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104th Congress Exec. Report
SENATE
1st Session 104-10
_______________________________________________________________________
START II TREATY
_______
December 15, 1995.--Ordered to be printed
_______________________________________________________________________
Mr. Helms, from the Committee on Foreign Relations, submitted the
following
R E P O R T
together with
ADDITIONAL VIEWS
[To accompany Treaty Doc. 103-1]
The Committee on Foreign Relations to which was referred
the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian
Federation of Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic
Offensive Arms (the START II Treaty) signed at Moscow on
January 3, 1993, including the following documents, which are
integral parts thereof: the Elimination and Conversion
Protocol; the Exhibitions and Inspections Protocol; and the
Memorandum of Attribution having considered the same, reports
favorably thereon and recommends that the Senate give its
advice and consent to ratification thereof subject to 6
conditions and 7 declarations as set forth in this report and
the accompanying resolution of ratification.
CONTENTS
Pages
I. Purpose.........................................................2
II. Treaty Terms.....................................................3
III. Bilateral Military Implications..................................6
IV. Multilateral Implications.......................................21
V. Verification and Compliance.....................................29
VI. START II Implementation.........................................38
VII. Committee Action................................................40
VIII.Resolution of Ratification......................................46
IX. Article-by-Article Analysis.....................................49
X. Additional Views................................................60
I. Purpose
The Treaty Between the United States of America and the
Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of
Strategic Offensive Arms (The START II Treaty) will commit the
United States and Russia to deeper reductions in strategic
offensive nuclear weapons, building upon the Treaty between the
United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic
Offensive Arms (The START Treaty). Whereas START theoretically
limits each States Party to 6,000 total warheads deployed on
1,600 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (a 30 to 40 percent
reduction in existing arsenals), the START II Treaty
contemplates a substantially lower limit of 3,500 deployed
warheads, a ban on all land-based, multiple warhead ballistic
missiles, and limitations on the number of warheads deployed on
submarine launched ballistic missiles. Furthermore, unlike
START, all warheads deployed on heavy bombers will be
attributable under START II counting rules. Taken together,
START and START II will reduce the deployed strategic offensive
arms of the United States and Russia by roughly two-thirds.
CENTRAL LIMITS IN START II
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Phase II
Weapon System Phase I (complete by
2003)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total warheads.......................... 3,800-4,250 3,000-3,500
MIRVed ICBM warheads................ 1,200 0
Heavy ICBM warheads................. 650 0
SLBM warheads....................... 2,160 1,750
------------------------------------------------------------------------
START II is a bilateral treaty between the United States
and the Russian Federation, in contrast with START, which also
includes Belarus, Kazakstan, and Ukraine as Parties. In
accordance with Lisbon Protocol, the other three Parties to the
START Treaty have joined the Non-Proliferation Treaty and have
pledged and are proceeding to eliminate strategic offensive
arms located on their territories. No nuclear warheads or
deployed strategic offensive arms should be located on their
territories by the completion of the first phase of the
reductions under START II.
START II is to be implemented simultaneously with START.
Seven years after START's entry into force neither Party may
deploy in excess of 4,250 strategic warheads. By January 1,
2003, the total number of warheads deployed by each Party will
not exceed 3,500. Furthermore, beyond that date no warheads are
to be deployed on land-based, intercontinental ballistic
missiles with multiple independently targetable nuclear
warheads (MIRVed ICBMs) or on heavy ICBMs.
In addition to central limits, the Treaty contains a number
of other prohibitions and exemptions, such as provisions
allowing for the downloading of all SLBMs and some multiple
warhead ICBMs, the elimination or conversion of launchers
(including the conversion of 90 SS-18 launchers to accommodate
the single-warhead SS-25), the elimination of the SS-18 class
of heavy ICBMs and conversion of SS-18 silos, and procedures
for inspecting and counting warheads deployed on heavy bombers.
The inspection regime established under START will be used
to verify START II provisions, except as otherwise provided. In
addition to the use of national technical means, on-site
inspection, and technical exhibitions, the START II Treaty
provides for additional inspections to confirm the elimination
of heavy ICBMs and their launch canisters and to confirm ICBM
silo conversions. The Treaty also provides for exhibitions and
inspections to observe the variety of nuclear weapons with
which heavy bombers are actually equipped in order to ascertain
their relevant observable differences. For the U.S. this means
Russian inspection of the weapons carriage areas of a B-2
bomber--something not allowed under START inspection
provisions. Portions of the B-2 can be ``shrouded,'' however,
to safeguard the bomber's sensitive technical characteristics
during inspections.
Negotiations on START II, conducted throughout 1992, were
premised on U.S. interest in eliminating MIRVed ICBMs and
Russian interest in reducing nuclear arsenals to a sustainable
level given political and economic realities following the
dissolution of the Soviet Union. As a result, Presidents Bush
and Yeltsin agreed at a June 1992 summit to a complete ban on
MIRVed ICBMs, warhead limitations on SLBMs, and a central limit
of 3,500 accountable warheads. They also issued the Joint
Statement on a Global Protection System, endorsing the concept
of U.S.-Russian cooperation on ballistic missile defense as a
stabilizing complement to well-structured reductions in
strategic offensive forces.
However, a number of developments in the fall of 1992
complicated negotiations, including a number of new Russian
proposals that differed from the agreed framework and which
raised concerns regarding new break-out opportunities for
Russia. During the final weeks of December 1992, the United
States made two significant concessions. Specifically, the
downloading rule established in START was relaxed to permit
Russia to maintain 105 of its 170 SS-19 ICBMs as single-warhead
missiles, and it was further agreed that Russia would be
allowed to deploy single-warhead missiles in 90 of its 154 SS-
18 silos. In return, Russia agreed to destroy all of its SS-18
missiles. Russia also agreed that the 90 SS-18 launchers it
retained would be converted using procedures designed to make
reconversion difficult.
Notwithstanding these modifications, the critical
components of the START II Treaty remained intact. Presidents
Bush and Yeltsin signed the Treaty on January 3, 1993 and it
was submitted to the Senate for advice and consent and referred
to the Committee on Foreign Relations on January 20, 1993.
Discussions on ballistic missile defense cooperation continued
throughout the Bush Administration but were discontinued by the
Clinton Administration.
II. Treaty Terms
The Treaty between the United States of America and the
Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of
Strategic Offensive Arms (The START II Treaty) consists of the
main Treaty text and three documents formally transmitted to
the Senate by the President on January 20, 1993, for the
Senate's advice and consent to ratification. START II is a
treaty with a preamble and 8 articles of an initial duration
the same as that of the START Treaty, two protocols, and a
memorandum of understanding as follows:
--The Protocol on Procedures Governing Elimination of
Heavy ICBMs and on Procedures Governing Conversion of
Silo Launchers of Heavy ICBMs Relating to the Treaty
Between the United States of America and the Russian
Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of
Strategic Offensive Arms (the Elimination and
Conversion Protocol);
--The Protocol on Exhibitions and Inspections of
Heavy Bombers Relating to the Treaty Between the United
States of America and the Russian Federation on Further
Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms
(the Exhibitions and Inspections Protocol); and
--The Memorandum of Understanding on Warhead
Attribution and Heavy Bomber Data Relating to the
Treaty Between the United States of America and the
Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation
of Strategic Offensive Arms (the Memorandum on
Attribution).
The President also transmitted documents associated with,
but not integral parts of, the Protocols or the START II
Treaty. These documents are three exchanges of letters
embodying legally binding commitments from the Russian
Federation and the United States concerning the removal of SS-
18 missiles from Kazakstan, the deployment of nuclear weapons
on heavy bombers, and Russian conversion of SS-18 missile
silos. These documents are relevant to the consideration of the
START II Treaty by the Senate. No new U.S. security assurances
or guarantees are associated with any of these letters.
a. the treaty text
Article I obligates the Parties to meet START reductions
and to reduce their ICBMs, SLBMs, respective launchers, and
heavy bombers so that by January 1, 2003, the aggregate number
for deployed warheads does not exceed 3,500. The following
sublimits are also applied: 1,750 for deployed SLBMs, no ICBMs
to which more than one warhead is attributed, no deployed heavy
ICBMs, no deployed launchers of an ICBM to which more than one
warhead is attributed, no deployed launchers of heavy ICBMs,
and no heavy ICBMs. Launchers may either be destroyed or
converted (the procedures for which are specified elsewhere)
and, in most cases, the missiles need not be destroyed. To
reach the above levels there is not a specific legal obligation
to reduce at a given rate.]
Article II states an exception to the requirement for
launchers. Ninety heavy ICBM silo launchers may be converted to
accommodate SS-25 type ICBMs. Russia further pledges its best
efforts to reach an agreement with Kazakstan on the return of
heavy SS-18 ICBMs for destruction. Each party has the right to
inspect the destruction of heavy ICBMs and their launch
canisters, as well as the conversion of silo launchers for
heavy ICBMs. Both Parties agree not to transfer heavy ICBMs to
any recipient whatsoever; nor will they produce, acquire,
flight-test, or deploy ICBMs to which more than one warhead is
attributed.
Article III sets forth the rules for reducing the warhead
attribution (i.e. ``downloading'') of existing types of ICBMs
and SLBMs other than heavy ICBMs. START II bans downloading of
heavy ICBMs as well as new types of ICBMs and SLBMs but it
allows the Parties to exceed the START limit of 1,250 on total
warhead downloading and the 500 warhead limit on downloading
ICBMs and SLBMs other than the U.S. Minuteman III and the
Russian SS-N-18. The Parties also are allowed to download by up
to five warheads up to 105 of one of the two types of ICBMs or
SLBMs permitted to be downloaded by subparagraph 5(c)(ii) of
Article III of the START Treaty. As a practical matter, this
means Russia will retain 105 SS-19 missiles whose elimination
otherwise would be required. Reentry vehicle platform
destruction is not required. The uploading of ICBMs or SLBMs
which have been downloaded is banned.
Article IV establishes constraints on heavy bombers,
specifying that the number of nuclear warheads attributed to a
deployed heavy bomber shall be equal to the number of nuclear
weapons with which any bomber of that type or variant is
actually equipped. The number of warheads attributed to a heavy
bomber of a given type or variant of a type is listed in the
Memorandum on Attribution. The Memorandum requires a one-time
exhibition, no later than 180 days after entry into force, of
one heavy bomber of each type and variant to demonstrate the
number of nuclear weapons for which such bombers are actually
equipped. Each Party can increase or decrease the number of
warheads for which a heavy bomber is actually equipped, but
this requires a repeated exhibition. Each party may reorient to
a conventional role heavy bombers not accountable under START
as being equipped with air launched cruise missiles. This is in
addition to the right under START to convert up to 76 heavy
bombers, using specified procedures, to a non-nuclear role.
Reoriented heavy bombers must have segregated basing and may
not be used in nuclear missions, nuclear exercises, nor can
their crews train or exercise for nuclear missions. Each party
has the one-time right, with a 90-day notice, to return heavy
bombers to a nuclear role. Reoriented bombers must be based at
least 100 kilometers away from storage areas for heavy bomber
nuclear armaments, and are subject to inspection. If only some
bombers of a given type are reoriented, then those bombers must
be distinguished from the nuclear types in a manner observable
by National Technical Means.
