1997 Congressional Hearings
Special Weapons
Nuclear, Chemical, Biological and Missile


FY 1998 security assistance budget request for foreign operations

Thomas McNamara
Assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs.

Senate subcommittee on International Economic Policy, Export and Trade Promotion

March 12, 1997

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am pleased to testify today in support of
the administration's FY 1998 security assistance budget request for
foreign operations.

As America stands at the threshold of a new century, we face a
challenge that recalls the opportunities and dangers that confronted
our nation at the end of the First and Second World Wars. Then, as
now, two distinct choices lay before us: either to claim victory and
turn inward, or to continue to provide strong American leadership in
international affairs and enhanced U.S. national security. After World
War I, our leaders chose the first course and we and the world paid a
terrible price.

No one can dispute that after the Second World War, our leaders -- and
most of all the American people -- wisely made the second choice. By
choosing a path of engagement, America made possible the construction
of a more secure, democratic and prosperous world. To meet the
challenges of the next century and to build an even safer world for
our children, we must plot a similar course marked by vision and
steadfastness of purpose.

The United States has a remarkable opportunity in the years ahead to
shape a world conducive to American interests and consistent with
American values -- a world of open societies and open markets. But the
pathway to a more peaceful, secure and democratic world remains beset
with uncertainty. As in the past, the critical test of American
leadership will be our willingness to dedicate the resources necessary
to protect and enhance American national interests abroad. This task
will not be easy, in light of budget constraints and our commitment to
balance the federal budget.

However, if we fail to exercise our leadership now in meeting the
threats to the security of our nation posed by the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction and other dangerous arms, drug
trafficking, terrorism, and other activities that undermine regional
security, impede democratic reform and stifle economic growth, we will
pay an enormous price later.

President Clinton's fiscal year 1998 International Affairs budget
request of $19.451 billion, a modest increase over the FY 97
appropriated level of $18.227 billion, will provide the minimum
essential tools for maintaining America's strong global leadership
role. The foreign operations component of this request totals $13.324
billion, up from $12.250 billion in FY 97. We look to Congress for
solid, bipartisan support in rebuilding a foreign affairs program base
that in recent years has slipped to dangerously low levels.

Mr. Chairman, the purpose of American foreign policy is to protect and
promote American interests. We can no longer afford to cut our
International Affairs budget and risk crippling U.S. prestige,
credibility and influence on the international stage. If we do, we
threaten to jeopardize important political and economic interests, and
potentially compromise our national security. By supporting our FY 98
budget request, you and the members of this committee will enable a
dedicated corps of public servants to champion American political and
economic interests, further democracy, and maintain American
leadership abroad. Although the future may be uncertain, one thing is
for sure: we will continue to face crises and challenges. As we move
toward the 21st Century, we must remain willing and prepared to
protect our nation's vital interests.

Secretary Albright has laid out six mutually reinforcing objectives
which form the framework of our International Affairs budget request
for fiscal year 1998. They include:

-- Securing peace;

-- Promoting economic prosperity;

-- Fostering sustainable development;

-- Providing humanitarian assistance;

-- Promoting democracy; and

-- Promoting diplomatic readiness.

Today, I would like to address in greater detail programs which
respond to two of those objectives: securing peace and promoting
democracy. First, let me discuss key regions where we are pursuing
peace. In each, these programs not only build but also leverage
support from our friends and allies for our common goals. From there,
I will review our security assistance programs that promote democracy,
and conclude with an overview of programs that confront global threats
to our national security.

Securing Peace in Regions of Vital Interest

Ensuring the security of our nation remains our principal obligation.
Today's uncertain environment still presents a variety of threats to
U.S. security including:

-- Efforts by rogue regimes to build or acquire weapons of mass
destruction, their delivery systems, and other dangerous arms;

-- Attempts by regional forces hostile to U.S. interests to dominate
their respective regions through aggression, intimidation or terror;
and

-- Internal conflicts among ethnic, national, religious or tribal
groups that undermine regional stability, impede democratic reform,
stifle economic growth and create major humanitarian tragedies and
refugee flows.

