TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY COULD REPRESENT MAJOR SECURITY BREACH (House of Representatives - May 13, 1998)

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The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Sessions). Under the Speaker's announced policy of January 7, 1997, the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Weldon) is recognized for the remaining time until midnight as the designee of the majority leader.

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, I do not rise to speak in the well to talk about scandals in this city. Many of my colleagues do, and many of our colleagues talk about the latest scandal of the day, whether it is in the White House or from other parts of our society. I do not like to do that, and in fact, I have not done that.

Mr. Speaker, I rise tonight to talk about, first of all, an issue that I usually speak about on the floor when I get the opportunity. That is our national security, and our relationship with those countries who have been our adversary, or who may be our adversary in the future.

Tonight, unfortunately, Mr. Speaker, I rise to talk about both of those issues, our national security and a scandal that is currently unfolding that I think will dwarf every scandal that we have seen talked about on this floor in the past 6 years.

Mr. Speaker, this scandal involves potential treason, and if in fact the facts are true as they have been outlined in media reports, which we are currently trying to investigate, I think will require articles of impeachment.

Mr. Speaker, there was a story that ran in the New York Times in the early part of April that outlined a technology transfer involving American companies and institutions in China involving the Long March space launch vehicle. In February of 1996 the Long March space launch vehicle exploded, blew up, and destroyed a $200 million satellite built by the Loral Company that it was supposed to place into orbit.

What happened after that explosion, Mr. Speaker, is the subject of intense investigation right now, but there are some facts that we do know. What we do know is that there was some degree of cooperation between one and perhaps two American companies and the Chinese government and their military and space agencies that allowed for a technology transfer to assist the Chinese in not just their commercial space launch program, but, more importantly, their ability to place long range missiles into the upper atmosphere and have a capability of deploying multiple warheads, posing an extremely significant threat to the U.S. and our allies.

The military significance of the technology transfer that took place following this explosion was of such gravity that a criminal investigation was opened by the U.S. Justice Department, and a grand jury was empaneled. The grand jury was empaneled to consider whether indictments were warranted in this cooperative technology transfer with the Chinese.

However, before any formal charges were filed, the criminal inquiry was dealt a very serious blow two months ago, in fact, this would have been in February or March of this year, when President Clinton quietly authorized the export to China of similar technology by one of the companies under investigation, the Loral Corporation.

So in effect, the President's quiet authorization of this technology transfer, which up until this time was not allowed under U.S. law, basically took the entire foundation away from the Justice Department investigation. In fact, Mr. Speaker, we know the Justice Department opposed that decision by the White House, arguing that it would be much more difficult to prosecute the companies if the government gave its blessing to the deal that had occurred. In fact, it is probably now impossible to have any indictments against Loral and Hughes because of the President's actions.

Why is this a scandal, Mr. Speaker? First of all, and I am going to get into this in great detail, this, perhaps, will do as much harm to our security as that situation that occurred years ago when the Russians were able to get our quieting technology that they basically illegally acquired, that allowed them to build their submarines in a quiet manner that makes it extremely difficult and in some cases impossible for our U.S. intelligence sources to monitor these submarines as they travel across the oceans of the world. This is a very egregious violation of transferring technology that directly threatens the U.S. and our people, as well as our allies.

But in addition, Mr. Speaker, the American people need to understand something else about the Loral Corporation. First of all, the CEO of the Loral Corporation, Mr. Schwartz, was the largest contributor to the Democratic National Committee in the year during which this entire process occurred. That in itself raises some concerns.

The questions that need to be answered are, did the CEO of Loral Corporation's involvement in contributing hundreds of thousands of dollars of personal wealth to one political party affect the President's decision to waive a requirement that basically undermined a judicial investigation, a criminal judicial investigation of this incident? We are attempting to find that out right now, Mr. Speaker.

The American people and our colleagues in this institution need to know whether or not this administration basically allowed a technology to be transferred to China that was up until that point in time prohibited, and that appears not only is that in itself an outrageous act; but then on top of that, did the influence of the CEO of that corporation, and the fact that that corporation hired one of the most well-connected lobbyists in the city, whose brother in fact had been working at the White House, did that connection have an impact on the President's decision? If it did, in my opinion, Mr. Speaker, that is treason.

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Mr. Speaker, the whole issue of this technology transfer itself is a scandal. Newspapers across this city and across this country, through bits and pieces, have picked up the story and have attempted to piece it together.

The Speaker of the House, leadership on both sides of the national security effort in this body are concerned about the technology transfer itself as well as whether or not there was an impact of this CEO's involvement with one political party and convincing the President to waive the requirement that would have allowed the criminal prosecution of Loral and possibly Hughes to move forward.

We need to know the answers, and we need to have that information provided to us. To me it is an absolute outrage that this occurred even without the connection of the dollars from the CEO of Loral and his contributions to the Democratic National Committee.

But, Mr. Speaker, I think even of more significance to us for the long-term security of our country is the fact that this is a continuing pattern that we have seen over the past six years of this administration, advocating an aggressive arms control policy but in fact doing the complete opposite when it comes to violations of arms control agreements or the transfer of sensitive technology.