Article V establishes that the provisions of the START
Treaty, including its verification provisions, shall be used
for implementing START II. The Bilateral Implementation
Commission (BIC) shall be established to serve as the framework
within which the Parties will seek to resolve any questions
related to compliance with the START II Treaty, and the forum
by which Parties might agree on any additional measures
necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of START
II.
Article VI specifies that the Treaty is subject to
ratification prior to entering into force, and will not enter
into force prior to the START Treaty. The ban on the transfer
of heavy ICBMs to a third state or states shall be
provisionally applied as of the date of signature of START II.
The START II Treaty will remain in force for the duration of
the START Treaty. Both Parties have the right to withdraw from
the Treaty with six months notice if extraordinary events
related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized a
Party's supreme interests.
Article VII is identical in content to Article XVIII of the
START Treaty, providing for amendments to the START II Treaty.
Such amendments would be subject to ratification as specified
in Article VI of the Treaty.
Article VIII provides for the registration of the Treaty
with the United Nations in accordance with Article 102 of the
Charter of the United Nations.
Final Provision of the START II Treaty records that the
Treaty was done at Moscow on January 3, 1993, in two copies,
each in the English and Russian languages, and each being
equally authentic.
b. integral additional documents
The Treaty includes other documents which the President and
the Secretary indicated are ``integral'' parts of the Treaty,
and are submitted for consideration as legally binding parts of
the Treaty:
--an Elimination and Conversion Protocol setting
forth elimination and conversion procedures for heavy
ICBMs and heavy ICBM launchers;
--an Exhibition and Inspections Protocol setting
forth requirements on exhibitions and inspections of
heavy bombers; and
--a Memorandum of Understanding that includes the
required data on the treaty-limited items possessed by
the Parties.
c. separate letters
Associated with the START II Treaty are three separate,
legally binding exchanges of letters, two of which were signed
by Andrey Kozyrev, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, and
Lawrence Eagleburger, U.S. Secretary of State, and one exchange
of letters signed by Pavel Grachev, Russian Minister of
Defense, and Richard Cheney, U.S. Secretary of Defense. No new
U.S. obligations are entailed in these letters.
III. Bilateral Military Implications
The committee considered the START II Treaty during a
period of fundamental transformation in the international
security environment. START II is a bilateral arms control
agreement committing the United States and Russia to even
deeper reductions in their strategic nuclear arsenals than
contemplated under the START Treaty. The Treaty provides that
by the year 2003 the United States and Russia must reduce their
deployed strategic warheads to a level at or below 3,500--a
more than two-thirds reduction over current levels. When fully
implemented, it will eliminate completely all land-based
multiple warhead (MIRVed) ICBMs, including all of the Russian
``heavy'' SS-18 ICBMs, thereby accomplishing two longstanding
U.S. negotiating goals. However, both U.S. nuclear doctrine and
U.S. strategic forces must evolve to meet the challenges of the
post-Cold War era. Consequently, as shall be discussed later in
this report, any assessment of the military implications of the
START II Treaty must consider the changing nature of a complex
and multipolar world. More directly, START II's bipolar
military significance and verifiability both are linked
integrally to the full implementation of START and the
anticipated composition of the post-START II Russian strategic
forces. It should also be recalled that START II was negotiated
in the context of a robust national missile defense program
intended to enhance strategic stability and possible
cooperation with Russia on the same. A national missile defense
system remains imperative to enhance stability under START II;
safeguard against potential changes in Russia; and defend
against other emerging ballistic missile threats to the United
States.
Linkages with the START Treaty
The START Treaty provides for the following principal,
maximum numerical limitations on the strategic arsenals of the
United States and Russia:
1,600 deployed strategic nuclear delivery vehicles
(ICBMs, SLBMs, and Heavy Bombers);
6,000 accountable warheads (ICBMs, SLBMs, and Heavy
Bombers);
4,900 ballistic missile warheads (ICBMs and SLBMs);
1,100 warheads on land-mobile ICBMs;
1,540 warheads deployed on no more than 154 Soviet
SS-18s;
1,250 total warhead limit on downloading;
500 total warhead sublimit on downloading for ICBMs
and SLBMs other than the U.S. Minuteman III and the
Russian SS-N-18 SLBM; and
3,600 metric tons throw-weight ceiling.
Further, a set of politically binding side agreements under
START limits each side to 880 deployed sea-launched cruise
missiles (SLCMs) in any one year, and limits Russia to 500
Backfire bombers, which are understood not to possess
intercontinental range nor in-flight refueling capability.
In addition to these limits, START requires the destruction
of strategic launchers (bombers, silos, and submarine
launchers), but does not require destruction of nuclear
warheads or missiles (other than mobile missiles beyond the
non-deployed limit of 250). Instead, START allows the use of
retired missiles as space-launch vehicles and for missile
defense programs, with corresponding verification provisions
designed to constrain illicit activities.
Taken altogether, the START Treaty will produce the
following reductions:
TOTAL ACTUAL WARHEADS
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
As of EIF START limits Net reduction Percent reduction
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
United States (MOU)................. 13,000 8,500 4,500 35
Soviet (MOU)........................ 11,000 6,500 4,500 41
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ACCOUNTABLE START WARHEADS
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
As of EIF \1\ START limits Net reduction Percent reduction
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
United States (MOU)................. 10,563 6,000 4,563 43
Soviet (MOU)........................ 10,271 6,000 4,271 42
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Entry into Force
BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEADS
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
As of EIF START limits Net reduction Percent reduction
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
United States (MOU)................. 8,210 4,900 3,310 40
Soviet (MOU)........................ 9,416 4,900 4,516 48
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DELIVERY VEHICLES
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
As of EIF START limits Net reduction Percent reduction
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
United States (MOU)................. 2,246 1,245 1,00 145
Soviet (MOU)........................ 2,500 1,424 1,076 43
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note.--Estimates depend upon particular force structure assumptions.
HEAVY ICBM's
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
As of EIF START limits Net reduction Percent reduction
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
United States (MOU)................. 0 0 0 0
Soviet (MOU)........................ 308 154 154 50
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The START Treaty was signed as a bilateral agreement
between the United States and the Soviet Union on July 31,
1991, after nine years of negotiation. Although the Treaty was
transmitted to the Senate for its advice and consent to
ratification on November 25, 1991, the Soviet Union dissolved
formally on December 25, 1991. The dissolution of the Soviet
Union introduced a number of complex state succession issues
into the Senate's consideration of the START Treaty. Most
importantly, strategic offensive nuclear weapons were left
deployed in four former Soviet republics: Russia, Belarus,
Ukraine and Kazakstan:
1992 DISPOSITION OF STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE FORMER SOVIET UNION (FSU)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Kazakstan Ukraine Belarus Russia Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ICBM's........................... 104 SS-18s 46 SS-24s (silo), 54 SS-25s (mobile) 1,067 1,401
130 SS-19s (silo)
ICBM warheads.................... 1,040 1,240 54 4,278 6,612
SLBM's........................... 0 0 0 940 940
SLBM warheads.................... 0 0 0 2,804 2,804
SSBN's........................... 0 0 0 0 62
Bombers.......................... 40 Bear Hs 14 Bear Hs, 16 0 88 162
Blackjacks, 4
Heavy Bombers
Bomber warheads.................. 370 416 0 800 1,600
IC/HB bases...................... 3 4 2 2 31
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note.--Estimates of the total number of warheads on Ukrainian territory are open to question. In testimony
before the committee on October 4, 1994, Assistant Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter indicated that Ukraine
had 1,734 warheads prior to START's EIF, as opposed to the 1,564 cited in the START MOU.
In order to resolve this key succession problem, the START
Treaty was converted into a multilateral treaty among the
United States, Russia, Belarus, Kazakstan, and Ukraine by means
of the May 23, 1992, Lisbon Protocol (Treaty Doc. 102-32).
Constituting an amendment to, and an integral part of, the
START Treaty, the Protocol provided that the four former Soviet
republics would together assume the legal obligations of the
USSR for the START Treaty. It further obligated the four states
to make arrangements among themselves as necessary to implement
the Treaty's limitations, to permit verification of the
Treaty's provisions on their territory, and to allocate costs.
It also obligated Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakstan to accede to
the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in the status
of non-nuclear-weapons states as soon as possible.
In letters submitted with the Protocol, Belarus, Ukraine
and Kazakstan pledged to eliminate all nuclear weapons and
strategic offensive arms on their respective territories within
seven years after entry into force of the START Treaty. All
tactical nuclear weapons have been removed from the three
states and transferred to Russia. However, the committee notes
that Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakstan are under no legal
obligation to transfer any nuclear weapons to Russia. They
could--in theory--elect to eliminate such weapons on their own
territories. Yet, because these countries lack the necessary
facilities for local elimination, the Bush Administration's
Article-by-Article Analysis of the Lisbon Protocol concluded:
``As a practical matter, we expect that nuclear weapons will be
transferred to and eliminated in Russia.''
In addition to obligations undertaken with respect to the
Lisbon Protocol, Belarus and Kazakstan have also concluded
bilateral agreements with Russia to deactivate and transfer
their strategic arsenals to Russia. Prior to START's entry into
force, all Parties began deactivating and eliminating strategic
systems to meet Treaty obligations. In this regard, as of
September the Parties have achieved the following levels for
strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDVs) and warheads (WH).
NUMBER OF WEAPONS ATTRIBUTED TO THE FOUR PARTIES TO THE UNITED STATES
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SNDV/WH
---------------------------------------
As of Sept. 1,
1990 Sept. 1, 1995
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Belarus......................... 54/54 18/18
Kazakstan....................... 144/1,360 48/480
Russia.......................... 2,092/7,345 1,513/6,769
Ukraine......................... 210/1,512 220/1,592
---------------------------------------
Total for the former
Soviet Union............. 2,500/10,271 1,799/8,859
United States................... 2,246/10,563 1,727/8,345
------------------------------------------------------------------------
As of September 1995, the United States has:
Removed all nuclear warheads--approximately 3,900--
from 450 Minuteman II ICBMs and from 384 Poseidon C-3
and C-4 SLBMs;
Destroyed 120 Minuteman II ICBM silo launchers and
removed ICBMs from the remaining Minuteman II silo
launchers;
Destroyed 320 Poseidon C-3 and C-4 SLBM launchers,
which represents 20 ballistic missile submarines
destroyed, and removed SLBMs from the remaining 64
launchers;
Eliminated 251 heavy bombers from Treaty
accountability; roughly 135 heavy bombers remaining to
be eliminated under START have been retired from
operation and moved to an elimination facility.
The United States has thus completed 56 percent of its
overall missile launcher and heavy bomber eliminations to be
accomplished under START. As a result, the United States is
already below START's first phase limits on delivery vehicles
and accountable warheads, which do not take effect until
December 1997.
