Congressional Documents

EXCERPTS - Ballistic Missile Defense




105th Congress                                                   Report
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

 1st Session                                                    105-132
_______________________________________________________________________


 
        NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1998


                               ----------                              

                              R E P O R T

                                 OF THE

                     COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                                   ON

                               H.R. 1119

                             together with

                    ADDITIONAL AND DISSENTING VIEWS

      [Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]
                   

 June 16, 1997.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the 
              State of the Union and ordered to be printed


HOUSE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY One Hundred Fifth Congress FLOYD D. SPENCE, South Carolina, Chairman BOB STUMP, Arizona RONALD V. DELLUMS, California DUNCAN HUNTER, California IKE SKELTON, Missouri JOHN R. KASICH, Ohio NORMAN SISISKY, Virginia HERBERT H. BATEMAN, Virginia JOHN M. SPRATT, Jr., South JAMES V. HANSEN, Utah Carolina CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas JOEL HEFLEY, Colorado OWEN PICKETT, Virginia JIM SAXTON, New Jersey LANE EVANS, Illinois STEVE BUYER, Indiana GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi TILLIE K. FOWLER, Florida NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii JOHN M. McHUGH, New York MARTIN T. MEEHAN, Massachusetts JAMES TALENT, Missouri ROBERT A. UNDERWOOD, Guam TERRY EVERETT, Alabama JANE HARMAN, California ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland PAUL McHALE, Pennsylvania HOWARD ``BUCK'' McKEON, California PATRICK J. KENNEDY, Rhode Island RON LEWIS, Kentucky ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois J.C. WATTS, Jr., Oklahoma SILVESTRE REYES, Texas MAC THORNBERRY, Texas TOM ALLEN, Maine JOHN N. HOSTETTLER, Indiana VIC SNYDER, Arkansas SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia JIM TURNER, Texas VAN HILLEARY, Tennessee F. ALLEN BOYD, Jr., Florida JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida ADAM SMITH, Washington WALTER B. JONES, Jr., North LORETTA SANCHEZ, California Carolina JAMES H. MALONEY, Connecticut LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina SONNY BONO, California CIRO D. RODRIGUEZ, Texas JIM RYUN, Kansas MICHAEL PAPPAS, New Jersey BOB RILEY, Alabama JIM GIBBONS, Nevada Andrew K. Ellis, Staff Director C O N T E N T S ---------- Page DIVISION A--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION.................. 19 TITLE I--PROCUREMENT............................................. 19 Weapons Procurement, Navy.................................... 66 Items of Special Interest.................................. 70 Other Procurement, Navy...................................... 81 Items of Special Interest.................................. 91 Aircraft Procurement, Air Force.............................. 101 Items of Special Interest.................................. 106 TITLE II--RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION............ 140 OVERVIEW....................................................... 140 Army RDT&E-.................................................. 142 Items Of Special Interest.................................. 151 Navy RDT&E................................................... 164 Items Of Special Interest.................................. 174 Air Force RDT&E.............................................. 202 Items Of Special Interest.................................. 211 Defense Agencies RDT&E....................................... 216 Items Of Special Interest.................................. 225 Subtitle C--Ballistic Missile Defense Programs............... 258 Section 231--Budgetary Treatment of Amount Requested for Procurement for Ballistic Missile Defense Programs....... 258 Section 232--Cooperative Ballistic Missile Defense Programs 258 Section 233--Deployment Dates for Core Theater Missile Defense Programs......................................... 258 Section 234--Annual Report on Threat Posed to the United States by Weapons of Mass Destruction, Ballistic Missiles, and Cruise Missiles............................ 260 Section 235--Director of Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO)...................................... 260 Section 236--Tactical High Energy Laser Program (THEL)..... 261
105th Congress Report HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 1st Session 105-132 _______________________________________________________________________ NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1998 _______ June 16, 1997.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed
DIVISION A--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION TITLE I--PROCUREMENT ............. Weapons Procurement, Navy Overview ............. Items of Special Interest ............. Standard Missile (SM)-2 Block IIIB medium range (MR) modification kits The budget request contained $35.6 million for 80 SM-2 Block IIIB MR modification kits. The SM is the Navy's primary surface-to-air weapon against hostile aircraft and anti-ship cruise missiles. The latest MR version to enter production, SM-2 Block IIIB, retains the full performance of earlier models and adds improvements against electronic countermeasures. However, the current SM inventory is dominated by older versions that are less capable against modern anti-ship weapons and ineffective against some newer threat missiles. Even though the Navy plans to supplement its new missile production by upgrading older missiles to the Block IIIB configuration, its projected Block IIIB inventories at the turn of the century will still fall significantly short of the quantity required to meet deployment inventories. Accordingly, the committee recommends an increase of $33.0 million to procure an additional 80 SM-2 Block IIIB MR modification kits. This action will allow the Navy to field more of the latest- version missiles and reduce the need to ``cross deck'' the missiles between deploying and returning ships. ............. Other Procurement, Navy ............. Items of Special Interest ............. Cooperative engagement capability (CEC) The budget request did not contain funding for CEC. The CEC significantly improves anti-air warfare (AAW) capability by integrating all battle group component AAW sensor information into a single, real-time depiction that allows one platform to target and engage a hostile air threat with information from another. CEC distributes sensor data from any ship or aircraft in the battle group to all others through a real-time, line-of-sight, high-data-rate distribution network. The committee notes that the Chief of Naval Operations has identified CEC as one of the top three fiscal year 1998 unfunded procurement priorities. Therefore, the committee recommends $114.8 million to restore the Navy's CEC fielding plan by procuring and installing CEC shipsets for two aircraft carrier battle groups. ............. Aircraft Procurement, Air Force ............. Items of Special Interest ............. Theater Airborne Warning System (TAWS) The budget request contained $67.1 million for defense airborne reconnaissance program modifications, but did not contain funding for TAWS, a medium-wave infrared (MWIR) sensor system capable of detecting and calculating the launch points of tactical ballistic missiles. TAWS is currently deployed on the Cobra Ball RC-135 reconnaissance aircraft. In the statement of the managers accompanying the conference report on H.R. 3230 (H. Rept. 104-724), the conferees urged the Air Force to proceed with a program to install TAWS on the Rivet Joint RC-135 aircraft, which is available in greater numbers than the Cobra Ball. Such a program would provide an option for early deployment of TAWS in support of improved theater ballistic missile defenses. However, the Department has opted instead to install this capability on the Airborne Laser (ABL). The committee understands that the ABL is not scheduled to reach initial operational capability until 2003. The long intervening period during which TAWS would remain only on the very few Cobra Ball aircraft would not meet the near-term need for a theater ballistic missile analysis and warning capability. Furthermore, the Air Force plans to acquire no more than seven ABL aircraft, a force structure too small to assure that TAWS would be available when and where needed. The committee believes this important mission is best satisfied by a reconnaissance aircraft. Therefore, the committee recommends an increase of $20.0 million to migrate the MWIR TAWS technology from the Cobra Ball RC-135 to the Rivet Joint RC-135 to enhance near-term deployment flexibility. ............. LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS Subtitle A--Authorization of Appropriations ............. TITLE II--RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION ............. Army RDT&E ............. Items of Special Interest ............. Missile/air defense product improvement The budget request contained $17.4 million for missile/air defense product improvement within PE 23801A. The Patriot system, which provided vital air defense during Operation Desert Storm, is being upgraded through enhanced communications and other system improvements to respond to the evolving air and cruise missile threat. The committee is also aware of efforts to develop block II modifications to the Stinger Missile to provide enhanced performance. The committee supports continuation of these initiatives and recommends $34.1 million, an increase of $10.0 million for Patriot PAC-3 missile upgrades and an increase of $6.7 million for Stinger block II modifications. The Secretary of the Army may use existing PAC-3 missiles from inventory to support development of a cruise missile defense capability. ............. Missile defense battle integration center The budget request contained $5.0 million for the battle integration center (BIC). The Army is building a flexible distributed interactive simulation-based architecture which can operate in regimes of training, exercises and military operations, as well as providing support to advanced concept development. The committee understands that this effort has been identified as an Army priority, yet it is insufficiently funded. The committee recommends an increase of $14.0 million in PE 63308A to continue development of the BIC as an integrated battlelab with the capability to provide high fidelity representation of the modern battlefield. ............. Navy RDT&E ............. Items of Special Interest ............. Cooperative engagement capability The budget request contained $139.2 million in PE 63658N for the cooperative engagement capability (CEC). As reflected in the House report (H. Rept. 104-563) on H.R. 3230 and the statement of managers accompanying the conference report on H.R. 3230 (H. Rept. 104-724), the Congresshas recognized the CEC program as among the highest priority programs in the Navy and the Department of Defense. In testimony during the defense posture hearing on the fiscal year 1997 budget request, the Secretary of Defense singled out the CEC as a program of high priority that he had chosen to accelerate because of its great potential for linking units from more than one service together and greatly increasing their warfighting capability. The Congressional defense committees agreed with the priority established by the Secretary and recommended significant increases to the CEC program to accelerate the fielding of the capability to the fleet and to accelerate and expand joint service integration efforts. The committee notes that the Navy's fiscal year 1998 budget request for the CEC program is significantly less than projected in the fiscal year 1997 Future Years Defense Plan and budget justification, and results in a slip of over one year in the fielding of the capability to fleet units. The committee does not understand the Navy's failure to provide the funding required to maintain the accelerated fielding schedule for a program that has received such a high priority from the Secretary of Defense and from the Congress. The committee believes that the Navy has overemphasized programs for new naval ``platforms'', at the expense of the warfighting weapons systems that would make existing platforms more effective. The committee recommends a total increase of $50.0 million in PE 63658N for the CEC program: $15.0 million to continue the accelerated development of the low cost common equipment set, $5.0 million to support transfer of the CEC design and development agent to industry, $20.0 million to accelerate integration of the CEC into Navy E-2C and P-3 aircraft, $5.0 million to initiate development of an integrated capability between CEC and the ship self defense program, and $5.0 million to accelerate joint service integration and demonstration of CEC with the Army's Patriot and the Marine Corps' Hawk air defense missile systems. ............. Integrated ship self defense test site The budget request contained $132.3 million in PE 64755N for the ship self defense program and $33.2 million in PE 64759N, Major Test & Evaluation Investment. No funds were requested in either program element for the ship self defense set and support equipment required to activate the Navy's Integrated Ship Self Defense Engineering Center (ISDEC). In 1991, the Navy received approval to construct a land- based test facility at Wallops Island to integrate and test the ship self defense system (SSDS) and its related equipment. The decision was made after a comprehensive review of available test sites and their ability to support the engineering development, in-service engineering, training, testing, and other initiatives associated with the SSDS. Construction of the facility was completed in 1995. A December 1996 letter from the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations advised that ``program reductions have resulted in delays of two or more