Mr. Speaker, there are those who are sitting in their offices tonight or those around the country who would say, here is another Republican just railing about this administration or railing about issues involving security, someone who wants to use China and perhaps Russia as a scapegoat for larger defense budgets.

Let me state at the outset, Mr. Speaker, that I have supported this administration in many instances on this floor on security issues. In fact, just several months ago, I traveled to Moscow very quietly to make the case to members of the Russian State Duma that they should understand the reason why President Clinton was about to take on Saddam Hussein if he, in fact, did not allow the U.N. inspectors to complete their investigations throughout Iraq. I did that in support of this President because I felt that Russia should understand why Americans were concerned and why Democrats and Republicans were supportive of our President in this very difficult decision to stand down Saddam Hussein when he basically ignored the requirements of the United Nations.

In addition, Mr. Speaker, I take great pride in working in a very bipartisan way with the Members of our Committee on National Security. In fact, just last week we reported our bill out of committee with a vote of 51 to 1, a strong bipartisan measure that had Democrat and Republican active involvement. And next week we will have that bill on the floor. Again, it will be a strong bipartisan effort.

In terms of Russia and China, Mr. Speaker, I take great pride in leading this body in our interactive effort with Russia. In fact, next week, again, I will be hosting senior leaders of the Russian State Duma from all nine major factions as we begin again the ongoing interactive dialogue that I helped start on a formal basis between the Russian State Duma and our Congress 2 years ago. Having traveled to Moscow and Russia some 14 times and having led delegations there to discuss a broad range of issues, including helping encourage more investment in Russia, stabilizing the economy, helping create a middle class, I take great pride in proactively engaging the Russian people and their leaders.

Likewise, Mr. Speaker, in the case of China, I support the policy of the President in engaging China. I think an isolationist approach advocated by some of my conservative colleagues is the wrong approach. And to that extent, last year I led two delegations of our colleagues to Beijing and Shanghai. In fact, while in Beijing, I was the first U.S. policymaker to address the National Defense University of the People's Liberation Army both times I went. I gave the first lecture at Fudan University in the Lincoln lecture series, and I will go back to China this year where I will deliver lectures at two other Chinese universities where they will name me an honorary member of their faculty.

I mention these facts, Mr. Speaker, because I want our colleagues and I want the American people to understand that it is not my intent to sensationalize the problems that I am going to outline here or to think that I am always critical of this administration when it comes to our relationship with other countries throughout the world. But, Mr. Speaker, this administration has a major problem in the arms control area. And this country needs to understand it, needs to think through the effect that this policy is having on us in the short-term and, more importantly, needs to understand the undermining this policy is going to have on future stability in the world in the 21st century.

I have given you one specific proliferation case, an egregious case that occurred this year that involves the potential for the largest scandal I think that this administration will have encountered since it took office 6 years ago. But I want to go through some other instances, Mr. Speaker, because unfortunately we see a pattern, a pattern that I think is causing us a more destabilized relationship with the major powers of the world, with the emerging powers of the world and with rogue nations.

This is extremely important because we are reading the headlines, Mr. Speaker, every day, most recently of India conducting underground nuclear tests. We were assured by this administration that arms control agreements would prevent countries like India from further proliferating nuclear weapons by conducting underground tests. Right before these underground tests by India, in fact about a month earlier, the same newspapers reported on their front pages Pakistan testing a medium range missile, which perhaps led to India's underground nuclear tests. The question then becomes, how and why are India and Pakistan becoming involved in what I think is one of the world's newest and potentially most devastating arms races?

One only has to look at the arms control record of this administration to see a pattern that unfortunately has occurred over the past 6 years.

The same pattern exists not just with technology involving missiles and weapons of mass destruction but involves supercomputers. Let me cite, Mr. Speaker, another example. Documents that have been made public, again by the news media show, that the Clinton administration approved the export of U.S. built supercomputers to Communist China in late December 1997, even though the Chinese officials were unwilling to allow on-site inspections of the delivery venue of those supercomputers which is required by U.S. law. Facts have shown that commerce officials for this government at our embassy in Beijing were denied permission by the Chinese government to inspect the university where these supercomputers were headed prior to the export of these digital high performance computers.

In fact, according to a December 19, 1997 letter to Lee Yu Hu, director general for science and technology at China's ministry of foreign trade and economic cooperation or MFTEC, cosigned by Commerce Department officials, Amanda Bus, assistant secretary for export enforcement, and Roger Mayjack, assistant secretary for export administration, and I quote, We were disappointed at MFTEC's decision not to allow an on-site end-use check and refusal to permit an embassy representative to travel to the stated university at the university's invitation. Because we were unable to work through MFTEC, we gathered information on the end user through other sources and have approved the license through those means.

A case where the administration did not even abide by the laws on the books of this country to secure a complete understanding of where these supercomputers were headed. Why is that so important?

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It is so important because this body and the other body passed a new law in 1997 requiring that we know where this administration is allowing supercomputers to be sold.

Well, why would we pass a law like that, Mr. Speaker? We passed a law like that because in 1995 this administration allowed the export of high-speed supercomputers to Russia. Now, these supercomputers going to Russia, Mr. Speaker, were supposedly intended for a project involving wetlands analysis. When the actual determination was made as to where these supercomputers ended up, we found that these supercomputers ended up in nuclear weapons laboratories in Russia, a clear violation of the intent of the transfer and, obviously, a concern to Members' on both sides of the aisle in this institution and in the other body.

