Congressional Documents

Special Weapons-Related Excerpts

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION
ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1998
CONFERENCE REPORT
to accompany
H.R. 1119

October 23, 1997
105th Congress 1st Session
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Report 105-340



............ TITLE II--RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION ............ Subtitle D--Other Matters .............. SEC. 244. BIOASSAY TESTING OF VETERANS EXPOSED TO IONIZING RADIATION DURING MILITARY SERVICE. (a) Nuclear Test Personnel Program.--Of the amount provided in section 201(4), $300,000 shall be available for testing described in subsection (b) in support of the Nuclear Test Personnel Program conducted by the Defense Special Weapons Agency. (b) Covered Testing.--Subsection (a) applies to the third phase of bioassay testing of individuals who are radiation-exposed veterans (as defined in section 1112(c)(3)(A) of title 38, United States Code) who participated in radiation-risk activities (as defined in section 1112(c)(3)(B) of such title). .............. TITLE VII--HEALTH CARE PROVISIONS ...... Subtitle F--Persian Gulf Illness SEC. 761. DEFINITIONS. For purposes of this subtitle: (1) The term ``Gulf War illness'' means any one of the complex of illnesses and symptoms that might have been contracted by members of the Armed Forces as a result of service in the Southwest Asia theater of operations during the Persian Gulf War. (2) The term ``Persian Gulf War'' has the meaning given that term in section 101 of title 38, United States Code. (3) The term ``Persian Gulf veteran'' means an individual who served on active duty in the Armed Forces in the Southwest Asia theater of operations during the Persian Gulf War. (4) The term ``contingency operation'' has the meaning given that term in section 101(a) of title 10, United States Code, and includes a humanitarian operation, peacekeeping operation, or similar operation. SEC. 762. PLAN FOR HEALTH CARE SERVICES FOR PERSIAN GULF VETERANS. (a) Plan Required.--The Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, acting jointly, shall prepare a plan to provide appropriate health care to Persian Gulf veterans (and dependents eligible by law) who suffer from a Gulf War illness. (b) Contents of Plan.--In preparing the plan, the Secretaries shall-- (1) use the presumptions of service connection and illness specified in paragraphs (1) and (2) of section 721(d) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 (Public Law 103 337; 10 U.S.C. 1074 note) to determine the Persian Gulf veterans (and dependents eligible by law) who should be covered by the plan; (2) consider the need and methods available to provide health care services to Persian Gulf veterans who are no longer on active duty in the Armed Forces, such as Persian Gulf veterans who are members of the reserve components and Persian Gulf veterans who have been separated from the Armed Forces; and (3) estimate the costs to the Government of providing full or partial health care services under the plan to covered Persian Gulf veterans (and covered dependents eligible by law). (c) Follow-up Treatment.--The plan required by subsection (a) shall specifically address the measures to be used to monitor the quality, appropriateness, and effectiveness of, and patient satisfaction with, health care services provided to Persian Gulf veterans after their initial medical examination as part of registration in the Persian Gulf War Veterans Health Registry or the Comprehensive Clinical Evaluation Program. (d) Submission of Plan.--Not later than March 1, 1998, the Secretaries shall submit to Congress the plan required by subsection (a). SEC. 763. COMPTROLLER GENERAL STUDY OF REVISED DISABILITY CRITERIA FOR PHYSICAL EVALUATION BOARDS. Not later than March 1, 1998, the Comptroller General shall submit to Congress a study evaluating the revisions made by the Secretary of Defense (as required by section 721(e) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 (Public Law 103 337; 10 U.S.C. 1074 note)) to the Physical Evaluation Board criteria used to set disability ratings for members of the Armed Forces who are no longer medically qualified for continuation on active duty so as to ensure accurate disability ratings related to a diagnosis of a Gulf War illness. SEC. 764. MEDICAL CARE FOR CERTAIN RESERVES WHO SERVED IN SOUTHWEST ASIA DURING THE PERSIAN GULF WAR. (a) In General.--Chapter 55 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by inserting after section 1074d the following new section: ``1074e. Medical care: certain Reserves who served in Southwest Asia during the Persian Gulf Conflict ``(a) Entitlement to Medical Care.--A member of the armed forces described in subsection (b) is entitled to medical care for a qualifying Persian Gulf symptom or illness to the same extent and under the same conditions (other than the requirement that the member be on active duty) as a member of a uniformed service who is entitled to such care under section 1074(a) of this title. ``(b) Covered Members.--Subsection (a) applies to a member of a reserve component who-- ``(1) is a Persian Gulf veteran; ``(2) has a qualifying Persian Gulf symptom or illness; and ``(3) is not otherwise entitled to medical care for such symptom or illness under this chapter and is not otherwise eligible for hospital care and medical services for such symptom or illness under section 1710 of title 38. ``(c) Definitions.--In this section: ``(1) The term `Persian Gulf veteran' means a member of the armed forces who served on active duty in the Southwest Asia theater of operations during the Persian Gulf Conflict. ``(2) The term `qualifying Persian Gulf symptom or illness' means, with respect to a member described in subsection (b), a symptom or illness-- ``(A) that the member registered before September 1, 1997, in the Comprehensive Clinical Evaluation Program of the Department of Defense and that is presumed under section 721(d) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 (10 U.S.C. 1074 note) to be a result of service in the Southwest Asia theater of operations during the Persian Gulf Conflict; or ``(B) that the member registered before September 1, 1997, in the Persian Gulf War Veterans Health Registry maintained by the Department of Veterans Affairs pursuant to section 702 of the Persian Gulf War Veterans' Health Status Act (38 U.S.C. 527 note).''. (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections at the beginning of such chapter is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 1074d the following new item: ``1074e. Medical care: certain Reserves who served in Southwest Asia during the Persian Gulf Conflict.''. SEC. 765. IMPROVED MEDICAL TRACKING SYSTEM FOR MEMBERS DEPLOYED OVERSEAS IN CONTINGENCY OR COMBAT OPERATIONS. (a) System Required.--(1) Chapter 55 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by inserting after section 1074e (as added by section 764) the following new section: ``1074f. Medical tracking system for members deployed overseas ``(a) System Required.--The Secretary of Defense shall establish a system to assess the medical condition of members of the armed forces (including members of the reserve components) who are deployed outside the United States or its territories or possessions as part of a contingency operation (including a humanitarian operation, peacekeeping operation, or similar operation) or combat operation. ``(b) Elements of System.--The system described in subsection (a) shall include the use of predeployment medical examinations and postdeployment medical examinations (including an assessment of mental health and the drawing of blood samples) to accurately record the medical condition of members before their deployment and any changes in their medical condition during the course of their deployment. The postdeployment examination shall be conducted when the member is redeployed or otherwise leaves an area in which the system is in operation (or as soon as possible thereafter). ``(c) Recordkeeping.--The results of all medical examinations conducted under the system, records of all health care services (including immunizations) received by members described in subsection (a) in anticipation of their deployment or during the course of their deployment, and records of events occurring in the deployment area that may affect the health of such members shall be retained and maintained in a centralized location to improve future access to the records. ``(d) Quality Assurance.--The Secretary of Defense shall establish a quality assurance program to evaluate the success of the system in ensuring that members described in subsection (a) receive predeployment medical examinations and postdeployment medical examinations and that the recordkeeping requirements with respect to the system are met.''. (2) The table of sections at the beginning of such chapter is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 1074e (as added by section 764) the following new item: ``1074f. Medical tracking system for members deployed overseas.''. (b) Report.