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The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Metcalf). Under the Speaker's announced policy of May 12, 1995, the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Weldon] is recognized for 60 minutes as the designee of the majority leader.

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, I will not take the entire hour, but rise this evening to focus on an issue that will be heavily discussed tomorrow and later this week as we vote on the next fiscal year Defense appropriation bill.

Mr. Speaker, I think it is important that we approach defense spending in this day and age with a very cautious eye to what is happening, not just in the Soviet Union, but around the world. To that extent, I will be entering some documents into the Record this evening. I think Members should especially focus on, not just for the votes that will occur tomorrow and the rest of the week, but also for debate that we will be having further on in this session of Congress, during the conference process and as we begin to debate the relative importance of continuing within the confines of the ABM Treaty.

First of all, Mr. Speaker, let me say I rise as a 9-year member of the National Security Committee and the current chairman of the Research and Development Subcommittee, and as someone who is not just a self-proclaimed hardliner when it comes to dealing with the former Soviet Union and now Russia, as well as those rogue nations around the world, but as someone who spent the bulk of my last 20 years working on building bridges with the Russian people.

My approach to Russia is one of pragmatism. Reach out to the Russian people, work with them, build relationships on trust and mutual cooperation, but hold them accountable when they violate treaties on defense and foreign policy issues.

My background is in Russian studies, my undergraduate degree is in that area. Twenty years ago I spoke the language fluently. I have traveled throughout the country, stayed in Russian people's homes, and I have this year hosted well over 100 members of the Duma in various meetings and sessions.

Mr. Speaker, currently I am the cochair of the Russian-American Energy Caucus with my colleagues, the gentleman from Texas, Greg Laughlin, on the Republican side, and the gentleman from Maryland, Steny Hoyer, and the gentleman from Illinois, Glenn Poshard, on the Democratic side. Working with the 16 multinational energy corporations, we attempt to foster relationships that build bridges between our energy corporations and joint venture opportunities in Russia to allow them to bring in the hard currency they need. Most recently, this past year, we worked with our administration and the Yeltsin administration and members of the Duma to complete the final support and approval within the Duma for the Sakhalin project, a project that is in fact the largest energy project in the history of not just Russia, but the entire world, that will ultimately see approximately $10 to $15 billion of western investment through companies like McDermott Marathon go into the Sakhalin area for development of Russian energy resources.

Mr. Speaker, we are also working on the Caspian Sea project, which we hope will provide a force to unify some of the warring factions down in the Caspian Sea area, and also further help stabilize the Russian economy through development of their energy resources.

Mr. Speaker, I also cochair an effort working with the Duma members on environmental issues. Just last year I led a delegation of Members to Murmansk, the North Sea fleet, to talk about how we could work with them in finding ways of disposing of the Russian nuclear waste that is coming from the dismantlement of their ships and their submarines, as well as to try to help the Russians stop what has been a recurring practice over the past two decades of dumping nuclear reactors and nuclear waste into the Bering Sea, the Arctic Ocean, and even out in the East, in the Sea of Japan.

That effort is paying tremendous dividends, and there is an ongoing effort right now among members of the parliaments of not just Russia, but the European Parliament, the Japanese Diet, and our Congress to focus on this as one of our major priorities, the stopping of all dumping of waste, especially nuclear waste, in the oceans of the world. To that extent we held a conference here in Washington just a month ago where we had attendees from Russia, Japan, Europe, and the United States in trying to form a cooperative relationship in dealing with these problems.

Mr. Speaker, we are currently working with the Russian shipyard at St. Petersburg, the Baltic shipyard, to convert it to an environmental remediation center, where Russian workers who formerly built warships can be trained to dismantle old rusty vessels where the steel can be melted down and reused to benefit the Russian economy.

Mr. Speaker, we are working in Siberia, Nizhneyansk, in a joint venture to establish environmental opportunities with American firms and Russian firms to create jobs and economic opportunity and to also help stabilize environmental problems in Russia.

