FOREIGN OPERATIONS, EXPORT FINANCING, AND RELATED PROGRAMS APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 1998 (Senate - July 16, 1997)

Mr. GLENN. I would like to remind my colleagues that most United States economic and military aid to Pakistan was cut off in October 1990 by President George Bush, when he was no longer able to certify that Pakistan did not possess nuclear weapons or that the provision of further United States aid would reduce the risk that Pakistan would come to possess such weapons. That language, found in the Pressler amendment, sec. 620E(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act, has been substantially relaxed in recent years, in part by the actions of Congress, and in part by actions taken unilaterally by the Executive. Let me review briefly just how far America has gone already to relax these sanctions.

The Brown amendment, which was enacted in February 1996, amended the Pressler amendment to allow the provision of all types of economic assistance, notwithstanding Pakistan's continuing non-compliance with the Pressler criteria. In addition to allowing the transfer of over a third-of-a-billion dollars of embargoed military gear to Pakistan--including spare parts and upgrades for Pakistan's probable nuclear-weapons delivery vehicle, the F-16--the Brown amendment also unconditionally authorized the resumption of the following aid: international narcotics controls; military-to-military contacts, including IMET; humanitarian and civic assistance projects; peacekeeping and other multilateral operations; antiterrorism assistance; an exemption from storage costs for embargoed military equipment; and delivery of military items sent to the United States for repair before the 1990 sanctions.

For its sponsors, the Brown amendment suffered from one rather serious problem, however. That amendment failed to recognize that Pakistan was still in violation of the Symington amendment, sec. 101 of the Arms Export Control Act, and the likelihood of presidential waiver of the latter was extremely remote, in light of Pakistan's continued violations of that law. In short, because the Brown amendment neither repealed nor amended the Symington amendment, the Symington amendment continues to outlaw the provision of aid under the Arms Export Control Act or the Foreign Assistance Act to Pakistan. That is why the present amendment is being offered--it is being offered to liberalize the sanctions under the Symington amendment.

I note that the International Financial Institutions Act only requires U.S. executive officers at those institutions merely `to consider' the nonproliferation credentials of the potential recipient country, and hence this does not prohibit continued aid via such institutions. Pakistan has received hundreds of millions of dollars in assistance from such institutions since October 1990.

The Export-Import Bank Act only requires the denial of credits in the event of violations of safeguards or a US nuclear cooperation agreement; nuclear detonations; or persons or countries that willfully aid and abet non-nuclear-weapon states to get the bomb.

A host of other legislative amendments have authorized the provision of the following forms of assistance to Pakistan, notwithstanding existing nuclear sanctions, via nongovernmental organizations: agricultural, rural development, and nutrition; population and health; education and human resources development; energy;

appropriate technology; use of cooperatives in development; integrating women into national economies; human rights; environment and natural resources; endangered species; and private and voluntary organizations.

So America has not been heartless to the lot of Pakistan's vast majority, its poor people. We have over the years provided billions of dollars of assistance intended to improve the living conditions of the people of Pakistan.

Our grievance today is not with the people of Pakistan but with their Government. It arises in particular from the awesome and growing credibility gap between the peaceful words of Pakistan's leaders about their country's nuclear program, and the certain fact that Pakistan is continuing to develop nuclear weapons and the missiles to deliver them.

Now some might argue that we should simply be grateful that Pakistan is not detonating nuclear weapons right now. We should rejoice that Pakistan is not transferring its bombs, bomb designs, or bomb components--right now anyway--to other countries. We should be happy that Pakistan has not yet imported a complete nuclear reprocessing plant or uranium enrichment plant from China, and be grateful that it is only technical assistance and components that Pakistan has received for its bomb program from China. By golly, we should celebrate the fact that Pakistan does not yet have an ICBM, or that it has not yet attacked Indian civilian or military positions with nuclear weapons hung under the wings of United States-supplied F-16 aircraft. Yes, we can surely be grateful for all the above restraint.

But maybe, just maybe, all of this heroic nuclear restraint that Pakistan has exercised is due in good measure to the real and palpable costs that Pakistan would pay if it engaged in any of those flagrant activities--costs that include, but are no means limited to, the costs that are found in existing United States sanctions legislation.

