is expensive to maintain large equipment
and facility resources in a state of high readiness, with uncertain
mission needs.
The enduring stockpile is currently judged to be safe and reliable;
therefore, there is no anticipated short-term impact of a CTB on U.S.
strategic nuclear capability. U.S. strategic forces would continue to be
capable of conducting all options under current deterrent policy. In the
long term, it is impossible to predict the rate at which this confidence
in the safety and reliability of the stockpile may erode. The
degradation may be gradual; however, swings in confidence have
historically been dramatic as a result of unexpected findings.
Today, the U.S. is not developing new nuclear weapons systems for
force modernization. As a result, it is expected that weapons in the
current stockpile will be deployed for much longer periods of time
(perhaps 50 years) than in the past. In the event a problem (and
problems can be expected) affects the credibility of a weapon in the
stockpile, a CTB potentially could (depending on the nature of the
problem) prevent recertification of the weapon with.the level of
confidence provided by nuclear testing.
In summary, the pace and magnitude of the long-term effect of a CTB
cannot be predicted; however, history has shown that we should expect
problems with the stockpile. Any changes to correct a stockpile problem
during a CTB will adversely affect the confidence in the stockpile. Such
a reduced confidence would reduce strategic options in a changing
political environment and therefore could have a negative effect on
U.S. nuclear deterrent.
PLUTONIUM PIT STORAGE
Mr. Bevill. Describe the current plan to store the plutonium pits
from retired weapons. When will you run out of storage capacity?
Dr. Beckner. Pending construction of a new storage facility in the
reconfigured nuclear weapons complex, we are temporarily storing the
pits from dismantled warheads at the Pantex Plant. We will reach the
current capacity of Pantex early in FY 1994. We are currently
completing an Environmental Assessment under the National Environmental
Policy Act on the effects of making more storage space available at the
Pantex Plant within existing facilities. If the Environmental Assessment
supports a Finding of No Significant Impact, the increased capacity will
allow us to store all the pits from currently planned warhead
dismantlements until a new facility is available.
TRITIUM AND PLUTONIUM
Mr. Bevill. Are the Russians still producing tritium and Plutonium?
Mr. Ford.
Deleted
Deleted
There are three dual purpose reactors
still in operation, two at Tomsk and one at Krasnoyarsk. These supply
electricity and process heat to their respective nuclear sites and
neighboring cities as well as producing plutonium. The Russians have
indicated they will shut these reactors down by the year 2000.
COUNTRIES WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Mr. Bevill. Please identify all countries known or suspected to have
nuclear weapons and include the number of strategic and tactical nuclear
weapons held by each.
Mr. Ford. The countries known to have nuclear weapons are the
Former Soviet Union, China, France, and the United Kingdom. Countries
suspected of having nuclear weapons are Deleted and South
Africa. The following table provides a summary of the information.
(The information follows:)
Deleted
Deleted
* Includes warheads from deactivated systems which are candidates for
dismantlement but are still viable.
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB)
Mr. Bevill. Please describe the activities performed by the
Department's representative to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety
Board.
Mr. Whitaker. Public Law 100-456 dated September 29, 1988, amended
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.) by establishing
the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB). The Director and
staff of the Office of the Departmental Representative to the DNFSB
(Short title "Defense Board Liaison") assists the Secretary of
Energy in carrying out Departmental responsibilities to cooperate
fully with the Board as mandated by law. The Office represents the
Secretary of Energy in regular and continuing interactions with the
Board Chairman and members regarding Board matters. The Office provides
advice and guidance to Heads of Departmental Elements and the principal
Secretarial Officers covering the entire scope of the responsibilities
and functions of the Board. In performing these functions, the Office
in no way detract from the role and functions of Program Secretarial
Officers and Departmental oversight groups to deal directly with the
Board,on specific matters.
The Office is the focal point to facilitate DNFSB interactions
with senior Departmental management. The Office also monitors and
maintains general oversight of internal Departmental actions to ensure
compliance with Chapter 21 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended,
and respond to or take actions i.n consonance with DNFSB
recommendations, concerns, or observations.
Some specific activities that are performed by this office and its
staff are to:
Maintain liaison with the DNFSB and its staff to ensure an
understanding of Board priorities, plans, and actions in performing
its mandated oversight of DOE facilities and operations.
Provide a communication and information link between the Board
and all elements of the Department.
Provide assistance to the DNFSB and staff as necessary to obtain
information or facilitate access to Departmental officials and
facilities.
Contact the appropriate Program Secretarial Office with respect to
the sites to be visited to establish agenda, to schedule inspection
tours of appropriate areas, and to schedule interviews with principal
Department and contractor personnel.
Provide assistance to appropriate Department staff to clarify the
technical feasibility and to consider ramifications of the Board's
concerns, findings and recommendations.
Review proposed responses by the Secretary to Board recommendations
to assure quality, timeliness, completeness, and compliance with law
and Board policies.
Be a point of contact for other correspondence that is forwarded
routinely to the Board by different elements in DOE.
Be a point of contact for other correspondence that is forwarded
routinely to the board by different elements in DOE.
Maintain a close working relationship with Departmental line
programs and field managers and with internal staff oversight offices
to assist in understanding and facilitating actions necessary to
comply with accepted Board recommendations.
Coordinate analysis of Board recommendations, concerns, and
suggestions in order to assure the widest possible applications of
standards and guidance for all Departmental operations.
Maintain a calendar of events to record and track Board plans for
site visits, meetings, public hearing, etc.
Maintain a management information system (MIS) as appropriate to
record incoming Board recommendations, communications, requests for
information and track status of Departmental actions to assure full
and timely responses. The MIS must also track DOE commitments made to
the Board during public hearings, public meetings, briefings, or as
otherwise required by law, as well as follow-up action.
Report periodically to the Secretary on the status of Departmental
actions related to the Board.
ROCKY FLATS
Mr. Bevill. What is the status of the Rocky Flats Plant?
Dr. Beckner. Since there are no new weapons build requirements,
the Department has decided to no longer maintain a nuclear component
production capability at the Rocky Flats Plant. Therefore, the site is
currently undergoing transition from a defense mission to one of
environmental restoration, waste management, and economic development.
Effective January 15, 1993, the Office of Defense Programs
transferred management responsibility for five buildings (771, 776/777,
779, 865 and 886) to the Office of Environmental Restoration and Waste
Management. All residues, including liquids, were also transferred to
Environmental Restoration and Waste Management. The next phase,
tentatively scheduled for implementation in the June/July timeframe,
will transfer the remaining plutonium facilities, including the
previously retained nuclear production contingency buildings (707,
559, 371). Environmental Restoration and Waste Management will assume
landlord responsibilities for the Rocky Flats Plant upon
implementation of the second phase. Buildings 440, 444, 460, 883, and
their support buildings will be retained by Defense Programs to support
their nonnuclear production responsibilities. These buildings will be
retained by Defense Programs until a decision is reached on nonnuclear
consolidation within the Department of Energy complex.
