FY 1997 ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES BUDGET REQUEST WITH, 03/12/1996, Testimony

Basis Date:

19960419

Chairperson:

D. Hunter

Committee:

House National Security

Docfile Number:

T96AD085

Hearing Date:

19960312

DOE Lead Office:

DP SUB

Committee:

Military Procurement

Hearing Subject:

FY 1997 ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES BUDGET REQUEST WITH

Witness Name:

J. Rohlfing

Hearing Text:

  
 Statement of Joan B. Rohlfing
 Director
 Office of Nonproliferation and National Security
 Department of Energy
 Before the Military Procurement Subcommittee
 House National Security Committee
  
 12 MARCH 1996
  
 Statement of Joan B. Rohlfing
 Director
 Office of Nonproliferation and National Security
 Department of Energy
 Before the Strategic Forces Subcommittee
 Senate Armed Services Committee
  
 13 March 1996
  
 Good morning Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee.  It is my
 pleasure to address you today as the Director of the Office of
 Nonproliferation and National Security at the U.S. Department of Energy
 (DOE).
  
 In recent years, the worldwide proliferation of Weapons of Mass
 Destruction (WMD) and their missile delivery systems has emerged as one
 of the most serious dangers confronting the United States.  This is a
 continuing and evolving problem with broad consequences for
 international security and stability.  At least 20 countries some of
 them hostile to the United States   already have or may be developing
 WMD through the acquisition of dual-use technology, indigenous
 development and production, and/or support from rogue supplier states.
 Additionally, safety and security of existing nuclear weapons and
 materials are of increasing concern as economic and social pressures
 mount in countries such as Russia, Ukraine, Kazakstan and Belarus.
  
 The President has made nonproliferation one of this nation's highest
 priorities.  As the preeminent agency in nuclear materials and weapons
 technology and protection, the Department of Energy, through the Office
 of Nonproliferation and National Security, is uniquely suited to
 provide leadership in national and international efforts to reduce
 nuclear weapons worldwide; secure and prevent the spread of nuclear
 materials, technology and expertise; roll back nuclear weapons
 development programs; avoid proliferation surprise; and respond to
 nonproliferation emergencies.  We particularly draw upon 50 years of
 science and technology expertise resident throughout the DOE National
 Laboratory complex to help us achieve these goals.
  
 To reduce the international proliferation threat, the Office of
 Nonproliferation and National Security is focusing its resources and
 expertise on the following near-term priorities:   securing nuclear
 materials, technology and expertise in Russia and the Newly Independent
 States;   maintaining effective protection, control and accountability
 of nuclear materials, technology and expertise in the United States;
 limiting weapons-usable fissile materials worldwide; ensuring
 transparent and irreversible reductions of global nuclear stockpiles;
 supporting the completion of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1996;
 developing and integrating a program for preventing, detecting and
 responding to nuclear terrorism and smuggling; controlling nuclear
 exports; and strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation regime.
 Through the unique scientific, technical, analytical and operational
 capabilities of the Department and its National Laboratories, we are
 working to effectively and efficiently accomplish these near-term
 priorities by marshaling and integrating our resources and
 nonproliferation activities.
  
 Some of our most important international activities include: conducting
 the government-to-government and laboratory-to-laboratory programs of
 cooperation between U.S. nuclear experts and their counterparts at
 nuclear facilities and institutes in the former Soviet Union to improve
 the protection, control and accountability of nuclear materials;
 assisting Russia and the Newly Independent States in establishing and
 enhancing nuclear material export control systems; developing advanced
 technologies and systems to detect the indigenous proliferation of WMD,
 to enable the verification of arms control treaties, and to facilitate
 the collection of intelligence information in noncooperative
 environments; conducting critical operations in cooperation with the
 Democratic People s Republic of Korea to stabilize and safely store
 spent nuclear fuel thereby both freezing the North Korean nuclear
 weapons program and enabling the application of effective International
 Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards; working with the private sector
 to engage WMD weapons scientists, engineers and technicians in the
 former Soviet Union in activities which reduce the proliferation
 threat; and providing technical support of long-term monitoring of
 Iraqi facilities and other nuclear safeguards and emergency programs of
 the IAEA.  In addition, we are providing unique and in-depth technical,
 arms-control, intelligence, research and technology expertise as part
 of the U.S. Government s integrated efforts to conclude negotiations,
 prepare for entry into force, and implement a CTBT.
  
 The Department s unique technical and analytical capabilities allow us
 to play a pivotal role in the weapons of mass destruction arenas of the
 U.S. Intelligence Community.  For example, DOE continues to contribute
 to National Intelligence Estimates and to support the Intelligence
 Community s Non-Proliferation Center in assessing the activities of
 emerging nuclear weapons states and terrorist organizations, the
 activities of states that supply nuclear materials and expertise, and
 theft and smuggling of nuclear material.
  