Also as of December 1995, over 3,000 strategic warheads
have been removed from deployment in Belarus, Kazakstan, and
Ukraine, and over 2,500 of these have been transferred to
Russia, including all warheads formerly located Kazakstan. The
remaining warheads in Belarus and Ukraine are scheduled to be
transferred to Russia in 1996. Furthermore, over 700 missile
launchers and heavy bombers have been eliminated throughout the
former Soviet Union. As a result of these eliminations, the
combined total number of delivery vehicles and accountable
warheads in the new independent states is also below START's
first phase limits on these items.
From START to START II
In January 1992, President Bush proposed to ban MIRVed
ICBMs and to limit actual warheads to 4,700. He further offered
to reduce the number of U.S. Trident warheads by one-third.
Although President Yeltsin agreed with the ban in principle, he
considered the Bush proposal inequitable since it would affect
primarily the land-based leg of Russia's strategic triad--
traditionally Russia's forte--while allowing U.S. retention of
a nuclear advantage in both heavy bombers and submarine-
launched ballistic missile warheads. The impasse was resolved
by U.S. agreement to deeper cuts in SLBMs. On June 17, 1992,
Presidents Bush and Yeltsin signed a Joint Understanding in
Washington that paved the way for the formal negotiation of the
START II Treaty. On that same day they issued the Joint
Statement on a Global Protection System providing for
discussion of U.S.-Russian cooperation on ballistic missile
defense. This followed-up on President Yeltsin's speech at the
United Nations on January 31, 1992.
The START II Treaty, in contrast with START, is relatively
brief and straightforward, calling for two phases of reductions
in ICBMs, ICBM launchers, ICBM warheads, SLBMs, SLBM launchers,
SLBM warheads, heavy bombers, and the nuclear payloads loaded
onto heavy bombers. START II contains limits in some categories
of weapons not addressed in the START Treaty, and in turn does
not alter all START limits. In those cases where no limit is
expressed in the latter treaty, START limits remain applicable.
COMPARISON OF CENTRAL LIMITS IN START AND START II
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Weapon system START START II
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total delivery vehicles....... 1,600........... No limit specified.
Warheads attributed to all 6,000........... 3,000-3,500.
delivery vehicles.
Warheads attributable to all 4,900........... No limit specified.
ballistic missiles.
Warheads attributed to MIRVed No limit 0.
ICBMs. specified.
Warheads attributed to heavy 1,540........... 0.
ICBMs.
Warheads attributed to mobile 1,100........... No limit specified.
ICBMs.
Warheads attributed to SLBMs.. No limit 1,750.
specified.
Warheads attributed to heavy Discounted by As actually deployed.
bombers. 50%, or counted
as a single
warhead.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Besides the deeper cuts, the practical effect of the START
II Treaty is the elimination of the U.S. MX missile,
significant reductions in U.S. heavy bombers, and a sublimit on
the number of warheads to be deployed on SLBMs--all areas of
comparative advantage for the United States--in exchange for
elimination of the Russian SS-18 heavy ICBM and a ban on MIRVed
ICBMs.
Maintenance of the U.S. strategic deterrent
The committee has concluded that the START II Treaty will
enhance U.S. security through reducing the overall levels of
strategic nuclear arms possessed by both Russia and the United
States, eliminating the Russian SS-18 heavy ICBM, and banning
the deployment of ICBMs with more than one warhead. At the same
time, START II does not fundamentally alter the deterrence
value of the U.S. nuclear force posture, maintaining instead
the two fundamental concerns of strategic parity and strategic
stability. Parity undergirds U.S. deterrence strategy by
ensuring a retaliatory capability threatening unacceptable
costs that would outweigh benefits. Strategic stability--at
least in the Cold War, bipolar vein--derives from the types of
strategic offensive arms deployed by both Parties. In
particular, stability depends upon an environment in which
neither side has the incentive to engage in a pre-emptive
strike. As such, these two concepts are intertwined. In
testimony before the committee, the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, General John Shalikashvilli, offered his
judgment that the START II Treaty not only maintains the
deterrent value of U.S. nuclear forces, but goes further than
the START Treaty to ensure stability by emphasizing a
survivable mix of forces. On the subject of parity, General
Shalikashvilli noted:
It was our view that with the 3,500 warheads allowed
under this treaty we would remain capable of holding at
risk a broad enough range of high value political and
military targets to deter any rational adversary from
launching a nuclear attack against our nation or our
allies.
Last September, we completed the Nuclear Posture
Review (NPR)--an effort chartered to determine what
roles our nuclear forces must meet to protect against
future challenges to U.S. National Security interests.
The NPR assumed the post-START II nuclear force levels
and its analysis reconfirmed the calculations that were
done before and during the negotiations for START II.
The review reaffirmed both that we must maintain a
viable nuclear deterrent in the post-Cold War world and
that 3,500 warheads will be sufficient to hold at risk
those assets which any foreseeable enemy would most
value--the core determinant of effective deterrence.
On the question of strategic stability, General Shalikashvilli
further concluded:
In the past, with MIRVed ICBMs a significant part of
the forces of both sides, there was much greater
incentive to shoot first during a crisis. The inherent
vulnerability of land-based missiles to a first strike,
compounded by the consideration of losing the multiple
warheads on MIRVed missiles, argued for launching these
weapons before they could be disabled by an enemy
strike. Thus, eliminating this entire category of
nuclear weapons relieves the incentive to launch first,
adding greatly to crisis stability. START II also
eliminates the last of the heavy ICBMs--the remaining
Russian SS-18s--which are hostage to the same logic and
are therefore equally destabilizing in a crisis.
In addition to eliminating these two kinds of
systems, the restructuring of our triad made under the
terms of this Treaty will improve stability in its own
right. Our START II ICBM leg will be a less attractive
target than has been the case in the past. That all of
our remaining ICBMs will have single warheads will make
them less valuable targets than MIRVed missiles. But,
in addition, the combined calculus of rough equivalency
in overall warheads between us and the Russians, and
the fact that all remaining ICBMs will be equipped with
single warheads, will make it highly unlikely that
Russia will consider launching an effective first
strike to disarm our ICBMs. Under the warhead calculus
of this Treaty, to achieve the levels of confidence
needed to disarm this one leg of our triad would
require such a high proportion of Russia's overall
warheads that this course would leave the attacker at a
significant disadvantage. By any rational calculation,
the costs would greatly outweigh any potential gains.
The committee finds the logic and objectives underpinning
the U.S. negotiating position on START II to be based on sound
reasoning concerning the size and composition of nuclear forces
necessary to retain a credible deterrent force beyond the year
2003. Notwithstanding significant reductions under START and
START II, U.S. nuclear forces will continue to be robust enough
to sustain an appropriate targeting strategy and a suitable
range of response options, even in the unlikely event of a
massive first strike. The START II force levels provide enough
survivable forces which, when coupled with survivable,
sustained command and control systems, maintain U.S. national
security. Stability would be further enhanced by a national
missile defense against limited strikes whether by accidental
launch or from third countries.
U.S. force survivability
The START Treaty limits each side to 6,000 accountable
warheads (of which no more than 4,900 may be deployed on ICBMs
and SLBMs). START II will limit the two Parties to roughly half
of that ceiling--to between 3,500 and 3,000 warheads, of which
no more than 1,750 may be deployed on SLBMs and of which none
may be deployed on MIRVed or ``heavy'' ICBMs. As can be seen in
the table below, the Treaty will accomplish deep reductions in
both U.S. and Russian strategic forces. This table reflects the
judgment of Secretary of Defense Perry, who stated in testimony
before the committee that the U.S. allocation of 3,500
warheads:
* * * will be divided among ICBM, SLBMs and the bombs
and warheads on our bombers. An approximate disposition
of this force would be 500 ICBM warheads, fewer than
1700 SLBM warheads, and approximately 1300 warheads on
bombers. * * * Based on present planning, that is the
way we would distribute our forces under START II. I
believe this would be, of course, entirely capable of
carrying out our mission of strategic deterrence.
ILLUSTRATIVE COMPARISON OF U.S. AND RUSSIAN FORCES UNDER START AND START II
[As estimated by the Congressional Research Service]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
December 1994 START START II
-----------------------------------------------------------
U.S. Russia U.S. Russia U.S. Russia
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ICBM warheads....................................... 2,499 6,078 1,444 2,800 500 805
SLBM warheads....................................... 3,648 2,560 3,456 2,096 1,680 1,712
Bomber weapons...................................... 4,884 1,784 4,504 1,888 1,260 744
-----------------------------------------------------------
Totals........................................ 11,031 10,422 9,404 6,784 3,440 3,261
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Because weapons that are deactivated but not eliminated continue to count under the force limits
established in both START and START II, some of the warheads included on this table may be attributable to non-
operational systems.
In general, the survivability of U.S. forces depends upon
the nature of the attack, the mix of strategic nuclear delivery
vehicles employed, and force preparedness. It is commonly
accepted that the following percentages of warheads would
survive a first-strike attack:
--ICBMs in silos (roughly 10 percent survivable)
--ICBMs on mobile trucks/trains in garrisons (roughly
10 percent)
--ICBMs on mobile platforms scattered to deployment
areas (roughly 80-100 percent)
--SLBMs under normal U.S. operational practices
(roughly 65 percent for Tridents)
--Heavy bomber weapons under day-to-day alert
(roughly 30 percent).
Given these ratios, the committee finds that reductions
under both START and START II have resulted in a more
survivable U.S. force structure. Whereas these calculations
yielded a survivable force estimate of just over 37 percent for
the pre-START U.S. force posture, that estimate increases to 40
percent with START fully implemented, and to 44 percent, or
1,520 warheads, for a post-START II force structure. (500
ICBMs<greek-e>10%=50 warheads; 1,680 SLBMs<greek-e>65%=1,092
warheads; 1,260 Bomber Weapons<greek-e>30%=378 warheads;
total=1,520 warheads.)
Post-START II structure of U.S. forces
United States maintains a triad of strategic offensive
forces. In this combination, ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers
provide a redundant mix of mutually supporting capabilities.
This is designed, in part, to complicate an aggressors attack
by requiring the targeting of each independent leg in an effort
to reduce the effectiveness of a retaliatory second strike.
Further, the triad serves as a hedge against both a system-wide
flaw in one or another leg and the possibility of technological
breakthrough, which might render a component of the triad
obsolete or vulnerable. Finally, the triad offers flexibility
in striking military targets. While the bomber leg of the triad
will undergo deep reductions under START II--28 B-52H bombers
will be eliminated and all B-1B bombers will be reoriented to
conventional bombing roles--the composition of the ICBM and
SLBM legs of the U.S. triad will remain fairly constant. The
U.S. will operate four fewer Trident submarines and fifty fewer
ICBMs (all MX missiles having been slated for elimination) than
it would have under START. General Shalikashvilli contended in
his testimony before the committee on March 1, 1995, that START
and START II will improve the viability of the triad by
eliminating those elements of the Russian force posture which
most directly threatened its integrity.
