Congressional Documents

EXCERPTS - Weapons of Mass Destruction




105th Congress                                                   Report
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

 1st Session                                                    105-132
_______________________________________________________________________


 
        NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1998


                               ----------                              

                              R E P O R T

                                 OF THE

                     COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                                   ON

                               H.R. 1119

                             together with

                    ADDITIONAL AND DISSENTING VIEWS

      [Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]
                   

 June 16, 1997.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the 
              State of the Union and ordered to be printed


HOUSE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY One Hundred Fifth Congress FLOYD D. SPENCE, South Carolina, Chairman BOB STUMP, Arizona RONALD V. DELLUMS, California DUNCAN HUNTER, California IKE SKELTON, Missouri JOHN R. KASICH, Ohio NORMAN SISISKY, Virginia HERBERT H. BATEMAN, Virginia JOHN M. SPRATT, Jr., South JAMES V. HANSEN, Utah Carolina CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas JOEL HEFLEY, Colorado OWEN PICKETT, Virginia JIM SAXTON, New Jersey LANE EVANS, Illinois STEVE BUYER, Indiana GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi TILLIE K. FOWLER, Florida NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii JOHN M. McHUGH, New York MARTIN T. MEEHAN, Massachusetts JAMES TALENT, Missouri ROBERT A. UNDERWOOD, Guam TERRY EVERETT, Alabama JANE HARMAN, California ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland PAUL McHALE, Pennsylvania HOWARD ``BUCK'' McKEON, California PATRICK J. KENNEDY, Rhode Island RON LEWIS, Kentucky ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois J.C. WATTS, Jr., Oklahoma SILVESTRE REYES, Texas MAC THORNBERRY, Texas TOM ALLEN, Maine JOHN N. HOSTETTLER, Indiana VIC SNYDER, Arkansas SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia JIM TURNER, Texas VAN HILLEARY, Tennessee F. ALLEN BOYD, Jr., Florida JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida ADAM SMITH, Washington WALTER B. JONES, Jr., North LORETTA SANCHEZ, California Carolina JAMES H. MALONEY, Connecticut LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina SONNY BONO, California CIRO D. RODRIGUEZ, Texas JIM RYUN, Kansas MICHAEL PAPPAS, New Jersey BOB RILEY, Alabama JIM GIBBONS, Nevada Andrew K. Ellis, Staff Director C O N T E N T S ---------- Page DIVISION A--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION.................. 19 TITLE I--PROCUREMENT............................................. 19 Aircraft Procurement, Air Force.............................. 101 Items of Special Interest.................................. 106 Chemical Agents and Munitions Destruction, Defense........... 134 Overview................................................... 134 Items of Special Interest.................................. 136 TITLE II--RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION............ 140 OVERVIEW....................................................... 140 Air Force RDT&E.............................................. 202 Items Of Special Interest.................................. 211 Defense Agencies RDT&E....................................... 216 Items Of Special Interest.................................. 225 TITLE XI--COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION WITH STATES OF FORMER SOVIET UNION................................................... 413 OVERVIEW....................................................... 413 ITEMS OF SPECIAL INTEREST...................................... 413 Arms Elimination Projects in Russia........................ 413 Arms Elimination Projects in Ukraine....................... 414 Auditing of CTR Assistance................................. 414 Chemical Weapons Destruction............................... 415 Fissile Material Storage Facility.......................... 417 Nuclear Reactor Core Conversion............................ 418 Nuclear Weapons Storage Security In Russia................. 419 Other Support Programs..................................... 419 Program Overhead........................................... 420 Prohibition of Specified Activities........................ 420 LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS......................................... 420 Section 1101--Specification of Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs................................................. 420 Section 1102--Fiscal Year 1998 Funding Allocations......... 420 Section 1103--Prohibition on Use of Funds for Specified Purposes................................................. 420 Section 1104--Prohibition on Use of Funds Until Specified Reports are Submitted.................................... 420 Section 1105--Limitation on Use of Funds Until Submission of Certification......................................... 420 Section 1106--Use of Funds for Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility................................................. 421 Section 1107--Limitation on Use of Funds for Storage Facility for Russian Fissile Material.................... 421 Section 1108--Limitation on Use of Funds for Weapons Storage Security......................................... 421 Section 1109--Report to Congress on Issues Regarding Payment of Taxes or Duties on Assistance Provided to Russia Under Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs....... 421 Section 1110--Limitation on Obligation of Funds for a Specified Period......................................... 421 Section 1111--Availability of Funds........................ 421 TITLE XII--MATTERS RELATING TO OTHER NATIONS..................... 422 OVERVIEW....................................................... 422 Arms Control Implementation................................ 422 Strategic Force Reductions................................. 426 LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS......................................... 427 Section 1202--One-year Extension of Counterproliferation Authorities.............................................. 429 TITLE XXVIII--GENERAL PROVISIONS................................. 465 ITEMS OF SPECIAL INTEREST...................................... 465 Force Protection for Overseas Facilities from Chemical and Biological Weapons....................................... 465 105th Congress Report HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 1st Session 105-132 _______________________________________________________________________ NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1998 _______ June 16, 1997.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed
DIVISION A--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION TITLE I--PROCUREMENT ............. Aircraft Procurement, Air Force ............. Items of Special Interest B-1 modifications The budget request contained $114.2 million for B-1 modifications, but did not include funding to procure a digital data link for this aircraft. The committee notes that the Air Force Chief of Staff's fiscal year 1998 unfunded priority list included as the fifth highest priority a request for funding to provide a limited capability and to develop tactics and concepts for employment of a digital data link on the B-1 fleet. Such a data link allows the fighter and bomber fleets--the ``shooters''--to receive real-time, secure, and jam-resistant targeting information from aircraft such as the Airborne Warning and Control System or the Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System--the ``sensors.'' This linked information improves an aircrew's situational awareness, operational coordination among shooter aircraft, and in-flight re-targeting of emerging higher priority targets. It also contributes to the positive identification of both airborne and ground forces, thereby contributing to the elimination of friendly fire. The committee endorses the requirement