Third, Mr. Speaker, we are working on an effort to establish a joint Duma-Congress relationship between members of the Duma Defense Committee and members of our National Security Committee. Two months ago, the gentleman from South Carolina, Floyd Spence, chairman of the Committee on National Security, the gentleman from Louisiana, Bob Livingston, chairman of the Committee on Appropriations, and the gentleman from California, Duncan Hunter, chairman of the Subcommittee on Military Procurement, and I met for 3 hours with five members of the Russian Duma Defense Committee.

Mr. Speaker, the purpose of that meeting was to reach out to them and say look, we are not out to establish some kind of a dominant relationship over your people or your country, we are out to work with you, to change the whole notion of the way that we focus our efforts in the world, so that instead of building up more and more nuclear weapons and continuing this ridiculous posture of mutually assured destruction, to move toward a defensive posture where we asked the Russians and their leadership and their technical experts to work with us in developing defensive capabilities, much like Ronald Reagan first proposed some 10 years ago. In fact, we had that meeting, which was very successful, and we are currently planning on taking a group of similar leaders to Russia to continue that dialog with members of the Russia Duma Defense Committee.

Mr. Speaker, all of these efforts are designed to show that yes, we must reach out to the Russian people, to their government, to their leaders, to show them that we sincerely want to work with them to bring about the economic reforms that they want, the political reforms, the freedoms that they long for. But at the same time, we must not underestimate what is happening within the former Soviet Union, and now Russian, military.

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Many of those military leaders there today were in power during the Soviet regime. Many of the ideals and goals of those leaders are similar today to what they were then, and we must understand that.

We must deal with the Russian leadership from a position of understanding while showing compassion and willingness to work with them to help stabilize their economy and their country.

Mr. Speaker, before continuing, I yield to the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. Linder].

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Mr. Speaker, it is not just talk or rhetoric that is important; it is the substance and actual extent of involvement of both countries in bringing about long-term peaceful relations. My own fear as a member of the Committee on National Security is that our two biggest security threats, as we approach the next century, involve terrorism throughout the world and in this country, and the proliferation of missiles and weapons of mass destruction. To that extent, we must understand what our threats are, what we can do about those threats and how we can work with our allies and countries like Russia to develop common defenses against those threats.

Some in this body would have us believe that the Russians are no longer putting money into sophisticated weapons systems. Mr. Speaker, that is just not true.

Mr. Speaker, I would like to submit for the Record an article taken from the FBIS reports, which I scan on a daily basis. This article is taken from Moscow Kommersant-Daily, printed in Russian on July 20 of this year, entitled `START II Treaty Ratification Seen Assured,' and in it the author Aleksandr Koretskiy, goes through the determination that it is in Russia's best interest to ratify START II and, therefore, that will occur.

What is interesting in the article, that we should be aware of, is that the Russians are still developing state-of-the-art military technology.

A number of statements were made in the hearings, these are hearings among the Duma members, each of which, in fact, amounts to a sensation. First, Russia is developing, at the design stage so far, a new submarine missile cruiser. To all appearances, its technological performance will by far eclipse that of the American `Ohio' type subs which form the basis of the U.S. nuclear forces until the year 2020 at a minimum. In other words, Russia plans for more than one day ahead despite the unprecedented cuts in funds for military R&D.

Second, a new missile for bombers is being developed which will make it possible to keep them effective also into the start of the next century at small cost. Work is in progress also in other fields.

The point of this article is that Russia, while it has certainly cut back its funds for the military, is still developing state-of-the-art technologies, not just to match what America has, but to give them an edge, an edge that we have to be able to deal with through the turn of the century.

Mr. Speaker, I include the article for the Record:

The deputies' reaction to the reports of military and independent experts and the nature of the questions asked make it possible to claim: the Duma is not only going to ratify START II, but it may also pass a special Russian strategic nuclear forces development program with corresponding funds.