Yet despite the effective retention of the nuclear triad
posture in the post-START II force structure, the committee is
concerned that no U.S. bombers are on day-to-day alert at
present, having been removed from nuclear alert in September
1991. A short or no-notice attack therefore holds the prospect
of destroying nearly all of the air-breathing leg of the triad
as well as the vast majority of U.S. ICBMs, leaving the United
States dependent upon those Trident submarines patrolling at
sea. During the Cold War, the U.S. fielded 40 SSBNs. The post-
START II force recommended in the Nuclear Posture Review will
consist of just 14 Trident submarines (of which only 8 to 10
would be at sea at any given time). Thus the number of
submarines that an adversary would need to locate at sea is
markedly less.
Second, the committee is concerned that, with no new
strategic systems under development, the United States will
possess for the next several decades an aging fleet of
strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. The last B-52 was produced
in 1964, and the last Minuteman III ICBM was deployed in 1975.
Yet these two systems comprise 61 percent of all U.S. nuclear
delivery vehicles, and will carry 42 percent of the warheads
allowed the United States. In contrast, it is likely that fully
three quarters of all of Russia's post-START II strategic
nuclear delivery vehicles will have been produced after 1985.
The committee concurs with Admiral Chiles, Commander in Chief,
U.S. Strategic Command, when he noted in a letter to Secretary
Perry prior to the public release of the Nuclear Posture Review
findings:
With no new strategic systems anticipated for the
foreseeable future, the challenge is to maintain
existing systems in the absence of a supporting
production base. Preservation of key strategic
industrial-base capabilities is required to attract and
retain the experienced personnel that will be needed to
resolve inevitable problems with aging systems.
If the United States is to maintain a credible nuclear
deterrent, it must accord a high priority to Minuteman life-
extension programs and retention of both the bomber and
submarine industrial bases.
Implications for the U.S. defense industrial base
Nowhere are qualitative and quantitative issues so
intertwined as in the case of the B-2 bomber. The fact that the
platform is so well positioned to capitalize upon technological
innovations such as stealth capability, new precision-guided
munitions, and information warfare, has much to do with its
cost. Nor is it is surprising to find that the defense
industrial base responsible for B-2 production has proven very
sensitive to decreases in procurement. Reduction in the number
of B-2s to be purchased to a total of 20 aircraft from the
original plan for 132 has caused dramatic attrition in the
ranks of subcontractors involved in B-2 production. Nearly half
of the industry has '``haken out'' between 1989 and 1995. Most
importantly, key components of the bomber will no longer be
produced after the construction of the twentieth aircraft. For
example, the sole producer of the radar-absorbent body core of
the B-2, the Hexcel Corporation, declared bankruptcy in late
1993.
There has been much discussion of late regarding the merits
of commercial and military integration. Certainly it has often
been the case that the technologies which have spurred
technological revolutions originated outside the defense sector
and were subsequently imported. Both the railroad and
telegraph, and the rise of commercial automotive and aircraft
production are excellent examples. Indeed, even the casting
methods employed to fashion church bells proved applicable to
creation of artillery tubes, leading the military historian
Bernard Brodie to comment that ``the early founders, whose task
had been to fashion bells which tolled the eternal message of
peace * * * contributed unintentionally to the discovery of one
of man's most terrible weapons.''
However, the committee does not agree with Secretary of
Defense Perry's testimony on March 1, 1994, before a Senate
Armed Services subcommittee that:
The rationale for not maintaining the bomber
industrial base is that we have a robust commercial
base in building large transport planes * * * and
[that] we could, in time, pivot from the commercial
base to the building of bombers again as we have done
in earlier eras in our history.
This policy ignores the fact that some elements of the
defense industrial base are so uniquely military in their
orientation that they are without parallel in the commercial
sector. Such would be the case for the B-2, whose large
composite structures depend upon facilities and know-how the
reconstitution of which would prove an expensive proposition.
The original development of the B-2, for example, involved $24
billion in sunk costs. Once dissipated, the loss of
institutional memory and personnel would prove costly.
Debate on the preservation of the B-2 industrial base is in
many respects similar to the discussion over the submarine
industrial base. While the committee believes uniqueness, in
and of itself, is not a convincing argument for retention of
either capability, it does find central to both the B-2 and the
submarine debates the question of whether or not these
platforms fulfill important roles, and the extent to which
their respective industrial capabilities are critical to future
security requirements. The criticality of these systems to the
post-START II deterrent posture of the United States is beyond
question. Together, these two platforms will bear the onus of
carrying 61 percent of the U.S. nuclear arsenal--just 20 B-2
bombers will carry over 12 percent of the total, and an even
fewer number of Trident submarines will carry 49 percent. In
particular, the stealth capabilities and flexibility of the B-2
will become increasingly important in a world littered with
sophisticated technologies such as radar systems, surface-to-
air missiles, and nuclear, chemical, and biological threats.
The ongoing technological revolution
A number of defense planners have suggested that the United
States finds itself in the midst of an ongoing ``military-
technical revolution.'' Developments associated with this
revolution are particularly relevant to the question of how
U.S. strategic forces will be structured, as well as to efforts
at anticipating future threats. The Senate is challenged, in
its consideration of the START II Treaty, to conceptualize
future conflict in an environment already undergoing dramatic
transformations. While the United States may seek to use
emerging technologies in the future to compensate for force
structure reductions and to maximize platform capabilities, it
must be well positioned to capitalize upon such a development.
Naturally the identification of such technologies becomes
critical. Failure in this respect threatens the U.S. military
with obsolescence. Just as importantly, such a failure would
afford other countries the opportunity to offset current
numerical or qualitative inferiorities vis-vis the U.S.
deterrent with innovation, or to possibly to realize a sudden
jump to parity.
Military-technical revolutions depend not only on the
emergence of new technologies, but upon the adaptation of
operations and organizations to maximize the employment of
cutting-edge capabilities. German integration of aircraft
operations and radios following the First World War enabled
them to defeat the French and British in a six-week-long
combined arms offensive. Today's global positioning receiver
holds for the future battlefield what the radio posed for the
Western Front in 1940.
However, the comparative advantage conferred by a given
technology tends to be short-lived. The initial advantage by no
means suggests continued dominance, or even competitiveness.
This is a lesson of particular relevance to the submarine leg
of the U.S. triad. It was, after all, the French who made
substantial advances in sub-surface warfare during the
nineteenth century, but the Germans who ultimately employed the
submarine to devastating effect in both World Wars. Forty years
later, it would seem that current U.S. superiority in this
dimension of warfare make the Trident SSBN leg of the triad the
most invulnerable of the three. Yet financial pressures may
cause this advantage to evaporate, along with the submarine
industrial base. This is a particularly troubling prospect
given that Russian work on a fifth generation SSN continues
apace and that a new Russian SSBN is scheduled to enter
production shortly after the turn of the century. According to
a public report issued by the Office of Naval Intelligence:
``For the first time, Russia's front-line submarines are as
quiet or quieter in some respects than America's best.'' The
committee is concerned that, in light of continued Russian
technological advances and the global spread of sophisticated
technologies, the loss of the United States' industrial
capability in either the subsurface or aerospace dimension of
the battlefield would prove a serious error.
SLBMs
Under START II the United States will deploy 14 Trident
submarines, each equipped with 24 D-5 SLBMs. As was to be the
case under START, roughly half of all U.S. warheads will be
deployed on submarines. SLBMs will comprise 77 percent of all
ballistic missiles in the post-START II arsenal (versus 71
percent under START).
ILLUSTRATIVE U.S. SUBMARINE FORCES UNDER START AND START II
[As estimated by the Congressional Research Service]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
December 1994 Expected, START Expected, START II
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
SLBMs Warheads SLBMs Warheads SLBMs Warheads
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Poseidon C-3...................... 48 480 0 0 0 0
Poseidon C-4...................... 96 768 0 0 0 0
Trident C-4....................... 192 1,536 192 1,536 0 0
Trident D-5....................... 168 1,344 240 1,920 336 1,680
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Totals...................... 456 3,648 432 3,456 336 1,680
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Heavy bombers
START II's attribution rules for heavy bombers differ
significantly from those in START. Under the START Treaty, each
of the first 150 U.S. bombers equipped to carry air-launched
cruise missiles (ALCMs) was counted as having 10 warheads,
though these bombers in fact are capable of carrying as many as
20 ALCMs. Similarly, each of the first 210 Russian bombers
equipped with cruise missiles was counted as 8 warheads though
in reality each could carry up to 16. Every additional ALCM-
equipped bomber would be attributed with the full number of
warheads that they were equipped to carry. All other bombers
carrying nuclear gravity bombs or short-range nuclear missiles
were attributed one warhead (despite the fact that U.S.
bombers, for example, can carry up to 24 of these weapons).
These counting rules would have allowed both sides to deploy
nuclear weapons in excess of the 6,000 warhead limit imposed on
delivery vehicles by START.
Under the START II Treaty, bombers are attributed with the
actual number of warheads with which they can be equipped. As a
practical matter, this will produce major changes in the heavy
bomber leg of the U.S. strategic triad. In order to meet the
3,500 warhead central limit of START II, all B-1B bombers are
likely to be reoriented to conventional missions. Further, the
U.S. will retain fewer B-52s in inventory, and may equip many
of those with 12 ALCMs rather than the 20 allowed under START.
The committee anticipates that the net effect of changes in
attribution rules, coupled with lower warhead limits, will be a
much reduced heavy bomber force of less than 90 bombers
carrying roughly 1,260 warheads. The committee notes that, all
other considerations aside, the incorporation of an additional
20 B-2 bombers into the U.S. force structure would only require
the retirement of 16 B-52H bombers, thereby increasing the
number of U.S. strategic nuclear delivery platforms without
altering the basic warhead allocations of the triad.
As it now stands, the heavy bomber component will likely
constitute less than 40 percent of the total number of deployed
warheads in the total strategic force--a decrease of roughly 10
percent from the expected START nuclear force posture.
ILLUSTRATIVE U.S. HEAVY BOMBER FORCES UNDER START AND START II
[As estimated by the Congressional Research Service]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
December 1994 Expected, START Expected, START II
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Aircraft Warheads Aircraft Warheads MOU Aircraft Warheads
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
B-52G........................................................ 53 636 0 0 12 0 0
B-52H........................................................ 94 1,880 94 1,880 20 \1\ 66 940
B-1B......................................................... 96 2,304 96 2,304 16 0 0
B-2.......................................................... 4 64 20 320 16 20 320
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Totals................................................. 247 4,884 210 4,504 ........... 86 1,260
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ B-52G and B-52H.
ICBM's
The land-based component of the U.S. triad will also be
significantly reduced under the START II Treaty. Whereas the
United States planned to field 550 ICBMs under the START force
posture, under START II it will field 500 missiles, eliminating
its arsenal of 50 MX Peacekeeper ICBMs with 10 warheads each.
The Minuteman III, which is to be deployed with one warhead
under force planning for both Treaties, will become the sole
ICBM in the U.S. inventory. The land-based share of the total
U.S. warhead allotment remains unchanged from START to START II
(at 15 percent). However, the number of ballistic missiles that
will be deployed on land versus the number deployed at sea will
decrease to less than one quarter of the total.