to include the B-1 on the Department's primary data link and recommends $24.0 million to install a stand-alone Joint Tactical Information Distribution System terminal and display on up to six B-1 aircraft for this purpose. B-2 The budget request contained $174.1 million for the B-2 bomber. These funds are requested for costs associated with additional software investment, technical orders, interim contractor support, aircrew training devices, peculiar support equipment, program management administration, and non-recurring costs for curtailment of the B-2 production line. Having held two hearings on the B-2 since the committee concluded its fiscal year 1997 authorization deliberations, the committee is convinced of the need to continue production of this bomber. No less than seven former secretaries of defense have recommended doing so, as have numerous other former senior leaders of the Air Force and the Congress. Likewise, current Air Force leaders privately acknowledge that they would welcome more B-2s in the bomber inventory, except that they are ``unaffordable.'' The committee rejects this ``unaffordable'' assertion and strongly believes the United States can afford additional B-2s. Twenty-one B-2s does not constitute an adequate force level to deal with the many likely contingencies and crises over the next 30-40 years, and no other military systems in existence or on the drawing boards can adequately substitute for the capabilities the B-2 offers. As noted in testimony presented to the committee by the former air component commander in the Persian Gulf war, the B-2 is the only weapon system in the U.S. inventory free of range, survivability, and lethality limitations, and, as such, could well be the nation's only practical option for quickly projecting truly decisive power in future regional crises. On April 1, 1997, the B-2 reached its initial operational capability milestone. According to a statement issued by the commander of the Air Force's Air Combat Command, ``This is a significant milestone in ensuring the future of national defense. The combination of low observability, large payload capacity, bombing accuracy, and long range gives America a unique, unprecedented military capability. This combination allows the B-2 to penetrate sophisticated defenses and threaten an enemy's war-making capability. It gives the United States the capability to project power to any part of the globe within a matter of hours and deliver combat power with precision in support of warfighting commands.'' The committee agrees that the B-2's combination of range, payload, precision weapons delivery, and stealth make it uniquely capable of independently responding quickly and decisively from secure U.S. bases to future contingencies anywhere in the world--and thus justify its continued production. Accordingly, the committee recommends an additional $331.2 million for the B-2. This amount represents an increase of $353.0 million to initiate the eventual procurement of an additional nine B-2s coupled with a decrease of $21.8 million, which was requested for production curtailment costs. Of the $353.0 million added, $281.0 million is for reestablishment of those elements of the production line that have been previously laid away and $52.0 million is for advance procurement. ............. Chemical Agents and Munitions Destruction, Defense ............. Items of Special Interest Chemical agents and munitions destruction The budget request contained $620.7 million for the defense chemical agents and munitions destruction program, including $472.2 million for operations and maintenance, $66.3 million for research and development, and $82.2 million for procurement. Section 152 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 (Public Law 104-106), directed the Secretary of Defense to conduct an assessment of the chemical stockpile disposal program and to consider measures that could be taken to reduce program costs, while continuing to ensure maximum protection of the public and the environment. The results of the assessment were to be reported to the Congress with the submission of the fiscal year 1998 budget request. Section 142 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (Public Law 104-201) further required that the Secretary of Defense conduct an assessment of alternative demilitarization technologies (other than incineration) that could be used for destruction of the chemical stockpile and report the results of this assessment to the Congress by December 31, 1997. Section 8065 of the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (Public Law 104-208) directed that the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology) conduct a pilot program to identify and demonstrate not less than two alternatives to the baseline incineration process and appoint a program manager for these activities who would report directly to him. Based upon the results of a hearing which addressed all of the aforementioned concerns, the committee affirms its previously-held views that the risks of continued storage of the chemical weapons stockpile exceed those associated with demilitarization operations. Therefore, the committee believes that the demilitarization program should proceed expeditiously with the current baseline incineration program until such time as the evaluation of alternative technologies for destruction of the stockpile is concluded. The committee also notes that continued delays in the program will lead to further cost increases. However, the committee also agrees with the Department's decision to further develop chemical neutralization technologies for destruction of agents at the bulk-only chemical storage sites and with its plan for assessing the feasibility of alternative technologies for potential use at other chemical stockpile storage sites. The committee directs the Secretary of Defense to report to the Congress by December 31, 1997, the status of that assessment and its potential impact on the costs and schedule for completion of destruction operations at the Pueblo and Lexington-Blue Grass storage sites. Of the $63.3 million requested for research and development activities, $40.8 million is for the non-stockpile chemical materiel project. The committee notes that the project is to be completed in the third quarter of fiscal year 2002, and believes that this represents too aggressive a schedule in view of the overall uncertainties surrounding the project. The committee expects that more time will be needed for the Army to prove that the proposed disposal systems will safely and effectively destroy all non-stockpile materiel and will be accepted by the affected states and communities. Accordingly, thecommittee recommends a reduction of $10.0 million for non- stockpile chemical materiel research and development. ............. Air Force RDT&E ............. Items of Special Interest ............. Bomber testing The budget request contained $389.3 million in PE 65807F for test and evaluation support of Air Force test ranges and facilities. The committee is aware of ongoing efforts to improve B-2 bomber testing capability at the Bark Flight Test Facility and supports the expansion of this facility's capability to conduct testing of other Air Force bomber aircraft. The committee recommends an increase of $8.0 million to add test capability to this existing facility for B-1B, B-52, and other bomber or strike aircraft. Conventional ballistic missile The budget request contained $32.8 million in PE 63851F for intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) demonstration and validation activities. The committee notes that a number of ``rogue'' nations have constructed hardened, deeply buried facilities. Some of these facilities represent command and control structures and sites at which weapons of mass destruction are developed and stored and are therefore of great military significance. The destruction of these sites requires a weapon that can penetrate hardened structures or rock, while maintaining sufficient structural integrity to detonate. The committee further notes that the ability of the U.S. military to strike at these targets effectively without recourse to nuclear weapons is extremely limited. The committee believes that a conventionally armed ICBM has