National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 1996
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
104th CONGRESS, 1st Session
[Report No. 104-112]
July 12 (legislative day July 10), 1995
Senate Missile Defense Act of 1995
SUBTITLE C--MISSILE DEFENSE
Sec. 231. Short title.
Sec. 232. Findings.
Sec. 233. Missile defense policy.
Sec. 234. Theater missile defense architecture.
Sec. 235. National missile defense system architecture.
Sec. 236. Cruise missile defense initiative.
Sec. 237. Policy regarding the ABM Treaty.
Sec. 238. Standard for assessing compliance with the ABM Treaty.
Sec. 239. Ballistic Missile Defense program elements.
Sec. 240. ABM Treaty defined.
Sec. 241. Repeal of missile defense provisions.
SUBTITLE C--MISSILE DEFENSE
SEC. 231. SHORT TITLE.
This subtitle may be cited as the `Missile Defense Act of 1995'.
SEC. 232. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The threat that is posed to the national security of the
United States by the proliferation of ballistic and cruise
missiles is significant and growing, both quantitatively and
qualitatively.
(2) The deployment of Theater Missile Defense systems will
deny potential adversaries the option of escalating a conflict
by threatening or attacking United States forces, coalition
partners of the United States, or allies of the United States
with ballistic missiles armed with weapons of mass destruction
to offset the operational and technical advantages of the
United States and its coalition partners and allies.
(3) The intelligence community of the United States has
confirmed that (A) the missile proliferation trend is toward
longer range and more sophisticated ballistic missiles, (B)
North Korea may deploy an intercontinental ballistic missile
capable of reaching Alaska or beyond within 5 years, and (C)
although a new indigenously developed ballistic missile threat
to the continental United States is not forecast within the
next 10 years there are ways for determined countries to
acquire intercontinental ballistic missiles in the near future
and with little warning by means other than indigenous
development.
(4) The deployment by the United States and its allies of
effective defenses against ballistic missiles of all ranges, as
well as against cruise missiles, will reduce the incentives for
countries to acquire such missiles or to augment existing
missile capabilities.
(5) The Cold War distinction between strategic ballistic
missiles and nonstrategic ballistic missiles and, therefore,
the ABM Treaty's distinction between strategic defense and
nonstrategic defense, is technologically and geostrategically
outdated.
(6) The concept of mutual assured destruction, which provides
the philosophical rationale for the ABM Treaty and continued
reliance on an offense-only form of deterrence, is adversarial
and bipolar in nature and is not a suitable basis for stability
in a multipolar world and one in which the United States and
the states of the former Soviet Union are seeking to normalize
relations and eliminate Cold War attitudes and arrangements.
(7) By undermining the credibility of, and incentives to
pursue, destabilizing first-strike strategies, theater and
national missile defenses can contribute to the maintenance of
strategic stability as missile threats proliferate and as the
United States and the former Soviet Union significantly reduce
the number of strategic nuclear forces in their respective inventories.
(8) Although technology control regimes and other forms of
international arms control can contribute to nonproliferation,
such measures are inadequate for dealing with missile
proliferation, and should not be viewed as alternatives to
missile defenses and other active and passive defenses.
(9) Due to limitations in the ABM Treaty which preclude
deployment of more than 100 ground-based ABM interceptors at a
single site, the United States is currently prohibited from
deploying a national missile defense system capable of
defending the continental United States, Alaska, and Hawaii
against even the most limited ballistic missile attacks.
SEC. 233. MISSILE DEFENSE POLICY.
It is the policy of the United States to--
(1) deploy as soon as possible highly effective theater
missile defenses capable of countering existing and emerging
theater ballistic missiles;
(2) deploy a multiple-site national missile defense system
that (A) is highly effective against limited ballistic missile
attacks on the territory of the United States, and (B) will be
augmented over time to provide a layered defense against larger and more sophisticated ballistic missile threats;
(3) improve existing cruise missile defenses and deploy as
soon as practical defenses that are highly effective against
advanced cruise missiles;
(4) pursue a focused research and development program to
provide follow-on ballistic missile defense options;
(5) employ streamlined acquisition procedures to lower the
cost and accelerate the pace of developing and deploying
theater missile defenses, cruise missile defenses, and national
missile defenses; and
(6) seek a cooperative transition to a regime that does not
feature mutual assured destruction and an offense-only form of
deterrence as the basis for strategic stability.
SEC. 234. THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE ARCHITECTURE.
(a) Establishment of Core Program: To implement the policy
established in section 233, the Secretary of Defense shall
establish a top priority core theater missile defense program
consisting of the following systems:
- The Patriot PAC-3 system, which shall have a first unit
equipped (FUE) in fiscal year 1998.