 In concert with our international activities, we are responsible for
 conducting a wide range of domestic activities that support our
 nonproliferation and national security goals.  These activities
 include: directing a rigorous safeguards and security program for the
 entire Department of Energy complex, thereby ensuring the demonstrated
 security of our own nuclear materials, technology and expertise;
 declassifying millions of DOE documents while protecting critical
 information that has the potential to facilitate the proliferation of
 weapons of mass destruction; and maintaining a security investigations
 and reinvestigations program for both Federal and contractor employees
 of the Department.  We also provide technical, analytical, policy and
 implementation support to the efforts of the nation s policy community
 to deal with nonproliferation issues.
  
 We also ensure the Department has a robust emergency management and
 response capability for nonproliferation, energy and nuclear
 emergencies.  Through this program, we provide assistance to other
 government agencies as well as state, tribal and local governments.
 Over the past year, we have been providing emergency response experts
 to assist other foreign governments in reviews of their emergency
 preparedness plans and capabilities.  Through the Partnership for
 Peace, we have been working with the Departments of State and Defense
 to assist Russia and the Newly Independent States to plan for and
 manage energy and radiological emergencies.  We also have been working
 with the International Atomic Energy Agency, International Energy
 Agency and Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy to develop
 procedures and support plans for any radiological emergency.
  
 ACCOMPLISHMENTS
  
 Over the past year, we have demonstrated leadership and achieved
 significant accomplishments in each of our near-term priorities:
  
 In 1995, our cooperative efforts with Russia and the Newly Independent
 States in securing nuclear materials, technology and expertise, has
 protected over 8 tons of direct-use nuclear material with upgrades to
 26 facilities  material protection, control and accounting programs.
 Before the end of 1996, we expect to broaden this effort to over 35
 facilities and protect hundreds of tons of plutonium and highly
 enriched uranium.  Additionally, we have begun discussions with the
 Russian Navy to begin upgrades on their nuclear facilities as well.
  
 We have engaged nearly two thousand weapons scientists, engineers and
 technicians on 219 scientific projects at 77 institutes in Russia,
 Ukraine, Kazakstan and Belarus to prevent a brain-drain of these
 scientists to other countries that would employ them for their own
 indigenous nuclear weapons programs.
  
 Our work in North Korea has effectively stopped their indigenous
 nuclear weapons development program.  We have a team currently in
 country canning the spent fuel to prevent its reprocessing for use in
 nuclear weapons. Additionally, we have enabled the IAEA to apply
 international safeguards on the existing nuclear facilities remaining
 in North Korea.
  
 We are the sole agency responsible for developing technologies to
 monitor and verify a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.  In 1995, we
 demonstrated significant progress in each of the sensor technologies
 required to support an international monitoring system: seismic
 monitoring, radionuclide monitoring, hydroacoustic monitoring, on-site
 inspection, space-based monitoring, and automated data processing.  One
 particular success is our improvement of the capability to more easily
 distinguish nuclear explosions from earthquakes a formidable step
 toward a greater verification capability.
  
 In 1994, the Office of Nonproliferation and National Security completed
 installation of sensors on all Global Positioning Satellites that allow
 the United States to continuously detect near-earth and atmospheric
 nuclear explosions and verify treaty compliance worldwide.  In 1995 we
 began developing and deploying the next-generation of sensors to
 improve our detection capability.
  
 We have also completed the first comprehensive assessment of all the
 chemicals that might be used in a nuclear weapons life-cycle.  This
 positions the United States to develop better techniques to detect an
 indigenous nuclear weapons program.
  
 Our declassification program has also played an instrumental role in
 furthering U.S. nonproliferation goals, especially in the initiative to
 achieve a bilateral agreement with Russia for the exchange of
 classified information to facilitate confirmation of transparent and
 irreversible nuclear weapons reductions.
  
 The Department s safeguards and security functions that were previously
 spread across the DOE complex are now consolidated within the Office of
 Nonproliferation and National Security.  This achievement is an
 important step toward creating a responsive and efficient focal point
 for the Department s nuclear safeguards and security program and
 providing a national-level technical resource which is capable of fully
 supporting multilateral nuclear nonproliferation efforts.
  
 LOOK TO THE FUTURE
  
 With our many achievements, there is much work to be done in our long
 and short term priority areas.  We cannot rest on our laurels and
 expect the global nuclear danger to reduce on its own.  The programs of
 the Office of Nonproliferation and National Security seek to broaden
 their effects wherever they are able.
  
 In the coming year and a half, the Department will accelerate efforts
 to provide enhanced materials protection, control and accounting for
 fissile materials in Russia and the Newly Independent States.  We hope
 to complete all MPC&A improvements in former Soviet Union states
 outside of Russia by the end of calendar year 1997 (with the majority
 of work being completed by the end of the fiscal year).  In Russia, we
 intend to expand cooperation to the remaining facilities in the civil
 nuclear complex while continuing work with facilities related to the
 nuclear weapon complex.  Our efforts with Gosatomnadzor (the Russian
 agency equivalent to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission) to design
 and promote an indigenous MPC&A standards system will ensure that
 Russian weapons usable material will be protected after the U.S.
 involvement has been completed.  The program as a whole anticipates
 upgrades at 50 locations in Russia and 13 locations in the Newly
 Independent States completed by the year 2002.
  