We must examine, however, not just at what Pakistan has not done, but also recall what Pakistan has done. Here is what Pakistan has done recently:

Pakistan has acquired thousands of specially-designed ring magnets for its unsafeguarded uranium enrichment project, and reportedly acquired them just about the time the United States Congress was debating the Brown amendment in 1995. Pakistan's actions make a mockery not just of the Brown amendment, but also of America's nuclear nonproliferation policy as a whole.

Pakistan is nearing completion of an unsafeguarded plutonium production capability with its production reactor at Khushab and, by some reports, a related nuclear reprocessing plant.

Pakistan has in the eyes of most of the world, but evidently not yet those in our own State Department, acquired nuclear-capable M-11 missiles from China, and recently test-fired its HATF missile .

On March 20, 1997, the trade publication, Nucleonics Week, reported that `Pakistan has completed its tests of its atomic bomb capability successfully through computer simulation.' This claim was made by one who should know, Pakistan's former Army Chief of Staff, Mirza Aslam Beg, and comes as a particularly bitter reminder of the Senate's unfortunate decision last week to vote down a proposal by my colleagues, Messrs. Cochran and Durbin, to tighten up export controls over high-powered computers going to Pakistan and other risky countries.

In June 1997, the CIA Director sent to Congress an unclassified report on global weapons proliferation in the last 6 months of 1996--Report entitled: `The Acquisition of Technology Related to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions: July-December 1996'. Here is what the report had to say about Pakistan:

[Page: S7556]

Pakistan was very aggressive in seeking out equipment, material, and technology for its nuclear weapons program, with China as its principal supplier. Pakistan also sought a wide variety of nuclear-related goods from many Western nations, including the United States. China also was a major supplier to Pakistan's ballistic missile program, providing technology and assistance. Of note, Pakistan has made strong efforts to acquire an indigenous capability in missile production technologies.

The report also said that,

The Chinese provided a tremendous variety of assistance to both Iran's and Pakistan's ballistic missile programs.

Needless to say, these are some of the key findings from just one recent unclassified U.S. government report, perhaps the tip of the proverbial iceberg.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to insert into the Record at the end of my remarks copies of some of these relevant reports.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. GLENN. How are we to interpret such activities? Should we just write them off as due to India's own irresponsible nuclear and missile programs? Is it due to the so-called inevitability of proliferation? No, indeed, we need to redouble our efforts to roll back both countries' programs. Above all, we should not be engaging in acts that can reasonably be interpreted as rewards for proliferation.

I do not myself see this legislation as a reward for proliferation and do not believe that its sponsors, including its supporters in the Administration, so view it. But I worry more about how others will perceive it, particularly those in Pakistan and in the various ministries of other countries that may be working on clandestine projects to develop weapons of mass destruction. How far can Uncle Sam be pushed when it comes to avoiding sanctions against the bomb? If past is prologue, it appears that the unfortunate answer is, pretty far indeed.

Through this legislation, America has now made a gesture--based more on hope than on experience--that the Government and people of Pakistan will interpret as they wish. I hope they will recognize that America is sincere about its global commitments to nuclear and missile nonproliferation. I hope they recognize that America remains determined to pursue vigorously these commitments not only in Pakistan, but also in India, and indeed, wherever such illicit programs may exist.

I also hope--as the profound direct and indirect costs mount of maintaining these dangerous nuclear and missile programs--that the Government and people of Pakistan will come in due course to realize that there is a more rational course to follow and a new day will dawn. It is a course charted by the governments and people of South Africa, Brazil, Sweden, Switzerland, South Korea, Taiwan, Germany, Japan, and numerous other countries that individually reached their own decisions that their latent nuclear weapons options are just not worth the substantial national security and economic costs of exercising those options. Make no mistake about it: cost assessments have been and will continue to be crucial to national leaders around the world in making such decisions.

We will not come any closer to witnessing the dawn of that new day, however, if we continue on our current course of incrementally weakening the costs we impose for proliferation where it occurs. I remain concerned that while today's step is quite modest and incremental, the overall tendency is one that is suggestive of a weakening of America's resolve to pursue vigorously its key nonproliferation goals. Last week we gave the Senate's blessing to the disposal of licensing requirements for computers that were used in making hydrogen bombs. Today we loosen sanctions on Pakistan despite its ongoing nuclear and missile programs. Where will this process lead tomorrow?

That is the question that remains unanswered by today's legislation. It is a question that I surely hope is on the minds of each Member of Congress and the relevant offices in the Executive. Indeed, this is a question that should be on the minds of all Americans.