Because of that transfer and the fact that this administration allowed these supercomputers that were supposed to go for Russia for an environmental project to end up going to a nuclear weapons laboratory, we passed a law. That law was violated, Mr. Speaker, earlier this year when the President did not, in fact, require the Chinese government to allow us to see the end location of where these most recent supercomputers were going in China.

Mr. Speaker, this administration has maintained throughout the past 6 years that our security relationships around the world are based on arms control agreements. In fact, in many cases this administration has said that we do not need defensive military systems because arms control negotiations and deterrence and control of technology through these documents will provide the stability in the world and, therefore, we do not need defensive systems.

So not only has this administration opposed defensive systems, and not only have they tried to impose limitations on the Congress' ability to deploy these systems, but even more egregiously, Mr. Speaker, this administration, which claims to base its security arrangements on arms control agreements, has failed to enforce sanctions time and time again when proliferations occur; when companies and institutes in China and in Russia are caught transferring technology illegally to other nations.

Now, to back up my claim, Mr. Speaker, I would like to insert in the record for all of our colleagues and the American people to see several documents. The first involves a chronology compiled not by some Republican think tank but rather by the Congressional Research Service, an independent nonpartisan arm of the Congress, supported, I might add, by Democrats and Republicans. A chronology of Chinese weapons-related transfers since 1992.

Over the past 6 years our intelligence community caught China transferring technology illegally 271 times. This administration imposed sanctions once. Twenty-one times China transferred technology.

November 1992. M-11 missiles transferred to Pakistan. Violations: Missile Technology Control Regime, Arms Control Export Act, Export Administration Act. This time administration sanctions were imposed and then they were waived on November 1 of 1994.

In 1994-95. Dozens and possibly hundreds of missile guidance systems and computerized machine tools transferred by China to Iran. Violations of the MTCR, the Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act, the Arms Export Control Act, the Export Administration Act. The administration's response: Nothing. No sanctions.

Second quarter of 1995. Parts for the M-11 missile to Pakistan. Violations: MTCR, Arms Export Control Act, Export Administration Act. The administration's response: Nothing. No sanctions.

December 1994 to mid 1995. 5,000 ring magnets to be used for nuclear enrichment programs for nuclear weapons in Pakistan. Violations: The Nonproliferation Treaty, the Export-Import Bank Act, the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act, the Arms Export Control Act. The administration's response: They considered the sanctions but they never imposed them.

July 1995. More than 30 M-11 missiles stored in Sargodha Air Force Base in Pakistan. Violation: MTCR, Arms Export Control Act, Export Administration Act. This administration's response: Nothing. No sanctions.

September 1995. Calutron electromagnetic isotope separation system for uranium enrichment to Iran. Again, for a nuclear weapons program. Violation: Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act, Export-Import Bank Act, Arms Export Control Act. Response by this administration: Nothing. No sanctions.

1995 and 1997. C-802 anti-ship cruise missiles and C-801 air launch cruise missiles, again to Iran. Violation: Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act. Response by the administration: Nothing. No sanctions.

February 1996. Dual-use chemical precursors and equipment to aid Iran's chemical weapons program. Violation: Arms Export Control Act, Export Administration Act. Result: Sanctions were imposed. The one time in 21. Sanctions were imposed May 21, 1997.

Summer 1996. 400 tons of chemicals transferred to Iran. Violation: Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act, Arms Export Control Act, Export Administration Act. Administration response: Nothing. No sanctions.

August 1996. A plant to manufacture M-11 missiles or missile components in Pakistan. Violation: MTCR, Arms Export Control Act, Export Administration Act. Response by the administration: Nothing. No sanctions.

August 1996. Gyroscopes, accelerometers and test equipment for missile guidance systems, again to Iran. Violation: MTCR, Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act, Arms Export Control Act, Export Administration Act. Response by the administration: Nothing. No sanctions.

September 1996. Special industrial furnace and high-tech diagnostic equipment to unsafe guarded nuclear facilities in Pakistan. Violation: NPT, Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act, Export-Import Bank Act, Arms Export Control Act. Response by the administration: Nothing. No sanctions imposed.

July to December of 1996. The Director of Central Intelligence reports, and I quote, tremendous variety, end quote, of technology and assistance for Pakistan's ballistic missile program. Violations of the MTCR, the Arms Export Control Act, the Export Administration Act. Response by the administration: Nothing. No sanctions.

July-December of 1996. The same Director of Central Intelligence reports, and I quote, a tremendous variety, end quote, of assistance for Iran's ballistic missile program. Violations: MTCR, Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act, Arms Export Control Act, Export Administration Act. Response by the administration: Nothing. No sanctions.

July-December 1996 again. Again this Director of Central Intelligence reports, principal supplies of nuclear equipment, material and technology for Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. Violations: NPT, Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act, Export-Import Bank Act, Arms Export Administration Act. Response by the administration: Nothing. No sanctions.

July-December 1996. The same director reports key supplies for technology for large nuclear projects in Iran. Violations: NPT, Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act, Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act. Export-Import Bank Act, Arms Export Administration Act. Response by the administration: Nothing. No sanctions.