ROCKY FLATS
Mr. Bevill. Please describe the current plan for the Rocky Flats
Plant.
Mr. Grimm. The Rocky Flats Plant is transitioning in mission from
Defense Programs to the Office of Environmental Restoration and Waste
Management. Responsibility for five former weapons production buildings
was transferred January 15, 1993. Landlord responsibilities and the
nuclear weapons production contingency buildings currently are planned
to be transferred in June 1993. While the non-nuclear weapons production
facilities will remain the responsibility of Defense Programs, the
transition at Rocky Flats will focus on environmental cleanup. Major
activities will include the deactivation of the former production
buildings, removal of plutonium residues, and the management of
radioactive, chemically hazardous, mixed wastes, environmental
restoration, and the cleanup and possible reuse of selected buildings
for economic development. These efforts are moving forward in parallel
with efforts to retrain displaced workers and minimize economic impact
to the local communities.
ROCKY FLATS
Mr. Bevill. What non-nuclear components are being produced at Rocky
Flats in FY 1993 and FY 1994? Provide type and number of units as well
as total cost of non-nuclear program for FY 1992, FY 1993, and FY 1994.
Dr. Beckner. The following nonnuclear components, all components
of gas reservoir systems, are being produced at Rocky Flats in FY 1993
and FY 1994:
Type System 1993 1994
SP800 W62 115 255
SP981A W76 535 471
LF7 W78 0 68
1K W80 205 430
SP1041 W87 0 19
SP1042 W87 165 297
Test Stems Misc 9525 6000
Total 10,545 7540
The total operating cost of the nonnuclear program at Rocky Flats
is as follows:
1992 1993 1994
$127.1M $102.5M $102.3M
REPLACEMENT TRITIUM FACILITY
Mr. Bevill. Please describe the status of the Replacement Tritium
Facility. When will it,be operational?
Dr. Beckner. On April 2, 1993, the Westinghouse Savannah River
Company requested startup approval. The request was endorsed by the
DOE Savannah River Operations Office on April 9, 1993, and is
currently under review at Headquarters.
At the present time, the onsite facility staff and management are
carrying out facility operations without tritium in accordance with
Conduct of Operations procedures and the Technical Safety
Requirements. These same requirements will be imposed once approval
for actual operation with tritium is authorized. The operations
demonstration run was completed in late April 1993, and the facility
is ready in all aspects for tritium introduction for testing purposes.
However, the Secretary will make the decision on facility startup
once she is satisfied that all relevant considerations have been
thoroughly evaluated.
The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board and staff were briefed
on the status of startup efforts for the Replacement Tritium Facility on
April 12, 1993. During the week of April 19, 1993, the Board and staff
reviewed onsite the order compliance effort and the Replacement
Tritium Facility's accident analyses.
We expect the remaining technical issue involving seismic upgrades
to be resolved with our internal oversight organization shortly.
FUNDING FOR THE NATIONAL ATOMIC MUSEUM
Mr. Bevill: How much funding is provided for the National Atomic
Museum in Albuquerque, New Mexico, in FY 1992, FY 1993 and FY 1994?
Dr. Beckner: The National Atomic Museum received $411,000 in FY
1992, and will receive an estimated $504,000 in FY 1993, including
$70,000 to move one exhibit, and an estimated $465,000 in FY 1994.
SANDIA NATIONAL LABORATORIES RADIO STATION
Mr. Bevill. Please describe the Sandia National Laboratories radio
station, including the need for the activity and the funding in FY 1993
and FY 1994.
Dr. Beckner. Operating under license from the National
Telecommunications and Information Agency, Radio Sandia uses a 10-watt
AM signal to broadcast a 10-to-12-minute program every work day; that
program is repeated constantly until the next work day. Thus, Radio
Sandia provides an effective way for employees of both Sandia/New
Mexico and DOE's Albuquerque Operations Office to keep up with key
developments and program directions affecting the laboratory. In
addition, the station provides a means for Sandia's Emergency
Preparedness team to communicate immediately with employees. The
budget for Radio Sandia is,$166,000 in FY 1993 and $169,000 in FY 1994.
VERIFICATION AND CONTROL TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM FOCUS
Mr. Bevill. How has the focus of this program changed since the
breakup of the former Soviet Union?
Dr. Alessi. Since the breakup of the former Soviet Union, the
focus of the Verification and Control Technology (V&CT) program has
been reoriented to reflect the increasing importance of the
proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction and
the means to deliver them to U.S. national security interest.
Specifically the development of arms control-related verification
technologies and systems under our Detection Technology activity has
been reoriented to include the development of technologies and systems
for enhancing U.S. and international capabilities for detecting the
proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. Our
Analytical Support activity has been reoriented to include
establishing a baseline technical analysis program at the national
laboratories in support of U.S. and international nonproliferation
efforts.
In addition, under our Analytical Support activity, we have been
playing an increasing role in coordinating Department of Energy
efforts in support of U.S. activities aimed at assisting Russian
and other states of the former Soviet Union, in a number of
critical areas such as nuclear warhead dismantlement and emergency
response capabilities.
Lastly, beginning in FY 1994, funding for the Office of Arms
Control and Nonproliferation's Offices of Nonproliferation Policy
and Export Control and International Safeguards is included in the
V&CT program rather than under the Departmental Administration and
Nuclear Safeguards and Security programs as in previous years. As
reflected in our FY 1994 budget request, funding for these offices
will be significantly increased to: expand our activities in support
of U.S. regional nonproliferation efforts; accelerate development and
implementation of a U.S. national and international Proliferation
Information Network System; expand other activities needed to support
U.S. and international export control regimes; expand International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards and other safeguards and
physical protection support activities; and expand technology
development programs needed to enhance safeguards and IAEA special
inspection activities.
VERIFICATION & CONTROL TECHNOLOGY
Mr. Bevill. Please describe any role you have had in discussions
with Russia regarding control, storage and dismantlement of their
nuclear weapons.
Dr. Alessi. In November 1991, a Soviet Union delegation was
invited to Washington to discuss measures for cooperation and
assistance in control, storage, and dismantlement of Soviet nuclear
weapons. DOE participated in the delegation meetings, as well as in
a technical working group meeting. At this first U.S./Soviet meeting
on such technical issues, the U.S. presented an overview of how
the U.S. manages nuclear weapons, with particular emphasis on control,
storage, and dismantlement of nuclear weapons. In this meeting, as
well as in all following meetings, Soviet (and subsequently, Russian)
delegations insisted that direct assistance in control, storage, and
dismantlement of their nuclear weapons was neither necessary nor
desired. The sensitivity of weapon design information, as well as
the reluctance to reveal any possible weakness with respect to
nuclear weapons issues, were believed to be the basis for this
Russian position.