Exhibit 1

U.S. Aid Policies and Pakistan's Bomb: What Were We Trying to Accomplish?

Letters to Congress from Presidents Reagan & Bush, 1985-1989, required under sec. 620(e) of Foreign Assistance Act (Pressler Amendment)--`The proposed United States assistance program for Pakistan remains extremely important in reducing the risk that Pakistan will develop and ultimately possess such a device. I am convinced that our security relationship and assistance program are the most effective means available for us to dissuade Pakistan from acquiring nuclear explosive devices. Our assistance program is designed to help Pakistan address its substantial and legitimate security needs, thereby both reducing incentives and creating disincentives for Pakistani acquisition of nuclear explosives.'--President George Bush, 10/5/89; President Ronald Reagan, 11/18/88; 12/17/87; 10/27/86; & 11/25/85.

President George Bush, letter to Congress (addressed to J. Danforth Quayle as President of the Senate), 12 April 1991, urging abandonment of Pressler certification requirement: `. . . my intention is to send the strongest possible message to Pakistan and other potential proliferators that nonproliferation is among the highest priorities of my Administration's foreign policy, irrespective of whether such a policy is required by law.'

Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Teresita Schaffer, testimony before House subcommittee, 2 August 1989: `None of the F-16's Pakistan already owns or is about to purchase is configured for nuclear delivery . . . a Pakistan with a credible conventional deterrent will be less motivated to purchase a nuclear weapons capability.'

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Arthur Hughes, testimony before House subcommittee, 2 August 1989: `Finally, we believe that past and continued American support for Pakistan's conventional defense reduces the likelihood that Pakistan will feel compelled to cross the nuclear threshold.'

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Robert Peck, testimony before House subcommittee, 17 February 1988: `We believe that the improvements in Pakistan's conventional military forces made possible by U.S. assistance and the U.S. security commitment our aid program symbolizes have had a significant influence on Pakistan's decision to forego the acquisition of nuclear weapons.'

Special Ambassador at Large Richard Kennedy, testimony before two House subcommittees, 22 October 1987: `We have made it clear that Pakistan must show restraint in its nuclear program if it expects us to continue providing security assistance.'

Assistant Secretary of State Richard Murphy, testimony before Senate subcommittee, 18 March 1987: `Our assistance relationship is designed to advance both our non-proliferation and our strategic objectives relating to Afghanistan. Development of a close and reliable security partnership with Pakistan gives Pakistan an alternative to nuclear weapons to meet its legitimata security needs and strengthens our influence on Pakistan's nuclear decision making. Shifting to a policy of threats and public ultimata would in our view decrease, not increase our ability to continue to make a contribution to preventing a nuclear arms race in South Asia. Undermining the credibility of the security relationship with the U.S. would itself create incentives for Pakistan to ignore our concerns and push forward in the direction of nuclear weapons acquisition.'

Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Howard Schaffer, testimony before House subcommittee, 6 February 1984: `The assistance program also contributes to U.S. nuclear non-proliferation goals. We believe strongly that a program of support which enhances Pakistan's sense of security helps remove the principal underlying incentive for the acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability. The Government of Pakistan understands our deep concern over this issue. We have made clear that the relationship between our two countries, and the program of military and economic assistance on which it rests, are ultimately inconsistent with Pakistan's development of a nuclear explosives device. President Zia has stated publicly that Pakistan will not manufacture a nuclear explosives device.'

Special Ambassador at Large Richard Kennedy, testimony before two House subcommittees, 1 November 1983: `By helping friendly nations to address legitimate security concerns, we seek to reduce incentives for the acquisition of nuclear weapons. The provision of security assistance and the sale of military equipment can be major components of efforts along these lines. Development of security ties to the U.S. can strengthen a country's confidence in its ability to defend itself without nuclear weapons. At the same time, the existence of such a relationship enhances our credibility when we seek to persuade that country to forego [sic] nuclear arms . . . We believe that strengthening Pakistan's conventional military capability serves a number of important U.S. interests, including non-proliferation. At the same time, we have made clear to the government of Pakistan that efforts to acquire nuclear explosives would jeopardize our security assistance program.'

Statement by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Harry Marshall, 12 September 1983, before International Nuclear Law Association, San Francisco: `U.S. assistance has permitted Pakistan to strengthen its conventional defensive capability. This serves to bolster its stability and thus reduce its motivation for acquiring nuclear explosives.'