--Not later than March 1, 1998, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress an analysis of the administrative implications of establishing and administering the medical tracking system required by section 1074f of title 10, United States Code, as added by subsection (a). The report shall include, for fiscal year 1999 and the 5 successive fiscal years, a separate analysis and specification of the projected costs and operational considerations for each of the following required aspects of the system: (1) Predeployment medical examinations. (2) Postdeployment medical examinations. (3) Recordkeeping. SEC. 766. NOTICE OF USE OF INVESTIGATIONAL NEW DRUGS OR DRUGS UNAPPROVED FOR THEIR APPLIED USE. (a) Notice Requirements.--Chapter 55 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new section: ``1107. Notice of use of an investigational new drug or a drug unapproved for its applied use ``(a) Notice Required.--(1) Whenever the Secretary of Defense requests or requires a member of the armed forces to receive an investigational new drug or a drug unapproved for its applied use, the Secretary shall provide the member with notice containing the information specified in subsection (d). ``(2) The Secretary shall also ensure that health care providers who administer an investigational new drug or a drug unapproved for its applied use, or who are likely to treat members who receive such a drug, receive the information required to be provided under paragraphs (3) and (4) of subsection (d). ``(b) Time of Notice.--The notice required to be provided to a member under subsection (a)(1) shall be provided before the investigational new drug or drug unapproved for its applied use is first administered to the member, if practicable, but in no case later than 30 days after the drug is first administered to the member. ``(c) Form of Notice.--The notice required under subsection (a)(1) shall be provided in writing unless the Secretary of Defense determines that the use of written notice is impractical because of the number of members receiving the investigational new drug or drug unapproved for its applied use, time constraints, or similar reasons. If the Secretary provides notice under subsection (a)(1) in a form other than in writing, the Secretary shall submit to Congress a report describing the notification method used and the reasons for the use of the alternative method. ``(d) Content of Notice.--The notice required under subsection (a)(1) shall include the following: ``(1) Clear notice that the drug being administered is an investigational new drug or a drug unapproved for its applied use. ``(2) The reasons why the investigational new drug or drug unapproved for its applied use is being administered. ``(3) Information regarding the possible side effects of the investigational new drug or drug unapproved for its applied use, including any known side effects possible as a result of the interaction of such drug with other drugs or treatments being administered to the members receiving such drug. ``(4) Such other information that, as a condition of authorizing the use of the investigational new drug or drug unapproved for its applied use, the Secretary of Health and Human Services may require to be disclosed. ``(e) Records of Use.--The Secretary of Defense shall ensure that the medical records of members accurately document-- ``(1) the receipt by members of any investigational new drug or drug unapproved for its applied use; and ``(2) the notice required by subsection (a)(1). ``(f) Definitions.--In this section: ``(1) The term `investigational new drug' means a drug covered by section 505(i) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 355(i)). ``(2) The term `drug unapproved for its applied use' means a drug administered for a use not described in the approved labeling of the drug under section 505 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 355).''. (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections at the beginning of such chapter is amended by adding at the end the following new item: ``1107. Notice of use of an investigational new drug or a drug unapproved for its applied use.''. SEC. 767. REPORT ON PLANS TO TRACK LOCATION OF MEMBERS IN A THEATER OF OPERATIONS. Not later than March 1, 1998, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress a report containing a plan for collecting and maintaining information regarding the daily location of units of the Armed Forces, and to the extent practicable individual members of such units, serving in a theater of operations during a contingency operation or combat operation. SEC. 768. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING THE DEPLOYMENT OF SPECIALIZED UNITS FOR DETECTING AND MONITORING CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, AND SIMILAR HAZARDS IN A THEATER OF OPERATIONS. It is the sense of Congress that the Secretary of Defense, in conjunction with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, should take such actions as are necessary to ensure that the units of the Armed Forces deployed in the theater of operations for each contingency operation or combat operation include specialized units with sufficient capability (including personnel with the appropriate training and expertise, and the appropriate equipment) to detect and monitor the presence of chemical, biological, and similar hazards to which members of the Armed Forces could be exposed in that theater during the operation. SEC. 769. REPORT ON EFFECTIVENESS OF RESEARCH EFFORTS REGARDING GULF WAR ILLNESSES. Not later than March 1, 1998, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress a report evaluating the effectiveness of medical research initiatives regarding Gulf War illnesses. The report shall address the following: (1) The type and effectiveness of previous research efforts, including the activities undertaken pursuant to section 743 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (Public Law 104 201; 10 U.S.C. 1074 note), section 722 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 (Public Law 103 337; 10 U.S.C. 1074 note), and sections 270 and 271 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 (Public Law 103 160; 107 Stat. 1613). (2) Recommendations regarding additional research regarding Gulf War illnesses, including research regarding the nature and causes of Gulf War illnesses and appropriate treatments for such illnesses. (3) The adequacy of Federal funding and the need for additional funding for medical research initiatives regarding Gulf War illnesses. SEC. 770. PERSIAN GULF ILLNESS CLINICAL TRIALS PROGRAM. (a) Findings.--Congress finds the following: (1) There are many ongoing studies that investigate risk factors which may be associated with the health problems experienced by Persian Gulf veterans; however, there have been no studies that examine health outcomes and the effectiveness of the treatment received by such veterans. (2) The medical literature and testimony presented in hearings on Gulf War illnesses indicate that there are therapies, such as cognitive behavioral therapy, that have been effective in treating patients with symptoms similar to those seen in many Persian Gulf veterans. (b) Establishment of Program.--The Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, acting jointly, shall establish a program of cooperative clinical trials at multiple sites to assess the effectiveness of protocols for treating Persian Gulf veterans who suffer from ill-defined or undiagnosed conditions. Such protocols shall include a multidisciplinary treatment model, of which cognitive behavioral therapy is a component. (c) Funding.--Of the funds authorized to be appropriated in section 201(1) for research, development, test, and evaluation for the Army, the sum of $4,500,000 shall be available for program element 62787A (medical technology) in the budget of the Department of Defense for fiscal year 1998 to carry out the clinical trials program established pursuant to subsection (b). SEC. 771. SENSE OF CONGRESS CONCERNING GULF WAR ILLNESS. (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings: (1) Americans served in the Persian Gulf Conflict of 1991 in defense of vital national security interests of the United States. (2) It was known to United States intelligence and military commanders that biological and chemical agents were in theater throughout the conflict. (3) An undetermined amount of these agents were released into theater. (4) A large number of United States military veterans and allied veterans who served in the Southwest Asia theater of operations have been stricken with a variety of severe illnesses. (5) Previous efforts to discern the causes of those illnesses have been inadequate, and those illnesses are affecting the health of both veterans and their families. (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that all promising technology and treatments relating to Gulf War illnesses should be fully explored and tested to facilitate treatment for members of the Armed Forces and veterans who served the United States in the Persian Gulf conflict and are stricken with unexplainable illness. ............... TITLE X--GENERAL PROVISIONS ............... Subtitle G--Other Matters ............... SEC. 1078. RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE OF HUMAN SUBJECTS FOR TESTING OF CHEMICAL OR BIOLOGICAL AGENTS. (a) Prohibited Activities.