the potential to hold these targets at risk, in the near term, and at modest cost. This proposed capability is based on a combination of very high ICBM warhead terminal velocities, technologies that allow precision delivery, long range, relative invulnerability to enemy defenses, and the maturity of current ICBM technology. Therefore, the committee recommends $49.3 million for ICBM demonstration and validation activities, an increase of $16.5 million. The additional funding is for the purpose of establishing a conventional ballistic missile advanced concept technology demonstration program. The funding is to be used to modify an existing reentry vehicle, complete flight test plans, and procure long lead items to support a flight test. ............. Minuteman safety enhanced reentry vehicle The budget request contained $137.9 million in PE 64851F for efforts to upgrade the Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) guidance and propulsion systems. The Minuteman guidance replacement program (GRP) is replacing 1960's vintage electronics with modern supportable technology. The program is proceeding through engineering and manufacturing development and the first of the upgraded guidance systems is expected to be delivered in 1999. The GRP also preserves the option to incorporate the Mk-21 safety enhanced reentry vehicle on the Minuteman III ICBM if Peackeeper ICBMs, which are now equipped with the Mk-21, are retired. The committee notes that the Mk-21 is the most modern, safest, and logistically supportable reentry vehicle in the Air Force inventory. It further notes that the Air Force is planning to replace the older Mk-12A reentry vehicle with the Mk-21 on 150 Minuteman III ICBMs. However, the actual design and development efforts for the hardware and software needed for the incorporation of the Mk-21 remain to be accomplished. Initial engineering tests will be accomplished with additional funding authorized and appropriated for fiscal year 1997. The committee believes that a continuation of this effort will reduce the risk of a potentially costly redesign and refit of the new guidance systems. To promote the timely completion of Mk-21 integration efforts, the committee recommends $152.9 million for PE 64851F, an increase of $15.0 million. ............. Chemical-biological defense program The budget request included a total of $530.9 million for the chemical-biological defense (CBD) program of the Department of Defense, including $320.8 million in research, development, test, and evaluation and $210.0 million in procurement. The committee has been advised of problems in manufacture and qualification of new production M-40 protective masks and is concerned about the impacts of these problems on the ability to meet acquisition objectives for the mask. The committee directs the Secretary of the Army to review the M-40 mask procurement program and provide a report to the Congressional defense committees by October 30, 1997, which addresses the results of that review and the actions to be taken to correct any problems discovered. The committee notes that the Counter Proliferation Review Committee's May 1997 Report states the Defense Advance Research Projects Agency (DARPA) biological warfare defense program will no longer be incorporated into the CBD program management and oversight structure. The Committee directs the Secretary of Defense to ensure that the DARPA biological warfare defense program is coordinated and integrated under the program management and oversight of the Department's CBD program. The committee understands that the Department's policies on anthrax vaccination of U.S. forces and support for Other than U.S. Forces are awaiting final approval, and that these decisions will impact total funding, vaccine production, and storage requirements. The committee also notes the impending award of a prime systems contract to develop new biological defense vaccines, pursue vaccine licensing, and produce stockpile vaccines to meet the Department's requirements. To address funding shortfalls in the budget request for the CBD program, the committee recommends an increase of $1.6 million in PE 63384BP for vaccine advanced development, an increase of $858,000 in PE 64384BP for vaccine development and an increase of $5.0 million in PE63884 to support on-going development efforts in detectors, decontamination equipment, and protective equipment for the Chemical-Biological Quick Reaction Force and its components. The committee directs the Secretary of Defense to address the above issues as specific areas of interest in the next annual report to Congress on the NBC defense program. ............. Counter-proliferation analysis and planning system The budget request contained $58.3 million in PE 63160D for advanced development of counter-proliferation support technologies. The committee has been made aware of the counter- proliferation analysis and planning system (CAPS) and is supportive of its demonstrated performance as a counter- proliferation analysis and planning tool for the intelligence community and regional commanders-in-chief. The committee recommends an increase of $3.0 million in PE 63160D to accelerate the development of CAPS mission planning tools and develop the system architecture for mission-specific data bases and mission support. ............. Pulsed fast neutron analysis technology demonstration The budget request contained no funds for continuation of a program for demonstration of the application of pulsed fast neutron analysis (PFNA) technology to the inspection of cargo and baggage at ports-of-entry for the presence of drugs, explosives, nuclear and chemical agents, and weapons of mass destruction. Proposals have been made for the development and operational field demonstration of a relocatable PFNA cargo inspection system, which would be based upon Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)'s completed demonstration of a fixed-site PFNA system; and a total of $11.2 million was appropriated for this purpose in fiscal years 1996 and 1997. In March 1997, the Technical Support Working Group initiated a contract for modification of the fixed-site PFNA demonstrator to a relocatable system for testing in a controlled operational environment. The committee understands, based on a recent General Accounting Office report, that PFNA system technology has not been adopted by the U.S. Customs Service because of concerns about cost, size, operations, and safety issues. The committee also understands that the fixed site system has not yet demonstrated the ability to detect chemical agents or special nuclear materials, that an additional $10.0 million will be required to complete system modification and the operational testing program, and that the Customs' Service has not indicated any funding support for the program or intent to field the system should operational testing be successful. The committee believes that the ability of fixed-site PFNA system to detect chemical agents and special nuclear materials must be demonstrated before the program proceeds to the design and engineering phase for a relocatable PFNA system, and recommends no additional funding for the PFNA program in fiscal year 1998. The committee directs the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Treasury to conduct a joint assessment of the PFNA program which addresses Department of Defense and Department of the Treasury operational requirements for a PFNA cargo inspection system, demonstrated technical performance of the fixed-site PFNA inspection system, the ability of a relocatable PFNA inspection system to meet the operational requirements, the intention of each Department regarding the fielding of the PFNA inspection system, and recommendations and funding requirements for the completion of the testing program and fielding the system. The results of the assessment shall be provided to the Congress by December 31, 1997. Should the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Treasury jointly recommend continuation of the program, the committee would encourage the reprogramming of fiscal year 1998 funds for that purpose. Response to threats of terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction The budget request contained $49.5 million to improve emergency response preparedness and coordination with state and local agencies through First Responder training, interagency exercises and technical assistance. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (Public Law 104-201) directed the President to take immediate actions to enhance the capability of the Federal government to prevent and respond to terrorist incidents involving weapons of mass destruction, to provide enhanced support to improve the capabilities of state and local emergency response agencies to prevent and respond to such incidents at both the national and local level. The committee has reviewed the President's January 1997 report to the Congress, which provided hisassessment of those capabilities, and the Counterproliferation Program Review Committee's May 1997 report that provides the details of the Department of Defense role. The committee notes the actions taken to date by the Department of Defense to enhance emergency domestic preparedness and response to terrorist nuclear, biological, or chemical attacks under the counterproliferation support program and the CBD program. The committee notes the initial progress that has been made and that much remains to be done to extend the program to additional metropolitan areas and local jurisdictions. Chemical-biological response team Public Law 104-201 required the Secretary of Defense to establish and maintain at least one chemical-biological domestic terrorism rapid response team. The committee understands that the Department is establishing a Chemical- Biological Quick Reaction Force (CBQRF) and directs the Secretary of the Army, as executive agent for the domestic emergency response program, to ensure that the plans, programs, and budget of the CBQRF and its components are reviewed to ensure full coordination and integration of all DOD assets. The committee also directs the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Program) to ensure that all research, development, and acquisition efforts in support of the CBQRF and its components are fully integrated and coordinated within the Department's chemical and biological defense program. The committee understands that the Department of Defense is examining a new mission for the National Guard which would involve countering chemical and biological terrorism in the United States. The committee notes that the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve include a number of chemical defense units which could be employed in response to a chemical emergency and also notes that trained chemical incident response forces are present at the Army's chemical munitions storage sites. The committee believes that the availability of the National Guard chemical defense units to State authorities would make them particularly useful in response to a chemical or biological incident. The committee recommends an increase of $2.0 million in PE 63122D to accelerate the development and evaluation of protective masks for emergency response forces that could be used in the evacuation of casualties and other personnel from a contaminated area. Elsewhere in this report the committee recommends an increase of $5.0 million to the Department's chemical and biological defense program to support on-going development efforts in detectors, decontamination equipment, and protective equipment for the CBQRF and its components. First responder training The committee understands that an interagency training strategy is being developed which would initially focus training under the domestic emergency response preparedness program on professional emergency response organizations in the 27 cities and metropolitan areas identified by the Federal Bureau of Investigation as being at particularly high risk and that the DOD Office of Domestic Preparedness (collocated with the Army's Chemical-Biological Defense Command) has been assigned responsibility for development of the first responder training program. The program objective is to complete first responder training for 126 major metropolitan areas and cities within three years. The committee recommends that emphasis also be placed on training of local volunteer emergency first response organizations. The training program and priorities must be coordinated with State emergency management directors. The committee believes that support of the first responder training program would be an appropriate mission for the National Guard and should be considered by the Secretary of Defense and the involved governors. The committee also believes that in addition to the ``train the trainer'' approach being used in the existing program, an exportable training package should be developed that is oriented toward the training of volunteer emergency first responders. The committee recommends an increase of $7.0 million in PE 65160D to support the further development of the first responder training strategy and the development of an exportable training package suitable for use by volunteer emergency first response organizations. Exercise program During the committee's review of the budget request, several proposals were made for the establishment of major exercise and training facilities at the national or regional level. The committee endorses the use of training exercises to test and improve consequence management response capabilities, but believes that the exercise site requirements should be based on the training and exercise needs of the agencies to be exercised, site capabilities, frequency of use, and proximity to participating agencies. These considerations imply the need for an overall coordinated training exercise strategy similar to that developed for training by the Senior Interagency Group. The committee recommends an increase of $5.0 million in PE 65160D to support the development of a training exercise strategy for domestic emergency response preparedness and support of pilot training exercises in accordance with that strategy. The committee directs the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, to provide an annual assessment of progress in the domestic emergency response preparedness program. The report should be submitted to the Congressional defense committees beginning with the fiscal year 1999 budget request and extending through fiscal year 2001. ............. Safeguard The budget request contained $60.0 million in PE 62384BP for exploratory development of advanced technologies for chemical and biological defense in the areas of detection, identification and warning, contamination avoidance, individual and collective protection and decontamination. The committee recommends an increase of $10.8 million to continue the program, initiated by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, for proof-of-concept demonstration and prototype development of multi-spectral sensors for detection of chemical agent precursors and agents from medium and high altitude platforms. The committee believes that the results of the program to date indicate the potential the technology has for stand-off detection and identification of chemical agents on the battlefield and for detection of the production of chemical agents and their precursor chemicals. ............. TITLE XI--COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION WITH STATES OF FORMER SOVIET UNION OVERVIEW The budget request contained $382.2 million for cooperative threat reduction (CTR) activities, representing an increase of $31.3 million over the amounts appropriated for fiscal year 1997. The request includes $63.0 million for core conversion and chemical weapons production facility elimination in Russia, and expanded defense and military contact programs throughout the former Soviet states. Funding for these programs was not included in last year's CTR budget request, but was authorized separately in Title XIV of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (Public Law 104-201). The Administration is also seeking $210.0 million within the request for destruction and dismantlement, $100.7 million for fissile materials and nuclear weapons safety and storage, $41.0 million for reactor core conversion in Russia, and $30.5 million for other program support, which includes expanded defense and military-to-military contacts. The committee recommends a total of $284.7 