On the issue of a new superfighter, in a FBIS report summarizing a Moscow Interfax article, dated July 20 of this year, talking about the capabilities of the new Russian superfighter, and I will quote:

`The Sukhoy Design Bureau will exhibit its latest product, the superfighter Su-35, at the MAKS-95 Moscow air show in August,' this month, `the bureau's designer-general, Mikhail Siminov, told a solemn meeting on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of Pavel Sukhoy's birthday. Siminov told Interfax that Su-35 was a dramatically modified version of the Su-27 jet. However, the new aircraft differed from the original by its exceptional maneuverability, adjustable thrust vector, new armament system to simultaneously destroy 6 ground and naval targets and artificial-intelligence computer.'

He goes on to say, `In the West, such fighters do not yet exist,' Siminov said. `The only exception is the U.S.-made X-31, but no other analogues will appear within the next five years,' he added.

`If sufficient funds are set aside by the state, Russia's superfighter Su-27 and versions of it will occupy the first position in the world's arms market in the third millennium, Western experts say.

`At present, Russia's Air Forces have over 250 Su-27 fighters.'

Mr. Speaker, I include the article for the Record:

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Mr. Speaker, we witnessed this past year the selling of three Russian submarines to Iran. We have witnessed efforts to sell technology to China. As a matter of fact, I was aghast when I read that we were, in fact, allowing proliferation to occur involving the Russians in countries where we could have imposed sanctions and yet had backed down on repeated occasions.

Mr. Speaker, this is an issue that this body has got to deal with, an issue that we have got to confront. it is important for Members, as we get ready to debate the issue of defense appropriations levels for next year and the defense conference process that will unfold in the fall, that we understand what is happening, based on the facts. It is important that we understand proliferation that is occurring throughout the world, not just by Russia, but by other countries.

China is a perfect example. The Clinton administration, Mr. Speaker, to my mind, seems incapable of employing a toughness in terms of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

A good example of that is China's sale of missiles and missile technology to Iran and Pakistan. Classified evidence of these sanctionable transactions have been on the books since the President's first day in office.

What has been the President's response? First, the State Department tried to sanction China's missile maker, the Great Wall Industries, but not long after, withdrew those sanctions. Then United States officials claimed that they had secured Chinese pledges not to proliferate.

Evidence of Chinese missile proliferation to Iran and Pakistan continued and was leaked in the press last month. This evidence continues to mount. So far this administration has taken no new action.

And then there is Russia, Mr. Speaker. Here the administration lifted sanctions that were imposed by the Bush administration against Glavkosmos, a Russian firm that violated the MTCR, missile technology control regime, guidelines. It had exported sensitive upper-stage rocket technology to India's Indian Scientific Research Organization, including production and integration technology. This know-how could help India extend the range of its missiles to reach Bejing and improve Indian upper rocket stages in general.

In exchange for Russian pledges to stop such technology transfers to India, the administration, in September 1993, offered Moscow hundreds of millions of dollars in space cooperation projects.

Mr. Speaker, I am not saying that we should not cooperate, but we have got to set a tone of firmness. When countries, whether it be China or Russia, violate proliferation agreements and violate understandings that we have, this administration has got to be firm. That has not worked.

What Clinton officials have chosen not to do about MTCR violations, however, is far less disturbing than what they recently announced that they are planning to do. That is to make MTCR members of the nations that are violating the regime. The Clinton administration hopes this will encourage problem proliferators to become part of the nonproliferation solution. In fact, I think it is shortsighted diplomatic public relations that will trivialize the MTCR and, worse, turn the regime into a major proliferation promotion organization.

How is this possible? Simple. Both U.S. law and the missile technology control regime guidelines discourage U.S. exporters and other members of the MTCR against selling missile technology to non-MTCR members who have missile projects of concern or who have had a bad track record proliferating missile technology to other nations.

Once these countries are made members of MTCR, which the Clinton administration proposes to do now, there is a legal presumption of approval for the very missile transfers that were previously barred, which means that once these countries are able to be a part of the MTCR, they can sell their missiles without any sanctions being available to the United States and other countries.

Under U.S. law, a nation that becomes a member of the MTCR can no longer be sanctioned for importing the hardware or technology needed to complete dangerous rockets or missiles or export it to any MTCR member.

What sort of nations might these be? Until the past few months, even the Clinton administration claimed that they included Brazil and Russia.