President Ronald Reagan, report to Congress pursuant to sec. 601 of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act (`601 Report'), for calendar year 1982--`Steps were taken to strengthen the U.S. security relationship with Pakistan with the objective of addressing that country's security needs and thereby reducing any motivation for acquiring nuclear explosives.'

President Ronald Reagan, report to Congress pursuant to sec. 601 of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act (`601 Report'), for calendar year 1981--`Military assistance by the United States and the establishment of a new security relationship with Pakistan should help to counteract its possible motivations toward acquiring nuclear weapons . . . Moreover, help from the United States in strengthening Pakistan's conventional military capabilities would offer the best available means for counteracting possible motivations toward acquiring nuclear weapons.'

Assistant Secretary of State James Malone, address before Atomic Industrial Forum, San Francisco, 1 December 1981: `We believe that this assistance--which is in the strategic interest of the United States--will make a significant contribution to the well-being and security of Pakistan and that it will be recognized as such by that government. We also believe that, for this reason, it offers the best prospect of deterring the Pakistanis from proceeding with the testing or acquisition of nuclear explosives.'

Undersecretary of State James Buckley, testimony before Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 12 November 1981: `We believe that a program of support which provides Pakistan with a continuing relationship with a significant security partner and enhances its sense of security may help remove the principal underlying incentive for the acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability. With such a relationship in place we are hopeful that over time we will be able to persuade Pakistan that the pursuit of a weapons capability is neither necessary to its security nor in its broader interest as an important member of the world community.'

Testimony of Undersecretary of State, James Buckley, in response to question from Sen. Glenn, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 12 November 1981, on effects of a nuclear detonation on continuation of cash sales of F-16's: `[Sen. Glenn] . . . so if Pakistan detonates a nuclear device before completion of the F-16 sale, will the administration cut off future deliveries?

`[Buckley] Again, Senator, we have underscored the fact that this would dramatically affect the relationship. The cash sales are part of that relationship. I cannot see drawing lines between the impact in the case of a direct cash sale versus a guaranteed or U.S.-financed sale.'

Undersecretary of State James Buckley, letter to NY Times, 25 July 1981: `In place of the ineffective sanctions on Pakistan's nuclear program imposed by the past Administration, we hope to address through conventional means the sources of insecurity that prompt a nation like Pakistan to seek a nuclear capability in the first place.'

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Exhibit 2

From Nucleonics Week, April 24, 1997

[FROM NUCLEONICS WEEK, APRIL 24, 1997]

PAEC Official Says China Will Make Key Parts, Finish Chashma by 1999

(BY MARK HIBBS)

Tokyo: Pakistan's first imported PWR will be finished by the end of 1998, and contain equipment which China imported for its prototype PWR at Qinshan but which Chinese firms have since learned to make, according to Parvez Butt, a member of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC).

Butt described the 300-MW PWR at Chashma as 70% complete in terms of both cost and equipment installed. Still to be installed are reactor internals.

For Qinshan-1, the reactor vessel and internals and steam generator tubing were manufactured in Japan, Germany, France, Sweden, and Britain. At that time, Western industry firms involved in making the equipment claimed that China did not have the metallurgical know-how needed to make all the equipment needed to replicate the plant in Pakistan (NW, 6 Feb. '92, 2). South Korean officials said in 1995 that Korea Heavy Industry & Construction Co. Ltd. (KHIC) had been approached to make the vessel, since it is already manufacturing vessels for China's larger indigenous PWRs at Qinshan, but the idea was dropped when Seoul applied to join the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NW, 28 Sept. '95, 1).

Butt said that the pressure vessel for Chashma-1 was made at a factory in northern China and has been undergoing testing since October. Butt said the vessel would be `ready soon' and would conform to international quality standards. According to French industry sources, China sought to make larger pressure vessels for the next French-supplied PWRs to be build in Guangdong Province, but experts at Framatome refused, citing quality concerns.

The steam generators for Chashma-1 will be made by Shanghai Boiler Works, and Shanghai Turbine Works will make the turbine generator. The unit's two main circulation pumps will also be provided by Chinese firms. Instrumentation and control (I&C) equipment is of Chinese design, Butt said, and will be manufactured by Chinese firms in Shanghai and Beijing.

Butt said China will also provide the first core and three reloads, using Chinese uranium enriched and fabricated into fuel in China. China has trained about 150 Pakistani operating and maintenance personnel at Qinshan, Butt said. Pakistan industry input to the Chashma project has been limited to some auxiliary equipment such as decontamination tanks in the liquid waste treatment system.

