According to US intelligence officials, an accidental or unauthorized launch from Russia or China is extremely unlikely. Moreover, it is in the interests of Russia and China to ensure that such launches do not occur. Indeed, Defense Intelligence Agency Director Gen. James Clapper testified in 1994 that `Russian strategic missile systems are currently considered to have very good control mechanisms' to prevent such launches, and the United States is currently discussing sharing similar systems with China. National missile defenses are the wrong solution to this problem in any event since cooperative measures could be implemented more quickly and cheaply, and would be more effective than NMD. These include installing destruct-after-launch mechanisms on all missiles to abort an unauthorized launch and separating nuclear warheads from delivery systems.
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(3) Deliberate missile attack by other country in the future:
Ballistic missiles are the least likely method a developing country would use to deliver an attack. Long-range missiles are more expensive and technically difficult to build and deploy than other means of delivery, and are less accurate. Since launches are readily detected by satellites, the United States would pinpoint the origin of a missile attack and could retaliate quickly with devastating force. Such retaliation would have to be considered as certain by any leader, and will always be a powerful deterrent to missile attacks.
Currently, no country hostile to the United States possesses ballistic missiles that can reach US territory. Even if such threats begin to emerge in the future, the United States will have considerable warning since missile development requires flight testing that can be monitored by satellite. Although some 20 countries in the developing world possess some type of short-range missile or space-launch vehicle, only countries friendly to the United States--Israel, India, and Saudi Arabia--have deployable systems with a range greater than 600 kilometers.
North Korea, perhaps the most discussed threat, has conducted one partial-range test of the 1000 kilometer range Nodong missile, but does not have an operational version after six to seven years of development. North Korea is reported to be working on new missiles with ranges up to 3,500 kilometers, but such missiles would require new technologies, such as staging and more powerful engines. Judging from the long development time of past North Korean missiles, deployment of such an intermediate-range missile is many years off at least, and progress can be monitored closely by satellite. In any event, none of these missiles would have the range to strike the US homeland.
Rather than devoting resources to national missile defenses, the United States should instead focus on programs to combat existing, more pressing threats. For example, a higher priority should be placed on bringing military and civil weapon-usable fissile material in the former Soviet republics under better control and accelerating safe, verified dismantlement of Russian nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles.
In sum, proposals to deploy NMD are misguided and irresponsible. National missile defenses do not address the existing and most likely future threats to the U.S. homeland and are diverting valuable resources. Instead, NMD will destroy much of one of the United States' primary tools for maintaining and increasing national security: arms control. We urge you to weigh carefully the negligible benefits and substantial costs of deploying NMD. Thank you for your attention to our views and please call on us if we can be of assistance as you deliberate on this matter.
Sincerely,
Hans Bethe,
Professor of Physics Emeritus, Cornell University.
Richard Garwin,
Adjunct Professor of Physics, Columbia University and IBM Fellow Emeritus, IBM Research Division.
Kurt Gottfried,
Professor of Physics, Cornell University.
Frank von Hippel,
Professor of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University.
Henry W. Kendall,
Chairman, Union of Concerned Scientists and Stratton Professor of Physics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Wolfgang K.H. Panofsky,
Professor and Director Emeritus, Stanford Linear Accelerator Center, Stanford University.