While American military power serves as the principal means by which
we can protect our interests against these threats, our critical
mission is to prevent such threats from requiring military
intervention. We do this through intensive diplomacy, multilateral
peace operation efforts, and strengthening of our alliances and
coalition partners. The foreign operations budget funds these
important efforts and, in the end, helps us avoid the costs of armed
conflict while preserving international peace and stability.

Building a New European Security Structure

America has a great stake in preserving and promoting peace, democracy
and security throughout the European continent. Deep political,
military, economic and cultural ties link Europe's security and
prosperity to our own. Twice in this century, Americans have gone to
war in Europe to protect our vital interests, and American troops have
remained in Europe since World War II. Europe is now in a period of
transition and transformation as we attempt to overcome Cold War
divisions in building a New Atlantic Community. But regional conflicts
persist in the Balkans, the former Soviet Union, Central Europe and
the eastern Mediterranean, posing serious threats to regional -- and
global -- security and stability.

U.S. security policy in Europe rests upon the cornerstones of NATO;
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE);
cooperation with Russia; and an enhanced partnership with the European
Union on regional and global issues. The point of departure has been
and will remain the preservation of U.S. leadership in a robust
Atlantic Alliance. We have led in adapting NATO to meet the challenge
of ensuring peace and stability in Europe in light of the changed
security environment. In NATO, we face several critical, ongoing
tasks: 1) continuing the momentum toward gradual, transparent
enlargement of the Alliance; 2) establishing a new, cooperative
relationship between NATO and Russia, expressed in a formal charter;
3) promoting a more visible and capable European role; and 4)
enhancing the Partnership for Peace program.

The potentially volatile situation in Europe's southeastern corner
requires particular care. The United States is committed to promoting
a settlement on Cyprus, controlling tensions between Turkey and
Greece, and strengthening Turkey's place in the Western economic and
security system. The United States gives high priority, not only to
bilateral relations with these countries, but also to promoting ties
between this region and Western Europe.

For FY 98, we are requesting $219.3 million in military and economic
assistance to support our security objectives in Europe. Together with
our requested economic assistance program for Central Europe and the
Baltic States ($492 million) and NIS ($900 million) these funds will
help to build a stable, free, undivided, integrated and democratic
Europe.

FY 98 Budget Request - Building a New European Security Structure
(dollars in millions)
FMF = Foreign Military Financing
ESF = Economic Support Fund
PFP = Partnership for Peace
IMET = International Military Education and Training

                      FMF              ESF             TOTAL

CE Defense Loans/a    20.000                           20.000
Cyprus                                 15.000          15.000
Greece/a              12.850                           12.850
PFP/b                 70.000                           70.000
Turkey/a              33.150           50.000          83.150
IMET                                                   18.300

Total/c              136.000           65.000         219.300

/a Loan amounts: CE - $402.000; Greece - $122.500; Turkey - $175.000.

/b Does not include approximately $33.0OO from Function 050 for PFP.

/c Does not include $l9.600 in ESF for the International Fund for
Ireland.

Partnership For Peace

In 1994, the president proposed, and allies embraced, a program of
NATO adaptation. The goal is to create a new NATO, internally
restructured, equipped for new roles and missions, and open to new
members and deeper partnerships. NATO's Partnership for Peace (PFP)
program is designed to strengthen practical cooperation and establish
strong security ties between NATO and participating countries in
Central Europe and the New Independent States of the Former Soviet
Union (NIS). It can also serve to prepare those partners interested in
joining NATO for the obligations of membership. By forging close
cooperative ties between NATO and its Central European and NIS
Partners, PFP will help erase Cold War lines of confrontation and
bring former adversaries into a community of shared values, principles
and interests. The transformation of NATO's relations with the rest of
Europe will help provide a secure and stable environment conducive to
increased trade, development and market-based reforms.

NATO enlargement creates a special need to enhance support to those
countries seeking NATO membership. Those countries which will be
invited to open accession talks need assistance to make their military
forces operable with Alliance forces. We must therefore increase the
FMF grant assistance available to these countries. For those countries
which desire to join NATO but will not be part of the first accession,
the need is equally critical. PFP links between Central European,
Baltic states, the NIS and the West must be strengthened to reassure
these countries of their place in the West, and to prevent any sense
of a security vacuum.