According to Butt, Pakistan paid cash for all the Chinese input to the Chashma project. Financing for a second Chinese unit there, he said, has `not yet been arranged.'

--

--

From Nucleonics Week, March 27, 1997

[FROM NUCLEONICS WEEK, MARCH 27, 1997]

New Pakistani Government Restores Full Funding for Chashma Project

(BY ABDUL RAUF SIDDIQI)

Karachi: The new government of Nawaz Sharif has decided to divert unutilized funds amounting to about 4-billion rupees (U.S. $100-million) from the disbanded People's Works Programme to the 300-MW Chashma Nuclear Power Project, restoring the current year's budget to ensure the plant's on-time completion, government sources said.

The People's Works Programme was disbanded by the caretaker government headed by Miraj Khalid, which bridged the time between the dissolution of Benazir Bhutto's government to the formation of the current one. The caretaker government, brought into office on complaints of corruption, mismanagement, and misuse of funds in the Bhutto regime, allowed only those program projects which were near to completion to continue.

The caretaker government also reduced the allocation for Chashma by Rs 3-billion from the Rs 4.7-billion budgeted for fiscal 1996-97.

Chashma, being constructed at an estimated cost of Rs 31-billion by the China National Nuclear Corp., is said to be progressing on schedule and is expected to be completed by the target of October 1998. It is modeled on China's indigenous-design PWR at Qinshan.

--

From Nucleonics Week, March 20, 1997

[FROM NUCLEONICS WEEK, MARCH 20, 1997]

Ex-Army Head Says Pakistan Bomb Passed Computer Simulation Tests

(BY ABDUL RAUF SIDDIQI)

Karachi: Pakistan has completed its tests of its atomic bomb capability successfully through computer simulation, according to Pakistan's former Army Chief, retired general Mirza Aslam Beg in an interview with the Urdu language national daily Pakistan published in Lahore.

Beg, who retired in 1990, is head of the Awami Qiyadat Party (AQP) and of an international think tank, Foundation for Research on International Environment, National Defence & Security. He took over the reins of the armed forces after his predecessor died in a 1988 plane crash. He was the first army chief to confirm Pakistan's nuclear capability, and disclosed that the government froze the nuclear program in 1989 under U.S. pressure.

The former army chief's confirmation of Pakistan's nuclear test via computer came an India is preparing to conduct a final test of its intercontinental ballistic missile Prithvi at Arrisa, Khalij Bengal. Beg said that Pakistan's next step would be the technology to drop a bomb. He said he has no knowledge of Pakistan's possessing the needed missile technology, he said, `we can use F-16 aircraft for the purpose.'

--

From the Deutsche Presse-Agentur, July 3, 1997

[FROM THE DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR, JULY 3, 1997]

Pakistan Confirms Test Firing Rocket but Gives no Details

Islamabad: A government spokesman in Islamabad confirmed Thursday that Pakistan's Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Council (Suparco) recently test fired a rocket.

`It was a routine test carried out by Suparco in rocket motor technology and was aimed at peaceful uses of technology,' said the spokesman of the Foreign Ministry commenting on press reports that the test involved Hatf-3 missile .

The spokesman did not identify the rocket as Hatf-3 nor did he confirm a report that it had a range of 800 kilometres. `I do not have the technical details,' he said.

Suparco is a civilian organization and its research had `no military component', he added.

Pakistan has been developing the Hatf missile to rival India's medium-range Prithvi missile . China has been helping Pakistan in the effort and has also supplied its M-11 missiles to the Moslem country.

`You are free and welcome to locate the factory,' the spokesman said rejecting as `totally baseless' a U.S. Time magazine report last month that spy satellites of the American Central Intelligence Agency had spotted the layout of a new missile factory in the suburbs of Rawalpindi, adjacent to Islamabad.

In the past, American intelligence agencies reports about the existence of secret nuclear facilities near Rawalpindi have neither been admitted nor proved independently.

--

--

From Nucleonics Week, July 3, 1997

[FROM NUCLEONICS WEEK, JULY 3, 1997]

U.S. Believes Khushab Still Cold, No Heavy Water Sold by China

(BY MARK HIBBS)

Bonn: U.S. officials last week categorically denied a report from Pakistan which claimed that an unsafeguarded reactor near Khushab has started operating. One official monitoring nuclear developments in Pakistan told Nucleonics Week instead that `all the data at hand indicates that the reactor is still cold.'