The Soviet delegation informed the U.S that the most important
way in which the U.S. could help the Soviet Union achieve its goal
of dismantling tactical, INF, and START nuclear warheads by the year
2000, was to support construction of a specially designed storage
facility and procurement of containers for nuclear materials
removed from dismantled weapons. The U.S. has agreed to provide
assistance in both these areas. This assistance also includes, among
other things, a design of the system for control, accounting,
and physical protection of fissile material in the facility. Many
Department of Energy and national laboratory staff members are
working to apply the very best technical expertise to these
problems. Since November 1991, DOE has participated in frequent
U.S. delegations to Russia and technical information exchanges both
in Russia and in the U.S. to discuss issues associated with
facilitating dismantlement of Russian nuclear weapons (on average
at least monthly).
In summary, we have placed emphasis on providing assistance
which is believed important to Russia in maintaining control,
safeguarding stored weapons, and performing safe and ecologically
sound dismantlement of nuclear warheads. The attached table lists
agreements in which DOE is involved in implementing or on-going
negotiations. As our technical partnership as nuclear weapon states
improves and we are able to become increasingly open with each
other in addressing these problems of mutual concern, it is realistic
to expect further initiatives in these areas.
Agreements with the states of the Former Soviet Union:
Agreements with Russia:
- Technical assistance in design of a fissile material
storage facility (now being implemented)
- Fissile material storage containers (now being
implemented)
- Flexible armor blankets (now being implemented)
- Security upgrade kits for railcars (now being
implemented)
- Accident response equipment (now being implemented)
- International Science and Technology Center (ISTC)
in Moscow (awaiting Russian signature)
- Highly-enriched uranium (HEU) purchase (agreement
signed, contract being negotiated)
- Equipment for the storage facility (awaiting Russian
signature)
- Technical assistance for establishing a state system
for nuclear material control, accounting, and physical
protection (awaiting Russian signature)
- Assistance in the elimination of strategic offensive arms
(awaiting Russian signature)
Agreements with Belarus:
- Emergency response equipment (now being implemented)
- Government-to-government communication link equipment
(now being implemented)
- Assistance in export control (now being implemented)
Agreements with Ukraine:
- Emergency response equipment (awaiting Ukrainian approval)
- Government-to-government communication link equipment (awaiting
Ukrainian approval)
- Assistance in nuclear material control, accounting, and physical
protection (awaiting Ukrainian approval)
- Assistance in export control (awaiting Ukrainian approval)
- Science and Technology Center of Ukraine (STCU) in Kiev (awaitin
Ukrainian approval)
Agreements with Kazakhstan:
- Emergency response equipment (now being negotiated)
- Government-to-government communication link equipment
(now being negotiated)
- Assistance in nuclear material control, accounting, and
physical protection (now being negotiated)
- Assistance in export control (now being negotiated)
DOE ACTIVITIES IN ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS
Mr. Bevill. Please describe the activities of DOE in arms control
negotiations. What activities will be conducted in FY 1994.
Dr. Alessi. DOE serves on U.S. delegations involved in bilateral
and multilateral consultations and negotiations related to arms control.
For example:
DOE representatives served on the Nuclear Testing Talks, the START,
Defense and Space, and Chemical Weapons Convention and US/Russian
bilateral Chemical Weapons delegations and on U.S. delegations for
Review Conferences on the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the
Biological Weapons Convention. DOE also provides representatives
and/or expert advisors to consultative committees associated with
the completed treaties, e.g. START, INF, and TTBT.
DOE expertise is often requested by the interagency in preparing
for negotiations and other arms control related meetings.
For instance, in preparation for international meetings on
potential verification measures which might be applied to the
Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), DOE was asked to prepare a
series of papers evaluating specific types of technologies. The
papers were prepared by the Laboratories, coordinated with the
interagency through DOE's Office of Arms Control and will be
presented as U.S. papers at the BWC meeting in Geneva next month.
Assistance to the Former Soviet Union
DOE is heavily involved in the U.S. effort to assist the Former
Soviet Union in activities related to Safe Secure Dismantlement (SSD)
of its nuclear weapons. DOE-laboratories are providing technical
support to production of containers for shipment and storage of
fissile materials, emergency response equipment, security upgrades
for railcars, and technical assistance in design of a secure storage
facility for special nuclear materials. Moreover, DOE weapons
laboratories have held several meetings with their Russian counterparts
and identified a series of peaceful activities on which they can
collaborate.
1994 ACTIVITIES
Treaty Negotiations DOE will provide policy and technical support,
including experts for delegations and analytical studies of policy
and technical issues as noted above for on going negotiations,
including: review of verification proposals for the Biological
Weapons Convention, the Preparatory Commission for the Chemical
Weapons Convention, the Conference on Disarmament and the Preparatory
Committee meetings for the Nonproliferation Treaty Extension Conference
to be held in 1995. In addition, the Department will continue to
prepare for expected negotiations on a Comprehensive Test Ban and for
the possibility of negotiations on a global ban on production of
fissile materials for weapons purposes. In that regard, the Office
of Arms Control will continue to call on Laboratory scientific and
expertise both for analytical support of technical issues and
identification and application of technologies to meet specific
treaty needs.
Treaty Implementation DOE facilities are subject to overflights under
Open Skies and to suspect site inspections under the Chemical Weapons
Convention. The Department must prepare to meet its obligations both
under the treaties and under U.S. laws protecting Secret Restricted
Data (SRD). The Office of Arms Control must play a significant role
in that effort. Among the activities which will be pursued are:
(1) analytical tools for assessing treaty requirements and SRD
vulnerabilities and,
(2) strategies for demonstrating treaty compliance without
revealing SRD
As in Fiscal Year 1993, DOE again will provide policy and technical
support for consultative commissions associated with existing treaties
such as START, INF and TTBT.
LABORATORY ROLES
Mr. Bevill. Please describe the roles performed by each DOE
laboratory or facility for arms control activities. Who has the lead
in each programmatic area?
Dr. Alessi. The Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation
conducts research and development (R&D) to support national-level
arms control and proliferation policies. Detection Technology is
being developed for current and future nuclear and chemical weapons
arms reduction treaties and for proliferation detection via on-site
verification, regional effluent monitoring, and remote (satellite)
detection. Listed below are the laboratories and the major projects
currently underway. At the end of this section there is a table
addressing lead laboratories.