- The Navy Lower Tier (Area) system, which shall have a
user operational evaluation system (UOES) capability in fiscal
year 1997 and an initial operational capability (IOC) in fiscal
year 1999.
- The Theater High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system,
which shall have a user operational evaluation system (UOES)
capability in fiscal year 1997 and an initial operational
capability (IOC) no later than fiscal year 2002.
- The Navy Upper Tier (Theater Wide) system, which shall
have a user operational evaluation system (UOES) capability in
fiscal year 1999 and an initial operational capability (IOC) in
fiscal year 2001.
(b) Interoperability and Support of Core Systems: To maximize
effectiveness and flexibility, the Secretary of Defense shall
ensure that core theater missile defense systems are interoperable
and fully capable of exploiting external sensor and battle
management support from systems such as the Navy's Cooperative
Engagement Capability (CEC), the Army's Battlefield Integration
Center (BIC), air and space-based sensors including, in particular,
the Space and Missile Tracking System (SMTS).
(c) Termination of Programs: The Secretary of Defense shall
terminate the following programs:
- The Corps Surface to Air Missile system (Corps SAM).
- The Boost Phase Interceptor (BPI).
(d) Follow-On Systems:
- The Secretary of Defense shall develop
an affordable development plan for follow-on theater missile
defense systems which leverages existing systems, technologies, and
programs, and focuses investments to satisfy military requirements
not met by the core program.
- Before adding new theater missile defense systems to the core
program from among the follow-on activities, the Secretary of
Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a
report describing--
- (A) the requirements for the program;
- (B) how the new program will relate to, support, and leverage off existing core programs;
- (C) the planned acquisition strategy; and
- (D) a preliminary estimate of total program cost and budgetary impact.
(e) Report: Not later than 60 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the
congressional defense committees a report detailing the Secretary's
plans for implementing the guidance specified in this section.
SEC. 235. NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE.
(a) In General: To implement the policy established in section
233, the Secretary of Defense shall develop an affordable and
operationally effective national missile defense system, which will
attain initial operational capability (IOC) by the end of 2003. The
national missile defense system to be developed for deployment
shall include the following:
- Ground-based interceptors deployed at multiple sites, the
locations and numbers of which are to be determined so as to
optimize the defensive coverage of the continental United
States, Alaska, and Hawaii against limited ballistic missile
attacks.
- Fixed ground-based radars and space-based sensors,
including the Space and Missile Tracking system, the mix,
siting and numbers of which are to be determined so as to
optimize sensor support and minimize total system cost.
- Battle management, command, control, and communications (BM/C3).
(b) Interim Operational Capability: To provide a hedge against
the emergence of near-term ballistic missile threats against the
United States and to support the development and deployment of the
objective system specified in subsection (a), the Secretary of
Defense shall develop an interim national missile defense
capability, consistent with the technical requirements and schedule
of such objective system, to be operational by the end of 1999. In
developing this capability the Secretary shall make use of--
- developmental, or user operational evaluation system
(UOES) interceptors, radars, and battle management, command,
control, and communications (BM/C3), to the extent that such
use directly supports, and does not significantly increase the
cost of, the objective system specified in subsection (a);
- one or more of the sites that will be used as deployment
locations for the objective system specified in subsection (a);
- upgraded early warning radars; and
- space-based sensors.
(c) Use of Streamlined Acquisition Procedures: The Secretary of
Defense shall prescribe and use streamlined acquisition procedures
to--
- reduce the cost and increase the efficiency of developing the national missile defense system specified in subsection (a); and
- ensure that the interim national missile defense capabilities developed pursuant to subsection (b) are operationally effective and on a path to fulfill the technical requirements and schedule of the objective system.
(d) Additional Cost Saving Measures: In addition to the
procedures prescribed pursuant to subsection (c), the Secretary of
Defense shall employ cost saving measures that do not decrease the
operational effectiveness of the systems specified in subsections
(a) and (b), and which do not pose unacceptable technical risk. The
cost saving measures should include the following:
- The use of existing facilities and infrastructure.
- The use, where appropriate, of existing or upgraded systems and technologies.
- Development of systems and components that do not rely on a large and permanent infrastructure and are easily transported, emplaced, and moved.
(e) Report on Plan for Deployment: Not later than 60 days after
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense
shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report
containing the following matters:
- The Secretary's plan for carrying out this section.