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Again in July and December of 1996. The same Director of Central Intelligence reports, considerable chemical weapons-related transfers for production equipment and technology to Iran. Violations: Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act, Arms Export Control Act, Export Administration Act. Response by the Administration: Nothing. No sanctions.

January of 1997. Dual use biological items to Iran. Violation: The BWC, the Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act, the Arms Export Control Act, the Export Administration Act. Response by the Administration: Nothing. No sanctions.

1997 again. Chemical precursors, production equipment, and production technology for Iran's chemical weapons program including a plant for making glass-lined equipment. Violations again of the Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act, the Arms Export Control Act, the Export Administration Act. Response by the Administration: Nothing. No sanctions.

September-December of 1997. The China Great Wall Industry Corporation provided telemetry equipment used in flight tests to Iran for its development of the Shahab III and Shahab IV medium-range ballistic missiles. Violation: MTCR, Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act, Arms Export Control Act, Export Administration Act. Response by the Administration: Nothing. No sanctions.

And finally, November 1997 through April of 1998. We now find they may have transferred technology for Pakistan's Ghauri medium-range ballistic missile that was flight-tested on April 6, 1998, violating the MTCR, the Arms Export Control Act, the Export Administration Act. No sanctions. No action taken by the administration.

Mr. Speaker, this is the record that is causing us to see a scenario unfolding that will place this country and the world at the greatest possible risk of confrontation. We see the administration daily railing about Iran's capability, Iraq's capability. We see them railing about India doing underground nuclear tests, Pakistan testing medium-range missiles. When here we have 21 specific cases, all documented, where this administration, which purports to base its arms control treaty relationships, as the basis for stopping proliferation in a situation where they do not enforce any of them except in one case.

And yet they wonder why, they wonder why India and Pakistan are now in a major arms control race. And they wonder why Iran and Iraq continue to develop threatening capabilities that threaten to destroy Israel, all of our allies in that region, all of our Arab friends, as well as our troops in that region.

Mr. Speaker, I argue on the floor tonight, it is this administration that is causing the problem we currently see in India, in Pakistan, Iraq, and Iran. It is this administration that bases its security relationships on arms control agreements but never enforces those very agreements when they are in fact violated.

Let us talk about Russia, Mr. Speaker. We have documented here for the Record 16 specific violations since 1990 and 1991 by the Russians of various treaties, and only for two of those 16 did the administration impose sanctions.

Early in the 1990s, we do not know the exact year, Russians sold drawings. Now listen to this, Mr. Speaker. The Russians sold drawings of a sarin plant manufacturing procedures and toxic agents to a Japanese terrorist group. The Russians sold these drawings to a Japanese terrorist group.

And we all know, several years ago in Japan in a subway we had a sarin weapons attack in a subway that killed Japanese citizens. Violations, Mr. Speaker, of the Arms Export Control Act, section 81, and the Export Administration Act, section 11(c). No publicly known sanctions were administered by this administration.

In 1991, Mr. Speaker, Russia transferred to China, Russian entities, 3 RD-120 rocket engines and electronic equipment to improve the accuracy of ballistic missiles, a violation of the MTCR; the Arms Export Control Act, Section 73; the Export Administration Act, section 11(b). No sanctions imposed by the Administration.

From 1991 and 1995, Russian entities transferred cryogenic liquid oxygen hydrorocket engines and technology to India, Mr. Speaker. Now China is supplying Pakistan. Russia is supplying India. Violations: MTCR; the Arms Export Control Act, section 73; the Export Administration Act, section 11(b). Sanctions against Russia and India under both of those cases were imposed on May 6 for 2 years and then they expired after 2 years. But they were imposed in that one instance.

From 1992 to 1995, Russian transfers to Brazil of carbon fiber technology for rocket motor cases for a space launch program. Violating the MTCR, the Arms Export Control Act, and the Export Administration Act. Sanctions were reportedly secretly imposed and then waived, although we never knew that because it was all done in secret.

From 1992 to 1996, Russian armed forces delivered 24 Scud-B missiles and eight launchers to Armenia, violating the MTCR, the Arms Export Control Act, the Export Administration Act. Sanctions again were never introduced or implemented by this administration.

June of 1993. Additional Russian enterprise involved in missile technology transfers to India, violating the MTCR, the Arms Export Control Act, the Export Administration Act. Sanctions were imposed on June of 1993, but they were waived until July. No publicly known follow-up on those sanctions.

1995 to the present, Mr. Speaker. Construction of a 1,000 megawatt nuclear reactor at Bushehr in Iran. And by the way, there was a side deal that the Ministry of Atomic Industry in Russia initially had that even Boris Yeltsin was not aware of on this nuclear power plant deal that only because inside of Russia it was exposed was that separate effort actually canceled, but the construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant continued. Violations of the Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act, the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act, and the Foreign Assistance Act. The response by the administration: They refused to renew some civilian nuclear cooperation agreements. They waived sanctions on aid. Waived sanctions, Mr. Speaker.

August of 1995. Russian assistance to Iran to develop biological weapons. Violations of the Biological Weapons Convention, the Arms Export Control Act, the Export Administration Act, the Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act, the Foreign Assistance Act. No known sanctions.

