Proliferation is a real concern:
(A) At their summit in Moscow in May of 1995, President Clinton and President Yeltsin commented on the threat posed by proliferation when they released a Joint Statement recognizing `. . . the threat posed by worldwide proliferation of missiles and missile technology and the necessity of counteracting this threat. . . .'
(1) In a March 1995 report, The Weapons Proliferation Threat, the Central Intelligence Agency's Nonproliferation Center observed that at least 20 countries-nearly half of them in the Middle East and South Asia-already have or may be developing weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile delivery systems. Five countries--North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Syria--pose the greatest threat because of the aggressive nature of their regimes and status of their weapons of mass destruction programs. All five already have or are developing ballistic missiles that could threaten U.S. interests.
(2) The missile proliferation threat, even to the U.S. homeland with long-range missiles, is real and growing. Third World nations are advancing their missile programs through indigenous development, the purchase of missile components, and the purchase of space launch vehicles for reportedly peaceful purposes.
(3) While space launch vehicles can be used for peaceful purposes, such as launching communications satellites, they also give would-be proliferants an inherent missile capability. Every four years another country develops space launch capability.
(4) The Clinton Administration is overestimating how long it could take for Third World countries to develop nuclear missiles that could hit the American homeland. The Clinton Administration claims that missile attack threats from potentially dangerous Third World nations to the U.S. homeland will not arise for at least ten years. No one can possibly know that--much less depend on such a guess.
(5) This estimate is based on the assumption that the states acquiring missiles will develop them indigenously. While it is questionable whether it will take ten years for Third World countries to develop missiles on their own, it is clear that proliferants could purchase long-range missiles and nuclear warheads at any time, with little or no advance warning.
(6) Indeed, Saudi Arabia purchased the 2,000-mile range CSS-2 missile from China several years ago. Others, such as Iran and Syria, have purchased shorter range ballistic missiles from North Korea. There is evidence, including from Russian General Victor Samoilov, who was charged with maintaining control over nuclear weapons, that nuclear warheads have disappeared from former Soviet sites.
(7) There are also reports that nuclear weapons have been sold abroad covertly, particularly to Iran.
(8) The key to estimating how long the United States has to respond to a missile threat is not, as is currently the practice, to determine how long it takes a rogue state to produce ICBMs once it has decided to do so. Rather, U.S. planning should be based on how long a rogue state needs to field missiles once the intelligence community has convincing evidence that either their development or purchase is under way.
(9) The evidence, as reported by the Heritage foundation, thus far is troubling indeed. For example:
`(a) Iraq tested a booster with potential intercontinental range in 1990, only months after the U.S. intelligence community discovered what it was doing. After the Gulf War, it was discovered that Iraq had been pursuing an extensive, undetected, and covert program to develop nuclear warheads for its ballistic missiles. By authoritative accounts the Iraqis were within 18 months of having the bomb.
`(b) U.S. intelligence in early 1994 discovered that the North Koreans were developing a long range missile dubbed the Taepo Dong 2. Then Deputy Secretary of Defense John Deutch testified on August 11, 1994, that the Taepo Dong 2 may be able to strike U.S. territory by the end of this decade. If so, this capability will have arisen only five years after its discovery.'
(10) Once the basics of missile technology are mastered, adding more range to the missile is not a great technical challenge. It can be accomplished by adding more thrust and rocket stages. Further, it can be accomplished under the guise of developing space launchers. Every booster capable of placing satellites in orbit can deliver a warhead of the same weight to intercontinental range. And missile sales can create a new missile threat very quickly.
(III) Others will argue that if the United States were threatened by a nuclear weapon, it would be in the form of a suitcase bomb, or errant aircraft, or fashioned like the Oklahoma City bombing.
(A) Each scenario represents a possible method of attack. But, why is that an argument against BMD? We make great strides to cope with these and other kinds of threats. We have anti-aircraft weapons to shoot down hostile aircraft. We suspend commercial flights from potentially dangerous countries. The immigration and customs services monitor people and goods coming to the United States. Law enforcement agencies seek to identify terrorist groups before they act. Our tools may be woefully inadequate, but we make considerable efforts. Not so in defending the country against ballistic missile attack.
(IV) Moreover, the ballistic missile is the weapon of choice in the Third World. Ballistic missiles signify technological advancement, and are thus a source of prestige in the developing world. Missiles have become symbols of power, acquiring a mystique unrelated to their capabilities. Regional powers that have acquired these weapons can threaten the security of global powers and extend influence throughout the region.
(A) Jasit Singh, Director of the Indian Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis, has pointed out that `the element which is tending to rapidly enhance the strategic value of ballistic missiles . . . is there is yet no credible defense against them.'
(V) Others may argue that the arms control regimes will protect us from threat from ballistic missiles. Not so.
(A) The Non-Proliferation Threaty (NPT), provides a useful barrier to discourage the transfer of technology concerning weapons of mass destruction. It is not, however, leak proof, and should not be relied upon as a primary element of American and allied security. The NPT, for example, failed to prevent Iraq or North Korea from developing their nuclear weapons programs.
(B) The Missile Technology Control regime (MTCR), founded by Ronald Reagan in 1987, again, has admirable goals, but can only slow the transfer of missile technology until more effective measures can be developed. The MTCR is a weak agreement that has no monitoring agency or enforcement mechanism, does not incorporate all the world's missile producers (most notably China), and cannot forbid technologies that have civil uses.
(C) Former CIA Director James Woolsey said on January 10, 1995, that, with regard to Russia, `. . . we are particularly concerned with the safety of nuclear, chemical, and biological materials, as well as highly enriched uranium or plutonium, although I want to stress that this is a global problem.
(D) We simply cannot rely on arms control to do the job.
(VI) The Kyl/Inhofe amendment expresses the Sense of the Senate that Americans should be defended--whether in foreign lands or here at home.
We can argue about how to do it: but we should not begin this debate without at least agreeing on the basic premise that Americans should be protected. Surely we can all agree with that.
There is nothing threatening about defenses. Missile defense destroys only offensive missiles.