Two weeks ago, the Pakistani English-language newspaper Dawn asserted that the reactor is finished and has started up, but cannot produce electricity or reach full power because of a shortage of heavy water (NW, 19 June, 15).

Western officials conjectured that the Pakistani claim may have been triggered by a construction milestone at the reactor site or planted in response to recent reports that India has deployed the Prithvi ballistic missile .

In 1994, Western officials told Nucleonics Week that Pakistan was building a plutonium production reactor, rated at between 50 and 70 megawatts thermal, at a site near Khushab. These sources later added that intelligence pointed to construction of a fuel fabrication or reprocessing center near the reactor (NW, 22 Feb. '96, 6). As late as this April, however, a member of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission denied flatly that the reactor existed.

According to one U.S. official this week, however, the Khushab reactor `is definitely out there' but not scheduled to be finished `until later this year or sometime in 1998.' Another official said that, under the most optimistic schedule, completion of the reactor `is several months away.' Sources indicated that the reactor had not yet undergone cold testing, let alone become critical.

The Pakistani report suggested that the reactor would be used for electricity production as well as for isotope production. Recent surveillance photographs of the site, however, do not indicate that Pakistan is building power grid infrastructure, such as turbine generator equipment, for electricity generation. Moreover, Western officials said, it is not believed the reactor's chief purpose is isotope or silica production, as stated in the Pakistani account. Pakistan has a technical cooperation program with the IAEA for these activities, `but none of this has got anything to do with Khushab,' one Vienna official said, and the IAEA `has not been informed' by Pakistan that the reactor is under construction or that Pakistan plans to incorporate the unit into its existing technical cooperation program.

Sources said that, because Pakistan is facing a massive financial crisis, the U.S. and other creditor countries supporting the International Monetary Fund are trying to leverage Islamabad to keep the reactor from operating outside of IAEA safeguards. Zia Mian, a research fellow at the Union of Concerned Scientists in Cambridge, Mass., observed, `If Pakistan were to start operating the reactor now, it would be taking a very major foreign policy step,' demonstrating to the world that its unsafeguarded program is going forward regardless of U.S. opposition, and escalating military nuclear activities to include significant plutonium production.

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INDIAN REPORT ALSO UNCONFIRMED

U.S. officials last week confirmed the assertion by Dawn that a critical factor which may indefinitely delay full-power operation of Khushab is shortage of heavy water. But they did not confirm recurring Indian reports that China, which the U.S. believes to have supported construction of Khushab, also provided heavy water for it. According to Western intelligence sources, a full inventory of heavy water for the unit would be about 15-20 metric tons (MT), though it could go critical with a smaller amount.

Indian sources said that, in 1996, China sold Pakistan 40 MT for Khushab, U.S. officials said the Indian government had told Washington this recently, but U.S. government agencies `could not confirm' the Indian assertion. A U.S. official said last week that, when New Delhi made the allegations to Washington, the U.S. `went back to the Chinese on this' and received assurances from Beijing that Chinese entities did to sell heavy water to Pakistan for Khushab.

U.S. officials said Indian allegations of Chinese heavy water trading with Pakistan were first made during the 1970s, and the most recent claims were initially taken seriously because there is evidence of past Chinese heavy water sales to both India and Pakistan.

Last year, the Department of State, now negotiating a resumption of nuclear commerce with China, asserted to the U.S. Congress that as of May 1996, China was not assisting any unsafeguarded foreign nuclear programs. Despite the Indian claims, U.S. officials last week continued to back China's nonproliferation credentials. `That means nothing has gone to Khushab,' since mid-1996, `and no heavy water,' one U.S. official involved said June 26.

According to the Pakistani report, administrative difficulties in Pakistan had prevented heavy water from being allocated for the Khushab reactor. Sources told Nucleonics Week that, in fact, most of Pakistan's scarce heavy water resources have, over the last two years, been allocated for the Kanupp PHWR, which generates electricity under IAEA safeguards. That allocation, sources said, reflected a general policy by Pakistan under former prime minister Benazir Bhutto not to take any steps, such as producing high-enriched uranium (HEU) at the Kahuta centrifuge enrichment plant, which would be seen by Washington as provocative and escalating regional nuclear tension. One source said, `Keeping heavy water at Kanupp and away from Khushab should be seen by Washington as going hand-in-hand with not enriching uranium to HEU.'