Argonne National Laboratory (ANL):
The major projects support warhead dismantlement and
detection of nuclear material. Technology is being developed
to track containers and treaty limited items using commercial
technology and to develop a detector which will remotely
measure emission signatures of key molecules released from
exhaust and vent stacks of a plant.
Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL):
Current R&D projects will develop a Raman Spectrometry/Chemical
Analysis system to detect chemical effluent in concentrations
of less than 10 parts per million at a one kilometer range.
Also under development is a Controlled Intrusiveness
Verification Technology (CIVET) to identify, with a
high-confidence level, nuclear warheads while minimizing
intrusiveness and protecting classified information.
Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL):
Major projects focus on supporting the Chemical Weapons (CW)
Bilateral Agreement and the START II requirements for on-site
inspection of re-entry vehicles. Development is underway
on-the Portable Isotopic Neutron Spectroscopy (PINS) system
as a nondestructive assay system to identify the contents of
suspected or declared CW containers or munitions. INEL is
developing an experimental system, Fission Assay Tomography,
as a passive verification tool for counting nuclear warheads
on missiles without moving the missile or shroud. In support
of proliferation detection, INEL is developing a Surface
Analysis Molecular Beam ion trap mass spectrometer for rapid
detection (<5 minutes) and chemical identification of
nonvolatile and low volatility compounds.
Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL):
Major projects here are in the following program areas:
- Development of technologies which will improve our ability
to detect nuclear proliferation activities from space-borne
observation platforms. Included are multi-spectral thermal
imagery, multi-spectral transient radiometry, low light-level
imagery, and others.
- Development and fabrication of satellite instrumentation
which supports nuclear detonation detection for nuclear treaty
verification, proliferation detection, and collateral military
goals.
- Development of advanced Light Detection and Ranging (LIDAR)
systems for noncooperative proliferation detection scenarios.
- Development of Continuous Reflectometry for Radius versus
Time Experiment (CORRTEX) and advanced hydrodynamic yield
technologies for nuclear threshold testing treaties.
- The study of the generation and propagation of shock waves
in a geologic media surrounding underground nuclear tests.
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL):
The major R&D projects support current and future treaty
verification requirements and the development of new
proliferation detection technologies. The major projects are:
- Development of a Temperature Imaging System Infrared Camera
which corrects atmospheric effects so that temperature
determinations to 0.1 degree C (absolute) and 0.01 degree C
(relative) are feasible. This system will have broad
application in analyzing thermal emission from CW and nuclear
suspect sites and possibly in detecting nuclear warheads.
- Development of an advanced seismic verification and analysis
capability to distinguish nuclear from chemical explosions.
- Development of an Advanced Forensic Science Laboratory to
advance the knowledge base for optical characterization and
mass spectrometry technologies for effluent signatures and
chemical collection/analysis.
- Development of on-site monitoring technologies for
measurements of nuclear testing sites as prescribed by a
very low-yield threshold treaty, comprehensive test ban
treaty, or an enhanced nonproliferation treaty.
- Development and commercialization of high security
electronic tags and seals for treaty applications.
Nevada Operations Field Office (NV)/Remote Sensing Laboratory (RSL):
The R&D projects here support the development and engineering
of airborne applications of technologies for the experimental
collection of data for testing data/knowledge fusion concepts.
RSL also develops advanced radiometric detection technologies.
Concurrently, NV is leading the operational/logistical support
for a one kilo-ton underground chemical test experiment to
evaluate ground motion data. This test will enhance
discrimination between chemical explosions and decoupled
low-yield nuclear explosions.
Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL):
Major R&D supports the development of field portable
instrumentation for.future bilateral/multilateral
international inspections. Technologies include Microchip
Liquid Chromatograph and Surface Enhanced Raman Scattering
Monitors which can theoretically provide chemical resolving
power equivalent to conventional laboratory devices, but with
much less sample preparation. ORNL is also developing a
Centrifugal Concentrator for organic molecules to enhance
sample collection and analysis.
Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL):
Major projects here include:
- Development of advanced radiation detection technologies and
effluent collection and analysis for nuclear proliferation
detection.
- Leading in a tag and seal demonstration project to support
the U.S. purchase of highly enriched uranium from Russia.
- Development of a rigorous statistical assessment for both
current and future analytical methodologies to enhance
monitoring of proliferation and testing weapons of mass
destruction.
- Improving commercial technologies for arms control and
noncooperative proliferation detection scenarios. Ultrasonic
measurement and acoustic technology is investigated to verify
selected liquid properties (e.g., speed of sound, density, and
viscosity).
Sandia National Laboratories (SNL):
Major projects include:
Development of technologies which will improve our ability to
detect nuclear proliferation activities from space-borne
observation platforms. Included are multi-spectral thermal
imagery, multi-spectral transient radiometry, low light-level
imagery, and others.
- Development of detection/sensor technologies for satellite
flight systems. This program provides a number of operational
payloads supporting DOE requirements for continuously
monitoring and categorizing atmospheric nuclear events.
- Development of seismic instrumentation and analysis methods
to ensure effective monitoring of underground nuclear testing.
- The SNL Tags/Seals program is the lead developer of new
concepts for treaty and nonproliferation application.
- SNL is developing signal and image processing algorithms to
improve and augment national technical means (NTM) and
advanced remote sensing technology.
- SNL is responsible for fielding a pod mounted synthetic
aperture radar and integrating optical and hyperspectral
instruments in an accompanying airborne pod.
Savannah River Technical Center (SRTC):
The major R&D projects at SRTC are to develop systems to
support nonproliferation initiatives by improving
analytical methods. SRTC is developing a method for
chemical analysis by fiber optic spectrometry. This
technology will be designed into an automated
in-line/in-tank analytical system capable of identifying
chemical agents and measuring their concentration in disposal
incinerators and in phosphate based pesticide manufacturing
plants. Also SRTC is developing an improved Radio Frequency
Glow Discharge/Fourier Transform Mass Spectrometer with
resolving power necessary to unambiguously identify the
isotopes present in bulk and/or particulate samples.
Lead Laboratories. The lead laboratory in each programmatic area
is not in all cases discernable, but is generally reflected as
follows:
= On-site Monitoring: Lead - LANL, Second - LLNL.
= Satellite Instrumentation: Joint lead - LANL/SNL.
= Seismic Verification: Lead - LLNL, Second - LANL/SNL.
= Samples/Debris Detection and Analysis: Multilaboratory program
area with no clear programmatic leader, but the larger
laboratories dominate (LANL/LLNL/PNL/SNL).
= Nonseismic Verification: Lead - LANL.