years for the procurement and installation of systems intended for ships and insufficient funding to operate and maintain the Wallops Island facility.'' In view of the priority assigned to the cooperative engagement capability (CEC) and ship self defense programs, the committee does not understand the inability of the Department of the Navy to fund the installation of the required SSDS equipment set and related equipment required to activate the integrated SSDS test site. Such funding should have been an integral part of the program plan when approval for construction of the site was sought and given in 1991. The Navy's inability to provide the required funding is even more incomprehensible in view of the fact that the ship self defense and CEC programs that will use the site have been among the Navy's highest priority programs. These programs have been funded at an average funding level of approximately $400.0 million annually since 1990, and have received significant annual funding increases from Congress. By failing to budget for the activation and operation of the ISDEC, the Navy has severely restricted its ability to perform testing and lifetime engineering support, in-service engineering, and engineering initiatives related to the CEC and SSDS systems. Accordingly the committee recommends an increase of $8.6 million in PE 64759N to purchase the SSDS and related equipment required to activate the integrated land based test site at Wallops Island. The Secretary of the Navy is also directed to provide from available funds the $6.0 million that is required to refurbish and install an AN/SPS-48E air search radar at the site. ............. Air Force RDT&E ............. Items of Special Interest ............. Rocket system launch program The budget request contained $8.0 million in PE 65860F for the rocket system launch program (RSLP). The RSLP provides research, development, test, and evaluation support to the Department of Defense and other government agencies using excess ballistic missile assets. The committee continues to support the atmospheric interceptor technology (AIT) program, a primary technology base program within the Ballistic Missile Defense Office for advanced hit-to-kill interceptor technologies. Flight tests are needed in fiscal year 1998 for the AIT program to move ahead, but funding for these tests was not included in the AIT or RSLP budget requests. The committee understands that these flight tests may use experimental Advanced Solid Axial Stages boosters, the testing of which will help the RSLP program better meet future requirements. The committee recommends $33.0 million for RSLP, an increase of $25.0 million, to support AIT flight tests in fiscal year 1998. ............. Defense Agencies RDT&E ............. Ballistic missile defense The budget request contained $2,589.1 million for research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E), procurement, and military construction of ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems within the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO). The committee recommends changes to the request as summarized below: [In millions of dollars] Support technologies(PE63173C)................................ $25.0 Navy Theater Wide (PE63868C).................................. 150.0 Navy Area Theater (PE64867C).................................. 22.0 THAAD (PE64861C).............................................. 45.0 National Missile Defense (PE63871C)........................... 474.0 Cooperative Programs (PE63XXXC)............................... 123.1 Joint Theater Missile Defense (PE63872C)...................... (18.7) UAV BPI (PE63870C)............................................ (12.9) Theater Missile Defense procurement........................... 384.6 A detailed explanation of the recommended changes are provided below. Cooperative programs The budget request did not contain a separate program element (PE) for cooperative ballistic missile defense (BMD) programs. The committee continues to support cooperative ballistic missile defense programs with U.S. allies. The budget request for cooperative BMD programs with Israel contained $38.7 million for the Arrow Continuation Experiments/ Arrow Deployability project (ACES/ADP) in PE 63872C, and $12.9 million for the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Boost Phase Intercept (UAV BPI) program in PE 63870C. The Israeli commitment to cooperative BMD development remains strong. The committee notes the accomplishments achieved to date by the U.S.-Israeli ACES/ ADP project and recommends $48.7 million for the program, an increase of $10.0 million. The committee believes that additional funding will support efforts to deploy an Israeli ballistic missile defense capability while also providing valuable technological benefits to on-going U.S. TMD programs. The budget request contained $16.5 million within PE 63308A for the Tactical High Energy Laser (THEL) program. The committee is aware that the threat from tactical rockets and missiles is growing, as such systems proliferate world-wide. The U.S. and Israel are cooperating in an effort to respond to this threat by developing a high energy laser that can destroy tactical missiles in flight. The committee recommends a legislative provision (sec. 236) that would transfer the THEL program from the Secretary of the Army to the director of BMDO, and would authorize a total of $38.2 million for the THEL program. The committee directs the transfer of $16.5 million from PE 63308A to PE 63XXXC, a new program element that would consolidate cooperative ballistic missile defense programs under BMDO management. The committee also recommends an increase of $15.0 million to ensure completion of the first phase of the program to design, build, integrate and test the THEL advanced concept technology demonstrator and to begin developmental testing to validate THEL capabilities. The committee further directs the director of BMDO to provide the remaining $6.7 million required for the THEL program from BMDO administrative accounts. The budget request did not contain funding for two cooperative projects with Russia, the Russian-American Observation Satellite (RAMOS) and the Active Plasma Experiment (APEX). The committee recommends $30.0 million for the RAMOS and APEX projects. Recent events indicate some Russian interest in exploring the possibility of greater cooperation in this area. For example, at the recent Helsinki summit, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin declared that they are prepared to explore integrated cooperative defense efforts in the area of early warning support for TMD activities, technology cooperation in areas related to TMD, and expansion of the ongoing program of cooperation in TMD exercises. The committee notes that expanded cooperation with Russia in the area of ballistic missile defense must be carefully considered and implemented only in a manner that does not jeopardize U.S. technological advantages or the development and deployment of U.S. BMD systems. The committee directs the Secretary of Defense to develop a plan for U.S.