Mr. Speaker, I will enter into the Record, with unanimous consent, articles where Brazil, in fact, has been working on the capability for rocket technology which they have purchased from Russia through the black market. And I will provide an article once again from the FBIS documents that Members can read.

In addition, Brazil has made it known that they would like to have the capability that one of the most sophisticated Russian rockets offers in terms of a space launch capability.

SS-25 is perhaps the most sophisticated intercontinental ballistic missile that Russia has today. It has a range of 10,500 kilometers. It can hit any city in any part of America with that range. It is a mobile-launched system, launched off of the back of a mobile-launch tractor that can be moved around the country. Russia has somewhere less than a thousand of these launchers throughout Russia and the former Soviet republics.

Each missile battery has the potential of launching three missiles, which currently have nuclear warheads on them. However, what Russia has been doing for the past 2 years is, it has been trying to sell a version, a modified version, of the SS-25 to any country that, in fact, would want to have a space launch capability.

What problems does this present for us? Well, imagine, Mr. Speaker, a missile that has a range of 10,500 kilometers. Take the nuclear warhead off of that missile and modify it to become a space launch vehicle, and you can offer it for sale to anyone.

Brazil has been very interested in acquiring this capability and, in fact, had a tentative deal worked out until the administration and Members of Congress, including myself, stepped up and said, `We cannot allow this to go forward;' and Brazil temporarily backed off. We understand Russia has had other discussions with other countries who would like to use this technology for space launch purposes.

Now, you are not going to have a nuclear warhead on this missile, but, Mr. Speaker, what we are talking about doing is giving other nations the capability that comes with a missile that has a range of 10,500 kilometers. Furthermore, if you believe what the Clinton administration tells us in terms of the current command and control of the Russian nuclear arsenal, that all dissipates when you take the SS-25, as modified, and you give it to a Russian profitmaking venture to market on the open market as a space launch vehicle.

That is exactly what is happening today. In fact, several months ago, the world witnessed the first unsuccessful launch of an SS-25 modified rocket with an Israeli satellite on board from the Pozitiskiya Aerodrome. It was not successful, and the rocket and the satellite fell into the Sea of Okhotsk. The fact remains, Mr. Speaker, that Russia is aggressively trying to export this technology.

Make no mistake about it, Mr. Speaker, I do not fear for the safety of our people from an all-out nuclear attack by Russia. That is not my concern. What I fear, Mr. Speaker, is the capability the Russians have with the SS-25 and the SS-18, which they are also currently trying to market for space launch purposes to a Third World rogue nation.

You give any of the rogue nations of this world one of those missile launch systems, allow them then to put a conventional weapon on board, a conventional bomb or perhaps a chemical or biological weapon, and with the range of an SS-18 or an SS-25, our country and our people are under direct threat.

Mr. Speaker, this is reality. This is not some hypothetical situation made up in some star wars movie. Mr. Speaker, this is what is occurring today inside of Russia as proliferation of these missiles is a top priority. As the Russians are looking for ways to bring in hard currency, they see one of the quickest ways as selling off this technology, like the SS-25 and the SS-18.

Mr. Speaker, here is the real problem, besides the lack of attention and focus by the administration and the clear and consistent policy to call these acts when they occur, like the recent sale of rocket motors to China by the Garrett Engine Co., which are being used for fighter planes.

But unless the administration takes some overt action this year, the technology will be transferred to China, which we think will allow them to increase the capability of their cruise missiles. This administration has remained silent on blocking that technology transfer.

Again, Mr. Speaker, what we are talking about, whether it is it is the SS-25, whether it is the SS-18, whether it is technology to help the Chinese improve their cruise missile capability, whether it is North Korea Taepo Dong-1 or -2, which has a range of 5,500 kilometers, which today could hit Guam or Alaska, Mr. Speaker, these are real situations that every Member of this body has to understand.

No longer can this body vote in a vacuum. We must understand and recognize the facts as they are. The documents that I am placing in the Congressional Record today are factual statements by leaders in Russia, documented articles of situations occurring with China, North Korean developments in China. It will take only one of those systems to get in the hands of a rogue nation and then what do we do, Mr. Speaker?