million for CTR activities in fiscal year 1998, a reduction of $97.5 million from the budget request. The committee recommends the request of $77.9 million for strategic offensive arms elimination activities in Russia; $76.7 million for strategic nuclear arms elimination in Ukraine; $7.0 million for fissile materials storage containers in Russia; and $57.7 million for a fissile material storage facility in Russia. The committee recommends the following reductions to the budget request: chemical weapons destruction ($41.0 million); reactor core conversion ($41.0 million); nuclear weapons storage security ($12.5 million); defense and military contacts ($1.0 million); and other program support ($2.0 million). The discussion below provides additional rationale for these reductions as well as other matters of interest and concern to the committee. ITEMS OF SPECIAL INTEREST Arms Elimination Projects in Russia The budget request contained $77.9 million for strategic offensive arms elimination projects in Russia representing a significant increase from the fiscal year 1997 appropriated amount of $52.0 million. The committee reiterates its support for the accelerated dismantlement and destruction of strategic offensive weapons in Russia under the terms of the START I Treaty. To this end, the committee notes that the Department intends to obligate 115 percent of the appropriated fiscal year 1997 amount for strategic offensive arms elimination programs in Russia in accordance with section 1502 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (Public Law 104-201). The request includes $50.0 million for new commitments made last October by former Secretary of Defense Perry, who pledged additional assistance to Russia as part of the Administration's effort to encourage Russian ratification of the START II Treaty. The new commitments pledged by Secretary Perry and identified by the Department to the committee would be directed toward accelerating Russian strategic offensive force reductions to START II levels. While the committee is supportive of CTR efforts that would directly assist Russia in the elimination of its strategic offensive forces, the committee believes that Russia should share in the cost of these reductions. However, the Russian Duma has not yet given its support to START II ratification and is unlikely to do so anytime soon. In addition, at the recent Helsinki summit, the United States agreed to postpone for several years the 2003 START II deadline for elimination of treaty-covered strategic systems in another attempt to encourage Russian ratification and to ease the near-term fiscal requirements on Russia for eliminating strategic systems. The Russians have asserted that they lack the fiscal resources to meet START II's reduction timelines. However, Russia continues to invest resources in the production of additional land-based and sea-based strategic offensive arms. For these reasons, the committee recommends a provision (sec. 1105) that would prohibit the obligation or expenditure of these funds for START II-related elimination activities until 30 days after the President certifies to Congress that these expenditures are in the national security interest and that the Russians have agreed to share the cost of such elimination activities. Moreover, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to submit to the Congressional defense committees, within 15 days of the date of the above certification, a report on the specific cost-sharing arrangements that have been agreed to with Russia. Arms Elimination Projects in Ukraine The budget request contained $76.7 million for strategic nuclear arms elimination projects in Ukraine, a 63 percent increase over the fiscal year 1997 appropriated level. This increase would fund a new project to eliminate additional land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, associated silos and launch control centers, and supporting infrastructure. The committee supports these additional efforts and approves the requested amount for strategic nuclear arms elimination in Ukraine. Auditing of CTR Assistance Under section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 (Public Law 104-106), the Department of Defense is required to submit to Congress an annual report on CTR assistance. The committee notes that the most recent report reflected an improvement in how the Department tracks the provision of CTR assistance, although the report was submitted almost one year late. The committee welcomes the increased number of annual audits and examinations conducted by the Department and expects that this level of effort will continue. The committee also notes that recent press reports indicate Russian officials have been imposing duties and ``taxes'' on the provision of U.S. assistance, some of which has reportedly been used to ``pay off'' local officials and to cover various ``overhead'' costs. In particular, the committee is concerned by reports that equipment deliveries are being taxed and that the CTR program has been a source of funding for inappropriate Russian activities. In light of these reports, the committee recommends a provision (sec. 1109) that would require the Secretary of Defense to submit a report to Congress by September 31, 1997 providing a detailed explanation of whether and how the CTR program has been used to support such activities and what actionsthe Department has taken and is prepared to take to ensure that CTR assistance is not ``taxed'' or misused by Russia. Chemical Weapons Destruction The budget request contained $55.4 million for chemical weapon destruction activities, including $20.0 million for the dismantlement and conversion of a chemical weapons production facility, at Volgograd, to non-weapons use. Last year, the committee denied the request for $2.2 million in funding to initiate dismantlement of the facility at Volgograd. In so doing, the committee noted its concern about establishing a precedent for a new U.S. commitment and program regarding the destruction of Russia's declared chemical weapons stockpile despite Russia's ability to destroy such facilities on its own. The budget request reflects a substantial increase in funding. However, formal cost estimates of the dismantlement work at Volgograd have not yet been accomplished. Moreover, the Department has indicated that the $20.0 million requested for this activity may be used for other ``Volgograd-like projects'' involving chemical or biological weapons production facilities elsewhere in Russia. In addition, the committee notes that the Congress has previously disapproved the use of CTR funds for defense conversion purposes such as envisioned in the Volgograd project. Such activities are currently funded through the Department of State. Because of continuing concerns over U.S. involvement in this project and the uncertainty over the eventual cost and scope of this activity, the committee reiterates its belief that Russia should proceed with the destruction of chemical weapons production facilities on its own. Consequently, the committee denies the request for this project. The budget request also contained $35.4 million for the design and construction of a chemical weapons destruction facility to be built in Russia. Most of the technology development for the chemical weapons destruction process is expected to be completed by the end of fiscal year 1997. Accordingly, the budget request for this purpose is significantly less than the fiscal year 1997 appropriated level and is directed toward the design of the destruction facility. However, because no specific site has yet been chosen for the facility, actual design costs have not been reliably determined. In addition, the committee has a number of other concerns regarding this project. First, the ultimate cost of the facility may be as high as $800.0 million, a cost which the committee views as prohibitive. A more accurate cost estimate based on a one-third completed design is still unavailable and is not anticipated by the Department to be available until January 1999. The General Accounting Office (GAO) has reported that the U.S. share of these costs remains undefined and potentially large, and the United States has not agreed to cap its financial contribution. Indeed, the budget request