-Russian cooperative projects--identifying the costs and benefits associated with each project--and to submit this plan to the Congressional defense committees no later than February 1, 1998. The committee believes that the effective management of cooperative BMD programs requires their consolidation in a separate program element. Therefore, the committee recommends a legislative provision (Sec. 232) that would establish the ``Cooperative Ballistic Missile Program'' as a separate program element within BMDO to support technical and analytical cooperative missile defense efforts between the U.S. and other nations. The committee recommends $123.1 million to support the cooperative programs in the new PE63XXXC. This amount includes the transfers of $38.7 million from PE 63872C, $12.9 million from PE 63870C, $16.5 million from PE 63308A, and an increase of $55.0 million over the amounts requested. Joint theater missile defense The budget request contained $542.6 million for the Joint Theater Missile Defense (JTMD) in PE 63872C. The Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF) provides an essential test range capability for Navy and other TMD programs. PMRF enhancements are needed to ensure that the range can support the full scope of TMD testing required in the future. The committee recommends an increase of $20.0 million for the purpose of upgrading the PMRF. The committee also directs the transfer of $38.7 million from PE 63872C to the new cooperative BMD PE 63XXXC to support the Israeli-U.S. effort to develop the Arrow ballistic missile defense system (project 2259). The details of this transfer are discussed elsewhere in this report. The committee recommends $523.9 million for the JTMD program. Medium extended air defense system (MEADS) The budget request contained $47.9 million in PE 63869C for the Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS). The Administration has identified the MEADS as a high priority Theater Missile Defense (TMD) initiative and as an important international cooperative development effort. While the committee supports MEADS, it does so with some reluctance since the Administration currently has no funding in fiscal year 1998 or the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) to continue MEADS development beyond the current project definition- validation phase. The Administration's apparent lack of long- term commitment to MEADS threatens both program stability and perceptions of U.S. reliability as a partner in current and future international cooperative programs. The committee's support for MEADS is dependent on the Administration's willingness to fund its continued development and the Secretary of Defense is urged to provide adequate funding for this development in the FYDP and to designate strongly MEADS as a core TMD program. Multilateralization of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty The committee notes the Administration's decision to seek to expand beyond Russia the number of states party to the 1972 U.S.-Soviet Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty to include three former republics of the Soviet Union. The committee is concerned with the Administration's contention that multilateralizing the ABM Treaty is not a substantive change to the treaty's terms and, therefore, Congressional approval is not required. In a report to Congress in November 1996, the Administration asserted that ``the resolution of succession questions has long been regarded as a function of the Executive Branch'' and that the notion of Congressional approval of any succession agreement ``would cast doubt on well-established principles of treaty succession.'' The committee believes that the issue of whether or not multilateralization involves substantive changes to ABM Treaty has less to do with the question of which states are appropriate successors than with the rights accorded those states under the agreement reached. For example, the treaty allows the parties to deploy up to 100 ABM interceptors. However, the administration has stated that Russia will be granted exclusive rights to deploy the full complement of 100 interceptors on its side. In other words, although the former Soviet states of Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan might become parties to the treaty, they would not be allowed to deploy ABM interceptors on their national territory. In the committee's view, this represents a modification to the rights of the states party to the ABM Treaty, and, therefore a substantive change to the treaty. Furthermore, the committee believes that the addition of multiple coequal parties to the ABM Treaty would substantively change the process by which treaty revisions to might be negotiated. Four parties, each of equal legal standing but with varying rights accorded under the treaty, would presumably have to agree unanimously to amend the treaty if the U.S. pursues such amendments. Such a process is substantively different than negotiating with one equal party. Deployment of an effective national missile defense capable of defending all fifty states, even against a limited ballistic missile threat, will likely require amendment of the treaty. With five parties where there were once only two, the treaty amendment process would be rendered much more difficult, and perhaps impossible. Thus, even while the Administration purports to be committed to an NMD deployment option, it simultaneously supports a change to the ABM Treaty that could render any such deployment option, short of abrogating the treaty, implausible. The committee believes that multilateralization represents a substantive change to the ABM Treaty, and, as such, that the Administration is required to submit any such proposal to Congress for appropriate review and approval. National missile defense The budget request contained $504.1 million for National Missile Defense (NMD) in PE 63871C, $324.7 million less than appropriated for fiscal year 1997. The Secretary of Defense recently informed the committee that NMD funding in the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) is inadequate to support the program and identified a fiscal year 1998 shortfall of $474.0 million, part of a total shortfall of at least $2.3 billion over the FYDP. The committee has consistently believed that proposed NMD budgets were inadequate to support the Administration's ``three plus three'' deployment readiness program. As early as 1994, the committee was informed by the BMDO that annual NMD funding of $600 million was required for a viable technology readiness program. BMDO reported then that annual funding in the range of only $450 million ``could seriously damage our NMD readiness strategy and would likely permit projected third world threats to the homeland to materialize prior to any viable NMD deployment capability.'' In 1995, BMDO informed the committee that a ``three plus three'' deployment readiness program would require annual development funding of $800 million to $850 million. However, the Administration's annual funding requests have consistently fallen hundreds of millions of dollars short of the levels needed for a viable program. Even after the