= Directed Energy Verification: Lead - LANL.
= Technology and Advanced Concepts: Multilaboratory program
with no clear leader, but the larger laboratories dominate.
= Radiation Detection Technology: Multilaboratory program with
no clear leader, but the larger laboratories dominate.
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY ARMS CONTROL BUDGET
Mr. Bevill. Please provide a lead table as shown in the budget that
includes only arms control funding, excluding intelligence activities.
Dr. Alessi. [Deleted)
TREATY IMPLEMENTATION ACTIVITY
Mr. Bevill. In the treaty implementation activity, how many U.S.
and Soviet tests were monitored in FY 1992 and how many planned for
FY 1993 and FY 1994?
Dr. Alessi. During FY 1992, Russia monitored one U.S. underground
nuclear test. That test was named JUNCTION. No Russian (Soviet) tests
were conducted.
No decisions have yet been made about the U.S. FY 1993 and FY 1994
test programs. Because of the TTBT Protocol requirements, it is now too
late for any Russian monitoring of U.S. tests in FY 1993 and too early
to project activities for FY 1994.
Current guidance provides for the United States to exercise all of
its verification rights under the TTBT Protocol. This would mean
conducting on-site verification activities for all eligible Russian
nuclear tests.
A Russian test is in the planning stage and the United States plans
to exercise its full monitoring rights when it is executed.
TREATY VERIFICATION BUDGET ASSUMPTIONS
Mr. Bevill. What are the treaty verification assumptions on which
the budget is based?
Dr. Alessi. The Treaty Implementation activity budget request for
FY 1994 assumes: (1) that the U.S. will exercise its full spectrum of
monitoring and inspection rights on every Russian test or explosion
under the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and Peaceful Nuclear Explosion
Treaty verification protocols; (2) that the Department of Energy will
continue to be required to maintain a capability to support three
verification deployments; and (3) that the Department of Energy will
maintain a capability to support three verification efforts by the
Russians at the Nevada Test Site.
LIST OF TREATIES IN EFFECT, UNDER NEGOTIATION, AND ANTICIPATED THROUGH
THE 1990'S IN WHICH DOE WILL BE INVOLVED
Mr. Bevill. Please provide a list of treaties in effect; treaties
under negotiation; and anticipated treaties through the 1990's in
which DOE will be involved.
Dr. Alessi. The treaties and agreements which are in effect
include:
- Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) (awaiting Ukrainian
ratification)
- Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II (START II) (awaiting both U.S.
and Russian ratification)
- Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
- Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty
- Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT)
- Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT)
- Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET)
- "Hot Line" Agreement
- "Hot Line" Modernization Agreement
- "Hot Line" Expansion Agreement
- "Accidents Measures" Agreement
- Incidents at Sea Agreement
- Interim Agreement on Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms
- Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers Agreement
- Ballistic Missile Launch Notification Agreement
- Prevention of Nuclear War Agreement
- U.S.-IAEA Safeguards Agreement
- Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
- Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty
- Outer Space Treaty
- Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)
- Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
- Bilateral U.S.-Russian Chemical Weapons Destruction Agreement
(awaiting both U.S. and Russian signature)
- Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of
Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological
Methods of Warfare
- Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)
- Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty
- Open Skies
- Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)
- Confidence- and Security-Building Measures Document
- Environmental Modification Convention (ENMOD)
- Seabed Arms Control Treaty
- Treaty of Tlatelolco (Latin-American Nuclear Weapon Free Zone)
- Treaty of Raratonga (South Pacific Nuclear Weapon Free Zone)
- Antarctic Treaty
The treaties which are under negotiation include:
- Chemical Weapons Convention Preparatory Commission
- Radiological Weapons Convention (RWC)
The treaties we anticipate DOE will be involved with through the 1990's
include:
- Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
- Global Ban on the Production of Fissionable Material for
Nuclear Weapons Purposes
FUNDING AND FULL TIME EQUIVALENTS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THRESHOLD
TEST BAN TREATY (TTBT) AND PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSION TREATY (PNET)
Mr. Bevill. Provide the total funding by program activity included
in the budget for implementation of the TTBT and PNET in FY 1992,
FY 1993 and FY 1994.
Dr. Alessi. The attached chart shows by major areas of activity
(maintenance of core capability, support for Russian verification
activities at the Nevada Test Site (NTS), and support for U.S.
verification deployments in Russia) and organization (Nevada Operations
Office contractor support, Lawrence Livermore and Los Alamos National
Laboratories) the budget for implementation of the Threshold Test Ban
Treaty (TTBT) and Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaty (PNET) in FY 1992,
FY 1993 and FY 1994.
Mr. Bevill. How many FTEs support each activity?
Dr. Alessi. Also, the Full Time Equivalents supporting each
activity are indicated on the chart.
FUNDING AND FULL TIME EQUIVALENTS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THRESHOLD
TEST BAN TREATY (TTBT) AND PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSION TREATY (PNET)
FY 1992 FY 1993 FY 1994
DOLLARS FTE DOLLARS FTE DOLLARS FTE
IN THOUSANDS IN THOUSANDS IN THOUSANDS
Nevada Oper Office
-Core Capability $4,300 30.8 $3,716 27.04 $3,400 24.74
-NTS Activities 665 4.6 - - 300 2.08
-Deployments - - 35 0.30 35 0.30
------- ----- ------ ----- ------ -----
Subtotal $4,965 35.4 $3,751 27.34 $3,735 27.12
Lawrence Livermore
-Core Capability $1,150 5.03 $1,100 4.40 $ 800 3.20
-NTS Activities 800 5.0 - - 400 2.50
-Deployments - - 250 1.07 250 1.07
------- ----- ------ ----- ----- -----
Subtotal $1,950 10.03 $1,350 5.47 $1,450 6.77
Los Alamos
-Core Capability $2,845 10.32 $2,788 10.85 $2,600 10.12
-NTS Activities 1,040 3.80 - - 515 1.88
-Deployments - - 911 3.33 500 1.83
------ ----- ------ ----- ------ -----
Subtotal $3,885 14.12 $3,699 14.18 $3,615 13.83
Total $10,800 59.55 $8,800 46.99 $8,800 47.72
FOLLOW-ON EARLY WARNING SYSTEM
Mr. Bevill. What is the Status of the Follow-on Early Warning
System?
Dr. Alessi. In light of the breakup of the Soviet Union, and the
shift in emphasis to detecting emerging proliferants, the intelligence
community has been reevaluating monitoring requirements for nuclear
tests in space. Awaiting final decisions, the Department of Energy
(DOE) has ceased almost all effort related to the Follow-on Early
Warning System, except for minimal coordination with the Air Force
and its related contractors. In the absence of a strong statement
supporting exoatmospheric monitoring requirements from the intelligence
community or the Department of Defense, DOE has no plans to continue
funding this program in FY 1994.