ILLUSTRATIVE U.S. ICBM FORCES UNDER START AND START II
[As estimated by the Congressional Research Service]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
December 1994 Expected, START Expected, START II
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
ICBMs Warheads ICBMs Warheads ICBMs Warheads
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Minuteman II...................... 409 409 0 0 0 0
Minuteman III..................... 530 1,590 500 944 500 500
MX................................ 50 500 50 500 0 0
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Totals...................... 989 2,499 550 1,444 500 500
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Post-START II structure of Russian forces
Like the United States, Russia maintains a strategic triad
of land-based, submarine, and bomber forces. Unlike the United
States, however, Russia's strategic forces are dominated by the
land-based component. Even more so than in the case of START,
ICBMs will bear the brunt of Russia's reductions under START
II. Under START, Russia could be expected to deploy roughly 60
percent of its ballistic missile warheads on ICBMs. The
committee anticipates that START II will produce a significant
shift in the composition of Russian strategic forces, leading
Russia to deploy approximately 30 percent of its ballistic
missile warheads on land-based systems. The other 70 percent
likely will be deployed on SLBMs. Even with this shift in
priorities, START II will have very little effect on either the
submarine or bomber-based legs of the Russian strategic triad
since--in any event--Russia would have eliminated the bulk of
these systems to comply with START and to reduce maintenance
and operations costs.
SLBM's
In the case of submarine-launched ballistic missiles, as
noted previously, START II contains a sublimit of 1,750 SLBMs.
Projections of Russia's future SLBM force structure are
contingent upon a number of variables. Given Russian Defense
Minister Grachev's high prioritization of a new generation of
ballistic missile submarines (SSBN), the committee believes it
reasonable to assume that Russia will deploy roughly the
treaty-maximum number of warheads. One difference, however, may
be that the SS-N-18 missiles, which would have been downloaded
under START from seven to three warheads, will instead be
eliminated.
ILLUSTRATIVE RUSSIAN SUBMARINE FORCES UNDER START AND START II
[As estimated by the Congressional Research Service]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
December, 1994 Expected, START Expected, START II
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
SLBM's Warheads SLBM's Warheads SLBM's Warheads
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SS-N-6............................ 32 32 0 0 0 0
SS-N-8............................ 256 256 0 0 0 0
SS-N-17........................... 0 0 0 0 0 0
SS-N-18........................... 208 624 128 384 0 0
SS-N-20........................... 120 1,200 120 1,200 120 1,200
SS-N-23........................... 112 448 128 512 128 512
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Totals...................... 728 2,560 376 2,096 248 1,712
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bombers
According to President Yeltsin, Russia has ceased
production of heavy bombers. Soviet declarations on bombers in
the START MOU were already within START limits, and thus no
reduction in the size of the Russian heavy bomber force was
anticipated. However, the counting rules for START II differ
from those of START, attributing the actual number of warheads
deployed on every heavy bomber. Whereas under START, 150 U.S.
and 180 Soviet bombers equipped with long-range air-launched
cruise missiles (ALCMs) were discounted by up to 50 percent,
and all other bombers equipped with nuclear weapons other than
ALCMs were counted as having only one warhead, under START II
these platforms are attributed with their actual nuclear
payloads. Thus, in a departure from a Russian force structure
designed to meet START limits, the committee expects that
Russia may choose to retire or reorient the Bear B/G heavy
bomber.
ILLUSTRATIVE RUSSIAN HEAVY BOMBER FORCES UNDER START AND START II
[As estimated by the Congressional Research Service]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
December, 1994 Expected, START Expected, START II
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Aircraft Warheads Aircraft Warheads MOU Aircraft Warheads
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bear B/G..................................................... .35 140 60 240 1 or 2 0 0
Bear H....................................................... 84 1,344 85 1,360 6 or 16 57 912
Blackjack.................................................... 25 300 24 288 12 5 60
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Totals................................................. 144 1,784 169 1,888 ........... 62 972
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ICBM's
In order to reach a mix of forces permitted under START II,
Russia will be required to remove from service roughly 2,500
warheads deployed on 250 missiles. However, most of this
reduction will be achieved by the total elimination of the SS-
18 MIRVed heavy ICBM force. Furthermore, because of the MIRV
ban and the limitations on down-loading, Russia will also be
forced to eliminate its mobile SS-24 ICBM force (the Russian
equivalent of the MX).
While the central numerical limits of START II are
important, START II requirements for the downloading or
elimination of all MIRVed ICBMs and the elimination of all of
Russia's SS-18 missiles--believed to be the only Russian
missile capable of destroying hardened targets such as ICBM
silos--are even more important. MIRVed ICBMs deployed in fixed
silos have long been considered destabilizing by the U.S. since
they make inviting targets--one attacking warhead delivered
onto a silo holds the prospect for pre-emptively destroying up
to ten warheads per missile. This vulnerability in turn is
thought to contribute, at a minimum, to a ``launch-on-warning''
posture, and--in a worst-case scenario--to a first-strike
nuclear strategy. The committee notes that in 1983, the
Scowcroft Commission found that ``the Soviets now probably
possess the necessary combination of ICBM numbers, reliability,
accuracy, and warhead yield to destroy almost all of the 1,047
U.S. ICBM silos, using only a portion of their own ICBM
force.''
The START Treaty did little to alleviate this concern.
Although it reduced the number of deployed SS-18s from 308 to
154, it also reduced the number of U.S. silo-based ICBMs from
1,000 to 550. Thus the ratio of SS-18 warheads to U.S. silos
decreased only marginally, from 3.08:1 to 2.80:1. Under START
II, the elimination of all SS-18 missiles assuages this
longstanding concern. By altering fundamentally the
capabilities of the Russian strategic rocket forces, shifting
Russian emphasis to more survivable platforms such as
submarines and mobile ICBMs, it is possible that the Treaty
will also prompt revision of Russia's nuclear posture and
doctrine.
START II creates a managed process of nuclear arms
reductions. While much of Russia's motivation to engage in
deeper cuts may stem from economic imperatives, reliance upon
these incentives alone can provide no assurance that reductions
would be undertaken in a sustained or stabilizing fashion. In
his testimony before the committee, Ambassador Linton Brooks
noted that:
* * * I do not believe that economics and goodwill
exchange of information is a substitute for these
treaties, because economics will in fact not drive you
to a stabilizing force structure. The cheapest way for
the Russian Federation to reduce is to keep the new SS-
24s and the new SS-18s and throw away all that
expensive single warhead mobile stuff and all those
submarines. That is not in our interest, because it
would then lead to a very destabilizing force
structure.
Retention of the SS-18 is not an option under START II.
Furthermore, by allowing Russia to convert 90 SS-18 silos and
by relaxing START downloading rules--which will have the
cumulative effect of allowing Russia to deploy 90 additional
SS-25 type missiles and to maintain 105 SS-19 missiles--the
START II Treaty makes more palatable the elimination of the
newer, ten-warhead SS-24, which probably would have been
retained by Russia in a START force structure. In addition,
Russia may deploy several hundred new, single-warhead missiles
to build-up to the central limits of the START II Treaty. The
post-START II Russian ICBM force will be significantly smaller
and different in composition than it is currently.
ILLUSTRATIVE RUSSIAN ICBM FORCES UNDER START AND START II
[As estimated by the Congressional Research Service]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
December 1994 Expected, START Expected, START II
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
ICBMs Warheads ICBMs Warheads ICBMs Warheads
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SS-11............................. 20 20 0 0 0 0
SS-13............................. 20 20 0 0 0 0
SS-17............................. 11 44 0 0 0 0
SS-18............................. 292 2,920 154 1,540 0 0
SS-19............................. 300 1,800 0 0 105 105
SS-24 silo-based.................. 56 560 0 0 0 0
SS-24 rail-based.................. 36 360 96 960 0 0
SS-2520........................... 354 354 300 300 700 700
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Totals...................... 1,089 6,078 550 2,800 805 805
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
IV. Multilateral Implications
The committee recognizes that familiar Cold War assumptions
about Soviet military power as the key threat to U.S. survival,
the predictability of the rigid, bipolar arena and attendant
East-West alliances, the rationality of actors and the primacy
of mutual-assured destruction in deterrence strategy, the
political, military, and economic role of the United States
within NATO, the strategic value of nuclear weapons, and the
global nature of U.S. security concerns can be called into
question as bases for strategic thought, planning, and action.
At the same time, the committee believes that we have only a
rudimentary understanding of the emerging environment with
which the United States will be forced to contend. The end of
the Cold War ushered in unprecedented change in several key
respects, each with significant strategic military
implications. Already the world has witnessed an increased
assertiveness by states with regional ambitions; the
proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons; and
the proliferation of conventional armaments, sensitive, dual-
use technologies, and ballistic missile capability.
The juxtaposition of these trends in countless combinations
at the regional, state, and sub-state level offer the potential
for a wide range of conflicts, some of which may impinge upon
U.S. national security interests. Consequently, this new
security environment will demand greater recourse to a broad
range of political, economic, and military responses than did
the relatively predictable Cold War era. Recent commitments to
reductions in the U.S. strategic arsenal notwithstanding, the
committee finds that nuclear deterrence will remain the
fundamental guarantor of U.S. security. Nuclear weapons will
serve an indispensable role in U.S. national security policy
for the foreseeable future. The objective of nuclear arms
control must therefore be the maintenance of nuclear forces at
a level commensurate with the nation's national security needs,
and specifically its targeting requirements. The task of
understanding the military implications of the START II Treaty
is rendered challenging since a variety of new threats such as
regional assertiveness by various states increasingly is likely
to be coupled with the spread of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) and sophisticated conventional weapons systems such as
ballistic missiles. This creates the potential for an expansion
in the number of strategic targeting requirements at precisely
the same time that the U.S. arsenal is being dramatically
reduced. The committee therefore believes that the United
States should only proceed with strategic nuclear arms control
to the extent that an equilibrium is maintained between targets
and strategic capability.
Further reductions
The committee finds that nuclear targeting policy and arms
control can prove mutually reinforcing. Both START and START II
reduce moderately the U.S. target list, thereby decreasing the
need for strategic weapons. It has been estimated in open
source literature that START will eliminate roughly 20 percent
of the U.S. targeting requirement. Implementation of START II
will further reduce the number of targets in the single
integrated operational plan (SIOP), as long as other countries
do not deploy additional strategic offensive arms. However, the
committee notes other countries are seeking nuclear capability.
For example, China not only fields two dozen SLBMs, several
hundred heavy bomber warheads, and roughly 24 medium and long-
range ballistic missiles, but has several modernization
initiatives ongoing. The following table uses estimates of
China's nuclear arsenal drawn from the Carnegie Endowment's
``Tracking Nuclear Proliferation, 1995'':
ESTIMATES OF CHINA'S NUCLEAR ARSENAL
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Type Operating parameters Number
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dong Feng-3(3A)/CSS-2 (IRBM).... DF-3: 2,650 km range/2,150 kg 50
payload/1-3 Mt Warhead DF-
3A: 2,800 km/2,159 kg/2 Mt
Warhead.