Administration provides additional outyear funding for NMD, the program schedule will be challenging and the committee is concerned that several factors may undermine the viability of even the Administration's option to deploy an NMD by 2003. First, the previous Under Secretary for Acquisition and Technology testified to the committee that no long lead procurement funding for NMD had been budgeted anywhere in the FYDP because no deployment decision had been made. The committee remains concerned that unless appropriate funds for long lead procurement, military construction, and deployment planning are programmed in fiscal year 1999, the option to deploy an NMD by 2003 will be unavailable. Accordingly, the committee directs the Director of BMDO to provide a report to the Congressional defense committees by February 1, 1998, detailing long lead procurement, military construction, and deployment planning, and any other acquisition activity that must be funded prior to a decision to deploy an NMD in order to ensure that deployment by 2003 could be achieved; the cost of these activities; and how BMDO intends to preserve a 2003 deployment option if these activities are not funded in the fiscal year 1999 budget request. Second, the committee is concerned with persistent NMD program organizational difficulties, particularly the delays in establishing the NMD joint program office and awarding the lead system integrator contracts. The committee urges the Secretary to ensure that all management and contract difficulties are identified and addressed in an expedited manner in an effort to provide some long overdue stability to the program. Third, the committee notes that inadequate investments in test assets has increased technical and schedule risk for BMD programs, including NMD. A recent test failure, due to human error in the launch sequence of a NMD test vehicle, resulted in delays to the program because another booster and additional test targets were not available. The committee finds this kind of delay unacceptable for such a high priority program. Accordingly, the committee directs the Director of BMDO to report to the Congressional defense committees by February 1, 1998, on the specific steps that are being taken, and those that should be taken but are not, to mitigate schedule risks and the potential for single point failures resulting from inadequate test assets. Finally, the committee notes that NMD battle management/ command, control, and communications (BM/C3) funding has declined dramatically in each of the last two fiscal years. Effective BM/C3 is of central importance to the success of all ballistic missile defense efforts. While the committee is encouraged that reuse of theater missile defense BM/C3 software is being emphasized by BMDO as a means of speeding development and reducing risk and cost, NMD software development remains a significant challenge. The committee believes that BM/C3 development and risk reduction efforts deserve priority attention and urges DOD to establish reuse of TMD BM/C3 as a significant evaluation criterion in future NMD system contract awards, consistent with system requirements. The committee believes that deployment of a national missile defense remains a national priority and recommends $978.1 million, an increase of $474.0 million. Navy area theater ballistic missile defense The budget request contained $267.8 million in PE 64867C for Navy Area Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (TBMD). The committee notes the program's recent missile intercept testing successes and supports Department efforts to accelerate this program. As with all current TMD programs, the committee believes that the Navy Area TBMD test program could be more effectively accelerated if sufficient threat representative missile targets and test component spares were available. Accordingly, the committee recommends $289.8 million, an increase of $22.0 million to provide additional test support. Navy theater-wide missile defense The budget request contained $194.9 million in PE 63868C for the Navy theater-wide missile defense system. The unfunded requirements list from the Chief of Naval Operations and communications from other offices in the Navy indicate that the theater-wide program is inadequately funded to support an accelerated development test plan. Moreover, there is a growing concern that the Department still has not thoroughly assessed the feasibility of accelerating the currently planned Navy theater-wide missile defense deployment date of fiscal year 2008. Noting numerous Administration statements attaching high priority to TMD programs, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to report to the Congressional defense committees no later than February 15, 1998, on the cost and technical feasibility of options for a more robust Navy theater-wide flight test program, the earliest technically feasible deployment date, and costs associated with such a deployment date. The committee recommends an increase of $344.9 million, an increase of $150.0 million, to support a more robust program schedule. Support technologies The budget request contained a total of $147.6 million in PE 63173C for BMD support technologies. The Atmoshperic Interceptor Technology (AIT) program is an ongoing effort that addresses technological challenges common to several BMD programs, including THAAD, the Navy theater-wide program, and the national missile defense effort by examining advanced hit-to-kill warhead technologies. The budget request included only $4.9 million for AIT, a reduction from $43.0 million appropriated for fiscal year 1997. The committee supports AIT and recommends an increase of $25.0 million to continue more robust AIT development. The committee is concerned by a funding reduction of over $100.0 million for BMD support technologies from the fiscal year 1997 level. Reductions of this magnitude slow the development of critical and innovative technologies and are inconsistent with the Administration's assertion that the budget request supports an acceleration of theater missile defense programs. They also undermine the comprehensive technology effort needed to stay ahead of the evolving ballistic missile threat. The committee urges the Secretary of Defense to provide adequate funding for BMD support technologies and recommends $172.6 million, an increase of $25.0 million. Theater high altitude air defense The budget request contained $556.1 million for demonstration/validation and engineering and manufacturing development for the Theater High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) system. The committee supports the THAAD program, believes it will provide U.S. military forces with critically needed protection against ballistic missile attack, and restates its support of THAAD as a core TMD system. Although the THAAD program has met numerous test objectives to date, the committee is concerned by recent test failures and supports the Department's prompt and comprehensive program reviews. However, the committee is disturbed by indications that the Department nonetheless plans to reduce prior year and fiscal year 1998 THAAD