ONSITE MONITORING ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA
Mr. Bevill. In the absence of nuclear testing in this country and
Russia, what onsite monitoring activities are being conducted and at
what funding levels in FY 1993 and FY 1994.
Dr. Alessi. [Deleted]
As called for in the Coordinated Schedule for carrying out activities
related to verification of the Russian test that has been agreed upon
by Russia and the United States, [Deleted] Total DOE
funding in FY 1993 and FY 1994 for these monitoring activities is
estimated to be $1.2 million. Should the Russians conduct additional
tests (Deleted] similar funding would be required for DOE monitoring
activities for each test conducted. These costs are incremental costs
for actual onsite monitoring activities and do not include the costs
for maintaining a core capability for conducting such monitoring
activities. In addition, should the Russians decide to monitor any
U.S. tests conducted in FY 1993 or FY 1994, additional funding would be
required to support their monitoring activities at the Nevada Test Site.
SATELLITE INSTRUMENTATION PROGRAM
Mr. Bevill. Please describe fully each of the activities being
conducted under the Satellite Instrumentation program including
milestones through completion, annual funding requirements, and total
estimated cost of each.
Dr. Alessi. The activities being conducted under the Satellite
Instrumentation program are described in our draft plan for that
program, which is included in the written material we are providing.
That draft plan describes a program which is undergoing a major shift
in emphasis. The draft plan will be reviewed by the Community
Nonproliferation Committee Research and Development Subcommittee
before it is implemented. The review will assure that the plan
addresses the most urgent needs of the U.S. nonproliferation community.
While we will continue to provide space-borne instrumentation to detect
and characterize atmospheric nuclear explosions, most new investment
will be directed at technologies for detecting proliferation
activities prior to the occurrence of any nuclear test.
******DRAFT (SATELLITE INSTRUMENTATION PROGRAM PLAN) IS ATTACHED
TO ORIGINAL DOCUMENT*****
FRAMEWORK FOR DETECTION TECHNOLOGY
Mr. Bevill. The budget request for detection technology consists of
many separate tasks to be performed by the Department. Can you discuss
the overall framework for this request; explain how the components fit
together; and discuss what the overall priorities of the program are?
Dr. Alessi. As shown in the attached chart, the Detection
Technology activities are grouped in three program areas: on-site
verification, regional measurements, and remote sensing. This
programmatic structure is organized around the primary physical arenas
in which the technologies are likely to be deployed. The program areas
cover the spectrum of our technology development programs that are
aimed at providing technologies and systems to enhance U.S. and
international capabilities that range from cooperative on-site
inspections and monitoring to remote satellite verification and
monitoring. The overall priorities of the program have shifted from
arms control verification to the development of technologies for
detecting proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass
destruction as a result of the increasing importance of weapons
proliferation to U.S. national security interest.
******DETECTION TECHNOLOGY PROGRAMS ATTACHED TO ORIGINAL DOCUMENT*****
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS
AND DOE NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY
Mr. Bevill. How does the international safeguards program differ
from the activities performed by the nuclear safeguards and security
program?
Mr. Alessi. The International Safeguards Program, administered by
the Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation, and the Nuclear
Safeguards and Security Program, under the Office of Safeguards and
Security, have unique missions and serve fundamentally different
national security goals. The two programs differ substantially in the
threats they address and the technologies they use to accomplish their
objectives. The International Safeguards Program is managed expressly
to support the international nonproliferation regime, International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, and U.S. government initiatives
in bilateral and multilateral fora to prevent the proliferation of
nuclear weapons. The Program provides the DOE technical basis for
development of nonproliferation policy. It also provides the long-term
technology base for U.S. support of IAEA and other international
safeguards activities.
In addition, DOE's International Safeguards Program implements U.S.
technical exchanges and cooperation with other countries in
international safeguards, including training programs conducted in
support of IAEA objectives and as part of the U.S. Government's
ongoing nonproliferation policy objectives. International safeguards
are implemented by the IAEA to assure, through detection and deterrence,
that all declared nuclear material under safeguards is used for
peaceful purposes. International safeguards provide for independent
verification by the IAEA of a country's commitment to peaceful uses of
nuclear energy, and continuity of knowledge of peaceful nuclear
activities.
On the other hand, DOE's Office of Safeguards and Security (OSS)
implements safeguards and security measures for DOE's nuclear assets
(including the nuclear weapons complex). The OSS safeguards and security
program aims to protect DOE nuclear material and facilities against
theft or sabotage by external or internal adversaries (e.g.,
terrorists, criminals, etc.). This contrasts with the objective of
international safeguards to verify that declared nuclear material in
countries accepting safeguards on their peaceful nuclear activities has
not been diverted to some non-peaceful use.
Because international safeguards objectives and philosophy differ
from the safeguards and security measures employed at DOE for its own
facilities, the technologies employed to implement the two programs
also differ. Domestic safeguards in the United States are based on
rigorous, technically intrusive control and accountability for
nuclear material, and physical protection of nuclear material and
facilities which address a specific "design basis threat." Conversely,
international safeguards rely primarily on material accounting,
complemented by methods of material containment and surveillance.
Information on the status of nuclear material is collected and analyzed
through periodic inspections by IAEA staff.
IMPACT OF NO TESTING IN FY 1994
Mr. Bevill. How will treaty implementation funding be impacted
if there are no nuclear weapons tests in FY 1994?
Dr. Alessi. Should there be no nuclear weapons tests in FY 1994
funding required for the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and Peaceful
Nuclear Explosion Treaty implementation would decrease by about
$2.0 million to about $6.8 million in FY 1994. This funding level
would support Nevada Operations Office contractor personnel and
personnel at Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories
that are required to maintain a core capability for Threshold Test
Ban Treaty and Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaty verification
implementation.
WEAPONS ACTIVITIES
Mr. Bevill: Please provide a breakout by laboratory or site of DOE
funding for FY 1992, FY 1993, and FY 1994.