Partner nations, while generally committed to making their forces
capable of cooperating with NATO, currently lack the necessary
resources to undertake improvements in logistics, equipment and
training. We must be willing to contribute adequate resources to
ensure PFP's success. This assistance aims to improve partners'
abilities to contribute to peace operations, search and rescue,
humanitarian assistance operations, and other joint operations that
may be necessary in the future. For example, the participation of 13
partners in the multinational Implementation Force in Bosnia reflected
initial returns on the small investments we have made in PFP, and
provides an indication of the potential for long-term benefits.

In FY 98, the administration is requesting $103 million for PFP: $70
million in FMF and $33 million within the DOD request. In Central
Europe, foreign assistance funds will support expansion of the
Regional Airspace Initiative, which will provide NATO-compatible air
traffic control systems in selected countries, English language
training, search and rescue equipment, communication and command and
control systems, and transportation and logistical support for
participation in PFP exercises. Funds will also provide ongoing
support for the Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion. In the NIS, we will
build upon the foundations that we expect to lay in FY 97 in the areas
of language training and communications equipment, to include emphasis
on a Central Asia peacekeeping battalion and a Ukrainian-Polish
peacekeeping battalion. The combined State/DOD request will continue
support for partner participation by relieving some of the logistical
and resource deficiencies, equipment obsolescence, and operational
shortcomings which have hampered such participation.

Central Europe Defense Loans

In the interest of contributing to the stability of Europe, the United
States has a clear and compelling rationale for nurturing expanded
defense cooperation with the friendly, democratic states of Central
Europe and the Baltics. Our FY 98 request for $20 million in FMF loan
subsidies will provide approximately $402 million in market-rate
loans. The Central Europe Defense Loan (CEDL) program will increase
our ability to assist the region, in light of limited grant resources,
by encouraging creditworthy countries with growing economies to use
national funds to meet their defense sustainment modernization needs,
ultimately improving compatibility with NATO forces. Although the CEDL
contributes to the overall goal of NATO enlargement, it is separate
and distinct from our PFP program in that it addresses deeper
infrastructure deficiencies, such as lack of airlift capability or
incompatible radar and IFF systems.

The CEDL program will enhance the defensive military capabilities of
Central Europe and Baltic states by assisting in the acquisition of
defense equipment and training such as: NATO-compatible airfield
navigation aids; computers for defense ministries, individual soldier
equipment for peacekeeping or rapid deployment units; transportation
equipment, including vehicles and aircraft; ground-based radar
upgrades; search-and-rescue equipment; communications modernization;
and airfield radars, navigational aids and airfield landing systems.
Moreover, by focusing on qualitative improvements in defense
infrastructure, this program will allow some of the oversized,
Soviet-equipped militaries to continue downsizing and restructuring
their forces while maintaining essential defensive capability. The
CEDL program will support the trend in the region towards supporting
smaller, more capable, and more professional militaries.

Key NATO Allies

We are also planning to continue our support for two key NATO allies
in recognition of their importance in maintaining stability in a
region that is critical to U.S. interests. Our FY 98 request of $46
million for the subsidy cost of a total of $297.5 million in FMF loans
for Greece and Turkey will support sustainment of U.S.-origin
equipment. We are also requesting $50 million in ESF to assist Turkey
to address long-term structural reforms necessary to sustain growth,
to ease the transition as Turkey joins the EU Customs Union, and to
help offset the significant economic costs to Turkey associated with
enforcement of U.N. sanctions against Iraq.

It would be hard to overstate the importance of Turkey as a U.S. ally.
It sits at the crossroads of Europe, the Middle East, and the Newly
Independent States of the Former Soviet Union. It plays a critical
role in a wide range of issues vital to U.S. interests. Achievement of
key U.S. goals in the region will depend largely on our ability to
maximize Turkish-U.S. cooperation on a broad range of issues where we
have overlapping interests. Among these are stability in the Caucasus
and the northern Gulf region, lowering tensions in the Aegean, and a
solution in Cyprus. Cooperation on these issues is dependent on
preserving Turkey's position as a democratic, secular nation in a
region with weak democratic traditions and where political instability
prevails. We seek therefore to strengthen Turkey's ability to carry
out its essential security role in the region, to bolster its secular
democratic tradition through continued emphasis on human rights, and
to help its economy grow and prosper.