 We are working to improve regional arms control and nonproliferation
 regimes through programs such as the Cooperative Monitoring Center
 (CMC) in Albuquerque, New Mexico.  At the CMC, we assist political and
 technical experts from around the world acquire the technology-based
 tools they need to assess, design, analyze and implement
 nonproliferation, arms control and other security measures in their own
 regions.  This particularly fosters regional security and lessens the
 desire for nations to acquire or develop their own weapons of mass
 destruction.  We plan to further expand this effort with states of the
 middle East, South Asia, the Koreas, and China.
  
 In 1996, we hope to conclude an Agreement for Cooperation and a
 Stockpile Data Exchange Agreement with Russia that will allow us to
 gain insight into warhead dismantlement.  These agreements will build
 confidence between our two nations that our mutual nuclear arms
 reductions are in fact occurring and irreversible.
  
 These examples show that our activities are truly beneficial.  Through
 our robust and cost-effective programs, we are able to provide
 leadership in the nonproliferation community, further the
 nonproliferation goals of the United States, and ensure the national
 security.
  
 BUDGET REVIEW
  
 The table below summarizes the fiscal year 1997 budget request for the
 Office of Nonproliferation and National Security from the Energy and
 Water Development Appropriation as compared with the fiscal year 1996
 adjusted appropriation (in thousands).
  
 *** Chart is not available in this format.  Contact the Information
 Management and Administration Office at 202-586-5115 to obtain a copy
 of this chart***
  
 NOTE: Footnotes 1 and 2 are listed below:
 1  The Fiscal Year 1997 budget request includes a new Program Direction
 line item as mandated by the Energy and Water Appropriation for Fiscal
 Year 1996.  This new budget line item provides funding for salaries and
 benefits, travel, support service contractors and other related
 expenses associated with the overall management and administration of
 the Office of Nonproliferation and National Security.
  
 2  The Soviet Designed Reactor Safety program is run by the Office of
 Nuclear Energy and funding for this program has been included elsewhere
 in the Other Defense Activities account.
  
 The Nonproliferation and Verification Research and Development budget
 request for fiscal year 1997 reflects a savings of $15.3 million. This
 savings in part is a result of our effort to eliminate duplication
 between agencies and within DOE, improving coordination between
 sponsoring agencies, streamlining operations and generating a
 meaningful cost savings.
  
 The Arms Control and Nonproliferation budget request includes net
 increase of $36.1 million concentrated in the area of material
 protection, control and accounting.  This increase is due to the rapid
 pace of expansion of cooperation with Russian facilities and is
 important to ensure early safeguarding of weapons usable material at
 their source.  We are also expanding our efforts in the Reduced
 Enrichment Research and Test Reactor (RERTR) and Industrial Partnering
 Programs.  The increase will also allow us to ensure that the canned
 spent nuclear fuel in North Korea is not used in an indigenous nuclear
 development program.  Finally, the increase will provide increased
 analysis and support to: U.S. nuclear arms control policies in the
 Middle East, Asia and South Asia, nuclear energy security issues in
 Asia, South Asia and Europe, and U.S. policies to deal with excess
 civil plutonium.
  
 The Intelligence budget request reflects a modest reduction from fiscal
 year 1996 resulting from realized efficiencies.  The request will
 provide for timely, high-impact analysis and reporting on the
 proliferation implications of selected nuclear weapons states
 programs, emerging nuclear proliferants, nuclear suppliers, and global
 impacts to the U.S. energy security.
  
 The Nuclear Safeguards and Security budget request for fiscal year 1997
 includes a net increase of slightly over $1 million.  Through a
 requested increase and reprioritization of funding needs, we intend to
 increase the Classification and Declassification budget by
 approximately $2.3 million.  This increase seeks to further develop
 advanced automation technology in support of the Declassification
 Productivity Initiative program and implement Executive Order 12958 on
 Classified National Security Information.
  
 Finally, the Emergency Management budget request for fiscal year 1997
 is unchanged from the fiscal year 1996 appropriation.  The change in
 the summary table above is exclusively a result of consolidation of
 Program Direction funds.
  
 CONCLUSION
  
 Preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction is a crucial
 aspect of our national interest, and the Office of Nonproliferation and
 National Security is uniquely capable to serve this national interest,
 especially through the efforts of our national laboratories.  Our
 science and technology base enables us to provide unique solutions to
 national and international nonproliferation problems.  The work we do
 benefits the nation s security across a broad spectrum: protecting
 nuclear material in the United States and worldwide; rolling back
 existing nuclear weapons development programs internationally; ensuring
 the verifiability of nuclear treaties, especially a CTBT; and
 responding to energy and nonproliferation emergencies.