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General O'Neill, who is the administration's point person on missile defense, has said repeatedly in our congressional hearings this year that if a nation acquires the capability of an SS-25 or SS-18, or perhaps even a Taepo Dong II with a range of 5,500 kilometers, we, as a country, have no defense against an accidental or deliberate launch of one vehicle. We have no system available today, with all the money we spend on defense, with all the money we spend on military every year, we have no system available today to protect the American people from such a launch.

Mr. Speaker, to me that is outrageous, and to most of our colleagues in this body that is outrageous, and that is why this year, in our defense bills, we have plussed up missile defense accounts by about $900 million in the House. Hopefully, through the conference process, we will come somewhere in between what the Senate plussed up, about $600 or $700 million, and what we plussed up.

We focused on four specific areas, Mr. Speaker. We focused on theater missile defense to give our troops protection when they are in a theater of operation against an incoming missile attack, like we saw in Desert Storm with the Scud. In the world today, 71 nations have cruise missiles, have the capability of attacking our soldiers and our allies. The only systems we have in place today are the upgrades of the Patriot, quickly becoming outmoded. We have funded theater missile defense to allow us to continue to develop and deploy the most sophisticated theater based systems that money can buy, and our funding does that in this year's defense bill.

The second thing we did, Mr. Speaker, is we plussed up national missile defense spending. This will give us the eventual capability to protect the mainland of America against the kind of rogue launch that I talked about earlier. If a rogue nation were to get an SS-25 or an SS-18, or if North Korea would sell off a version of the Taepo Dong II, that we would be able to protect our people in this country from a single launch. We would not be able to protect our country if a massive launch were to occur, but, by all practical standards, we do not think that will happen.

No one can assure us, however, that a rogue nation will not get the capability of one, two, or three missiles, or, say, a battery of SS-25's that could be threatened to be launched against an American city. Today we have no protection for that, Mr. Speaker. Not one iota of protection. Our plus-up in the national missile defense account allows for $400 million of increased funding that, even with this level of funding, will not allow us to deploy a program, in General O'Neill's estimation, until approximately 4 years. Four years of vulnerability.

If the people of this country see what has been happening around the world with terrorism, and see what happens when rogue nations and people like Saddam Hussein get capabilities beyond their ability to manage, we then are threatened, and for 4 years, under the administration's plan, we will have no protection, Mr. Speaker.

The third area that we plussed up funding was for a program called Brilliant Eyes. Brilliant Eyes is a space-based sensor program that will allow us to see a missile when it is launched. We do not have that capability today. If a rogue country launches a missile, and the ultimate destination is America, today we do not have a system in space that can tell us that launch has occurred. Why is that important? It is important because it gives us more time to take that missile out once it is launched, and to take it out on the rise as opposed to on the descent. We plus-up the Brilliant Eyes program to give us that technical capability.

The fourth thing we do in both the authorization and the appropriation bills is we plus-up funding for ballistic missiles by about $75 million so that we can enhance our ability to protect our troops and our country against the very real threat of ballistic missiles that dominate the world today.

I mentioned, Mr. Speaker, 77 countries today have cruise missile capability. Seventy-seven countries. Twenty nations can build and are building cruise missiles today. Granted, some are very crude, like the Scud system that we saw used by Iraq over in Desert Storm, but, Mr. Speaker, some of them are extremely sophisticated and present real challenges to us from a defensive posture.

Mr. Speaker, all the more reason why we have to focus on the threat that is out there and what is happening in these rogue nations. We have to understand that when we make a decision as to how much money we are going to spend on defense or on missile defense or missile proliferation activities that it must be based on sound scientific evidence.

Mr. Speaker, another article I want to submit for the Record is a recent publication appearing in the Brooking Review written by Bruce Blair entitled `Lengthening the Fuse', and, by the way, Mr. Blair has been a witness at hearings, primarily brought in by Democrats to testify on missile proliferation issues. This article is must reading for every member of this body, because Mr. Blair now makes the case that from the standpoint of operational safety, Russian's nuclear posture today is more dangerous than it was during the cold war.