--The Secretary of Defense may not conduct (directly or by contract)-- (1) any test or experiment involving the use of a chemical agent or biological agent on a civilian population; or (2) any other testing of a chemical agent or biological agent on human subjects. (b) Exceptions.--Subject to subsections (c), (d), and (e), the prohibition in subsection (a) does not apply to a test or experiment carried out for any of the following purposes: (1) Any peaceful purpose that is related to a medical, therapeutic, pharmaceutical, agricultural, industrial, or research activity. (2) Any purpose that is directly related to protection against toxic chemicals or biological weapons and agents. (3) Any law enforcement purpose, including any purpose related to riot control. (c) Informed Consent Required.--The Secretary of Defense may conduct a test or experiment described in subsection (b) only if informed consent to the testing was obtained from each human subject in advance of the testing on that subject. (d) Prior Notice to Congress.--Not later than 30 days after the date of final approval within the Department of Defense of plans for any experiment or study to be conducted by the Department of Defense (whether directly or under contract) involving the use of human subjects for the testing of a chemical agent or a biological agent, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on National Security of the House of Representatives a report setting forth a full accounting of those plans, and the experiment or study may then be conducted only after the end of the 30-day period beginning on the date such report is received by those committees. (e) Biological Agent Defined.--In this section, the term ``biological agent'' means any micro-organism (including bacteria, viruses, fungi, rickettsiac, or protozoa), pathogen, or infectious substance, and any naturally occurring, bioengineered, or synthesized component of any such micro-organism, pathogen, or infectious substance, whatever its origin or method of production, that is capable of causing-- (1) death, disease, or other biological malfunction in a human, an animal, a plant, or another living organism; (2) deterioration of food, water, equipment, supplies, or materials of any kind; or (3) deleterious alteration of the environment. (f) Report and Certification.--Section 1703(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 (50 U.S.C. 1523(b)) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(9) A description of any program involving the testing of biological or chemical agents on human subjects that was carried out by the Department of Defense during the period covered by the report, together with-- ``(A) a detailed justification for the testing; ``(B) a detailed explanation of the purposes of the testing; ``(C) a description of each chemical or biological agent tested; and ``(D) the Secretary's certification that informed consent to the testing was obtained from each human subject in advance of the testing on that subject.''. (g) Repeal of Superseded Provision of Law.--Section 808 of the Department of Defense Appropriation Authorization Act, 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1520), is repealed. ................. TITLE XII--MATTERS RELATING TO OTHER NATIONS ................. Subtitle B--Export Controls on High Performance Computers SEC. 1211. EXPORT APPROVALS FOR HIGH PERFORMANCE COMPUTERS. (a) Prior Approval of Exports and Reexports.--The President shall require that no digital computer with a composite theoretical performance level of more than 2,000 millions of theoretical operations per second (MTOPS) or with such other composite theoretical performance level as may be established subsequently by the President under subsection (d), may be exported or reexported without a license to a country specified in subsection (b) if the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of State, or the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency objects, in writing, to such export or reexport. Any person proposing to export or reexport such a digital computer shall so notify the Secretary of Commerce, who, within 24 hours after receiving the notification, shall transmit the notification to the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of State, and the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. (b) Covered Countries.--For purposes of subsection (a), the countries specified in this subsection are the countries listed as ``Computer Tier 3'' eligible countries in section 740.7(d) of title 15 of the Code of Federal Regulations, as in effect on June 10, 1997, subject to modification by the President under subsection (e). (c) Time Limit.--Written objections under subsection (a) to an export or reexport shall be raised within 10 days after the notification is received under subsection (a). If such a written objection to the export or reexport of a computer is raised, the computer may be exported or reexported only pursuant to a license issued by the Secretary of Commerce under the Export Administration Regulations of the Department of Commerce, without regard to the licensing exceptions otherwise authorized under section 740.7 of title 15 of the Code of Federal Regulations, as in effect on June 10, 1997. If no objection is raised within the 10-day period, the export or reexport is authorized. (d) Adjustment of Composite Theoretical Performance.--The President, in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of State, and the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, may establish a new composite theoretical performance level for purposes of subsection (a). Such new level shall not take effect until 180 days after the President submits to the congressional committees designated in section 1215 a report setting forth the new composite theoretical performance level and the justification for such new level. Each report shall, at a minimum-- (1) address the extent to which high performance computers of a composite theoretical level between the level established in subsection (a) or such level as has been previously adjusted pursuant to this section and the new level, are available from other countries; (2) address all potential uses of military significance to which high performance computers at the new level could be applied; and (3) assess the impact of such uses on the national security interests of the United States. (e) Adjustment of Covered Countries.-- (1) In general.--The President, in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of State, and the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, may add a country to or remove a country from the list of covered countries in subsection (b), except that a country may be removed from the list only in accordance with paragraph (2). (2) Deletions from list of covered countries.--The removal of a country from the list of covered countries under subsection (b) shall not take effect until 120 days after the President submits to the congressional committees designated in section 1215 a report setting forth the justification for the deletion. (3) Excluded countries.--A country may not be removed from the list of covered countries under subsection (b) if-- (A) the country is a ``nuclear-weapon state'' (as defined by Article IX of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons) and the country is not a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; or (B) the country is not a signatory of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the country is listed on Annex 2 to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty. (f) Classification.--Each report under subsections (d) and (e) shall be submitted in an unclassified form and may, if necessary, have a classified supplement. SEC. 1212. REPORT ON EXPORTS OF HIGH PERFORMANCE COMPUTERS. (a) Report.--Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall provide to the congressional committees specified in section 1215 a report identifying all exports of digital computers with a composite theoretical performance of more than 2,000 millions of theoretical operations per second (MTOPS) to all countries since January 25, 1996. For each export, the report shall identify-- (1) whether an export license was applied for and whether one was granted; (2) the date of the transfer of the computer; (3) the United States manufacturer and exporter of the computer; (4) the MTOPS level of the computer; and (5) the recipient country and end user. (b) Additional Information on Exports to Certain Countries.--In the case of exports to countries specified in subsection (c), the report under subsection (a) shall identify the intended end use for the exported computer and the assessment by the executive branch of whether the end user is a military end user or an end user involved in activities relating to nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons or missile technology. Information provided under this subsection may be submitted in classified form if necessary. (c) Covered Countries.