funding in order to use the funds for other purposes. Although identification of the causes of test failures is necessary before further testing, the committee believes that both the Administration's currently planned fielding date of 2006 may be indicative of a program constrained by funding and insufficient test opportunities. Independent reviews of THAAD have reaffirmed the program's planned design, operational requirement, and the successful completion of 28 of the 30 THAAD program objectives to date. In addition to the on-going review of THAAD, the committee believes that the test program will benefit from additional funding to provide reserve interceptor, missile, and target assets, as well as other back-up resources. A more robust test program will help to lower the risk of delays and lost opportunities resulting for unexpected anomalies and single- point failures. The committee recommends $601.1 million, an increase of $45.0 million in PE 64861C, to provide funds necessary for additional THAAD testing and to further mitigate risk in the flight test program. The committee strongly urges the Department not to reduce funding for THAAD in order to address shortfalls elsewhere in the FYDP and to use any prior or fiscal year 1998 THAAD funds deemed unavailable for obligation for their original purpose for further risk reduction in the test program. Theater missile defense demarcation The committee notes that the presidents of the United States and Russia, at the recent Helsinki summit, signed a joint statement concerning the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and the relationship of TMD systems to that treaty. The joint statement outlined the agreement reached last year between both sides at the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) regarding lower-velocity TMD systems, which Russia refused to sign, and established parameters to be used as the basis for further negotiations on higher-velocity TMD systems. The committee is concerned with several elements of the joint Helsinki statement. First, it establishes limitations on TMD systems in the context of the ABM Treaty. The ABM Treaty, which prohibits a defense of U.S. national territory against strategic ballistic missiles, was never intended to apply to theater missile defense systems. Second, the Administration asserts that it has sought to negotiate an agreement with Russia that would ``clarify'' the distinction between permitted and prohibited missile defense capabilities. The agreement fails to achieve this clarification. The committee continues to accept the ``demonstrated standard'' identified in section 325 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 (Public Law 104-106), which makes no reference to interceptor speeds. Specifically, this provision established the principle that TMD interceptors could not be tested against a ballistic missile traveling farther than 3,500 kilometers or with a velocity greater than five kilometers per second. Interceptors tested against ballistic targets exceeding these parameters would be considered ABM-capable. This ``demonstrated standard'' was the only criterion supported by Congress for judging whether TMD interceptors were captured by the ABM Treaty. The U.S.-Russian Helsinki agreement would establish the ``demonstrated standard'' as the sole measure of treaty compliance for lower-velocity TMD systems, those with speeds of three kilometers a second or less. However, no agreement was reached on higher-velocity TMDsystems. While the Administration has issued public assurances that no U.S. TMD systems now under development will be restricted by the Helsinki agreement, it has also committed to negotiate with Russia on the higher-velocity systems. The Russian perspective on these impending negotiations is that limits on interceptor speed must be introduced, the U.S. cannot unilaterally declare its higher-velocity TMD programs to be in compliance with the ABM Treaty, and that compliance can only be established through negotiation Far from clarifying the distinction between permitted and prohibited systems, the Administration has apparently accepted an artificial distinction between lower- and higher-velocity TMD and has agreed to negotiations that may limit the performance of U.S. TMD systems. The committee opposes restrictions on higher velocity U.S. TMD systems, as well as negotiations that would compel any degradation of the capabilities embodied in U.S. TMD systems, present or future. Third, the agreement reached in Helsinki went beyond even the Administration's stated objective of clarifying ambiguities in the ABM Treaty. For instance, the joint statement notes that TMD deployments should be limited in ``number and geographic scope.'' Such a restriction could impose for the first time unacceptable restraints on where and how TMD systems might be deployed. Fourth, the joint statement notes U.S.-Russian agreement that no TMD deployment will be directed against the other party. This prohibition could deny new NATO members an important defensive benefit under Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty. Under such a restriction, Russia may object to U.S. TMD systems deployed in Western Europe or Asia intended to protect U.S. forces and allies. Such a restriction is likely to make it more difficult to build an allied consensus on the need for TMD. Finally, the language of the joint statement committing the sides to ``exchange detailed information annually on TMD plans and programs'' has the potential to provide Russia with sensitive information regarding U.S. TMD programs, as well as an opportunity to challenge U.S. TMD programs early in their development. Such exchanges must be carefully thought through and implemented only to the extent that they do not undermine U.S. national security objectives. The committee notes the Administration has stated that the Helsinki agreement on theater missile defense demarcation represents a substantive change to the ABM Treaty and its intention to submit the agreement to the Senate for its advice and consent. The committee believes that a full and thorough debate over the implications of the TMD demarcation agreement for U.S. security is long overdue. Theater missile defense of U.S. territories The committee supports highly effective theater missile defenses for the territories of the United States and urges the Secretary of Defense to take all appropriate steps to ensure that U.S. ballistic missile defense planning continues to be responsive to evolving threats to these territories. ............. Transfer of cooperative engagement capability operating frequency band Title VI of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 (Public Law 103-66) requires the federal government to provide a span of radio frequencies aggregating not less than 200 Mhz for allocation to the public. To minimize negative impact on the federal government, the act requires that the spectrum to be reallocated must not be ``required for the present or identifiable future needs of the Federal Government'' and should not result in costs to the federal government that exceed the benefits gained. In February 