for fiscal year 1999 for chemical weapons destruction projects in Russia is approximately $150.0 million, an increase of 270 percent over the fiscal year 1998 request. Although detailed cost and program information is supposed to be contained in the Department's long-term program plan, which is required to be submitted to Congress annually at the same time as the President's budget request, the latest plan has only just been received. Consequently, the committee is unable to fully evaluate the long-term fiscal implications of this project. Second, the committee is concerned over Russia's ability to fulfill whatever financial commitment it makes to this project. Although Russia has committed the equivalent of $24.0 million for chemical weapons destruction in fiscal year 1997, none of these funds have been expended. Russia's chemical weapons destruction plan was rejected by the Federation Council-- Russia's upper house of parliament--in January of this year. In April 1997, the State Duma--Russia's lower house of parliament--refused to ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), only one day after the U.S. Senate had approved it. The Chairman of the Duma's Foreign Affairs Committee, Vladimir Lukin, explained the refusal by stating, ``It's simple: There's a lack of cash.'' Foreign financing to date for this project is extremely limited. While the United States has said it will finance a share of the costs of building the facility only, the Russians insist that associated infrastructure must be financed and built as well. Without an agreement on this matter, it is unlikely that construction can proceed. Third, the facility is designed to destroy only 14 percent of Russia's declared chemical weapons stockpile and will take more than 10 years to accomplish even this modest task. It has been estimated that Russia would need to construct six additional sites to meet the time frames required by the CWC for the destruction of the rest of its declared chemical weapons stockpile. Fourth, the committee disagrees with the United States' retreat from its prior insistence that the facility be used to destroy air munitions--the types of chemical munitions that are more threatening to U.S. interests--and has agreed to Russian demands that nerve agent contained in artillery shells be destroyed first. Because of their deteriorating condition, these artillery munitions are more of a Russian environmental concern than a U.S. or allied security concern. Finally, the committee is concerned by unclassified reports that Russia is continuing to develop chemical weapons, including three new and particularly lethal nerve agents. Such activity is clearly at variance with the commitments Russia assumed when it signed the CWC and suggests that U.S. assistance to dismantle older chemical weapons while Russia continues to produce newer ones amounts to a subsidy of a lethal Russian chemical weapons modernization program. The committee believes there are higher priority CTR programs with potentially greater benefits to U.S. security. The Department apparently shares this view, as it notified the Congress that it would transfer $7.8 million of fiscal year 1997 funds obligated for this project to strategic offensive arms elimination programs. The committee also notes that as of May 1997, more than $70.0 million in previously appropriated funds for this project remained unobligated, almost twice the amount actually disbursed. Consequently, the committee recommends a reduction of $21.0 million for this project and does not endorse proceeding with actual construction of the facility. The committee also recommends a provision (sec. 1106) that would prohibit the obligation or expenditure of fiscal year 1998 funds for chemical weapons facility planning and design until the Secretary notifies the Congress that the following conditions have been met: (1) that Russia has approved a chemical weapons destruction plan that commits it to sharing the financial costs of this program; (2) that the United States has agreed to cap its financial contribution; (3) that an agreement has been reached resolving the issue of who will pay for construction of infrastructure and facilities associated with the destruction facility and required by Russia; and (4) that a specific site has been chosen for construction of the facility. Fissile Material Storage Facility The budget request contained $57.7 million for fissile material storage activities in Russia. In particular, the funds requested are to be used to support the design and construction of a storage facility at Mayak to house materials from dismantled strategic nuclear weapons. The committee continues to support efforts to ensure the safe and secure storage of fissile materials in Russia. However, the committee notes that significant uncertainties remain regarding the Mayak facility. The project is approximately two years behind schedule and further delays are possible in light of Russia's uncertain commitment to funding its share of the costs. Although the United States has informed Russia that the U.S. share of Mayak costs will be capped at $275.0 million, the projected budget request for fiscal year 1999 reflects a significant increase in funding, including funds for preliminary work on a second fissile material storage facility in Russia, although the requirement for another such facility is unclear. Significantly, a recent GAO report (``Weapons of Mass Destruction: Status of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program,'' GAO/NSIAD-96-222, September 1996) notes, ``The draft CTR multiyear plan acknowledges that the program cannot measure the impact of CTR fissile material storage projects--such as Mayak--on CTR program objectives'' because the Department lacks the necessary information to make such a determination. Due to the Department's delay in submitting the latest annual CTR program plan as required, the committee cannot fully evaluate the long-term fiscal implications of this project. The most significant uncertainty is the lack of any transparency agreements that would allow the United States to verify the quantity and type of fissile materials stored at Mayak and the irreversibility of the dismantlements. The committee believes such agreements are essential to ensuring that the facility is being used for its intended purpose and that materials stored there are not capable of being used in the construction of additional weapons. Prior efforts to negotiate transparency arrangements with Russia have been unsuccessful. To date, Russia has not declared the specific type and quantity of fissile material that will be stored at Mayak. As the previously-cited GAO report noted, ``Until a detailed transparency arrangement is agreed upon, the United States does not know exactly how it will be able to insure that Mayak is being used as intended. A failure to reach such an agreement in the future would force the United States to choose between curtailing support for the facility--after investing many tens of millions of dollars--and compromising on its access rights.'' Negotiations are expected to resume later this year, and the Department has notified the committee of Russia's declared commitment to agree to transparency measures. However, the committee believes that continuing to fund this activity in advance of a formal agreement that clarifies and codifies U.S. rights weakens the U.S. negotiating position. Based on the above concerns, the committee conditions its approval of the budget request for this project on the conclusion of a written agreement with Russia acknowledging that the U.S. share of the ultimate cost of the Mayak facility will be capped at $275.0 million. Moreover, the committee recommends a provision (sec. 1107) that would prohibit the obligation of fiscal year 1998 funds for Mayak until a transparency agreement with Russia is signed. Finally, the committee directs that unobligated prior-year funds not be obligated or expended on this project until 15 days after the Secretary provides the Congressional defense committees with a status report on the issues and uncertainties noted above. Nuclear Reactor Core Conversion The budget request included $41.0 million for nuclear reactor core conversion projects in Russia to support the elimination