--For purposes of subsection (b), the countries specified in this subsection are-- (1) the countries listed as ``Computer Tier 3'' eligible countries in section 740.7(d) of title 15 of the Code of Federal Regulations, as in effect on June 10, 1997; and (2) the countries listed in section 740.7(e) of title 15 of the Code of Federal Regulations, as in effect on June 10, 1997. SEC. 1213. POST-SHIPMENT VERIFICATION OF EXPORT OF HIGH PERFORMANCE COMPUTERS. (a) Required Post-Shipment Verification.--The Secretary of Commerce shall conduct post-shipment verification of each digital computer with a composite theoretical performance of more than 2,000 millions of theoretical operations per second (MTOPS) that is exported from the United States, on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, to a country specified in subsection (b). (b) Covered Countries.--For purposes of subsection (a), the countries specified in this subsection are the countries listed as ``Computer Tier 3'' eligible countries in section 740.7 of title 15 of the Code of Federal Regulations, as in effect on June 10, 1997, subject to modification by the President under section 1211(e). (c) Annual Report.--The Secretary of Commerce shall submit to the congressional committees specified in section 1215 an annual report on the results of post-shipment verifications conducted under this section during the preceding year. Each such report shall include a list of all such items exported from the United States to such countries during the previous year and, with respect to each such export, the following: (1) The destination country. (2) The date of export. (3) The intended end use and intended end user. (4) The results of the post-shipment verification. (d) Explanation When Verification Not Conducted.--If a post-shipment verification has not been conducted in accordance with subsection (a) with respect to any such export during the period covered by a report, the Secretary shall include in the report for that period a detailed explanation of the reasons why such a post-shipment verification was not conducted. SEC. 1214. GAO STUDY ON CERTAIN COMPUTERS; END USER INFORMATION ASSISTANCE. (a) In General.--The Comptroller General of the United States shall submit to the congressional committees specified in section 1215 a study of the national security risks relating to the sale of computers with a composite theoretical performance of between 2,000 and 7,000 millions of theoretical operations per second (MTOPS) to end users in countries specified in subsection (c). The study shall also analyze any foreign availability of computers described in the preceding sentence and the impact of such sales on United States exporters. (b) End User Information Assistance to Exporters.--The Secretary of Commerce shall establish a procedure by which exporters may seek information on questionable end users in countries specified in subsection (c) who are seeking to obtain computers described in subsection (a). (c) Covered Countries.--For purposes of subsections (a) and (b), the countries specified in this subsection are the countries listed as ``Computer Tier 3'' eligible countries in section 740.7(d) of title 15 of the Code of Federal Regulations, as in effect on June 10, 1997. SEC. 1215. CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES. For purposes of sections 1211(d), 1212(a), 1213(c), and 1214(a) the congressional committees specified in those sections are the following: (1) The Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate. (2) The Committee on International Relations and the Committee on National Security of the House of Representatives. ..................... Subtitle C--Other Matters ..................... SEC. 1229. REPORT ON HELSINKI JOINT STATEMENT. (a) Requirement.--Not later than March 31, 1998, the President shall submit to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on National Security of the House of Representatives a report on the Helsinki Joint Statement on future reductions in nuclear forces. The report shall address the United States approach (including verification implications) to implementing the Helsinki Joint Statement, in particular, as that Statement relates to the following: (1) Lower aggregate levels of strategic nuclear warheads. (2) Measures relating to the transparency of strategic nuclear warhead inventories and the destruction of strategic nuclear warheads. (3) Deactivation of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. (4) Measures relating to nuclear long-range sea-launched cruise missiles and tactical nuclear systems. (5) Issues related to transparency in nuclear materials. (b) Definition.--For purposes of this section, the term ``Helsinki Joint Statement'' means the agreements between the President of the United States and the President of the Russian Federation as contained in the Joint Statement on Parameters on Future Reductions in Nuclear Forces issued at Helsinki in March 1997. ....................... TITLE XIII--ARMS CONTROL AND RELATED MATTERS Sec. 1301. Presidential report concerning detargeting of Russian strategic missiles. Sec. 1302. Limitation on retirement or dismantlement of strategic nuclear delivery systems. Sec. 1303. Assistance for facilities subject to inspection under the Chemical Weapons Convention. Sec. 1304. Transfers of authorizations for high-priority counterproliferation programs. Sec. 1305. Advice to the President and Congress regarding the safety, security, and reliability of United States nuclear weapons stockpile. Sec. 1306. Reconstitution of commission to assess the ballistic missile threat to the United States. Sec. 1307. Sense of Congress regarding the relationship between United States obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention and environmental laws. Sec. 1308. Extension of counterproliferation authorities for support of United Nations Special Commission on Iraq. Sec. 1309. Annual report on moratorium on use by Armed Forces of antipersonnel landmines. SEC. 1301. PRESIDENTIAL REPORT CONCERNING DETARGETING OF RUSSIAN STRATEGIC MISSILES. (a) Required Report.--Not later than January 1, 1998, the President shall submit to Congress a report concerning detargeting of Russian strategic missiles. The report shall address each of the following: (1) Whether a Russian ICBM that was formerly, but is no longer, targeted at a site in the United States would be automatically retargeted at a site in the United States in the event of the accidental launch of the missile. (2) Whether missile detargeting would prevent or significantly reduce the possibility of an unauthorized missile launch carried out by the Russian General Staff and prevent or significantly reduce the consequences to the United States of such a launch. (3) Whether missile detargeting would pose a significant obstacle to an unauthorized launch carried out by an operational level below the Russian General Staff if missile operators at such an operational level acquired missile launch codes or had the technical expertise to override missile launch codes. (4) The plausibility of an accidental launch of a Russian ICBM, compared to the possibility of a deliberate missile launch, authorized or unauthorized, resulting from Russian miscalculation, overreaction, or aggression. (5) The national security benefits derived from detargeting United States and Russian ICBMs. (6) The relative consequences to the United States of an unauthorized or accidental launch of a Russian ICBM that has been detargeted and one that has not been detargeted. (b) Definitions.--For purposes of subsection (a): (1) The term ``Russian ICBM'' means an intercontinental ballistic missile of the Russian Federation. (2) The term ``accidental launch'' means a missile launch resulting from mechanical failure. SEC. 1302. LIMITATION ON RETIREMENT OR DISMANTLEMENT OF STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DELIVERY SYSTEMS. (a) Funding Limitation.--Funds available to the Department of Defense may not be obligated or expended during fiscal year 1998 for retiring or dismantling, or for preparing to retire or dismantle, any of the following strategic nuclear delivery systems below the specified levels: (1) 71 B 52H bomber aircraft. (2) 18 Trident ballistic missile submarines. (3) 500 Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles. (4) 50 Peacekeeper intercontinental ballistic missiles. (b) Waiver Authority.--If the START II Treaty enters into force during fiscal year 1998, the Secretary of Defense may waive the application of the limitation under subsection (a) to the extent that the Secretary determines necessary in order to implement the treaty. (c) Funding Limitation on Early Deactivation.