1995, the National Telecommunications and Information Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, recommended reallocation of 50 MHz from within the operating frequency band of the Navy's cooperative engagement capability (CEC) system. In the statement of managers accompanying the conference report on H.R. 3230 (H. Rept. 104-724), the conferees directed the Secretary of the Navy to prepare a detailed report on: (1) progress being made to resolve spectrum interference that would result from the reallocation of the CEC operating band, and (2) steps being taken to resolve interference between CEC and other fleet weapon systems and data links. According to the Department of Defense (DOD) and the General Accounting Office (GAO), this transfer could result in the loss of a total of 200 MHz (one-third of the CEC's usable operating frequencies) and could severely affect the operational capability of the CEC. DOD officials have also indicated to the GAO that current and future spectrum reallocations could significantly degrade the capabilities of many major weapons systems in addition to the CEC and could cost the Department hundreds of millions of dollars to modify systems and/or rent frequencies from the private sector or foreign governments. The committee is informed, however, that the full implications of the 1993 act are not yet known and that the Department is conducting a comprehensive analysis of spectrum requirements for critical systems in order to determine the extent that operational effectiveness of these systems could be affected by loss ofthe frequency spectrum. The committee also understands that a recent DOD study indicates that the Department's top level spectrum management for planning, policy, and oversight is diffused and weak and that there is no single high-level DOD point of contact for spectrum management. In response to H. Rept. 104-724, the Secretary of the Navy has reported that the Navy is working with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to minimize interference with civilian applications in the reallocated frequency band and the effect of the reallocation on CEC performance. The Secretary's report also states that the Navy's preferred technical option for resolution of interference between CEC and the LAMPS Mk III data link is moving the LAMPS data link to the Ku-band. Should the Navy choose this option for resolution of the problem, the committee expects that the funding required for the transfer will be included in the fiscal year 1999 defense budget request. The committee concurs with the steps taken by the Navy to address the issues raised in the House report, but believes that the problem should be addressed in a more comprehensive manner by the Secretary of Defense. The committee encourages the Secretary to assign responsibility for overall radio frequency spectrum management to a specific organization within the Department. The committee directs the Secretary to prepare a report to the Congress, in coordination with the Chairman of the FCC and the Secretary of Commerce, which addresses: (1) agreements on measures being taken to resolve the impact of the transfer of 50 Mhz from the radio frequency operating band of the cooperative engagement capability (CEC); (2) the impact of transfers of the federal radio frequency spectrum on other critical military systems; (3) how the DOD plans to modify the CEC and other critical systems, including estimated costs and schedule, to compensate for any operational degradation that might be caused by losses of the radio frequency spectrum due to such transfers; and (4) any unresolved issues in joint frequency spectrum management and impediments to the resolutions of these issues. The report shall be submitted to the Congress by March 31, 1998. ............. Subtitle C--Ballistic Missile Defense Programs Section 231--Budgetary Treatment of Amount Requested for Procurement for Ballistic Missile Defense Programs The budget request incorporated a major change in funding policy for BMD programs by transferring all procurement for TMD programs from the centralized BMD account to the separate service procurement accounts. The committee is convinced that the Department, through this action, has placed its professed highest priority missile defense initiatives at risk by forcing them to compete with underfunded modernization programs of higher priority for each individual service. Additionally, in transferring fiscal year 1998 TMD procurement funding to the services, the Department did not issue any specific guidance that outyear funding for these programs was to be sustained or that TMD programs were to be considered as a service priority. Without such guidance, the committee believes that TMD procurement would suffer the same fate as other service modernization programs which continue to be restructured and have their schedules stretched due to funding shortfalls. Finally, despite testimony from the Department on the importance of TMD programs, the committee is disappointed to note that funding for all TMD programs is significantly reduced from the levels provided in fiscal year 1997. The committee is opposed to the proposed change in the TMD funding policy. This provision would direct the Secretary of Defense to transfer all fiscal year 1998 TMD program procurement funds back to the BMD procurement account. The provision would also require that all National Missile Defense program procurement funds be included in the BMDO procurement account. The committee considers procurement and fielding of TMD systems to be a priority congressional interest item and directs the Secretary to retain procurement for these programs within BMDO. Section 232--Cooperative Ballistic Missile Defense Programs This section would establish the ``Cooperative Ballistic Missile Defense Program'' within the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, to support on-going and future technical and analytical cooperative efforts between the U.S. and other nations that contribute to U.S. missile defense capabilities. Section 233--Deployment Dates for Core Theater Missile Defense Programs The committee is disappointed by the Administration's lack of commitment to the timely deployment of theater missile defenses. While the Administration concedes that theater ballistic missiles constitute a clear and present danger to U.S. forces deployed abroad, Congressional efforts on behalf of the rapid development and deployment of TMD systems to meet this threat have been slowed by both Administration action and inaction. In the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 (Public Law 104-106), Congress established first unit equipped (FUE) dates of fiscal year 2000 for Theater High Altitude Area Defense system (THAAD), fiscal year 2001 for the Navy Theater Wide system, fiscal year 1998 for Patriot Advanced Capability Configuration 3 (PAC-3), and fiscal year 1999 for the Navy Area Defense system. These dates were based on Congressional support for the early deployment of a TMD capability, but they were also based on the assumption of aggressive and streamlined management as well as robust funding. However, within