- An analysis of options for supplementing or modifying the
national missile defense architecture specified in subsection
(a) before attaining initial operational capability, or
evolving such architecture in a building block manner after
attaining initial operational capability, to improve the
cost-effectiveness or the operational effectiveness of such
system by adding one or a combination of the following:
- (A) Additional ground-based interceptors at existing or new sites.
- (B) Sea-based missile defense systems.
- (C) Space-based kinetic energy interceptors.
- (D) Space-based directed energy systems.
SEC. 236. CRUISE MISSILE DEFENSE INITIATIVE.
(a) In General: The Secretary of Defense shall undertake an
initiative to coordinate and strengthen the cruise missile defense
programs, projects, and activities of the military departments, the
Advanced Research Projects Agency and the Ballistic Missile Defense
Organization to ensure that the United States develops and deploys
highly effective defenses against existing and future cruise
missile threats.
(b) Actions of the Secretary of Defense: In carrying out
subsection (a), the Secretary of Defense shall ensure that--
- to the extent practicable, the ballistic missile defense
and cruise missile defense efforts of the Department of Defense
are coordinated and mutually reinforcing;
- existing air defense systems are adequately upgraded to
defend against existing and near-term cruise missile threats; and
- the Department of Defense undertakes a high priority and
well coordinated technology development program to support the
future deployment of systems that are highly effective against
advanced cruise missiles, including cruise missiles with low observable features.
(c) Implementation Plan: Not later than 60 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to
the congressional defense committees a detailed plan, in
unclassified and classified forms, as necessary, for carrying out
this section. The plan shall include an assessment of--
- the systems that currently have cruise missile defense
capabilities, and existing programs to improve these
capabilities;
- the technologies that could be deployed in the near- to
mid-term to provide significant advances over existing cruise
missile defense capabilities, and the investments that would be
required to ready the technologies for deployment;
- the cost and operational tradeoffs, if any, between
upgrading existing air and missile defense systems and
accelerating follow-on systems with significantly improved
capabilities against advanced cruise missiles; and
- the organizational and management changes that would
strengthen and further coordinate the cruise missile defense
efforts of the Department of Defense, including the
disadvantages, if any, of implementing such changes.
SEC. 237. POLICY REGARDING THE ABM TREATY.
(a) Sense of Congress: In light of the findings and policies
provided in this subtitle, it is the sense of Congress that--
- the Senate should--
- (A) undertake a comprehensive review of the continuing
value and validity of the ABM Treaty with the intent of
providing additional policy guidance on the future of the
ABM Treaty during the second session of the 104th Congress;
and
- (B) consider establishing a select committee to carry out
the review and to recommend such additional policy guidance
on future application of the ABM Treaty as the select
committee considers appropriate; and
- the President should cease all efforts to modify,
clarify, or otherwise alter United States obligations under the
ABM Treaty pending the outcome of the review.
(b) ABM Treaty Negotiating Record:
- To support the comprehensive review specified in subsection (a), the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with other appropriate officials of the executive branch, shall provide the Senate with a complete, declassified version of the ABM Treaty negot
iating record, including--
- (A) within 30 days after the date of the enactment of this
Act, an index of the documents comprising the negotiating
record; and
- (B) within 60 days after the date of the enactment of this
Act, the documents comprising the negotiating record in
unclassified form.
- If the Secretary considers it necessary to do so, the
Secretary may submit the documents referred to in paragraph (1)(B)
in classified form when due under that paragraph. If the Secretary
does so, however, the Secretary shall submit the documents in
unclassified form within 90 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act.
(c) Waiver: The Secretary of Defense, after consultation with any
select committee established in accordance with subsection
(a)(1)(B) or, if no select committee, the Committee on Armed
Services of the Senate, may waive the declassification requirement
under subsection (b) on a document by document basis.
SEC. 238. STANDARD FOR ASSESSING COMPLIANCE WITH THE ABM TREATY.
(a) Policy Concerning Systems Subject to ABM Treaty: Unless and
until a missile defense or air defense system, system upgrade, or
system component, including one that exploits data from space-based
or other external sensors (such as the Space and Missile Tracking
System, which can be deployed as an ABM adjunct, or the Navy's
Cooperative Engagement Capability), is flight tested in an
ABM-qualifying flight test (as defined in subsection (c)), such
system, system upgrade, or system component--
- has not, for purposes of the ABM Treaty, been tested in an ABM mode nor been given capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles; and
- therefore is not subject to any application, limitation, or obligation under the ABM Treaty.