of Russian plutonium production by 2000, an important U.S. non-proliferation objective. The requested amount is more than four times the amount appropriated for fiscal year 1997 and is intended to begin preparations for conversion work. However, to date no implementing agreement has been negotiated with Russia's Ministry of Energy (Minatom) to allow this work to proceed. Consequently, the $10.0 million appropriated in fiscal year 1997--which Congress authorized be transferred to the Secretary of Energy--is unable to be obligated until such an agreement is concluded. Reiterating its support for the goal of eliminating Russian plutonium production, the committee believes responsibility for this core conversion project more properly resides within the Department of Energy (DOE), which initially began this effort in fiscal year 1996 as a pilot project. For these reasons, the committee denies the request for fiscal year 1998 Department of Defense funds to pursue this project, but has added $10.0 million for core conversion to the appropriate DOE account. Nuclear Weapons Storage Security In Russia The budget request contained $36.0 million for projects designed to ensure the safe storage of nuclear weapons and materials from dismantled strategic nuclear systems. However, in March 1997 the Department informed Congress that the Russian Ministry of Defense has reevaluated its requirement for supercontainers to enhance the security of Russian nuclear weapons during transit. As a result, the Department proposes to reallocate $12.5 million in fiscal year 1996 CTR funds for other ``higher priority'' weapons storage security projects. Because these previously appropriated funds are now available to augment other weapons storage security activities, the committee recommends a reduction in the fiscal year 1998 budget request of $12.5 million. The committee reiterates its support for efforts to ensure the safe and secure storage of fissile materials and recommends this reduction without prejudice. However, the committee is concerned over Russia's unwillingness to allow the United States access to certain storage sites. This raises questions about the U.S. ability to ensure that equipment provided is used solely for its stated purpose. In its March 1997 notification to Congress of intent to obligate fiscal year 1997 funds, the Department noted that ``DOD will not be able to perform audits and examinations of some portions of the assistance provided under these agreements,'' but intends to impose other restrictions to ensure that the assistance ``remains under the control of the Russian Government.'' The committee is concerned that these arrangements may be insufficient to guard against the improper use of CTR assistance. Accordingly, the committee recommends a provision (sec. 1108) that would limit the obligation and expenditure of fiscal year 1998 funds until a formal agreement is reached with Russia on a mutually-acceptable arrangement for conducting audits and examinations; that agreement is provided by the Secretary to the Congressional defense committees; and 15 days have elapsed from the date the agreement is received. Other Support Programs The budget request contained $1.0 million for defense and military contacts with Belarus. In light of the recent Presidential de-certification of Belarus as eligible for CTR funds on the basis of human rights violations, the committee denies this request. In addition, the committee notes that, as of May 1997, the Department had obligated only $80.3 million of the $117.3 million in prior-year funds notified to Congress for CTR projects in Belarus. The committee expects that the Department will not obligate the remaining $37.0 million for projects in Belarus as long as Belarus remains ineligible for additional CTR assistance. Program Overhead The budget request contained $20.5 million for management and administrative costs, project development, and audits and examinations. In light of the reductions in various CTR programs noted above, and the logical reduction in associated administrative costs, the committee recommends a reduction of $2.0 million for these activities. The committee notes that the Department unilaterally reduced the appropriated level of fiscal year 1997 program support by more than $300,000 to cover the costs of other higher priorities. Prohibition of Specified Activities The committee reiterates its belief that funding for CTR activities should be directed toward facilitating the safe transportation, storage, and elimination of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery vehicles, and components, and for programs and activities deigned to prevent proliferation. The committee does not support CTR funding for activities outside these basic purposes. For this reason, the committee recommends a provision (sec. 1103) that would maintain a prohibition on the use of CTR funds for peacekeeping-related activities, housing, environmental restoration, job retraining, and defense conversion. LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS Section 1101--Specification of Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs This section would specify the kinds of programs to be funded under this title. Section 1102--Fiscal Year 1998 Funding Allocations This section would allocate fiscal year 1998 funding for various CTR purposes and activities. Section 1103--Prohibition on Use of Funds for Specified Purposes This section would prohibit the use of CTR funds for specified activities, including peacekeeping-related, housing, environmental restoration, job retraining, and defense conversion purposes. Section 1104--Prohibition on Use of Funds Until Specified Reports are Submitted This section would prohibit obligation or expenditure of fiscal year 1998 CTR funds until 15 days after various reports are submitted to Congress. Section 1105--Limitation on Use of Funds Until Submission of Certification This section would prohibit the obligation or expenditure of fiscal year 1998 CTR funds for certain START II-related strategic offensive arms elimination programs until the President certifies that such expenditures are in the national security interest and the Russians have agreed to share the cost of these activities. It would also direct the Secretary of Defense of submit a report on the specific cost-sharing arrangements. Section 1106--Use of Funds for Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility This section would prohibit the obligation or expenditure of funds for chemical weapons destruction purposes until the Secretary of Defense notifies Congress that certain cost- sharing and site agreements have been reached with Russia. Section 1107--Limitation on Use of Funds for Storage Facility for Russian Fissile Material This section would prohibit the obligation or expenditure of funds for a storage facility for Russian fissile material until the Secretary of Defense notifies Congress that certain cost-sharing and transparency agreements have been reached with Russia. Section 1108--Limitation on Use of Funds for Weapons Storage Security This section would prohibit the obligation or expenditure of funds for weapons storage security in Russia until the Secretary of Defense notifies Congress that an agreement has been reached with Russia regarding audits and examinations. Section 1109--Report to Congress on Issues Regarding Payment of Taxes or Duties on Assistance Provided to Russia Under Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs This section would require the Secretary of Defense to submit a report to Congress on attempts by Russia to tax assistance provided under the CTR program. Section 1110--Limitation on Obligation of Funds for a Specified Period This section would amend title 10, United States Code to limit the use of all appropriated funds for CTR purposes to a period of three years. Section 1111--Availability of Funds This section would make fiscal year 1998 CTR funds available for obligation for three years. TITLE XII--MATTERS RELATING TO OTHER NATIONS ............. Arms Control Implementation The fiscal year 1998 budget request contained $315.1 million for arms control implementation programs, representing a 12 percent increase over the fiscal year 1997 budget request and a 27 percent increase over