November 1995. Russian citizens transferred to unnamed country technology for making chemical weapons, violating the Arms Export Control Act, the Export Administration Act. The sanctions were imposed in this case on a Russian citizen on November 17, 1995.

December of 1995. Russian gyroscopes from submarine launched ballistic missiles smuggled to Iraq through middlemen. We caught them red-handed, Mr. Speaker, red-handed, violating the United Nations sanctions, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Arms Export Control Act, the Export Administration Act, the Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act, and the Foreign Assistance Act. No sanctions were ever imposed.

In fact, Mr. Speaker, we were told when I wrote to the President on this particular transfer that we would pursue this aggressively, and we did not impose sanctions, the Administration said, because Russia was pursuing a criminal investigation.

We now know that last fall Russia ended the criminal investigation. No criminal levies were brought against any Russian citizen or company, and in fact, no sanctions were ever imposed. The transfer took place. In fact, we now know there were 120 sets of these guidance systems that went to Iraq from Russia three different times.

July-December of 1996. The Director of Central Intelligence reported Russia transferred to Iran a variety of items related to ballistic missiles. Violating the MTCR, the Arms Export Control Act, the Export Administration Act, the Foreign Assistance Act, the Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act, and the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act. The administration's response, no sanctions.

November of 1996. Israel reported Russian assistance to Syria to build a chemical weapons plant. Violating the Arms Export Control Act, the Export Administration Act, and the Foreign Assistance Act.

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No publicly known sanctions. 1996 and 1997, Russia delivered 3 kilowatt diesel electric submarines to Iran, violations of the Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act, the Foreign Assistance Act. No sanctions imposed.

January to February of 1997, Russia transferred detailed instructions to Iran on the production of the SS-4 missile, which now, within a year, will threaten all of Israel and all of our friends and our troops in that theater, violating the MTCR, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Arms Export Control Act, the Export Administration Act, the Foreign Assistance Act, the Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act, and the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act. No sanctions imposed, Mr. Speaker.

April of 1997, Russia sold S-300 antiaircraft, antimissile missile systems to Iran to protect the nuclear plant that they were building, again in violation of treaties. These violations were of the Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act and the Foreign Assistance Act. No known sanctions.

Finally, in October of 1997, Israeli intelligence reported Russian technology transfers for Iranian missiles developed with ranges between 1,300 and 10,000 kilometers. The transfers included engines and guidance systems, violating the MTCR, the Arms Export Control Act, the Export Administration Act, the Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act, and the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act. No known sanctions.

Mr. Speaker, I know I sound repetitious in going through all of those violations, but I think it is about time, Mr. Speaker, that we lay the cards on the table. This administration has no foreign policy. This administration maintains that arms control agreements are the basis of our security relationships.

I have just cited on the Record, with documentation involving China and Russia, which I ask all of our colleagues and the American people to review, 40 separate occasions where violations of agreements have taken place and where on only three occasions has this administration imposed sanctions.

We wonder why the President says Iran and Iraq have this capability. We wonder why Russian entities continue to sell technology to Iraq and to Iran. We wonder why India is doing underground nuclear tests. We wonder why Pakistan is testing medium-range missiles, all of which are destabilizing world security.

Why are all these things happening? Because everyone in the world knows this administration does not enforce the laws that we place on the books, that we ask every nation that is a signatory to abide by.

Mr. Speaker, time is running out. In the 12 years that I have been in this institution, I have never seen a greater lack of confidence in any administration by this body and the other body in enforcing arms control agreements.

Last November, after this body found out, primarily by the actions of the leaders of Israel, Mr. Netanyahu and the Israeli intelligence community, after we found out from them that Russia had signed deals, the Russian space agency with the Iranians, to build this missile that is going to threaten Israel a year from now, the Congress was outraged.

A bipartisan Iran sanctions bill was introduced by the gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman), co-endorsed by the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman), and supported by Democrats and Republicans.

Vice President Gore, who I have the highest respect for, called a group of us down to the White House. This was in November of last year. There were 12 or 13 of us in the room, the Vice President's meeting room, along with some of his security people.

We met for an hour. There were Senators, Democratic, Republican Senators, and there were Democratic, Republican House Members, chairmen of committees, and key people involved in international and defense issues.

The Vice President personally pleaded with us. He said, my friends, please do not let this Iran sanctions bill pass the House, because if it passes, it will send the wrong signal. It will send the signal that the Congress has no confidence in this administration's ability to control proliferation.

When he finished, every one of us in the room, Democrats and Republicans, Senators and House Members, said, Mr. Vice President, it is too late. The Congress has lost confidence.

That same week, Mr. Speaker, the Record speaks for itself, the Iran missile sanctions bill came up on the House floor, and almost 400 Members of this body voted in favor of that bill in spite of the Vice President lobbying personally against it. Liberals, conservatives, southerners, northeasterners, big city representatives, and rural areas all came together and said, we have got to send a signal that this policy of the past 6 years is failing. It is destabilizing the world. The bill passed the House.

Then a month and a half ago, I got a call from the White House to come back down because the Vice President again wanted to meet with a group of us. So I went back down to the White House. Again, I was with the Vice President. On one side of him was a Member of the National Security Council. On the other side was one of his key staffers.

