Sidney Graybeal

Ballistic Missile Defense and the ABM Treaty
21 March 1996 - House National Security Committee
Subcommittees on Military Research and Development and Military Procurement

Mr. Chairman, it is an honor to testify before the Subcommittees on the topic of Ballistic Missile Defenses (BMD) and the ABM Treaty.

I served as Alternate Executive Officer throughout the SALT-I negotiations and was the first U.S. Commissioner of the Standing Consultative Commission, the body responsible for implementing the ABM Treaty. I have remained closely involved in activities related to the Treaty, including the issues before the Subcommittees today. My statement this morning is based on work which my colleague, Dr. Patricia McFate, and I have been performing in various capacities. The view that I will be presenting should not be attributed to any governmental agency or private organization.

I would like to request that four brief papers which we have prepared which are directly related to your considerations be entered into the record:

1. "NMD System Architectures and the ABM Treaty";
2. "Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on Effective Theater Missile Defense and the ABM Treaty (May 1995);
3. "A Double Verification Standard for the ABM Treaty: Creating Problems where None Should Exist"; and
4. "More ABM Treaty Compliance Issues: Now It's Space-Based Sensors."

This morning I want to make some brief comments on four issues which apparently are of concern to the Subcommittees:

1. Key ABM Treaty background considerations;
2. TMD and the ABM Treaty;
3. NMD and the ABM Treaty; and
4. Achieving operationally-effective BMD systems while maintaining the ABM Treaty.

Background Considerations

• The ABM Treaty is of unlimited duration, but it was intended to be a "living document."
• Verification of the Treaty is by NTM alone.
• There are no limits on the quantity or quality of data from external sensors.
• There are no limits on ATBMs per se; however, Article VI (a) of the Treaty prohibits giving non-ABM components "capabilities to counter strategic ballisticmissiles" and prohibits testing them "in an ABM mode."
• The Treaty does not prohibit any defense of the national territory; it limits extensive, effective ABM defenses.
• There are no limits on the range or velocity of ABM interceptors. o The Treaty permits NMD systems capable of handling limited ballistic missile threats.

TMD and the ABM Treaty.

• The threat is real and recognized. The testimony of James Woolsey on 14 March 1996 clearly set forth the theater ballistic missile threat and the emerging threat to the United States; I fully agree with his assessments.
• The ABM Treaty is verified by national technical means alone. Therefore, the basis for determining compliance must be "demonstrated" capabilities, not "inherent" capabilities derived from unverifiable computer simulations.
• The U.S. position regarding target missile velocity and range, as set forth by Dr. Robert Bell in the Standing Consultative Commission in November 1993, was a sound position, based upon demonstrated capabilities.
• The THAAD compliance finding in 1994 was based on computer simulations; these simulations were used to determine that the THAAD system could possess a 'significant' intercept probability against some strategic reentry vehicles. This finding was a mistake, and until it is rescinded or replaced, it will constrain THAAD's potential capabilities.
• In my view, placing precise limits on interceptor velocities is also a mistake. In addition to constraining the capabilities of future TMD systems, it could also pose verification problems.
• The United States should avoid inhibiting the growth potential of TMD systems required for addressing future theater ballistic missile threats.
• As I have noted, THAAD's growth could be limited by a questionable compliance finding. o The Navy Upper Tier/Theater Wide system's growth should not be limited by the "demarcation" agreement currently under negotiation.
• Data from external sensors will be required to achieve the full potential of TMD systems.
• The United States should not permit the "demarcation" negotiations to result in mining the ABM Treaty into a "TMD Treaty."

NMD and the ABM Treaty

• A real threat is emerging but apparently it is not being acknowledged by the Clinton Administration. I concur with Mr. Woolsey's comments on the recently-completed NIE.
• The United States requires an operationally-effective NMD system for all fifty states in order to counter the emerging threat.
• The Army and the Air Force have proposed single site NMD deployments which they believe could provide defense against limited ballistic missile attacks.
  • Both require a new high velocity (7-8 km/sec) kinetic kill vehicle.
  • Both require data from external sensors to be effective.
• Neither is likely to provide operationally-effective defense of Alaska and Hawaii from ICBMs; neither will provide effective defense against future SLBM threats.
  • The Army system has only minor ABM Treaty problems.
  • The Air Force system raises both ARM Treaty and START Treaty issues.
• A fully operationally-effective NMD system for all fifty states will require a three- or five-site deployment. Each site would have no more than 100 ABM interceptors and ABM launchers.
  • Such a deployment would be completely consistent with the basic purpose and intent of the ABM Treaty. It would not undermine strategic stability, nor would it generate an arms race.
  • Such a multiple site deployment would require an amendment to the Treaty; in my opinion, such an amendment should not be difficult to achieve. Russia needs the Treaty in order to maintain its deterrence and to avoid a costly arms race with the United States.

BMD Systems and the ABM Treaty: A Compatible Marriage

• The real theater ballistic missile threats and the emerging strategic ballistic missile capabilities and threats from rogue countries require both effective TMD and NMD systems.
• Such systems can and should be acquired; this can be accomplished in a manner completely consistent with the purpose and intent of the Treaty.
• The United States needs a firm negotiating approach with the Russians in both the TMD and NMD areas. The Russian Federation needs to preserve the ABM Treaty; Russia should be willing to keep the Treaty a "living document" by cooperating in the clarifications, modifications, and amendments necessary to permit both parties to accommodate to the changing threats and advancing technologies.
• The United States should insist on its fight to develop and deploy effective TMD and NMD systems to meet its national security requirements.
• The United States and Russia should recognize that it is possible to have both an effective BMD and a viable ABM Treaty. We should not force a choice between the two; regardless of which one wins, the United States loses.