--(1) If the limitation under subsection (a) ceases to apply by reason of a waiver under subsection (b), funds available to the Department of Defense may nevertheless not be obligated or expended during fiscal year 1998 to implement any agreement or understanding to undertake substantial early deactivation of a strategic nuclear delivery system specified in subsection (a) until 30 days after the date on which the President submits to Congress a report concerning such actions. (2) For purposes of this subsection and subsection (d), a substantial early deactivation is an action during fiscal year 1998 to deactivate a substantial number of strategic nuclear delivery systems specified in subsection (a) by-- (A) removing nuclear warheads from those systems; or (B) taking other steps to remove those systems from combat status. (3) A report under this subsection shall include the following: (A) The text of any understanding or agreement between the United States and the Russian Federation concerning substantial early deactivation of strategic nuclear delivery systems under the START II Treaty. (B) The plan of the Department of Defense for implementing the agreement. (C) An assessment of the Secretary of Defense of the adequacy of the provisions contained in the agreement for monitoring and verifying compliance of Russia with the terms of the agreement and, based upon that assessment, the determination of the President specifically as to whether the procedures for monitoring and verification of compliance by Russia with the terms of the agreement are adequate or inadequate. (D) A determination by the President as to whether the deactivations to occur under the agreement will be carried out in a symmetrical, reciprocal, or equivalent manner and whether the agreement will require early deactivations of strategic forces by the United States to be carried out substantially more rapidly than deactivations of strategic forces by Russia. (E) An assessment by the President of the effect of the proposed early deactivation on the stability of the strategic balance and relative strategic nuclear capabilities of the United States and the Russian Federation at various stages during deactivation and upon completion, including a determination by the President specifically as to whether the proposed early deactivations will adversely affect strategic stability. (d) Further Limitation on Strategic Force Reductions.--(1) Amounts available to the Department of Defense for fiscal year 1998 to implement an agreement that results in a substantial early deactivation during fiscal year 1998 of strategic forces may not be obligated for that purpose if in the report under subsection (c)(3) the President determines any of the following: (A) That procedures for monitoring and verification of compliance by Russia with the terms of the agreement are inadequate. (B) That the agreement will require early deactivations of strategic forces by the United States to be carried out substantially more rapidly than deactivations of strategic forces by Russia. (C) That the proposed early deactivations will adversely affect strategic stability. (2) The limitation in paragraph (1), if effective by reason of a determination by the President described in paragraph (1)(B), shall cease to apply 30 days after the date on which the President notifies Congress that the early deactivations under the agreement are in the national interest of the United States. (e) Contingency Plan for Sustainment of Systems.--(1) Not later then February 15, 1998, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress a plan for the sustainment beyond October 1, 1999, of United States strategic nuclear delivery systems and alternative Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty force structures in the event that a strategic arms reduction agreement subsequent to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty does not enter into force before 2004. (2) The plan shall include a discussion of the following matters: (A) The actions that are necessary to sustain the United States strategic nuclear delivery systems, distinguishing between the actions that are planned for and funded in the future-years defense program and the actions that are not planned for and funded in the future-years defense program. (B) The funding necessary to implement the plan, indicating the extent to which the necessary funding is provided for in the future-years defense program and the extent to which the necessary funding is not provided for in the future-years defense program. (f) START Treaties Defined.--In this section: (1) The term ``Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty'' means the Treaty Between the United States of America and the United Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START), signed at Moscow on July 31, 1991, including related annexes on agreed statements and definitions, protocols, and memorandum of understanding. (2) The term ``START II Treaty'' means the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed at Moscow on January 3, 1993, including the following protocols and memorandum of understanding, all such documents being integral parts of and collectively referred to as the ``START II Treaty'' (contained in Treaty Document 103 1): (A) The Protocol on Procedures Governing Elimination of Heavy ICBMs and on Procedures Governing Conversion of Silo Launchers of Heavy ICBMs Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (also known as the ``Elimination and Conversion Protocol''). (B) The Protocol on Exhibitions and Inspections of Heavy Bombers Relating to the Treaty Between the United States and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (also known as the ``Exhibitions and Inspections Protocol''). (C) The Memorandum of Understanding on Warhead Attribution and Heavy Bomber Data Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (also known as the ``Memorandum on Attribution''). SEC. 1303. ASSISTANCE FOR FACILITIES SUBJECT TO INSPECTION UNDER THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION. (a) Assistance Authorized.--Upon the request of the owner or operator of a facility that is subject to a routine inspection or a challenge inspection under the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Secretary of Defense may provide technical assistance to that owner or operator related to compliance of that facility with the Convention. Any such assistance shall be provided through the On-Site Inspection Agency of the Department of Defense. (b) Reimbursement Requirement.--The Secretary may provide assistance under subsection (a) only to the extent that the Secretary determines that the Department of Defense will be reimbursed for costs incurred in providing the assistance. The United States National Authority may provide such reimbursement from amounts available to it. Any such reimbursement shall be credited to amounts available for the On-Site Inspection Agency. (c) Definitions.--In this section: (1) The terms ``Chemical Weapons Convention'' and ``Convention'' mean the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, ratified by the United States on April 25, 1997, and entered into force on April 29, 1997. (2) The term ``facility that is subject to a routine inspection'' means a declared facility, as defined in paragraph 15 of part X of the Annex on Implementation and Verification of the Convention. (3) The term ``challenge inspection'' means an inspection conducted under Article IX of the Convention. (4) The term ``United States National Authority'' means the United States National Authority established or designated pursuant to Article VII, paragraph 4, of the Convention. SEC. 1304. TRANSFERS OF AUTHORIZATIONS FOR HIGH-PRIORITY COUNTERPROLIFERATION PROGRAMS. (a) Authority.--(1) Subject to paragraph (2), the Secretary of Defense may transfer amounts of authorizations made available to the Department of Defense in this division for fiscal year 1998 to any counterproliferation program, project, or activity described in subsection (b). (2) A transfer of authorizations may be made under this section only upon determination by the Secretary of Defense that such action is necessary in the national interest. (3) Amounts of authorizations so transferred shall be merged with and be available for the same purposes as the authorization to which transferred. (b) Programs to Which Tranfers May Be Made.--The authority under subsection (a) applies to any counterproliferation program, project, or activity of the Department of Defense identified as an area for progress in the most recent annual report of the Counterproliferation Program Review Committee established by section 1605 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 (22 U.S.C. 2751 note). (c) Limitation on Total Amount.--The total amount of authorizations transferred under the authority of this section may not exceed $50,000,000. (d) Other Limitations and Requirements.--The provisions of subsection (b), (c), and (d) of section 1001 shall apply to a transfer under this section in the same manner as they apply to a transfer under subsection (a) of that section. (e) Construction With General Transfer Authority.