Dong Feng-4/CSS-3 (IRBM)........ 4,750 km/2,200 kg/3.3 Mt 20
Warhead/1-3 Mt Warhead.
Dong Feng-5(5A)/CSS-4 (ICBM).... DF-5: 12,000 km/3,200 kg/3.3 4
Mt Warhead DF-5A: 13,000 km/
3,200 kg/4-5 Mt Warhead.
Dong Feng-21(21A)/CSS-6 (Road- DF-21: 1,700 km/600 kg DF- 36
Mobile IRBM). 21A: 1,800 km/600 kg.
Julang-1/CSS-N-3 (SLBM)......... 1,700 km/600 kg/200-300 Kt 24
Warhead.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition to these forces, the Chinese military operates
several tactical, solid-fuel, road-mobile missiles such as the
M-9. Further, China is also developing for deployment by the
end of the 1990s four intermediate and long-range ballistic
missile systems: the land-mobile Dong Feng-25 (1,700 km/2,000
kg); the land-mobile Dong-Feng-31 (8,000 km/700 kg/200-300 Kt
Warhead); the silo-based Dong Feng-41 (12,000 km/800 kg/200-300
Kt Warhead; and the Julang-2 second-generation SLBM (8,000 km/
700kg/200-300 Kt Warhead).
Based upon a U.S. Army memorandum provided to the
Congressional Budget Office detailing the 1991/1992 SIOP for a
large military-industrial economy, the committee believes the
counter-force target reductions afforded by START II, largely
in the areas of silos and launch centers, will allow the United
States to meet narrowly its targeting requirements. However,
this depends upon U.S. deployment of the full START II Treaty--
allowable number of warheads, the down-sizing of a sizeable
percentage of the infrastructure supporting Russia's nuclear
arsenal, the absence of significant, new nuclear deployments
elsewhere in the world, and the replacement--rather than
augmentation--of aging Chinese delivery vehicles with second or
third generation systems.
General Colin Powell's stated before the Senate Committee
on Armed Services on July 28, 1992, that the viability of the
U.S. strategic triad depends upon the avoidance of ``pressure
to go lower than START II, precipitously lower than START II,
so it makes it hard for all three legs to remain coherent legs,
to make the land-based size too small or the number of bombers
too low or the number of submarines and warheads and missiles
aboard too small.'' This statement highlights the importance of
evaluating carefully further reductions beyond START II. The
committee will review any such a possibility in light of its
broad effect upon U.S. national security, targeting
requirements, and the effect upon the U.S. triad and strategic
stability.
The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
R. James Woolsey, former Director of Central Intelligence,
testified in February, 1993, before a Senate Governmental
Affairs subcommittee that more than twenty-five countries
either possess or are in the process of acquiring WMD
capabilities, as well as the means for delivering these
weapons. The committee is concerned that this trend may be
exacerbated by the fact that more than thirty thousand warheads
are scattered throughout Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakstan, and
Russia. Adding to this problem--as a consequence of the START
II Treaty--is the fact that thousands of additional warheads
will be removed from Russian delivery vehicles and stored in
facilities where security is suspect. On this matter, the
committee notes that neither START nor START II require the
dismantlement of the warheads downloaded to meet treaty limits.
Thus the size of Russia's fissile material stocks likely will
increase as warheads are withdrawn to Russia from Belarus,
Ukraine, and Kazakstan.
Weakened centralized control in Russia over nuclear
materials stocks has created a serious proliferation problem.
Former Director Woolsey also stated in testimony before
Congress that Russian criminal organizations, in particular,
have established elaborate infrastructures that ultimately may
be used to facilitate the transfer of this material to rogue
states. In the last ten years, the number, size, and range of
activities of non-state ``criminal'' organizations has
burgeoned in most regions of the world. President Boris
Yeltsin, for example, stated in 1993 that organized crime
constituted a major threat to Russia's strategic interests. The
committee believes these organizations also threaten the
security of the United States by potentially accelerating the
spread of nuclear weapons.
Regardless of the means by which states seek to acquire
weapons-grade material, their motivations invariably are
similar, and may be categorized as either fundamentally
military, political, or economic in nature. The following list
of rationales also apply to chemical and biological weapons
proliferation. In that respect, five Middle Eastern countries
reportedly possess undeclared offensive biological weapons
programs--Iran, Iraq, Israel, Libya, and Syria. These five,
plus Egypt, also possess chemical arsenals. Thus just as it is
conceivable that a growing number of states will possess
nuclear devices, is it also likely that the ``poor man's
bomb''--either biological or chemical weapons--will spread to
new countries for the following reasons:
RATIONALES FOR THE ACQUISITION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Military Political Economic
------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1) To deter or coerce a (1) To obtain (1) To obtain
regional adversary. international ``more bang for
prestige and the buck.''
political leverage.
(2) To deter a larger power, (2) To garner (2) For the
such as the United States. domestic support benefits and
and pride. backward-linkages
of a national
technical
infrastructure.
(3) To possess a weapon of (3) To offset a (3) For their ease
last resort. lack of extended of acquisition as
security bi-products of
guarantees, real civilian
or perceived. biological and
chemical
industrial
development.
(4) To equalize a military
imbalance, real or perceived.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The importance accorded to WMD by states is not limited
solely to the deterrence value these types of weapons afford.
In fact, the cost-benefit calculus for the acquisition and use
of these weapons likely will not conform to U.S. conceptions of
``rationality.'' The committee views this as important since
General Shalikashvili unequivocally linked the value of U.S.
strategic offensive weapons to their deterrent effect upon
``rational'' actors.
The spread of ballistic and cruise missile technology
The proliferation of WMD is rendered all the more troubling
by the increasing availability of sophisticated weapons systems
and sensitive technologies. The collapse of the Soviet Union
led to a reduction in barriers traditionally blocking arms
collaboration between many states. Moreover, the increasingly
competitive nature of the global arms market and reductions in
military budgets have led many governments and defense
industries to conclude that collaborative arms development and
production offer the best prospects for maintaining research,
development, and production capabilities. As a consequence, the
transnational design, development, and production of weapons
systems is becoming increasingly common. Economic trends have
changed the structure of defense industries worldwide, made
many sorts of critical and dual-use technology affordable and
available, and altered states' perspectives on the enforcement,
efficacy, and economic wisdom of various export controls.
Although these controls can serve as important retardants on
the development of ballistic missiles, they have been weakened
in the United States, Europe, Russia, and elsewhere by the
quest for access to export markets and an ``export or die''
mentality on the part of many firms and governments. This trend
has increased the diffusion of sensitive technologies and know
how around the globe.
Roughly thirty countries already possess ballistic missile
systems. Nine developing countries also produce ballistic
missiles--Argentina, Egypt, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, North
Korea, South Korea, and South Africa. Four others--Brazil,
Libya, Pakistan, and Syria--are pursuing the means for
production. The committee is concerned that the number of
states with ballistic missile arsenals continues to grow, and
that several states are in the process of acquiring large
inventories.
Several industrialized countries also possess cruise
missiles capable of carrying a nuclear warhead. At least thirty
other countries are currently seeking to develop cruise missile
systems. While few cruise missiles can carry a 500 kg nuclear
warhead, at this point, and while most have a range of less
than 200 km, most are capable of delivering chemical or
biological warheads and some missiles exceed 300 km in range.
The spread of dual-use technologies will enable more effective
integration of global positioning systems, larger turbojet,
turbofan, and ramjet engines, larger fuel tanks, and larger
wings. This will extend range and payload capabilities for
cruise missiles and reduce their circular error probable (CEP).
The committee notes that China, for example, has tested a
supersonic unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) and Israel is building
an air-launched cruise missile with a range of over 400 km.
Many countries engaged in the development of ballistic and
cruise missile capabilities have proven alarmingly willing to
collaborate, both covertly and in some cases quite openly. At
least ten countries in the Third World and four republics of
the former Soviet Union field either Soviet-made missiles or
some variant. The most prevalent evidence of cooperation in
ballistic missile development is the prominence of the single-
stage, liquid-fueled SCUD-B, which has a range of 300 km and is
capable of carrying a 1,000 kilogram payload. Libya, North
Korea, and Egypt have all transferred missiles to other
countries, and the committee believes China may have sold
intermediate range missiles to Saudi Arabia, M-11s to Pakistan,
and missiles or technology to Iran, Syria, and North Korea. The
latter of these states is now the predominant source of both
missiles and missile production facilities.
Ballistic missiles provide an extremely efficient means for
delivering weapons of mass destruction. When coupled with a
nuclear, chemical, or biological program, missiles enable
states to hold at risk neighboring populations, and potentially
the United States as well. Indeed, the primary motivation for
acquiring such systems may not be military in nature, but
political. First and foremost, ballistic missiles armed with
WMD are instruments of intimidation.
However, as suggested in the preceding table, they also may
be used to achieve military objectives. Drawing a number of
lessons from the Gulf War, Iranian defense planners with recent
acquisitions have oriented their country's military towards a
posture presumably designed to deter the United States from
engaging in military activities in the Gulf. Iranian analysts
have openly claimed that missile systems represent a critical
deterrent to outside attack, arguing in the Iranian press that
Iran should ``build up its own short, medium and long-range
surface-to-surface as well as surface-to-air missiles.''
Another country of concern is North Korea, which is developing
a series of missiles--the Taepo Dong-1 and -2--with ranges in
excess of 3,000 kilometers. In sum, the committee believes that
countries with interests antithetical to those of the United
States view nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons as
affording the opportunity to offset numerical and qualitative
conventional inferiorities with the U.S. military.
The problem of post-cold-war deterrence: Who-whom?
Deterrence during the Cold War was based upon assumptions
of rationality which allowed states to predict reactions with a
fair degree of success. Communication and the centralization of
command and control allowed for mutual familiarity between the
United States and the Soviet Union over one another's plans for
reaction in crisis situations. In other words, the potential
for an action-reaction spiral was controlled by strategic
parity at the top of the escalatory ladder. The committee
believes that the Nuclear Posture Review puts forward a START
II Treaty-compliant force based on Cold War deterrence
assumptions despite the fact that the post-Cold-War era has
none of the predictability or parity of its balanced, bipolar
predecessor.
The conventional/nuclear balance seems to have reversed
completely in this new era. Whereas strategic forces were
previously essential to the U.S. as a means of countering the
conventional superiority of the Warsaw Pact, now the commitment
of conventional forces may prove critical to countering or
reversing the proliferation of WMD in the Third World. In
parallel, the acquisition of WMD may be accelerated by desires
to counter conventional imbalances. This shift was aptly
enunciated by Chairman Aspin in 1992, when he declared that
while nuclear weapons may still serve as ``great equalizers,''
it is now the United States that is the potential
``equalizee.''
In short, the psychological assumptions underpinning the
doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) may no longer
prove applicable. The security environment is no longer such
that deterrence can be postulated in a consistent, reliable
framework. Instead, the U.S. is posed with the problem of
determining who is to be deterred and how.