Dr. Beckner: The breakout by laboratory or site of the Department
of Energy funding for FY 1992, FY 1993, and FY 1994 is shown in a table
which I would like to insert for the record. (The information follows:)
WEAPONS ACTIVITIES BY LABORATORY/SITE
TOTAL OBLIGATIONAL AUTHORITY
(Dollars in Millions)
FY 1992 FY 1993 FY 1994
Albuquerque $ 347.8 $ 355.5 $ 340.0
Kansas City 352.6 332.7 314.7
LANL 488.4 538.4 469.2
LLNL 455.8 500.4 431.0
Mound 151.9 97.4 71.2
NV 397.5 340.1 368.9
Pantex 241.5 247.9 236.8
Pinellas 126.1 105.2 85.3
Rocky Flats 624.7 527.0 260.2
SNL 735.5 701.6 666.2
SR 117.3 126.6 94.0
Y-12 (OR) 616.4 573.0 449.6
HQ/Other 185.9 258.1 337.5
TOTAL $4,841.4 $4,703.9 $4,124.6
LABORATORY RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND TESTING
Mr. Bevill: By laboratory, identify the number of FTE's funded in
the weapons program for each year since 1980, also provide total
laboratory funding for each laboratory by year.
Dr. Beckner: The information is provided for the record. (The
information follows:
LABORATORY RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND TESTING
FULL-TIME EQUIVALENTS
LLNL LANL SNL TOTAL
1980 3,457 2,766 3,778 10,001
1981 3,705 2,964 3,739 10,408
1982 3,704 3,000 3,806 10,510
1983 3,957 3,015 3,883 10,855
1984 3,889 3,082 3,914 10,885
1985 3,970 3,099 4,122 11,191
1986 3,757 2,956 3,953 10,666
1987 4,240 3,016 3,899 11,155
1988 3,841 2,853 3,676 10,370
1989 3,742 2,645 3,606 9,993
1990 3,550 2,585 3,632 9,767
1991 3,156 2,421 3,134 8,711
1992 3,322 2,441 3,480 9,243
1993 est. 3,049 2,129 3,242 8,420
1994 est. 2,689 1,816 2,539 7,044
LABORATORY RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND TESTING
OPERATING FUNDING
(Dollars in Millions)
LLNL LANL SNL TOTAL
1980 $145.1 $125.1 $213.3 $483.5
1981 181.5 154.3 148.0 483.8
1982 216.0 193.8 290.1 699.9
1983 235.2 215.5 316.5 767.2
1984 310.6 283.1 378.1 971.8
1985 356.2 309.9 421.4 1,087.6
1986 373.5 304.3 427.2 1,105.0
1987 319.8 292.0 433.8 1,045.6
1988 314.6 287.8 444.0 1,046.4
1989 342.0 291.2 464.6 1,097.8
1990 366.1 307.7 467.0 1,140.8
1991 347.4 291.7 465.8 1,104.9
1992 374.8 323.6 506.1 1,204.5
1993 est. 400.4 373.2 495.0 1,268.6
1994 est. 361.3 298.7 458.0 1,118.0
WEAPONS ACTIVITIES
Mr. Bevill. Please provide a detailed breakout of activities and
associated costs funded using DOD funds by individual DOE laboratory for
FY 1992, FY 1993 and FY 1994.
Dr. Beckner. The DOE laboratories provide DOD technological support
utilizing unique facilities and technical capabilities. Examples of
activities include: defense systems research, advanced conventional
munitions research, armor/anti-armor research, defense nuclear
research, arms control and verification research, security systems
development, weapons related experiments and tests, and environmental
studies for restoration of facilities, subsurface detection technology
research, computer code development and analysis, materials research,
weapons related training materials, reentry vehicle technology, weapon
trainers, miscellaneous weapon related hardware development, and
advanced manufacturing technologies.
DOD funding by laboratory is as follows:
FY 1992 FY 1993 FY 1994
Actual Estimated Estimated
Obligations Obligations Obligations
Los Alamos National
Laboratory $ 128.7M $ 118.lM $ 116.6M
Sandia National
Laboratories $ 299.1M $ 311.7M $ 312.3M
Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory S 198.7M S 200.0M S 200.0M
Total $ 626.5M $ 629.8M $ 628.9M
WEAPONS ACTIVITIES
Mr. Bevill. Is the Department funding development of a warhead
which could be used on an earth penetrating weapon?
Dr. Beckner. The Department of Defense has not requested
development of such a warhead, and the Department of Energy is not
developing one. However, many warhead designs could be used in such
an application. As part of the Phase 1 feasibility study for a
Precision Low-Yield Warhead Design, we are examining whether the
earth-penetrating mission might be feasible for such a design.
WEAPONS ACTIVITIES
Mr. Bevill: Provide a breakout by location of FY 1992, FY 1993,
and FY 1994 funding for weapons Research, Development and Testing by
Program element.
Dr. Beckner: A breakout by location of FY 1992, FY 1993, and
FY 1994 funding for weapons Research, Development, and Testing is
shown in a table which I would like to insert for the record.
(The information follows:)
******CHART ATTACHED TO ORIGINAL DOCUMENT********
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Mr. Bevill. Please describe the system and explain the need for all
weapon systems in Phase I or Phase 2 of weapons development.
Dr. Deutch. There are currently four development programs in
Phase 1 or Phase 2. It should be pointed out that Phase 1 and Phase 2
studies are concept and feasibility studies and are not necessarily
tied to a specific Identified need. The four programs are as follows:
Phase 2 - Navy SLBM Replacement Warhead Study
Phase 2 - Air Force High Power Radio Frequency Weapon Study
Phase 1 - Air Force Precision Low Yield Weapon Study
Phase I - DOE Advance Safety and Security Study
The Navy Phase 2 and the DOE Phase I studies are devoted to the
topics of improved safety and security technology for possible future
replacement warheads. The Navy Phase 2 is also considering possible
changes driven by the reduced numbers of warheads allowed per missile
under the new arms control agreements and potential increased service
life for the existing SLBM warheads. The DOE sponsored Phase 1 is
designed to look at revolutionary, as opposed to evolutionary,
improvements in safety and security technology to be applied to a
cruise missile sized warhead and a B-61 diameter gravity bomb.
The two Air Force programs are devoted to investigating possible
new technologies for use in advanced and/or replacement weapons systems.
All four programs are joint programs between the DoD and DOE. DoD
provides the technical requirements and DOE provides the technology
development. Together they determine the suitability of the advanced
concept and recommend further study or termination of the project at
the end of Phase I and/or Phase 2.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Mr. Bevill. Please provide a list by type and number of warheads
of the total nuclear weapons stockpile in FY 1992 and proposed for each
year through FY 2003.
Dr. Deutch. The Presidentially directed nuclear stockpile plan
is currently approved through FY 1998. It is described in the table
that follows:
Summary of Stockpile: Approved Period
[Deleted]
As part of developing the FY 1994-FY 1999 nuclear stockpile plan,
we are currently in the process of reviewing stockpile requirements
with the unified commanders and the military services, considering both
operational requirements and treaty obligations.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Mr. Bevill. Describe the DoD nuclear weapons retirement program
in FY 1993 and FY 1994. Provide a list showing the type and number of
warhead systems proposed to be retired each year through 2003.