(b) Prohibitions:
- Appropriated funds may not be obligated or expended by any official of the Federal Government for the purpose of--
- (A) prescribing, enforcing, or implementing any Executive
order, regulation, or policy that would apply the ABM Treaty
(or any limitation or obligation under such Treaty) to
research, development, testing, or deployment of a missile
defense or air defense system, system upgrade, or system
component, including one that exploits data from space-based or
other external sensors; or
- (B) taking any other action to provide for the ABM Treaty (or
any limitation or obligation under such treaty) to be applied
to research, development, testing, or deployment of a missile
defense or air defense system, system upgrade, or system
component, including one that exploits data from space-based or
other external sensors.
- This subsection shall cease to apply with respect to a
missile defense or air defense system, system upgrade, or system
component, including one that exploits data from space-based or
other external sensors, when that system, system upgrade, or system
component has been flight tested in an ABM-qualifying flight test.
(c) ABM-Qualifying Flight Test Defined: For purposes of this
section, an ABM-qualifying flight test is a flight test against a
ballistic missile which, in that flight test, exceeds
- a range of 3,500 kilometers, or
- a velocity of 5 kilometers per second.
(d) Actions of the Secretary of Defense: Not later than 60 days
after the date of the enactment of this Act, and each year
thereafter in the annual report of the Ballistic Missile Defense
Organization, the Secretary of Defense shall certify to Congress
that no United States missile defense or air defense system, system
upgrade, or system component is being limited, modified, or
otherwise constrained pursuant to the ABM Treaty in a manner that
is inconsistent with this section.
(e) Congressional Review of Range and Velocity Parameters:
Congress finds that the range and velocity parameters set forth in
subsection (c) are based on a distinction between strategic and
nonstrategic ballistic missiles that is technically and
geostrategically outdated, and, therefore, should be subject to
review and change as part of the Senate's comprehensive review
under section 237.
SEC. 239. BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAM ELEMENTS.
(a) Elements Specified: In the budget justification materials
submitted to Congress in support of the Department of Defense
budget for any fiscal year after fiscal year 1996 (as submitted in
the budget of the President under section 1105(a) of title 31,
United States Code), the amount requested for activities of the
Ballistic Missile Defense Organization shall be set forth in
accordance with the following program elements:
- The Patriot system.
- The Navy Lower Tier (Area) system.
- The Theater High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system.
- The Navy Upper Tier (Theater Wide) system.
- Other Theater Missile Defense Activities.
- National Missile Defense.
- Follow-On and Support Technologies.
(b) Treatment of Non-Core TMD in Other Theater Missile Defense
Activities Element: Funding for theater missile defense programs,
projects, and activities, other than core theater missile defense
programs, shall be covered in the `Other Theater Missile Defense
Activities' program element.
(c) Treatment of Core Theater Missile Defense Programs: Funding
for core theater missile defense programs specified in section 234,
shall be covered in individual, dedicated program elements and
shall be available only for activities covered by those program
elements.
(d) BM/C3I Programs: Funding for programs, projects, and
activities involving battle management, command, control,
communications, and intelligence (BM/C3I) shall be covered in the
`Other Theater Missile Defense Activities' program element or the
`National Missile Defense' program element, as determined on the
basis of the primary objectives involved.
(e) Management and Support: Each program element shall include
requests for the amounts necessary for the management and support
of the programs, projects, and activities contained in that program
element.
SEC. 240. ABM TREATY DEFINED.
For purposes of this subtitle, the term `ABM Treaty' means the
Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missiles,
signed at Moscow on May 26, 1972, and includes the Protocols to
that Treaty, signed at Moscow on July 3, 1974.
SEC. 241. REPEAL OF MISSILE DEFENSE PROVISIONS.
The following provisions of law are repealed:
- The Missile Defense Act of 1991 (part C of title II of
Public Law 102-190; 10 U.S.C. 2431 note).
- Section 237 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1994 (Public Law 103-160).
- Section 242 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1994 (Public Law 103-160).
- Section 222 of the Department of Defense Authorization
Act, 1986 (Public Law 99-145; 99 Stat. 613; 10 U.S.C. 2431
note).
- Section 225 of the Department of Defense Authorization
Act, 1986 (Public Law 99-145; 99 Stat. 614).
- Section 226 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 (Public Law 100-180; 101 Stat. 1057;
10 U.S.C. 2431 note).
- Section 8123 of the Department of Defense Appropriations
Act, 1989 (Public Law 100-463; 102 Stat. 2270-40).
- Section 8133 of the Department of Defense Appropriations
Act, 1992 (Public Law 102-172; 105 Stat. 1211).
- Section 234 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1994 (Public Law 103-160; 107 Stat. 1595; 10 U.S.C.
2431 note).
- Section 235 of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 1995 (Public Law 103-337; 108 Stat. 2701; 10
U.S.C. 221 note).