National objectives and strategic cultures will prove
critical variables affecting the utility of deterrence. Perhaps
the greatest challenge for the United States in the next
century will be to deter regional aggressors that may use
tactics common to low-intensity conflicts in order to secure
their objectives. Military power may prove markedly
asymmetrical in favor of the U.S., thus if conventional
military action alone does not offer future aggressors
prospects for success, it will be relegated to a secondary
role. Operations might be characterized by terrorism,
subversion, and efforts at blackmail using WMD capabilities. In
other words, future aggressors may increasingly employ
strategies that tend towards the indirect and unconventional,
emphasizing nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons to deter
the U.S. and/or allies.
Accordingly the most important aspects of the country's
order of battle will not be the number of main battle tanks,
armored fighting vehicles, and artillery that it fields, but
the number of nuclear, chemical, and biological munitions,
types of delivery systems, and access to commercial satellite
communications networks it possesses, and the way it seeks to
shield these capabilities--presumably among civilians or
hostages--from the deep-strike capabilities of the United
States. The committee therefore concludes that nuclear
deterrence will require additional flexibility, require a case
by case approach, and may prove to have reduced efficacy in
some instances.
Theater missile defense
The threat to the United States is changing. In responding
to the challenge of proliferation, the United States has four
options at its disposal: (1) deterrence against the use of the
system in question; (2) unilateral counter-proliferation
initiatives; (3) the use of arms control and nonproliferation
endeavors to restrict the spread of WMD systems and dual-use
technologies; and (4) passive and active defenses against the
use of WMD and ballistic/cruise missiles.
At the theater level, WMD proliferation and the spread of
missile delivery vehicles will likely circumscribe U.S. crisis
response capability. The use of forward-based tactical
platforms such as aircraft carriers will become more difficult
with the increased likelihood that U.S. forces will be detected
and engaged at their points of entry into theater. Indeed, the
fact that a number of regional powers are actively seeking
missile capability and nuclear weapons may ultimately preclude
the U.S. military from forward deployments unprotected by
ballistic missile defenses. It is with this logic that the
Director of the Defense Department's Office of Net Assessment,
Andrew Marshall, has warned against the creation of ``large,
juicy targets.'' Moreover, the spread of these technologies
raises the possibility that states may seek to deter the U.S.
from intervening at all in a region in defense of its security
interests. Some on the committee therefore view as critical the
development of effective theater missile defenses (TMD) to
protect U.S. troops, and is concerned that the effectiveness
and capability of programs such as the Theater High Altitude
Area Defense, Navy Upper Tier, and Brilliant Eyes systems not
be constrained. Other members would oppose any program or
development that jeopardizes the continued viability of the ABM
Treaty. In response, some feel that any deliberate degradation
of a TMD system's capability holds the prospect of rendering
U.S. troops more vulnerable than need be the case, or than is
acceptable, in the turbulent post-Cold War environment.
The committee is concerned that the Administration is
considering an expansion of the ABM Treaty's limitations to
include TMD systems through a joint declaration, and intends to
exercise its constitutional responsibilities to review
carefully for advice and consent any proposed modification or
multilateralization of the Treaty, or agreement to limit the
location or deployment of theater missile defenses.
National missile defense
The committee notes that the United States remains a party
to the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which limits the
development and deployment of national missile defenses. The
intent of that treaty, formulated in the midst of the Cold War,
was to circumvent the possibility of an expensive and
potentially dangerous action-reaction spiral whereby the United
States and the Soviet Union sought to overcompensate for one
another's ballistic missile defenses by increasing their
offensive arsenals.
Some on the committee feel that robust missile defense
programs have proven conducive to promoting arms control
initiatives. In the 1980s, the Strategic Defense Initiative
helped break the ``log-jam'' on offensive reductions, directly
contributing to conclusion of the Intermediate-range Nuclear
Force Treaty, and indirectly to START and the Treaty on
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. The committee notes that
the Joint Understanding of June 17, 1992--which created the
framework for the START II Treaty--was concluded in conjunction
with a Joint Statement on a Global Protection System signed on
the same day. This fact is explicitly referenced in the
Preamble to the START II. However, the committee is concerned
that U.S.-Russian discussions on cooperation on defenses
against ballistic missiles have fallen by the wayside.
The Chairman believes a number of factors combine to bring
into question the value of the ABM Treaty in the post-Cold War
world. Major technological advances have been made by Russia
and the U.S. in the last quarter of a century. Also, there has
been a considerable improvement in relations between the two
countries following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. At its
most basic level, the logic of the ABM Treaty assumes hostility
between Russia and the United States. Clearly, while a certain
degree of wariness still permeates U.S.-Russian relations, the
world has moved beyond the Cold War. Further, the mounting
problem of WMD and ballistic missile proliferation, the
uncertainties of the new security environment which complicate
the role of deterrence, and continuing concerns over the
potential for turbulence in the former Soviet Union all suggest
that--in a world of multiple potential nuclear threats--the
most likely nuclear danger to the U.S. is not a massive, pre-
emptive Russian strike, but the deliberate or accidental launch
of a few warheads. Such a danger is unpredictable,
undeterrable, and something to which the United States--
currently without any national missile defense whatsoever--is
completely vulnerable.
Some on the committee believe that this argument can easily
be carried too far. They believe it ignores the fact that the
United States has no effective defense against bomber attack or
transport of a nuclear device by terrorists. More importantly,
it completely discounts U.S. intelligence capabilities and our
considerable economic, diplomatic, and military strengths to
deal with such a threat. Consistent with this view, the least
desirable solution would be to spend tens of billions of
dollars developing and deploying a terminal defense, anti-
ballistic missile system.
In this later respect, the committee notes that though the
possibility of an outright nuclear exchange between Russia and
the United States is at an all-time low, the risk of mishap has
not decreased proportionately to reductions in the Russian
nuclear arsenal. In fact, the post-START II Russian force will
be far more mobile than its predominantly silo-based
predecessor. This poses a potential problem for command and
control of the arsenal in the event of internal turmoil in
Russia
While some on the committee disagree with this assessment,
others conclude that the reduction of the U.S. strategic
offensive arsenal under START and START II must be conducted in
connection with a review of U.S. deterrence doctrine and the
value of strategic missile defenses in ensuring U.S. national
security. In conclusion, the Chairman notes that a clearly
articulated defense strategy and credible national missile
defense system can possess a deterrent value of their own, and
need not threaten the viability of the Russian nuclear triad.
V. Verification and Compliance
START II builds upon the verification provisions
established in the START Treaty. Unless otherwise specified,
the counting rules, notifications, verification, conversion,
and elimination procedures from START are used in START II.
Having already concluded that the START Treaty is essentially
verifiable (see Exec. Rept. 102-53, pp. 27-64 for the
committee's analysis of START's verifiability), the Joint
Chiefs of Staff analyzed START II to determine whether its
additional verification procedures, in conjunction with those
of START, offer the United States an acceptable level of
confidence in verifying compliance and in detecting significant
violations, and whether the verification procedures provide
essential safeguards for protecting U.S. national security
assets against unnecessary or unwarranted intrusion. The
committee concurs, in general, with the Joint Chiefs'
assessment that START II's verification procedures are adequate
for monitoring Russian compliance while remaining sufficiently
restrictive to safeguard U.S. interests.
Militarily significant violations
The committee notes that a lack of consensus exists over
the definition of ``military significance.'' All violations,
intentional or otherwise, are significant. With dramatically
lower levels of strategic offensive arms, the degree of risk to
national security posed by possible violations is
proportionately greater for even minor cases of noncompliance.
The danger is that the resulting inequalities may undermine
strategic parity. Thus a military significant violation would
be one upsetting the strategic equilibrium maintained between
the United States and Russia, and between U.S. targeting
requirements and strategic nuclear assets. Such a violation
inevitably would necessitate an adjustment in the U.S. force
structure. Therefore, as then-Secretary of State James Baker
put it in testimony before the committee in January, 1992, a
key criterion in evaluating whether a treaty is verifiable ``is
whether, if the other side attempts to move beyond the limits
of the Treaty in any militarily significant way, we would be
able to detect such a violation before it became a threat to
national security.''
That said, the quantifiability of ``significance'' is less
than clear. Secretary of Defense Perry set a fairly high
benchmark when he argued before the committee on March 1, 1995,
that:
It is clear that * * * the violation would have to
result in an increase of a substantial number of
warheads, certainly measured in the many hundreds to
have a chance of meeting this definition of military
significance.
For its part, the committee assesses a lower threshold to the
question of military significance, and is more concerned about
noncompliance in terms of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles
than warheads. The committee expects the projected U.S. warhead
stockpile after implementation of START II to total roughly
8,500 (including spares), and to be adequate to ensure U.S.
national security in the near term.
THE PROJECTED U.S. STOCKPILE AFTER IMPLEMENTATION OF START II
[Prepared for Tri-Valley CARE's by Greg Mello]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Weapon Use Yield (Kt) No. Produced IHE \1\ FRP \1\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
B61-7........ Strategic bomb..... c. 10-350....... 450 1985-(pits 1966-1971)........... yes no
B61-mods 3/4/ Tactical bomb...... 1-150........... 100 1979-1990....................... yes no
10.
W76.......... SLBM C-4/D-5....... 100............. 1,280 1978-1987....................... no no
W80-0........ SLCM............... 5 & 150......... 350 1984-1990....................... yes no
W80-1........ ALCM............... 5 & 150......... 400 1982-1990....................... yes no
B-83......... Strategic bomb..... low to 1,200.... 500 1983-1990....................... yes yes
W87-0........ ICBM............... 300............. 500 1986-1989....................... yes yes
W88.......... SLBM D-5........... 475............. 400 1989-1990....................... no no
Reserve stockpile after START II (``Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,'' Jan./Feb. 1995)
W76.......... SLBM C-4/D-5....... 100............. 1,000 1978-1987....................... no no
W78.......... ICBM............... 335............. 1,000 1979-........................... no no
B53-1(?), B61 Gravity bombs and 5 to 1,200; 1,500 B-53: 1962-1965.................
& B83, W80-1. ALCM's. 9,000 for B53-1.
(1)B53 lacks
IHP, FRP, or
full
electrical
safety
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total weapons after START II: Roughly 8,500 (including spares).
\1\ IHE: Internal High Explosive; FRP: Fire Resistant Pit.
In order to retain a sufficiently-sized stockpile, the
committee expects the Department of Energy to regulate its
warhead disassembly process. According to a Clinton
Administration response to questions asked by Senator Lugar
during the course of committee consideration of START II, DOE
has dismantled nearly 8,200 warheads in the last six fiscal
years as follows:
Weapons dismantled
Year: No.