Dr. Deutch. The information is provided in the table below.
Summary of Retirements: Approved Period
[Deleted]
WEAPONS STORAGE
Mr. Bevill. How many weapons were disassembled at Pantex in FY
1992, FY 1993, and scheduled for FY 1994?
Dr. Beckner. In FY 1992, Pantex dismantled 1303 warheads (the DOE
total of 1857 includes 554 units at Y-12). In FY 1993, Pantex will
dismantle between 1431 and 1800 warheads, with the uncertainty being
due to safety issues which may not be resolved before the end of the
fiscal year. In 1994, Pantex plans to dismantle up to 2000 warheads.
NUCLEAR TESTING
Mr. Bevill. Are any countries currently testing nuclear weapons?
Dr. Beckner. The only country testing nuclear weapons that has not
officially declared a moratorium is the People's Republic of China.
NUCLEAR TESTING
Mr. Bevill. Which countries are currently imposing a moratorium
on testing nuclear weapons?
Dr. Beckner. The countries that are currently imposing a
moratorium on testing nuclear weapons are the United States, Russia,
and France.
Mr. Bevill, Describe the nuclear weapons test program including
for FY 1992, FY 1993, and FY 1994, a list of each test performed, a
brief description, the purpose, the weapon system, and the specific
program supported by the test.
Dr. Beckner. The following table associates the names of these
nuclear tests with the primary category to which they are directed.
The categories are: TECH - Technology Base and WDEC - Weapon
Development, Engineering, and Certification. Some of these tests have
more than one purpose and could be associated in part, with other
categories. The tests listed for FY 1992 have already been conducted.
Of these, the JUNCTION test was of an Improved safety device designed
for the Deleted
Deleted missile system. The other tests employed experimental
nuclear devices. Due to the requirements of Public Law 102-377, the
test program for FY 1993 and FY 1994 is still being coordinated.
FY 1992 LAB DESIGN
TEST NAME SPONSOR YIELD(kt) CATEGORY
LUBBOCK LANL TECH
JUNCTION LANL Deleted WDEC
GALENA LLNL WDEC
VICTORIA LANL Deleted TECH
DIVIDER LANL WDEC
MARSHALL ISLANDS RESETTLEMENT
Mr. Bevill. Please describe the Marshall Islands program
including the resettlement process on the Rongelap Atoll.
Mr. Brush. The Department of Energy has been working with the
Republic of the Marshall Islands and the Local Government Councils in
the fulfillment of the Department of Energy's responsibilities
delineated in the Compact of Free Association, Public Law 99-239.
Specifically, the Department of Energy continues to conduct
radiological monitoring and environmental characterization of the four
effected atolls (Bikini, Enewetak, Rongelap and Utrik) and to provide
medical care to the exposed population and control group of Rongelap
and Utrik.
During the last year each Department of Energy environmental
mission in the Marshall Islands visited Bikini Atoll for the collection
of samples in support of our agricultural research projects. The data
and knowledge gained in the conduct of this research will have
application throughout the Marshall Islands and will contribute to
resettlement activities. Since the agricultural research project data
collected at Bikini is reaching a level of near completion, the need
for resident Department of Energy personnel to maintain the
agricultural gardens at Bikini after 1993 will diminish. Since Bikini
has not been resettled the maintenance of the Bikini Field Station will
have continuing benefits and the Department of Energy is working
closely with the Bikini community to establish when and under what
circumstance the transition should occur. Sampling will also continue
on a mission basis to facilitate the completion of environmental data
needed to publish the final findings on the potassium fertilizer option
and the environmental half-life studies. The Department of Energy will
commence grid surveys of Enue Island this fall and will do grid surveys
of Bikini Island based on the resettlement option decided upon by the
people of Bikini.
Consistent with the desires of Congress, the Department of Energy
was successful this last year in the transition of ownership and
operation of the Enewetak Field Station to Local Government ownership
and control. Additional data was also collected to further our
initiative to fully characterize - radiation in the environment through
the completion of grid surveys on the islands.
The Department of Energy continues to aggressively pursue
activities in support of the Memorandum of Understanding between the
Department of Energy, the Department of Interior, the Republic of the
Marshall Islands and the Rongelap Local Government Council that
established the Rongelap Resettlement Project. During this last year,
members of the Republic of the Marshall Islands Nationwide Radiological
Study once again accompanied two Department of Energy environmental
missions to conclude environmental sampling and grid surveys to provide
radiological characterization of the southern islands of Rongelap
Atoll. Preliminary results of environmental samples that were split
with the Republic of the Marshall Islands Nationwide Radiological Study
for independent verification of the Department of Energy protocols and
procedures indicate close agreement. The evaluation of the Department
of Energy protocols and procedures by the National Academy of Sciences
continues with a preliminary report from the National Academy of
Sciences anticipated this summer and a final report by the end of this
year. Completion of our studies and the National Academy of Sciences
report by the end of this year and completion of the Republic of the
Marshall Islands studies indicated in the Memorandum of Understanding
and supporting Scientific Work Plan will support decisions on
resettlement of the southern portion of Rongelap Atoll in early 1994.
This last year, the Department of Energy has completed an
environmental mission to Utrik for the conduct of detailed grid surveys
and collection of environmental samples (e.g., coconuts, pandanus,
breadfruit, etc.) to further characterize the presence of radiation oh
Utrik.
Two Department of Energy medical missions were conducted this
last year in the Marshall Islands to provide necessary medical care to
the exposed populations of Rongelap and Utrik. Over 80 per"cent of the
exposed population availed themselves of the voluntary medical
examinations to identify any medical conditions which could be of
radiogenic origin. During the last year, exposed people needing
additional diagnoses or medical care were referred to Hawaii for more
extensive examination and treatment of medical conditions found during
the conduct of the DOE medical missions. These missions also provide
medical examinations to a control group of local citizens selected by
age and sex to closely match the exposed population. The Department of
Energy also provided logistical support to the Republic of the
Marshall Islands Section 177 physicians and nurses who joined the
Department of Energy medical missions to provide medical examinations
and care to the unexposed population of the outer islands visited.
Over the past year, the Department of Energy conducted a
bioassay and whole body counting mission to the Marshall Islands,
visiting the islands of Enewetak and Majuro. Another mission, scheduled
for this July, will visit the islands of Majetto, Utrik, Majuro and
Ebeye. These missions are conducted to measure the amount of radiation
in individuals of the Marshall Islands. This data assists the
Department of Energy in determining radiation exposures to the
populations.
NEVADA SUPPORT FACILITY
Mr. Bevill: On what basis did the Department obligate funds for
the Nevada Support Fa