--The authority provided by this section is in addition to the transfer authority provided in section 1001. SEC. 1305. ADVICE TO THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS REGARDING THE SAFETY, SECURITY, AND RELIABILITY OF UNITED STATES NUCLEAR WEAPONS STOCKPILE. (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings: (1) Nuclear weapons are the most destructive weapons on earth. The United States and its allies continue to rely on nuclear weapons to deter potential adversaries from using weapons of mass destruction. The safety and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile are essential to ensure its credibility as a deterrent. (2) On September 24, 1996, President Clinton signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. (3) Effective as of September 30, 1996, the United States is prohibited by section 507 of the Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act, 1993 (Public Law 102 377; 42 U.S.C. 2121 note) from conducting underground nuclear tests ``unless a foreign state conducts a nuclear test after this date, at which time the prohibition on United States nuclear testing is lifted''. (4) Section 1436(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1989 (Public Law 100 456; 42 U.S.C. 2121 note) requires the Secretary of Energy to ``establish and support a program to assure that the United States is in a position to maintain the reliability, safety, and continued deterrent effect of its stockpile of existing nuclear weapons designs in the event that a low-threshold or comprehensive test ban on nuclear explosive testing is negotiated and ratified.''. (5) Section 3138(d) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 (Public Law 103 160; 42 U.S.C. 2121 note) required the President to submit an annual report to Congress which sets forth ``any concerns with respect to the safety, security, effectiveness, or reliability of existing United States nuclear weapons raised by the Stockpile Stewardship Program of the Department of Energy''. (6) President Clinton declared in July 1993 that ``to assure that our nuclear deterrent remains unquestioned under a test ban, we will explore other means of maintaining our confidence in the safety, reliability, and the performance of our weapons''. This decision was incorporated in a Presidential Directive. (7) Section 3138 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 (Public Law 103 160; 42 U.S.C. 2121 note) also requires that the Secretary of Energy establish a ``stewardship program to ensure the preservation of the core intellectual and technical competencies of the United States in nuclear weapons''. (8) The plan of the Department of Energy to maintain the safety and reliability of the United States nuclear weapons stockpile is known as the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program. The ability of the United States to maintain and certify the safety, security, effectiveness, and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile without testing will require utilization of new and sophisticated computational capabilities and diagnostic technologies, methods, and procedures. Current diagnostic technologies and laboratory testing techniques are insufficient to certify the safety and reliability of the United States nuclear weapons stockpile into the future. Whereas in the past laboratory and diagnostic tools were used in conjunction with nuclear testing, in the future they will provide, under the Department of Energy's stockpile stewardship plan, the sole basis for assessing past test data and for making judgments on phenomena observed in connection with the aging of the stockpile. (9) Section 3159 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (Public Law 104 201; 42 U.S.C. 7274o) requires that the directors of the nuclear weapons laboratories and the nuclear weapons production plants submit a report to the Assistant Secretary of Energy for Defense Programs if they identify a problem that has significant bearing on confidence in the safety or reliability of a nuclear weapon or nuclear weapon type, that the Assistant Secretary must transmit that report, along with any comments, to the congressional defense committees and to the Secretary of Energy and the Secretary of Defense, and that the Joint Nuclear Weapons Council advise Congress regarding its analysis of any such problems. (10) On August 11, 1995, President Clinton directed ``the establishment of a new annual reporting and certification requirement [to] ensure that our nuclear weapons remain safe and reliable under a comprehensive test ban''. (11) On the same day, the President noted that the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy have the responsibility, after being ``advised by the Nuclear Weapons Council, the Directors of DOE's nuclear weapons laboratories, and the Commander of United States Strategic Command'', to provide the President with the information regarding the certification referred to in paragraph (10). (12) The Joint Nuclear Weapons Council established by section 179 of title 10, United States Code, is responsible for providing advice to the Secretary of Energy and Secretary of Defense regarding nuclear weapons issues, including ``considering safety, security, and control issues for existing weapons''. The Council plays a critical role in advising Congress in matters relating to nuclear weapons. (13) It is essential that the President receive well-informed, objective, and honest opinions, including dissenting views, from his advisers and technical experts regarding the safety, security, effectiveness, and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile. (b) Policy.-- (1) In general.--It is the policy of the United States-- (A) to maintain a safe, secure, effective, and reliable nuclear weapons stockpile; and (B) as long as other nations control or actively seek to acquire nuclear weapons, to retain a credible nuclear deterrent. (2) Nuclear weapons stockpile.--It is in the security interest of the United States to sustain the United States nuclear weapons stockpile through a program of stockpile stewardship, carried out at the nuclear weapons laboratories and nuclear weapons production plants. (3) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that-- (A) the United States should retain a triad of strategic nuclear forces sufficient to deter any future hostile foreign leadership with access to strategic nuclear forces from acting against the vital interests of the United States; (B) the United States should continue to maintain nuclear forces of sufficient size and capability to implement an effective and robust deterrent strategy; and (C) the advice of the persons required to provide the President and Congress with assurances of the safety, security, effectiveness, and reliability of the nuclear weapons force should be scientifically based, without regard for politics, and of the highest quality and integrity. (c) Addition of President to Recipients of Reports by Heads of Laboratories and Plants.--Section 3159(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (Public Law 104 201; 42 U.S.C. 7274o) is amended-- (1) by striking out ``committees and'' and inserting in lieu thereof ``committees,''; and (2) by inserting before the period at the end the following: ``, and to the President''. (d) Ten-Day Time Limit for Transmittal of Report.--Section 3159(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (Public Law 104 201; 42 U.S.C. 7274o) is amended by striking out ``As soon as practicable'' and inserting in lieu thereof ``Not later than 10 days''. (e) Advice and Opinions Regarding Nuclear Weapons Stockpile.--In addition to a director of a nuclear weapons laboratory or a nuclear weapons production plant (under section 3159 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (Public Law 104 201; 42 U.S.C. 7274o)), any member of the Joint Nuclear Weapons Council or the commander of the United States Strategic Command may also submit to the President, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy, or the congressional defense committees advice or opinion regarding the safety, security, effectiveness, and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile. (f) Expression of Individual Views.--A representative of the President may not take any action against, or otherwise constrain, a director of a nuclear weapons laboratory or a nuclear weapons production plant, a member of the Joint Nuclear Weapons Council, or the Commander of United States Strategic Command for presenting individual views to the President, the National Security Council, or Congress regarding the safety, security, effectiveness, and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile. (g) Definitions.--In this section: (1) The term ``representative of the President'' means the following: (A) Any official of the Department of Defense or the Department of Energy who is appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. (B) Any member of the National Security Council. (C) Any member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (D) Any official of the Office of Management and Budget. (2) The term ``nuclear weapons laboratory'' means any of the following: (A) Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, California. (B) Los Alamos National Laboratory, New Mexico. (C) Sandia National Laboratories. (3) The term ``nuclear weapons production plant'' means any of the following: (A) The Pantex Plant, Texas. (B) The Savannah River Site, South Carolina. (C) The Kansas City Plant, Missouri. (D) The Y 12 Plant, Oak Ridge, Tennessee. SEC. 1306. RECONSTITUTION OF COMMISSION TO ASSESS THE BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES. (a) Initial Organization Requirements.