He goes through the scenario of the possibilities for nuclear anarchy, from unauthorized use of weapons by rebellious commanders in the field, to political breakdown in Moscow, to a spread of nuclear weaponry and material on the global black-market.

Mr. Speaker, another article I will submit for publication in the Record today is an article within the Russian news media focusing on the problems of the control of the nuclear arsenal and the lack of adequate dollars to fund those military personnel who are monitoring on-site the Russian nuclear arsenal.

In that article there is discussion about the fact that you can have all the safeguards you want from a technology standpoint, but if the men and women who are monitoring those systems are not being paid, if they do have the quality of life issues that are important to them, the technical considerations go out the window, and that is the kind of threat that we have to fully assess.

Mr. Blair goes through that in great detail, and some of the quotes in here are the kinds of quotes that Members have to look at and understand, because they are critical to our posture in terms of defending our people in this country against what could happen in the former soviet Union. Let me quote just one piece from this article.

`The disintegration of the former Soviet Union and the dangers emerging from the attendant turmoil make loss of control the central problem of nuclear security. Indeed, the specter of nuclear anarchy in the former Soviet Union animates U.S. policy toward Russia.'

He goes on to say, and I quote, `The specter of a catastrophic failure of nuclear command and control looms even larger.'

Mr. Speaker, this is not some radical right wing conservation bashing the former Soviet Union. This is a respected individual who has studied the issue of command and control of the Russian nuclear arsenal. In fact, he goes on to say in his article that the Pentagon itself has conducted exercises to practice United States responses to nuclear anarchy in Russian, including scenarios that feature illicit strategic sites by Russian commanders. Can you imagine that, Mr. Speaker?

We now have evidence that our own Pentagon leaders have done practice sessions that, in fact, would have us assume that nuclear anarchy has broken out in Russia and that perhaps the American mainland is at threat. That is being done, Mr. Speaker, at a time where we have no capability to defend our mainland against a nuclear attack, either isolated or perhaps a multiweapon or multilaunched nuclear attack.

Another quote from Mr. Blair. `From the standpoint of operational safety, Russia's nuclear posture is more dangerous today then it was during the Cold `War.' Again a quote. `The Pentagon has so internalized deterrence as the essence of its mission that it simply cannot bring the two different conceptions of nuclear threat, the risk of deliberate attack and the danger of loss of control, into clear focus and perspective.'

Another quote. `If safety is ever to be put first in U.S. nuclear planning, it will be because public discussion and broad public support, not the Pentagon, put it there.'

Mr. Speaker, Bruce Blair has hit the nail on the head. We are not doing an adequate job of monitoring what is happening and what could happen in the former Soviet republics. Some would argue all is well.

Perhaps I will submit another article for the Record with unanimous consent again, Mr. Speaker, that talks about what has recently happened in Belarus. Belarus, Mr. Speaker, is one of those former Soviet republics that happens to have nuclear weapon capability. Just in July of this year less than 1 month ago, what did the President of Belarus say about his country's agreement to put all the SS-25's back into Russia? There are 18 remaining in Belarus. He said, and this article was printed on July 6, 1995, in Moscow's Izvestiya, in Russia, he said, and this is Alyaksandr Lukashenka, the President of Belarus, that he had made a decision to stop the movement of the SS-25's back to Russia; that he was going to leave the remaining 18 SS-25's in Belarus. He stated the reasons, which are in the article, which I will put in the Record, are twofold: First of all, it harms the national prestige of Belarus to give up the remaining parts of their nuclear arsenal; and, second, one day Russia and Belarus will be united again.

Now, Mr. Speaker, this is not me talking, this is the President of Belarus. I asked our State Department if we had gotten any clarification to this statement made by President Lukashenka of Belarus. They told me verbally we had; that he had denied that statement was made, even though it was printed both in Izvestiya and as well as on Moscow TV. To this date, Mr. Speaker, I have not had any statement from the State Department to refute the statement from the State Department to refute the statement by Mr. Lukashenka in terms of not complying with the agreed terms that Russia, Belarus, the United States, and the other former Soviet republics entered into to return those SS-25's back to Russia for dismantlement.