Voluntary Peacekeeping Operations

While the bulk of funding for multilateral peacekeeping operations
goes for assessed United Nations operations, it is sometimes in the
U.S. interest to support, on a voluntary basis, peacekeeping
activities that are not U.N.-mandated and/or are not funded by U.N.
assessments. The Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) account has a
demonstrated capacity, under appropriate circumstances, to separate
adversaries, maintain cease-fires, facilitate delivery of humanitarian
relief, allow repatriation of refugees and displaced persons,
demobilize combatants and create conditions under which political
reconciliation may occur and democratic elections be held. This
account provides the flexibility to support pro-actively conflict
prevention and resolution, multilateral peace operations, sanctions
enforcement, and similar efforts outside assessed U.N. peacekeeping
operations. The costs to the United States of such voluntary
operations are often much lower than in U.N.-assessed operations.

For FY 98, we are requesting $90 million in PKO for voluntary
peacekeeping activities. In addition to supporting long-term,
non-assessed commitments, such as the Multinational Force of Observers
(MFO) in the Sinai and the Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe (OSCE), these funds will be used to promote regional
involvement in the resolution of neighboring conflicts. In Africa, for
example, our PKO request, combined with a small amount of FMF, will be
used to help sustain and enhance the African Crisis Response Force
(ACRF) initiative, which seeks to improve and expand the abilities of
African militaries to respond quickly to humanitarian crises on the
African continent and elsewhere. The ACRF represents a regional
application of our new global initiative, the Enhancing International
Peacekeeping Capabilities (EIPC), for which the administration is
requesting $7 million in FMF. The EIPC will assist selected "focus"
countries in improving their capabilities and readiness for
peacekeeping operations, thereby reducing the burden on the United
States. Finally, the FY 98 PKO request also addresses potential
operations in Europe, Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean.

Demining

Mr. Chairman, the demining program is one of the most important
initiatives this Administration has undertaken. As you know, the
United States has a compelling interest to promote national and
regional security, political stability, and economic development by
reducing civilian landmine casualties and their tragic human, social,
and economic costs in war-torn countries. In May 1996, President
Clinton pledged to strengthen global efforts to clear minefileds
through developing better mine detection and mine-clearing technology,
and to expand demining training programs in countries with landmines.

The problem is enormous: more than 100 million mines have been placed
in the last 55 years in almost 70 countries, mainly in Africa and
Asia. Clearly, the clearing of landmines represents a major challenge
requiring long-term solutions. Since FY 94, we have worked together
with DOD to design programs wherein FMF funds for demining are used
primarily to provide equipment to complement comprehensive demining
training programs funded by DOD humanitarian assistance funds.
Together, these resources have begun to develop indigenous
capabilities to remove landmines from mine-afflicted countries.

Our FY 98 FMF request for $15 million will support demining programs
around the world. We will build upon ongoing progress in Angola,
Cambodia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Jordan, Laos, Mozambique, Namibia,
Rwanda, and Central America, as well as the U.N. Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance to Afghanistan, to assist with
their mine clearance/mine awareness program....

Confronting Transnational Security Threats

With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and advanced conventional
weapons now poses the gravest threat to the security of the United
States and our allies. As Secretary Albright emphasized to you last
month, arms control and non-proliferation efforts remain a key part of
our foreign policy strategy to keep America safe. The objectives of
our non-proliferation programs are to reduce the risk of war by
limiting and reducing destabilizing forces, inhibiting the spread of
weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems, and building
confidence through measures which enhance transparency and
verification of compliance with national commitments. In addition to
enhancing our security directly, these measures also support other
important U.S. interests, including economic and political reform in
Russia and the oilier newly independent states, our economic interests
in Asia and the Pacific, and our broader political efforts to resolve
long-standing disputes in the Middle East and South Asia.