The Vice President met with the 13 or 14 of us again for 90 minutes. He went through all of the efforts being taken to assist Russia in controlling proliferation. When he finished his discussion, I said, Mr. Vice President, I agree, you are making efforts, and you are getting some results, but you have not totally stopped the proliferation.

He said, I know. You are right. We have not totally cut it off. He said, but please do not pass that bill in the Senate.

That bill is pending right now for a vote in the Senate. If it is brought up, my prediction is it will pass.

Mr. Speaker, we have got a problem. This Congress has lost confidence in this administration's ability to stop proliferation. Why is that important, Mr. Speaker? Because every day we pick up the newspaper, we are reading more horror stories that shake this world that are eventually going to lead to a confrontation, a confrontation perhaps between India and Pakistan, and the tensions are flaring there rapidly; a confrontation between North Korea and perhaps Japan or South Korea; a confrontation between Iran and Israel or Iraq and Israel or some other nation, all of which have benefited from these technology transfers that this administration has ignored for 6 straight years, all the time saying we do not need defensive systems because our arms control negotiations are the security blanket we need to provide stability in the world.

On top of all of this, Mr. Speaker, we read of a situation, front page in the New York Times, that one of our companies assisted the Chinese illegally, were under a criminal investigation with the grand jury when the President of the United States very quietly issued an executive order waiving, waiving the actual prohibition so that the entire criminal investigation of Loral Corporation was undermined by the action of the President.

Then we find out that the CEO of that corporation is, in one year, the single largest contributor politically to the President's campaign and the Democratic National Committee, over $300,000 by one person, the CEO of that same company that was able to get itself out of what was an aggressive criminal investigation.

Mr. Speaker, we are going to get to the bottom of this. Not because this is a scandal that would embarrass the President, not because this is some kind of a campaign fund-raising issue, but because this threatens the security of this Nation.

If the facts are as they have been reported in the New York Times and the other major national media, this, in fact, Mr. Speaker, in my mind, is an act of treason, and this, in my mind, would result in a call for impeachment proceedings against this President.

Mr. Speaker, I thank the staff of the House for staying through this ordeal, and I thank you, Mr. Speaker, for remaining here during this time so that I could present this special order.

Mr. Speaker, I include for the Record the documents I referred to:

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Technology Scandal With Risky Portent

From the Washington Times, Apr. 7, 1998

[FROM THE WASHINGTON TIMES, APR. 7, 1998]

(BY FRANK GAFFNEY, JR.)

The front page of Saturday's New York Times featured an article that should alarm every American. It reported that two of America's leading aerospace companies--Loral Space and Communications and Hughes Electronics--are suspected of having provided `space expertise that significantly advanced Beijing's ballistic missile program.'

It will be recalled that the PRC's ballistic missile program includes missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons against cities in the United States. This is hardly an abstract threat.

Not so long ago, a top Chinese official intimated to the longtime No. 2 man at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing that such an attack against Los Angeles would be in prospect if the United States interfered in China's campaign of intimidation against Taiwan.

Although this is not the first time American firms are alleged to have supplied foreign governments with militarily relevant equipment and know-how that could wind up being used to harm the United States, its citizens or interests, it is a particularly egregious example of the syndrome.

According to the New York Times, the two American concerns were called in to help the Chinese determine why their Long March space-launch vehicle blew up in February 1996, destroying a $200 million satellite built by Loral that it was supposed to place on-orbit. The article states that `Those exchanges, officials believe, may have gone beyond the sharing of information that the companies had been permitted, giving the Chinese crucial assistance in improving the guidance systems of their rockets. The technology needed to put a commercial satellite in orbit is similar to that which guides a long-range nuclear missile to its target.'

In fact, the military significance of this technology transfer was of sufficient gravity that a criminal investigation was opened and a grand jury empaneled to consider indictments in the matter. Before formal charges were filed, however, `the criminal inquiry was dealt a serious blow two months ago when President Clinton quietly authorized the export to China of similar technology by one of the companies under investigation'--namely, Loral.

The chilling effect Mr. Clinton's action would have was clearly
understood at the time it was taken. In the words of the New York times: `The decision was opposed by Justice Department officials, who argued that it would be much more difficult to prosecute the companies if the government gave its blessing to the deal.' In fact, as a practical matter, it will probably be impossible to prosecute the case against Loral and Hughes.

This is a scandal on three levels.

First, the Clinton administration's indifference to the arming of communist China is simply stupefying. Even the most pollyannish of experts in the field recognize that there is a chance that the massive modernization program upon which the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has embarked may produce a `peer competitor' to the United States in the next century. More realistic observers judge the PLA's doctrine and procurement programs as dispositive evidence of a determined effort to attain such a status.

The Clinton team has nonetheless approved among other technology transfers to China: The sale of machine tools used to manufacture advanced military aircraft; jet engines suitable for use in fighter aircraft and cruise missiles; sophisticated telecommunications equipment; and 46 supercomputers that have wound up in the Chinese military-industrial complex, including its nuclear weapons program. Now, the administration has endorsed the sale of equipment and know-how that will assist Beijing in delivering its nuclear arms to American targets. This is all the more appalling given Clinton-Gore's determination to deny the American people near-term, effective defenses against ballistic missile attack.