weeks of the dates being approved by Congress and signed into law by the President, the Administration took budgetary and programmatic actions that had the effect ofdelaying each of these programs and their deployment dates. Compared to the legally directed dates, the Administration's plan delayed the THAAD deployment date by six years, the Navy Theater Wide system date by at least four years, PAC-3 by one year, and the Navy Area Defense system by two years. In presenting the fiscal year 1998 funding request earlier this year, the Department asserted that all TMD programs had been accelerated. Yet in the case of each of these TMD systems, the fiscal year 1998 request is lower than the amount Congress appropriated for fiscal year 1997. Despite the requirements of Public Law 106-104, the Administration target FUE dates for PAC-3 and Navy Area Defense remained fiscal year 1999 and 2001, respectively, the dates the Administration unilaterally established in 1996 contrary to the law. As noted elsewhere in this report, the Department has still not reviewed the Navy Theater Wide program to determine if accelerating the program from its currently anticipated deployment date of 2008 is feasible. And while Department of Defense announced in January that the THAAD FUE would be accelerated to 2004, the program's FUE was immediately slipped back to 2006 following a test failure. The committee continues to believe that a THAAD user operational evaluation system (UOES) can and should be deployed by fiscal year 2000 and FUE achieved by fiscal year 2004 at an acceptable risk given the high-value payoff associated with deployment of an operational THAAD capability. The committee also understands that BMDO is considering steps that could provide a more robust THAAD UOES capability, thus providing greater capability in the field at an earlier date, and strongly supports any such initiatives. Accordingly, this provision would require the Secretary of Defense to structure the THAAD program to achieve a THAAD UOES capability by fiscal year 2000 and FUE by fiscal year 2004. The committee reiterates its concern that the Department still has not defined the Navy Theater Wide program nor established a program schedule. The committee finds this lack of focus and commitment unacceptable and elsewhere in this report has directed the Secretary of Defense to report to the Congressional defense committees on the earliest feasible Navy Theater Wide deployment date. The committee reminds the Secretary of Defense of his obligation under current law and urges that the Navy Theater Wide program be structured to come as close as possible to achieving a UOES capability in fiscal year 1999 and FUE in fiscal year 2001. Congressional funding increases have helped to accelerate the Navy Area Defense system into engineering and manufacturing development and the PAC-3 program into procurement. The committee also notes the budget request does not propose to slip the deployment dates of these two systems further into the future. Given both programs' advanced state of development and the increasing likelihood that the currently programmed deployment dates will be met, this section would also repeal the dates specified in section 234 of the Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 (Public Law 104-106) for PAC-3 and the Navy Area Defense System. The committee remains committed to fielding effective TMD systems at the earliest feasible date and once again urges the Administration to support full funding and aggressive goal- oriented management for all of these critical systems. Section 234--Annual Report on Threat Posed to the United States by Weapons of Mass Destruction, Ballistic Missiles, and Cruise Missiles The committee believes that awareness of information and assessments concerning evolving threats to U.S. national security is essential to informed congressional debate and decision-making. To that end, the committee believes that a comprehensive description and assessment of the threats posed by weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic and cruise missiles to the U.S. and its allies would be an essential informational for Congress and the public. Therefore, this provision would direct the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Director of Central Intelligence, to prepare and submit to Congress by January 30, 1998, and January 30 of each subsequent year, a report on threats posed to the U.S. and its allies by cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, and weapons of mass destruction, and the proliferation of such technologies. The report should be prepared in classified and unclassified form, to assure the most complete information and widest distribution possible. Section 235--Director of Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) The committee believes that without appropriate senior leadership and a streamlined reporting chain, BMDO's ability to efficiently develop and deploy BMD systems is at risk. Therefore, this provision would requiring that the position of director of BMDO be filled by an officer of the armed forces of the United States with a rank of at least Lieutenant General or Vice Admiral. The committee believes that three star rank is essential to provide the BMDO director the stature within the Department of Defense commensurate with the job's responsibilities. The committee notes that the current director of BMDO is a Lieutenant General, and expects that the requirement established by this section will continue to be filled from within existing statutory authorizations for general and flag officers. The committee also recommends establishing a requirement that the director of BMDO report directly to the Secretary of Defense concerning all matters pertaining to the management of BMDO programs. Such streamlining will help overcome bureaucratic obstacles and allow issues to be promptly and definitively resolved. Section 236--Tactical High Energy Laser Program (THEL) This section would transfer the THEL program from PE 63308A to an new PE 63XXXC that would consolidate cooperative ballistic missile defense programs under Ballistic Missile Defense Organization management and would authorize $38.2 million for THEL. ............. ADDITIONAL AND DISSENTING VIEWS ---------- DISSENTING VIEWS OF RONALD V. DELLUMS I voted against reporting H.R. 1119 from the committee for several reasons. ....... Third, the committee recommendation would press forward too rapidly with national missile defense, notwithstanding that the committee recommendation implicitly adopts the administration's so-called three-plus-three strategy for development and preparation of a national missile defense system. I applaud the committee's retreat from any effort to implicitly or to explicitly recommend a program that would exceed the limits of the ABM Treaty. ...... Sixth, I am also troubled at the decision to reduce funds for the Cooperative Threat Reduction program, a program that is essential to our interests in reducing or eliminating threats that are currently posed by nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and materials. Ronald V. Dellums.