FY 98 Budget Request - Non-proliferation

IO&P = International Organizations and Programs
NDF = Non-proliferation and Disarmament Fund
IAEA = International Atomic Energy Agency
KEDO = Korean Energy Development Organization
DEF = Defense Enterprise Fund

                                 (dollars in millions)

                           IO&P      NDF      NIS     TOTAL

NDF                                 15.000            15.000
Science Centers                              15.000   15.000
IAEA Voluntary Contr.      36.000                     36.000
KEDO                       30.000                     30.000
Defense Enterprise Fund                       5.000    5.000

       Total               66.000   15.000   20.000  101.000


To help us achieve our overall non-proliferation objectives, we are
requesting $101 million in FY 98. Through the Non-proliferation and
Disarmament Fund (NDF), we will undertake a variety of bilateral
assistance programs, including export control assistance. Under the
International Organizations and Programs (IO&P) account, we will
contribute to the International Atomic Energy Agency (lAEA) and
support the Korean Energy Development Organization (KEDO). Under the
FREEDOM Support Act, we are also seeking funding for the International
Science Center in Russia, the Science and Technology Center in
Ukraine, and the Defense Enterprise Fund (DEF).

The Non-proliferation and Disarmament Fund

The Non-proliferation and Disarmament Fund (NDF) was established in
1994 to implement specific non-proliferation projects. Since its
inception, the NDF has funded numerous projects for dismantling and
destroying conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction and
their delivery systems, and for strengthening international
safeguards, export control, and nuclear smuggling efforts. Current NDF
projects include:

-- Elimination of SCUD missiles and their launch systems from Romania
and Hungary;

-- Dismantlement of South Africa's Category I missile production
infrastructure;

-- Assistance in the procurement of highly enriched uranium stocks
from the former Soviet Union;

-- Procurement of verifications and safeguards equipment for the IAEA;

-- Procurement of seismic arrays in support of the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty;

-- Completion of the Phase I engineering assessment needed to convert
Russian plutonium production reactors to a power only mode of
operation;

-- Provision of export licensing and enforcement assistance to Central
Europe, the Baltics, and the former Soviet Union; and

-- Successful deployment of an automated system in Poland for tracking
the export of sensitive materials.

To date, NDF has considered over 90 project proposals with an
estimated cost of $120 million, and has approved projects totaling
over $30 million. On March 5, we notified Congress of our intent to
provide $12.2 million for new NDF activities, leaving an available
balance of $10.6 million in the NDF. The FY 98 request of $15 million
will continue to provide funding for proposals to achieve our goals of
preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and
combating nuclear smuggling.

lAEA Voluntary Contribution

For the United States, the most critical function of the IAEA is the
implementation of safeguards to nuclear activities to deter, through
timely detection, the diversion of material and equipment for nuclear
weapons purposes. Safeguards establish the critical arms control
precedent of voluntary verification of compliance with
non-proliferation obligations, including on-site inspection, by a
sovereign state.

For FY 98, we are requesting a $36 million voluntary contribution to
the lAEA within the lO&P account to support safeguards and
non-safeguards-related technical assistance. Safeguards are the
principal but not exclusive U.S. concern with the IAEA. Another
fundamental premise of U.S. nuclear non-proliferation policy, also
embodied in the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is
the commitment to facilitate the exchange of equipment, materials, and
scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of
nuclear energy. A significant portion of the U.S. voluntary
contribution to the IAEA is used to fulfill this obligation. Because
the vast majority of IAEA member states consider this objective of
paramount importance, continued U.S. support for technical cooperation
is crucial to maintain support for a strong safeguards system.

Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO)

KEDO is the international consortium established to implement the
Agreed Framework between the United States and the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea (DPRK) signed on October 21, 1994. The Agreed
Framework will ultimately dismantle North Korea's nuclear weapons
capability. KEDO's central task is to manage the financing and
construction of the light-water reactor (LWR) project in North Korea,
to provide annual shipments of heavy fuel oil to the DPRK, and to
implement other aspects of the Agreed Framework. The U.S. role in this
consortium is to organize and lead KEDO and, with the help of the
Republic of Korea (ROK) and Japan, support the consortium in
fulfilling its tasks.

Our FY 98 request for $30 million within the IO&P account for KEDO is
essential to finance KEDO's administrative expenses and projects,
particularly the provision of heavy fuel oil to the DPRK. Support for
the LWR project and the majority of KEDO administrative expenses and
heavy fuel oil deliveries will come from cash and in-kind
contributions from other KEDO members, especially the ROK and Japan.
Eleven countries, spread over five continents, have become members of
KEDO, reflecting the organization's global character, composition, and
significance. The U.S. contribution is necessary to demonstrate U.S.
leadership and to supplement and leverage contributions from other
countries. Without this funding, KEDO will not be able to operate or
carry out its objectives, thereby weakening the credibility of U.S.
leadership, jeopardizing the implementation of the Agreed Framework,
and contributing to rising security tensions on the Korean Peninsula.
Full funding of this request is the best way to promote U.S.
objectives for peace, security, and nuclear non-proliferation in
Northeast Asia.