Second, even if the Chinese space-launch program were not an inherently dual-use affair (that is, a program that has both military and civilian dimensions, with technology flows between the two unavoidable), the administration's policy of abetting China's space activities
would still be contrary to long-term U.S. interests.

To be sure, some U.S. companies (notably, Loral and Hughes) are anxious to find inexpensive launch services for their satellites. They tend to be delighted with Mr. Clinton's easing of restraints on American use of massively subsidized space-launch operations in China and Russia, operations trying to buy into and ultimately to dominate the commercial launch market. In helping its friends in Beijing and the Kremlin to undercut an already-struggling U.S. space launch industry, however, the Clinton administration is further jeopardizing the United States' ability to assure its access to space. This is a critical national security, as well as commercial capability.

Regrettably, Mr. Clinton does little more than pay lip service to the need for this and other means necessary for the United States to exercise the dominance of outer space necessitated by both military and private sector requirements. Instead, he compounds the damage done by his line-item vetoes last fall of critical U.S. space control technologies with initiatives that reward Russia and China with dual-use missile technology for merely reaffirming their commitment to non-proliferation--even as they continue to engage in it. In fact, it is a safe bet, that at least some of the missile technology sold to China by Loral and others will wind up in the weapons fielded by enemies of Israel and other American friends.

Finally, it must be asked: Could the fact that Loral's CEO Bernard Schwartz, was the largest personal contributor to the Democratic National Committee last year have anything to do with the president's decision effectively to vitiate legal proceedings against his company? Or was this simply yet another instance in which a federal case involving Chinese interests was sabotaged by members of the Clinton team? (in 1996, someone--probably at the State Department--blew a sting operation as it was about to net a PRC `princeling' implicated in running thousands of AK-47s to U.S. agents who were posing as purchasers for drug lords and street gangs.)

Any way you slice it, the administration's handling of the China account is a scandal. Will it be held accountable for the damage it is thus doing to the nation's security, to long-term U.S. commercial interests and, perhaps ultimately, even to the physical safety of individual Americans?


Date of transfer or report Reported transfer by China Possible violation Administration's response
Nov. 1992 M-11 missiles or related equipment to Pakistan (The Administration did no officially confirm reports that M-11 missiles are in Pakistan.) MTCR: Arms Export Control Act, Export Administration Act Sanctions imposed on Aug. 24, 1993, for transfers of M-11 related equipment (not missiles); waived on Nov. 1, 1994.
Mid-1994 to mid-1995 Dozens or hundreds of missile guidance systems and computerized machine tools to Iran MTCR: Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act, Arms Export Control Act, Export Administration Act No sanctions.
2nd quarter of 1995 Parts for the M-11 missile to Pakistan MTCR: Arms Export Control Act, Export Administration Act No sanctions.
Dec. 1994 to mid-1995 5,000 ring magnets for an unsafeguarded nuclear enrichment program in Pakistan NPT: Export-Import Bank Act, Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act, Arms Export Control Act Considered sanctions under the Export-Import Bank Act; but announced on May 10, 1996, that no sanctions would be imposed.
July 1995 More than 30 M-11 missiles stored in crates at Sargodha Air Force Base in Pakistan MTCR: Arms Export Control Act, Export Administration No sanctions.
Sept. 1995 Calutron (electromagnetic isotope separation system) for uranium enrichment to Iran) NPT: Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act, Export-Import Bank Act, Arms Export Control Act No sanctions.
1995-1997 C-802 anti-ship cruise missiles and C-801 air-launched cruise missiles to Iran Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act No sanctions.
Before Feb. 1996 Dual-use chemical precursors and equipment to Iran's chemical weapon program Arms Export Control Act, Export Administration Act Sanctions imposed on May 21, 1997.
Summer 1996 400 tons of chemicals to Iran Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act, 1 Arms Export Control Act, Export Administration Act No sanctions.
Aug. 1996 Plant to manufacture M-11 missiles or missile components in Pakistan MTCR: Arms Export Control Act, Export Administration Act No sanctions.
Aug. 1996 Gyroscopes, accelerometers, and test equipment for missile guidance to Iran MTCR: Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act, Arms Export Control Act, Export Administration Act No sanctions.
Sept. 1996 Special industrial furnace and high-tech diagnostic equipment to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities in Pakistan NPT: Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act, Export-Import Bank Act, Arms Export Control Act No. sanctions.
July-Dec. 1996 Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) reported `tremendous variety' of technology and assistance for Pakistan's ballistic missile program MTCR: Arms Export Control Act, Export Administration Act No sanctions.
July-Dec. 1996 DCI reported `tremendous variety' of assistance for Iran's ballistic missile program MTCR: Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act, Arms Export Control Act, Export Administration Act No sanctions.
July-Dec. 1996 DCI reported principal supplies of nuclear equipment, material, and technology for Pakistan's nuclear weapon program NPT: Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act, Export-Import Bank Act, Arms Export Administration Act No sanctions.
July-Dec. 1996 DCI reported key supplies of technology for large nuclear projects in Iran NPT: Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act, Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act, Export-Import Bank Act, Arms Export Administration Act No sanctions.
July-Dec. 1996 DCI reported `considerable' chemical weapon-related transfers of production equipment and technology to Iran Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act, Arms Export Control Act, Export Administration Act No sanctions.
Jan. 1997 Dual-use biological items to Iran BWC: Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act, Arms Export Control Act, Export Administration Act No sanctions.
1997 Chemical precursors, production equipment, and production technology for Iran's chemical weapon program, including a plant for making glass-lined equipment Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act, Arms Export Control Act, Export Administration Act No sanctions.
Sept. to Dec. 1997 China Great Wall Industry Corp. provided telemetry equipment used in flight-tests to Iran for its development of the Shahab-3 and Shahab-4 medium range ballistic missiles MTCR: Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act, Arms Export Control Act, Export Administration Act No sanctions.
Nov. 1997/April 1998 May have transferred technology for Pakistan's Ghauri medium-range ballistic missile that was flight-tested on April 6, 1998 MTCR: Arms Export Control Act, Export Administration Act No sanctions.