--Section 1321(g) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (Public Law 104 201; 110 Stat. 2712) is amended-- (1) in paragraph (1), by striking out ``not later than 45 days after the date of the enactment of this Act'' and inserting in lieu thereof ``not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998''; and (2) in paragraph (2)-- (A) by striking out ``30 days'' and inserting in lieu thereof ``60 days''; and (B) by striking out ``, but not earlier than October 15, 1996''. (b) Funding.--Section 1328 of such Act (110 Stat. 2714) is amended by inserting ``and fiscal year 1998'' after ``for fiscal year 1997''. SEC. 1307. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN UNITED STATES OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS. (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings: (1) The Chemical Weapons Convention requires the destruction of the United States stockpile of lethal chemical agents and munitions by April 29, 2007 (not later than 10 years after the Convention's entry into force). (2) The President has substantial authority under existing law to ensure that-- (A) the technologies necessary to destroy the stockpile are developed; (B) the facilities necessary to destroy the stockpile are constructed; and (C) Federal, State, and local environmental laws and regulations do not impair the ability of the United States to comply with its obligations under the Convention. (3) The Comptroller General has concluded (in GAO Report NSIAD 97018 of February 1997) that-- (A) obtaining the necessary Federal and State permits that are required under Federal environmental laws and regulations for building and operating the chemical agents and munitions destruction facilities is among the most unpredictable factors in the chemical demilitarization program; and (B) program cost and schedule are largely driven by the degree to which States and local communities are in agreement with proposed disposal methods and whether those methods meet environmental concerns. (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the President-- (1) should use the authority of the President under existing law to ensure that the United States is able to construct and operate the facilities necessary to destroy the United States stockpile of lethal chemical agents and munitions within the time allowed by the Chemical Weapons Convention; and (2) while carrying out the obligations of the United States under the Convention, should encourage negotiations between appropriate Federal officials and officials of the State and local governments concerned to attempt to meet their concerns regarding compliance with Federal and State environmental laws and regulations and other concerns about the actions being taken to carry out those obligations. (c) Chemical Weapons Convention Defined.--For the purposes of this section, the terms ``Chemical Weapons Convention'' and ``Convention'' mean the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, ratified by the United States on April 25, 1997, and entered into force on April 29, 1997. SEC. 1308. EXTENSION OF COUNTERPROLIFERATION AUTHORITIES FOR SUPPORT OF UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL COMMISSION ON IRAQ. Section 1505 of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Control Act of 1992 (title XV of Public Law 102 484; 22 U.S.C. 5859a) is amended-- (1) in subsection (d)(3), by striking out ``or'' after ``fiscal year 1996,'' and by inserting ``, or $15,000,000 for fiscal year 1998'' before the period at the end; and (2) in subsection (f), by striking out ``1997'' and inserting in lieu thereof ``1998''. ................. TITLE XIV--COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION WITH STATES OF FORMER SOVIET UNION Sec. 1401. Specification of Cooperative Threat Reduction programs and funds. Sec. 1402. Funding allocations. Sec. 1403. Prohibition on use of funds for specified purposes. Sec. 1404. Limitation on use of funds for projects related to START II Treaty until submission of certification. Sec. 1405. Limitation on use of funds for chemical weapons destruction facility. Sec. 1406. Limitation on use of funds for destruction of chemical weapons. Sec. 1407. Limitation on use of funds for storage facility for Russian fissile material. Sec. 1408. Limitation on use of funds for weapons storage security. Sec. 1409. Report on issues regarding payment of taxes, duties, and other assessments on assistance provided to Russia under Cooperative Threat Reduction programs. Sec. 1410. Availability of funds. SEC. 1401. SPECIFICATION OF COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAMS AND FUNDS. (a) Specification of CTR Programs.--For purposes of section 301 and other provisions of this Act, Cooperative Threat Reduction programs are the programs specified in section 1501(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 1997 (Public Law 104 201: 110 Stat. 2731; 50 U.S.C. 2362 note). (b) Fiscal Year 1998 Cooperative Threat Reduction Funds Defined.--As used in this title, the term ``fiscal year 1998 Cooperative Threat Reduction funds'' means the funds appropriated pursuant to the authorization of appropriations in section 301 for Cooperative Threat Reduction programs. SEC. 1402. FUNDING ALLOCATIONS. (a) In General.--Of the fiscal year 1998 Cooperative Threat Reduction funds, not more than the following amounts may be obligated for the purposes specified: (1) For strategic offensive arms elimination in Russia, $77,900,000. (2) For strategic nuclear arms elimination in Ukraine, $76,700,000. (3) For fissile material containers in Russia, $7,000,000. (4) For planning and design of a chemical weapons destruction facility in Russia, $35,400,000. (5) For dismantlement of biological and chemical weapons facilities in the former Soviet Union, $20,000,000. (6) For planning, design, and construction of a storage facility for Russian fissile material, $57,700,000. (7) For weapons storage security in Russia, $36,000,000. (8) For development of a cooperative program with the Government of Russia to eliminate the production of weapons grade plutonium at Russian reactors, $41,000,000. (9) For activities designated as Defense and Military-to-Military Contacts in Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan, $8,000,000. (10) For military-to-military programs of the United States that focus on countering the threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and that include the security forces of the independent states of the former Soviet Union other than Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakstan, $2,000,000. (11) For activities designated as Other Assessments/Administrative Support $20,500,000. (b) Limited Authority To Vary Individual Amounts.--(1) If the Secretary of Defense determines that it is necessary to do so in the national interest, the Secretary may, subject to paragraphs (2) and (3), obligate amounts for the purposes stated in any of the paragraphs of subsection (a) in excess of the amount specified for those purposes in that paragraph. However, the total amount obligated for the purposes stated in the paragraphs in subsection (a) may not by reason of the use of the authority provided in the preceding sentence exceed the sum of the amounts specified in those paragraphs. (2) An obligation for the purposes stated in any of the paragraphs in subsection (a) in excess of the amount specified in that paragraph may be made using the authority provided in paragraph (1) only after-- (A) the Secretary submits to Congress notification of the intent to do so together with a complete discussion of the justification for doing so; and (B) 15 days have elapsed following the date of the notification. (3) The Secretary may not, under the authority provided in paragraph (1), obligate amounts appropriated for the purposes stated in any of paragraphs (3) through (11) of subsection (a) in excess of 115 percent of the amount stated in those paragraphs. (c) Limited Waiver of 115 Percent Cap on Obligation in Excess of Amounts Authorized for Fiscal Years 1996 and 1997.