Mr. Speaker, the problem continues. My bottom line concern is that the intelligence community is not giving us the full scoop and the full picture. I do not say this lightly, Mr. Speaker; and, in fact, in September of this year, we will have a full hearing on the command and control of the Russian nuclear arsenal. However, Mr. Speaker, we are also going to have something else in that hearing. We are going to look at what has been the posture of our intelligence community in bringing to the Members of Congress and to the American public the threat that exists.

Mr. Speaker, we in this body need to base our decisions on fact. I am not an alarmist. I am not here to demagogue this issue. I am not here to call the Russian people an evil empire, because they are not. As I started my comments tonight, I am one who has devoted a significant amount of my personal time to building relations inside of Russia. I will match my efforts in those categories with any Member of this body in the area of Russian joint energy ventures, environmental cooperation, defense cooperation, economic cooperation, and I will continue that as I did on the House floor when I sided with the ranking member of the Committee on Appropriations, Mr. Obey and the chairman of that committee, Mr. Livingston, in fighting back an effort to decrease Russian aid because of the importance of stabilizing their economy.

However, Mr. Speaker, We cannot allow anyone to dumb down our intelligence. We cannot allow anyone to pull the cloud over our eyes to the extent that we do not know really what is happening. That would be the worst travesty that could be brought on this body, to have any administration, or the intelligence community, dumb down information that is important for us as we determine how much money to spend on the defense of the people of this country.

We should not, Mr. Speaker, ever have any intelligence body think that they have to answer politically to some broader agenda of the administration of supporting the current Russian leadership. I support Boris Yeltsin. I support whoever the Russian people decide to have as their elected President. However, Mr. Speaker, we should never allow our support for the elected President of that country to downplay our understanding of the real threats that are there. That is my concern, Mr. Speaker. It is a concern that I think every American and every Member of this body has to understand and appreciate.

General O'Neill came in before our subcommittee earlier this year and he said, `Congressman, I am not satisfied with our intelligence assessment of the threat coming from Russia and other countries around the world in terms of nuclear proliferation, so I went to the intelligence community and I asked them to give me a new assessment, and that assessment is going to be published by the middle of June.'

Mr. Speaker, the middle of June came, and then the end of June came, July 1 came, the middle of July, and yesterday July ended, and now this is August 1.

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Mr. Speaker, we still have not gotten the upgraded intelligence assessment that General O'Neill asked for so that we can logically base our threat needs on what is out there.

Mr. Speaker, that is an outrage. The intelligence community has got to get its act together. They have got to give us the focus. They have got to give us the real facts, not sensationalized numbers, the real facts in terms of what is occurring. And they have got to give us real assessments about whether or not there is a potential for a nuclear anarchy, as Mr. Blair stated in his article.

Mr. Speaker, these issues go to the very core of what our Federal Government is all about, because in the end the primary purpose of a Federal Government is to protect and defend the American people, to protect and defend the American people from what I think are the two biggest threats that we are going to face in the next century: Terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, especially missiles and nuclear missiles.

Mr. Speaker, this is the first in what will be a series of discussions that we have to have in this body, and they will be based on fact. They will be based on articles published in Russian news media, reported in reports that every Member of Congress can get access to, and reported by other foundations and groups that are out there every day giving us the summaries of what is being said and what is occurring throughout Russia and the former Soviet republics.

It is extremely important, Mr. Speaker, as we approach our debate tomorrow, as we approach the conference process, the ultimate debate on the ABM Treaty, that we have good intelligence, that has not been filtered, has not been whitewashed, has not been dumbed down, so that we can make intelligent decisions that in the end will allow us to protect the American people, because that is what our job is all about, protecting the American people.

I hope my concerns will be shared by my colleagues in this body, and by the general public, who has to understand that today we have no protection in these areas. That is a shortcoming we are going to try to address in this budget process, which will hit the House floor tomorrow.

Mr. Speaker, I will put into the Record the items I highlighted during my comments.

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