1989.......................................................... 1,208
1990.......................................................... 1,151
1991.......................................................... 1,595
1992.......................................................... 1,303
1993.......................................................... 1,556
1994.......................................................... 1,371
The committee notes that the assembly of a nuclear weapon
is an exacting procedure requiring approximately 2,000 steps to
combine hundreds of subassemblies and parts (depending upon the
type of weapon or warhead). Because reconstitution of the U.S.
stockpile would prove a time-consuming enterprise, a balance
must be struck between warhead dismantlement and the
maintenance of a hedge against Russian noncompliance. The same
can be said for strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. However,
the committee finds that the potential uploading of all
multiple warhead Trident II D-5 buses and reorientation of the
B-1B heavy bomber provide acceptable interim assurances against
even a dramatic breakout in SNDVs deploying as many as 2,500
additional warheads. It is in this context that the committee
believes the aforementioned U.S. stockpile will prove adequate,
and expects all C-4 SLBMs to be back-fitted for the D-5. The
committee further urges the Administration, as an additional
assurance, to retain in storage all multiple warhead Minuteman
III buses if they are replaced with single-warhead buses.
These measures will prove sufficient to meet the national
security needs of the United States in the near term. However,
some on the committee are concerned that through neglect and
the application of some types of environmental restrictions the
infrastructure supporting the U.S. nuclear deterrent has
entered a precipitous decline. With the last U.S. warhead
having been manufactured five years ago, and a cut-off on
tritium production (which has a half-life of 12.3 years), U.S.
warheads will eventually lose their effectiveness. Purified
tritium gas from retired warheads will only meet U.S. stockpile
requirements for perhaps another fifteen years--yet the restart
of tritium production likely will take that long. Russia, on
the other hand, continues the manufacture of highly-enriched
uranium, plutonium, and tritium, and will not encounter such a
dilemma. The committee believes this issue to be of looming
importance to the maintenance of a viable nuclear deterrent
under the START II Treaty.
U.S. verification issues under START II
Verification of START II will be based largely upon
capabilities and provisions designed to verify START, and
generally reflect the same assumptions and considerations. The
two central elements of START II are the elimination of MIRVed
ICBMs (including all heavy ICBMs) by the year 2003, and deeper
reductions in the same basic categories of strategic offensive
arms as START. Accordingly, the conceptual basis for
verification of START II verification is the same as that for
START. The same capabilities and measures that provide for
verification of START limits on launchers, missiles, and
attributable warheads will be relied upon to verify the lower
aggregate limits of START II. The combination of START and
START II-mandated on-site inspections, U.S. National Technical
Means, and the increasing transparency of Russian society will
afford the United States opportunity to detect in a timely
fashion a violation of the magnitude contemplated by Secretary
Perry in his aforementioned testimony. The committee notes,
though, that there are some types of violations which the U.S.
will find difficult to detect. The Deputy Director of
Intelligence for the Central Intelligence Agency, Douglas
MacEachin, stated in testimony before the committee on February
28, 1995:
As with monitoring START I, the Intelligence
Community will be able to monitor many--and the most
significant--provisions of START II with high
confidence. In some areas, though, we will have
uncertainty.
START II will necessitate--in addition to the monitoring of
locational prohibitions and qualitative restrictions on
technical characteristics and capabilities (such as re-entry
vehicle telemetry data and throw-weight) as provided for by
START--the following new tasks:
Monitoring deployed warhead reduction to 3,500;
Monitoring the sublimit of 1,750 for SLBMs;
Monitoring the ban on the flight-testing,
acquisition, and deployment of MIRVed ICBMs after
January 1, 2003;
Verifying the conversion of up to 90 SS-18 silos to
accommodate the smaller, SS-25 type missile, and
continued compliance with START II's conversion
provisions;
Monitoring Russian compliance with START II
downloading rules for 105 SS-19 ICBMs;
Monitoring the payloads of Russian heavy bombers; and
Monitoring the activities of Russian heavy bombers
reoriented to conventional roles.
To augment the intelligence community's capabilities in
fulfilling these responsibilities, the START II Treaty provides
for four new types of on-site inspections in addition to the
thirteen types allowed under START. These inspections consist
of observations of all the eliminations of SS-18s that are not
launched to destruction, inspection of converted SS-18 silos,
four additional re-entry vehicle inspections per year at
converted SS-18 silo sites, and weapons bay inspections of
heavy bombers during all short-notice and special heavy bomber
exhibitions. Furthermore, START II provides for a detailed
exchange of data beyond that required under START on heavy
bombers, the downloading of missiles, heavy ICBM elimination,
and SS-18 silo conversion. For a full discussion of the
intelligence community's monitoring responsibilities for the
START Treaty, the committee refers to its report for that
treaty (Exec. Rept. 102-53, pp. 27-64 for the committee's
analysis of START's verifiability).
All of these measures depend in some fashion upon Russian
cooperation. Even with new inspections and data exchanges, the
committee underscores the necessity for the intelligence
community to continue to rely upon U.S. NTM to verify the
Treaty. Given uncertainties about Russia's political future,
the committee believes the maintenance of an independent
collection means to be critical and is concerned about Deputy
Director Douglas MacEachin's statement from the aforementioned
testimony that:
The Intelligence Community has reduced its resources
devoted to Russian military developments across the
board and since 1993, when the Senate first considered
the START II Treaty we have witnessed a steady erosion
of trained analysts on Russian strategic forces issues.
Furthermore, there are differences in the two treaties that add
to, modify, or in a few cases reduce, U.S. verification
challenges. For example, while the ability of the United States
to verify aggregate numbers of deployed ICBM silo-based
missiles and their associated launchers and deployed SLBM
launchers and their associated missiles is generally the same
and subject to the same concerns and considerations, START II
requires the elimination or conversion of all deployed and non-
deployed mobile launchers of MIRVed ICBMs, with the exception
of launchers for ICBMs (other than heavy ICBMs) permitted at
space launch facilities. The Treaty also requires that the
number of warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs of types to
which more than one warhead is attributed be reduced to zero.
It further allows downloading by more than four warheads of the
SS-19 missile. Since the SS-24 ICBM is attributed with ten
reentry vehicles, all SS-24 launchers (except those permitted
for space launch purposes) must be eliminated or converted to
launchers of single-warhead ICBMs. Consequently, after the end
of the elimination period, the problems associated with
verifying numbers of deployed rail-mobile ICBMs and launchers
(generally the most difficult deployed systems to verify) will
be reduced since any single detection of such a launcher
(except at a space launch facility), or of an SS-24 missile
loaded in any launcher, would be a clear Treaty violation.
Heavy ICBMs must be eliminated under START II, and their
launchers must be eliminated or converted. Currently, the
United States can confidently verify the number of deployed
heavy ICBMs and their silo launchers. This should remain true
even after the conversion of up to 90 heavy ICBM silos. For a
cheating scenario involving the covert deployment of illegal
heavy ICBMs in converted heavy ICBM silos to be successful,
several things would have to be achieved. First, the silo would
have to be reconverted without detection (or the conversion
would have to be successfully ``faked''). Second, a clandestine
supply of heavy ICBMs would have to be available. Third, the
illegal missiles would have to be transported to the silos,
installed, and fueled without detection. Each of these steps
likely would prove complicated enough that, taken together,
such an effort would be very difficult for the Russians to
accomplish without detection.
Under current Russian practices, the United States has high
confidence in its ability to identify the type of ICBM deployed
in a given launcher. Since the U.S. also has similarly high
confidence in which types of ICBMs have been tested with more
than one warhead, the U.S. expects to remain capable of
verifying the ban on fixed launchers for MIRVed ICBMs once it
goes into effect. Further, the ban on flight testing or
launching (other than space launches) of MIRVed ICBMs should
reinforce these confidences over time.
However, there are scenarios for which U.S. confidences
could be significantly lower. These involve covert deployment
of previously developed MIRVed ICBMs, the deployment of MIRVed
missiles such as SLBMs in heavy ICBM silos instead of the
single-warhead missile allowed, the uploading of warheads on
existing buses such as on the SS-19, the deployment of heavy
bombers with more warheads than currently attributed, and
Russian break-out of the SS-25 mobile missile.
Warheads on deployed ballistic missiles
Cheating scenarios involving the testing of ICBMs in ways
designed to conceal the maximum numbers of warheads with which
they have been tested, with which they are capable of
releasing, or involving deception with respect to the weight of
the lightest re-entry vehicle released, will be countered
significantly by U.S. interpretation of telemetry data.
Furthermore, after January 1, 2003 launches of MIRVed ICBMs
with re-entry vehicles will be prohibited. The committee notes
that Russia will be allowed to launch non-heavy, MIRVed ICBM
airframes without reentry vehicles from space launch facilities
after 2003, though these activities too will be monitored by
U.S. NTM. On the other hand, since MIRVed SLBMs will still be
permitted, no similar restriction will be applied. The
committee is concerned with the possible development of a
common missile (one developed for use as both an ICBM and an
SLBM) that would complicate verification questions.
Further, because for the purposes of economy the U.S.
agreed to relax the START requirement that multiple reentry
vehicle buses be removed, Russia will be allowed to retain its
six-warhead bus on the SS-19. The START II Treaty contains
provisions tailored to allow Russian retention of 105 SS-19s.
The committee notes that this provides one of the most obvious
break-out potentials in the START II Treaty, since over a short
period of time Russia could upload these ICBMs and restore 525
warheads to its arsenal. The United States, on the other,
likely will remove its three-warhead buses for the Minuteman
III arsenal and will be unable to respond without a massive
retrofit operation. This possible liability can be offset only
by the uploading potential of the Trident II D-5 which, though
having a smaller ``footprint'' than the Minuteman III, is also
widely believed to have hard-target kill-capability, and by
continued viability of the U.S. strategic triad.
The conversion of SS-18 silos
START II presents a different problem with regard to
converted heavy ICBM silos. START II provides for on-site
inspection to confirm the required conversion procedures for
heavy ICBM silos. After the completion of these specified
procedures, the Treaty also allows Russia to carry out further
conversion measures, presumably to complete conversion for a
single-warhead missile. However, the Treaty does not provide
for any on-site inspection or other specified access to observe
or fully identify the nature of these later conversion
procedures. Although the Treaty prohibits emplacement in such
converted silos of a missile with a launch canister greater
than 2.5 meters in diameter, and the Russians have undertaken a
political commitment to deploy in these converted launchers
only a single-warhead ICBMs of the SS-25 type, the possibility
exists that Russia could further modify the converted SS-18
silos to enable them to launch a different missile than the one
declared.
Heavy bombers and attributable warheads
The START II Treaty requires that, unless all of a given
type or variant of heavy bomber are reoriented to a
conventional role, there must be differences observable to NTM
and visible during inspections, between heavy bombers. However,
these required differences are left to the choice of the
reorienting Party, and there is no requirement that they be
functionally related. Moreover, inspections of heavy bombers
reoriented to a conventional role are limited to inspecting
only the observable differences in the bombers, and not the
internal portions of weapons bays. Under these circumstances,
it would not be difficult for the Russians to actually load
reoriented bombers with nuclear weapons if they so chose. The
committee recognizes that Russia might plan to use them in that
fashion in either a breakout scenario, or in contingency
planning surrounding Russian verification of U.S. compliance
with START II. Though START II provides additional restrictions
on reoriented bombers, these only modestly increase the ri