--(1) The limitation in subsection (b)(1) of section 1202 of the National Defense Authorization Act For Fiscal Year 1996 (Public Law 104 106; 110 Stat. 469), that provides that the authority provided in that sentence to obligate amounts specified for Cooperative Threat Reduction purposes in excess of the amount specified for each such purpose in subsection (a) of that section may not exceed 115 percent of the amounts specified, shall not apply with respect to subsection (a)(1) of such section for purposes of strategic offensive weapons elimination in Russia or the Ukraine. (2) The limitation in subsection (b)(1) of section 1502 of the National Defense Authorization Act For Fiscal Year 1997 (Public Law 104 201; 110 Stat. 2732), that provides that the authority provided in that sentence to obligate amounts specified for Cooperative Threat Reduction purposes in excess of the amount specified for each such purpose in subsection (a) of that section may not exceed 115 percent of the amounts specified, shall not apply with respect to subsections (a)(2) and (a)(3) of such section. SEC. 1403. PROHIBITION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR SPECIFIED PURPOSES. (a) In General.--No fiscal year 1998 Cooperative Threat Reduction funds, and no funds appropriated for Cooperative Threat Reduction programs for any prior fiscal year and remaining available for obligation, may be obligated or expended for any of the following purposes: (1) Conducting with Russia any peacekeeping exercise or other peacekeeping-related activity. (2) Provision of housing. (3) Provision of assistance to promote environmental restoration. (4) Provision of assistance to promote job retraining. (b) Limitation With Respect to Defense Conversion Assistance.--None of the funds appropriated pursuant to this Act may be obligated or expended for the provision of assistance to Russia or any other state of the former Soviet Union to promote defense conversion. SEC. 1404. LIMITATION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR PROJECTS RELATED TO START II TREATY UNTIL SUBMISSION OF CERTIFICATION. No fiscal year 1998 Cooperative Threat Reduction funds may be obligated or expended for strategic offensive arms elimination projects in Russia related to the START II Treaty (as defined in section 1302(f)) until 30 days after the date on which the Secretary of Defense submits to Congress a certification in writing that-- (1) implementation of the projects would benefit the national security interest of the United States; and (2) Russia has agreed in an implementing agreement to share the cost for the projects. SEC. 1405. LIMITATION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR CHEMICAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION FACILITY. (a) Limitation on Use of Funds Until Submission of Notifications to Congress.--No fiscal year 1998 Cooperative Threat Reduction funds may be obligated or expended for planning and design of a chemical weapons destruction facility until 15 days after the date that is the later of the following: (1) The date on which the Secretary of Defense submits to Congress notification of an agreement between the United States and Russia with respect to such chemical weapons destruction facility that includes-- (A) an agreement providing for a limitation on the financial contribution by the United States for the facility; (B) an agreement that the United States will not pay the costs for infrastructure determined by Russia to be necessary to support the facility; and (C) an agreement on the location of the facility. (2) The date on which the Secretary of Defense submits to Congress notification that the Government of Russia has formally approved a plan-- (A) that allows for the destruction of chemical weapons in Russia; and (B) that commits Russia to pay a portion of the cost for the facility. (b) Prohibition on Use of Funds for Facility Construction.--No fiscal year 1998 Cooperative Threat Reduction funds authorized to be obligated in section 1402(a)(4) for planning and design of a chemical weapons destruction facility in Russia may be used for construction of such facility. SEC. 1406. LIMITATION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR DESTRUCTION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS. (a) Limitation.--No funds authorized to be appropriated under this or any other Act for fiscal year 1998 for Cooperative Threat Reduction programs may be obligated or expended for chemical weapons destruction activities (including activities for the planning, design, or construction of a chemical weapons destruction facility or for the dismantlement of an existing chemical weapons production facility) until the President submits to Congress a written certification under subsection (b). (b) Presidential Certification.--A certification under this subsection is either of the following certifications by the President: (1) A certification that-- (A) Russia is making reasonable progress toward the implementation of the Bilateral Destruction Agreement; (B) the United States and Russia have made substantial progress toward the resolution, to the satisfaction of the United States, of outstanding compliance issues under the Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding and the Bilateral Destruction Agreement; and (C) Russia has fully and accurately declared all information regarding its unitary and binary chemical weapons, chemical weapons facilities, and other facilities associated with chemical weapons. (2) A certification that the national security interests of the United States could be undermined by a United States policy not to carry out chemical weapons destruction activities under the Cooperative Threat Reduction programs for which funds are authorized to be appropriated under this or any other Act for fiscal year 1998. (c) Definitions.--For the purposes of this section: (1) The term ``Bilateral Destruction Agreement'' means the Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Destruction and Nonproduction of Chemical Weapons and on Measures to Facilitate the Multilateral Convention on Banning Chemical Weapons, signed on June 1, 1990. (2) The term ``Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding'' means the Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding a Bilateral Verification Experiment and Data Exchange Related to Prohibition on Chemical Weapons, signed at Jackson Hole, Wyoming, on September 23, 1989. SEC. 1407. LIMITATION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR STORAGE FACILITY FOR RUSSIAN FISSILE MATERIAL. No fiscal year 1998 Cooperative Threat Reduction funds may be obligated or expended for planning, design, or construction of a storage facility for Russian fissile material until 15 days after the date that is the later of the following: (1) The date on which the Secretary of Defense submits to Congress notification that an implementing agreement between the United States and Russia has been entered into that specifies the total cost to the United States for the facility. (2) The date on which the Secretary submits to Congress notification that an agreement has been entered into between the United States and Russia incorporating the principle of transparency with respect to the use of the facility. SEC. 1408. LIMITATION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR WEAPONS STORAGE SECURITY. No fiscal year 1998 Cooperative Threat Reduction funds intended for weapons storage security activities in Russia may be obligated or expended until-- (1) the Secretary of Defense submits to Congress a report on the status of negotiations between the United States and Russia on audits and examinations with respect to weapons storage security; and (2) 15 days have elapsed following the date that the report is submitted. SEC. 1409. REPORT ON ISSUES REGARDING PAYMENT OF TAXES, DUTIES, AND OTHER ASSESSMENTS ON ASSISTANCE PROVIDED TO RUSSIA UNDER COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAMS. Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress a report on issues regarding payment of taxes, duties, and other assessments on assistance provided to Russia under Cooperative Threat Reduction programs. The report shall include the following: (1) A description of any disputes between the United States and Russia with respect to payment by the United States of taxes, duties and other assessments on assistance provided to Russia under a Cooperative Threat Reduction program, including a description of the nature of each dispute, the amount of payment disputed, whether the dispute was resolved, and if the dispute was resolved, the means by which the dispute was resolved. (2) A description of the actions taken by the Secretary to prevent disputes in the future between the United States and Russia with respect to payment by the United States of taxes, duties, and other assessments on assistance provided to Russia under a Cooperative Threat Reduction program. (3) A description of any agreement between the United States and Russia with respect to payment by the United States of taxes, duties, or other assessments on assistance provided to Russia under a Cooperative Threat Reduction program. (4) Any proposals of the Secretary for actions that should be taken to prevent disputes between the United States and Russia with respect to payment by the United States of taxes, duties, or other assessments on assistance provided to Russia under a Cooperative Threat Reduction program. SEC. 1410. AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS. Funds appropriated pursuant to the authorization of appropriations in section 301 for Cooperative Threat Reduction programs shall be available for obligation for three fiscal years.