the fiscal year 1997 appropriated level. The budget request is based in large part on planning assumptions regarding when various arms control treaties will enter into force. These assumptions have changed repeatedly, as the entry into force of several treaties--including the Open Skies Treaty, START II, and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)--has been delayed. The committee notes that the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which was recently ratified by the United States but has not been ratified by Russia, entered into force on April 29, 1997. This treaty places additional inspection obligations on the United States requiring an increase in funding for CWC activities. However, some of the requested increase in funding is directed toward support for the 1990 Bilateral Destruction Agreement (BDA) with Russia that is separate from the CWC. Because the Russians have refused to implement this agreement, the committee recommends a reduction of $4.1 million for BDA- related activities. As has been the case in the past, delays in the entry into force of other treaties will likely allow some reduction in the amount of funding authorized for these arms control implementation programs. For example, the committee believes that planning assumptions regarding the entry into force of the Open Skies Treaty are overly optimistic. Accordingly, the committee recommends a reduction of $1.7 million for Open Skies treaty implementation activities. In addition, the budget request would almost double the amount of funding for research and development (R&D) activities related to monitoring, implementation, compliance, and technical support for the CTBT over the fiscal year 1997 appropriated level. The committee is not convinced that such a significant increase is warranted given that the treaty has not yet been submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent and that U.S. ratification is not assured. Moreover, current DOD planning assumes that the treaty will not enter into force until late 1999. In addition, some of the specific projects supported by the R&D request appear to involve the procurement of items and are not strictly ``research and development'' activities. Finally, the committee has concerns over proposed DOD operation of seismic monitoring stations currently operated by the U.S. Geological Survey. Although the Department has expressed its intention to conclude agreements that delineate the obligations of each party responsible for a treaty station, no such agreements have yet been negotiated. Consequently, the committee directs elsewhere in this report that $13.3 million of the R&D budget request be fenced until 15 days after the Secretary of Defense notifies the Congressional defense committees that the necessary agreements have been concluded. Moreover, the committee directs the Secretary to provide the House National Security Committee and Senate Armed Services Committee with a detailed report no later that September 31, 1997 on how the Department intends to use these CTBT-related research and development funds. Finally, the committee notes that Russia has yet to ratify the START II Treaty. To encourage Russian ratification, the Administration agreed at the March 1997 Helsinki summit to postpone the START II deadline for elimination of certain strategic offensive arms from 2003 to 2007. The committee understands this step constitutes a substantive amendment to the START II Treaty and that the administration intends to submit such changes to the Congress for approval. However, the committee notes that members of Russia's lower house of parliament, or Duma, have indicated subsequent to the Helsinki summit that Russian ratification of the treaty has been deferred indefinitely. As a result of the agreed slippage in START II elimination deadlines and the unlikely prospect for ratification in the near-term, the committee recommends a reduction to the budget request of $5.4 million, for a total authorization of $303.9 million. ............. Strategic Force Reductions The committee notes that the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) endorsed maintaining U.S. strategic nuclear forces at Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I (START I) levels until Russia ratifies the START II Treaty. Despite the QDR's confirmation of current policy, the National Defense Panel has advocated unilateral U.S. nuclear force reductions to the levels specified in the START II Treaty. Moreover, and contrary to the QDR, Department of Defense officials also recently expressed interest in steps that could result in unilateral U.S. reductions. The committee believes that strategic nuclear forces remain central to U.S. national security, and any proposal to alter the nation's nuclear force structure must be considered on its own merits. The committee certainly does not believe that unilateral reductions to nuclear forces should be considered simply to generate savings for the military services to use to address program shortfalls, no matter how acute. Moreover, the committee believes that unilaterally reducing nuclear force structure below START I levels, prior to Russia's ratification of START II, would be counterproductive from an arms control standpoint. Because mutual obligation is the basis of all arms control agreements, unilateral reductions could undermine standing agreements and future negotiations. Unilateral U.S. nuclear force reductions would reduce Russian incentives to approve the START II Treaty by sending an unambiguous signal that U.S. reductions will occur with or without reciprocal Russian action. The committee continues to believe that any reductions to U.S. nuclear forces should be based on calculations of national security interest and implemented only in a mutual and balanced manner with Russia. LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS ............. Section 1202--One-Year Extension of Counterproliferation Authorities This section would extend the authority through fiscal year 1998 for the Department of Defense to provide support to the UN Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) under the Weapons of Mass Destruction Control Act of 1992. ............. TITLE XXVIII--GENERAL PROVISIONS ITEMS OF SPECIAL INTEREST Force Protection for Overseas Facilities From Chemical and Biological Weapons The committee is concerned about the adequacy of force protection for military installations and facilities abroad and is particularly concerned about the condition and ability of overseas facilities to contribute effectively to the protection of military personnel in the event of contingencies involving the use of chemical or biological munitions. The committee directs the Secretary of Defense to conduct a study of overseas military installations and facilities, with a particular emphasis on facilities in the Republic of Korea, and the capacity of those facilities to respond effectively to an attack in which chemical or biological munitions are used. The study should include an assessment of the military construction required to enhance and improve overseas facilities for the protection of military personnel from chemical and biological attack. The Secretary shall submit a report on the Department's findings, including any recommendations, to the congressional defense committees by March 1, 1998. .............. ADDITIONAL AND DISSENTING VIEWS ---------- DISSENTING VIEWS OF RONALD V. DELLUMS I voted against reporting H.R. 1119 from the committee for several reasons. ....... Third, the committee recommendation would press forward too rapidly with national missile defense, notwithstanding that the committee recommendation implicitly adopts the administration's so-called three-plus-three strategy for development and preparation of a national missile defense system. I applaud the committee's retreat from any effort to implicitly or to explicitly recommend a program that would exceed the limits of the ABM Treaty. ...... Sixth, I am also troubled at the decision to reduce funds for the Cooperative Threat Reduction program, a program that is essential to our interests in reducing or eliminating threats that are currently posed by nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and materials. Ronald V. Dellums.