[Footnote] 1 Additional provisions on chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons were not enacted until February 10, 1996.
[Footnote] BWC: Biological Weapons Convention.
[Footnote] MTCR: Missile Technology Control Regime.
[Footnote] NPT: Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.


Date of transfer or report Reported Russian transfers that may have violated a regime or law Possibly applicable treaties, regimes, and/or U.S. laws Administration's response
Early 1990s Russians sold drawings of a sarin plant, manufacturing procedures, and toxic agents to a Japanese terrorist group AECA sec. 81, EAA sec. 11C No publicly known sanction.
1991 Transferred to China three RD-120 rocket engines and electronic equipment to improve accuracy of ballistic missiles MTCR: AECA sec. 73, EAA sec. 11B No publicly known sanction.
1991-1995 Transferred Cryogenic liquid oxygen/hydrogen rocket engines and technology to India MTCR: AECA sec. 73 EAA sec. 11B Sanctions against Russia and India under AECA and EAA imposed on May 6, 1992; expired after 2 years.
1992-1995 Russian transfers to Brazil of carbon-fiber technology for rocket motor cases for space launch program MTCR: AECA sec. 73, EAA sec. 11B Sanctions reportedly secretly imposed and waived.
1992-1996 Russian armed forces delivered 24 Scud-B missiles and 8 launchers to Armenia MTCR: AECA sec. 73, EAA sec. 11B No publicly known sanction.
June 1993 Additional Russian enterprises involved in missile technology transfer to India MTCR: AECA sec. 73, EAA sec. 11B Sanctions imposed on June 16, 1993 and waived until July 15, 1993; no publicly known follow-up sanction.
1995-present Construction of 1,000 megawatt nuclear reactor at Bushehr in Iran IIANPA sec. 1604 and 1605, FOAA, NPPA sec. 821, FAA sec. 620G Refused to renew some civilian nuclear cooperation agreements; waived sanctions on aid.
Aug. 1995 Russian assistance to Iran to develop biological weapons BWC, AECA sec. 81, EAA sec. 11C, IIANPA sec. 1604 and 1605, FAA sec. 620G and 620H No publicly known sanction.
Nov. 1995 Russian citizen transferred to unnamed country technology for making chemical weapons AECA sec. 81, EAA sec. 11C Sanctions imposed on Nov. 17, 1995.
Dec. 1995 Russian gyroscopes from submarine launched ballistic missiles smuggled to Iraq through middlemen United Nations Sanctions, MTCR, AECA sec. 73, EAA sec. 11B, IIANPA sec. 1604 and 1605, FAA sec. 620G and 620H No publicly known sanction.
July-Dec. 1996 DCI reported Russia transferred to Iran `a varity' of items related to ballistic missiles MTCR AECA sec. 73, EAA sec. 11B, FAA sec. 620G and 620H, IIANPA sec. 1604 and 1605, FOAA No publicly known sanction.
Nov. 1996 Israel reported Russian assistance to Syria to build a chemical weapon plant AECA sec. 81, EAA sec. 11C, FAA sec. 620G and 620H No publicly known sanction.
1996-1997 Delivered 3 Kilo diesel-electric submarines to Iran IIANPA sec. 1604 and 1605, FAA sec. 620G and 620H No publicly known sanction.
Jan.-Feb. 1997 Russia transferred detailed instructions to Iran on production of the SS-4 medium-range missile and related parts MTCR: AECA sec. 73, EAA sec. 11B, IIANPA sec. 1604 and 1605, FOAA No publicly known sanction.
April 1997 Sale of S-300 anti-aircraft/anti-missile missile system to Iran to protect nuclear reactors at Bushehr and other strategic sites IIANPA sec. 1604 and 1605 FAA sec. 620G and 620H No publicly known sanction.
Oct. 1997 Israeli intelligence reported Russian technology transfers for Iranian missiles developed with ranges between 1,300 and 10,000 km. Transfers include engines and guidance systems MTCR: AECA sec. 73, EAA sec. 11B, IIANPA sec. 1604 and 1605, FAA sec. 620G and 620H FOAA No publicly known sanction.

[Footnote] Regimes: BWC: Biological Weapons Convention. MTCR: Missile Technology Control Regime.
[Footnote] U.S. Laws:
AECA: Arms Export Control Act.
EAA: Export Administration Act.
FAA: Foreign Assistance Act.
FOAA: Foreign Operations Appropriations Act,
IIANPA: Iran-Iraq Arms Non--Proliferation Act.
NPPA: Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act.

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