Rep. Lee H. Hamilton
on Foreign Affairs
May 1996/Volume XVI No. 5/ 2314 Rayburn H.0.B.
The Missile Defense Debate
The Star Wars debate is back. The Republican leadership in Congress has introduced a bill,
H.R.3144, to require the development and deployment of a national ballistic missile defense system
within seven years. It would force the Administration to choose a system now and deploy it, even
though the threat is distant. It would mandate an untested and potentially destabilizing new military
posture based on a missile shield that does not yet exist. It would also violate the 1972 Anti-Ballistic
Missile (ABM) Treaty, the cornerstone of all nuclear arms control agreements. The United States
needs some kind of missile defense: The question is what kind and when?
WHAT IS THE THREAT?
The missile defense debate turns on differing perceptions of the
threat. There is a need to defend U.S. troops (or those of our allies) against possible missile attack
in places such as the Middle East or Korea. To meet the threat posed by shorter range missiles -
those with a range of less than 600 miles - the United States has upgraded the Patriot missile, and
will soon deploy more advanced systems.
There is more controversy about the treat from inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)
that can reach U.S. territory. Today, only Russia and China pose a threat, and China has only a
handful of ICBMs. For 40 years, U.S. nuclear forces have deterred their use. According to U.S.
intelligence estimates, any new ICBM threat is unlikely during the next 15 years, with the exception
of a North Korean missile program that might produce a weapon to reach Alaska or Hawaii - but not
within five years. An accidental ICBM launch, or the chances that a rogue state could obtain an
ICBM to threaten the U.S., are remote.
CURRENT U.S. POLICY.
The United States is pursuing a three-fold approach to
missile defense. The first element consists of missile reduction and prevention - defense by other
means, as it is called. The Missile Technology Control Regime, signed by 28 countries, makes it
more difficult for non-member states to import missile parts and components. Other international
export control agreements block nuclear, chemical, and dual-use transfers of technology for use in
missile or warhead development.
Arms control agreements are a key ingredient. Under the first Strategic Arms Reduction
Treaty (START I), Russia dismantled hundreds of ICBMs and 3800 nuclear warheads. START II,
if ratified by the Russian Duma, will reduce Russian strategic forces by 70 percent. Other agreements
- including the U.S.-North Korean pact that has frozen North Korea's nuclear program, the
permanent extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the Chemical Weapons
Convention - slow the development of weapons that can be placed atop unfriendly missiles.
The second element is deterrence. By maintaining credible military forces, the United States
deters missile attack on its territory. Any nation foolish enough to use weapons of mass destruction
against the United States must know that the U.S. response would be devastating and overwhelming.
The third element is the interception of incoming missiles. Because the chief threat to troops and
allies comes from shorter-range missiles, the U.S. is focusing efforts on theater defenses, including
an improved version of the Patriot, sea-based systems, and a system called Theater High Altitude
Area Defense.
The U.S. is also pursuing research and development aimed at developing a national missiles
defense system that could shoot down ICBMs aimed at the United States. Such a system could be
deployed in 2003, eight years sooner than the threat is likely to exist, according to intelligence
estimates. The Administration has chosen not to deploy a system earlier because it sees no pressing
threat, wants to develop promising technologies further, wants to save money, and does not want to
violate the ABM treaty. That treaty puts sharp limits on U.S. and Russian defensive systems and has
been key to the success of nuclear deterrence.
DEBATE IN CONGRESS
. In the coming weeks, the House will decide whether to endorse
this policy or adopt an accelerated missile defense strategy, outlined in H.R.3144, requiring
deployment of a national missile defense by 2003. I oppose this bill. First, it would set back arms
control efforts. By requiring development and deployment of space-based lasers or interceptors, sea-based or multi-site ground based ABMs, the bill would violate the ABM Treaty. In response, the
Russian Duma would likely block ratification of START II, and fail to implement other arms control
agreements. The current Russian effort to eliminate its ICBMs would likely cease.
Second, this bill would lock the United States into an expensive deployment of a massive national
missile defense system today, irrespective of the threat assessment tomorrow. It is better to proceed
with vigorous research and development, but withhold deployment until the threat is clear. Finally,
this bill is a budget buster. The Congressional Budget Office says it would cost $7 billion more than
is currently budgeted for missile defense over the next five years. Through 2010, the system would
cost between $31 billion and $60 billion - plus operating costs.
CONCLUSION
. H.R.3144 would have the United States spend up to $60 billion to deploy
a national missile defense system prematurely for a threat that may not develop. The wiser course
is to develop a system, assess the threat in a few years, and decide then on deployment. We have
defense options even if an unexpected threat emerges. We should commit to deployment only if a
plausible threat develops.
R