International Science and Technology Centers

The International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) in Moscow,
operational since 1994, and the Science and Technology Center in
Ukraine (SYCU), which began to fund scientific research in early 1996,
help to counter the weapons expertise proliferation threat by putting
former Soviet weapons scientists to work on civilian projects. These
projects benefit all Science Center members and partners, including --
in many instances -- U.S. universities, national laboratories and
corporations, which participate as unfunded partners. This program
seeks: 1) to encourage the transition to market-based economies; 2) to
help find solutions to nationally- and internationally-recognized
problems, such as nuclear safety, energy production and environmental
protection; and 3) to integrate NIS scientists and engineers into the
international community.

In FY 98, we anticipate providing up to $15 million under the Freedom
Support Act to continue the important work of these two centers. The
European Union and Japan also provide voluntary contributions to the
ISTC, and Sweden and Canada contribute to the STCU. Procedures have
recently been implemented to allow other governments,
inter-governmental organizations and NGOs (including the private
sector) to participate in Science Center activities. To date, the ISTC
has funded 202 projects in Russia, Kazakstan, Georgia, Belarus and
Armenia, with the participation of nearly 17,000 scientists and
engineers, the majority of whom have expertise on weapons of mass
destruction or their delivery systems.

Defense Enterprise Fund

Our FY 98 assistance for the NIS includes $5 million for the U.S.
contribution to the Defense Enterprise Fund (DEF), which is now
expected to reach self-sustainability in 1999. The DEF, initially
authorized by Congress and established with a grant from the DOD
Cooperative Threat Reduction (Nunn-Lugar) program, was incorporated as
a private, non-profit venture capital fund in March 1994.
Responsibility for funding the DEF shifted to the State Department in
FY 97.

Like other enterprise funds, the DEF assists the NIS in the
development of successful private sector entities which contribute to
a stable market economy. However, the DEF focuses on the privatization
of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-related defense industries and
conversion of WMD-related military technologies and capabilities into
civilian activities. It provides both equity investments and loans to
qualified joint venture initiatives which include personnel and/or
facilities currently or formerly involved in research, development,
production or operation, and support of the former Soviet Union
WMD-related defense sector.

The DEF encourages private sector participation in the ownership and
management of the entities in which the DEF invests, and only makes
investments involving enterprises committed to privatization. U.S.
assistance to the DEF significantly leverages private U.S. investment:
every $1 we have provided to date has leveraged an average of $5 of
private investment. Thus, the DEF supports both the national security
objective of non-proliferation -- eliminating WMD production
capability -- as well as economic reform objectives by promoting the
development of market economies.

Mr. Chairman, these non-proliferation programs are both critical for
the security of America and extremely cost effective. By making very
small investments today to help other countries prevent the spread of
sensitive materials and technologies, we obviate the need to spend
larger sums in the future to protect ourselves against weapons that
have fallen into the wrong hands.

Conclusion

Let me conclude by returning to the central point of my presentation:
the funding that we are requesting directly increases the security of
Americans and advances our direct interest in a stable, peaceful and
prosperous international system. We undertake these programs to
achieve specific objectives, each of which can be measured in terms of
their successes, and each of which makes America and the world safer.
U.S. security depends on promoting peace in the Middle East, building
a new security order in Europe, preventing the spread of dangerous
weapons, and helping foster emerging democracies.

Foreign assistance is an essential tool to pursue American interests
abroad and our security at home. Without adequate funding, strong
American leadership in the world and our ability to protect our vital
interests will be at risk. Strengthening our diplomatic efforts to
address these threats now will help avoid the far greater costs, in
lives as well as resources, of military interventions later. The
support of this committee is essential to achieving those goals and we
are ready to work closely with the committee and staff to fully
address any concerns and questions that you and they may have.

Mr. Chairman, I wish to thank the members of the committee for the
opportunity to provide testimony on the FY 98 budget request, and
would be pleased now to answer any questions you may have.